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J. G. (Jabez Gridley) Sutherland.

A treatise on the law of damages : embracing an elementary exposition of the law, and also its application to particular subjects of contract and tort (Volume 1) online

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resulted) ; Louisville Home Tel. Co.



V. Gasper, 123 Ky. 128, 9 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 548; Sydnor v. Arnold, 122
Ky. 557; Lee v. Powell, 126 La. 51;
O'Brien v. White, 105 Me. 308;
Lockwood V. Boston E. R. Co., 200
Mass. 537, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 488;
Hollidge V. Duncan, 199 Mass. 121,
17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 982; Cunningham
V. Atlas T. Co., 187 Mass. 51; Fott-
ler V. Moseley, 185 Mass. 563; Skinn
V. Reutter, 135 Mich. 57, 15 Am.
Neg. Rep. 86, 106 Am. St. 384, 63
L.R.A. 743; Anderson v. Smith, 104
Minn. 40 ; Obermeyer v. Logeman C.
Mfg. Co., 229 Mo. 97; Smith v. For-
dyce, 190 Mo. 1; O'Hara v. Laclede
G, L. Co., 131 Mo. App. 428; Estes
V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 110 id. 725;
Knaish v. Joline, 138 App. Div. (N.
Y.) 854; Atchison, etc. R. Co. v.
Seeger (Tex. Civ. App.), 126 S. W.
1170; French P. & O. Co. v. Phelps,
47 Tex. Civ. App. 385; Sipes v.
Puget Sound E. R., 54 Wash. 47;
Wooding V. Jacobino, id. 504; Akin
v. Bradley E. & M. Co., 48 Wash.
97, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) .586; United
States N. G. Co. v. Hicks, 134 Ky.
12, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 249, 135 Am.
St. 407; Freeman v. Missouri & K.
Tel. Co., 160 Mo. App. 271; Webber
V. Barry, 66 Mich. 127, 11 Am. St.
466; Sumner v. Kinney (Tex. Civ.
App.), 136 S. W. 1192 (effects of
medical treatment upon person in-
jured) ; Burrows v. March, etc. G.
Co., L. R. 5 Ex. 67; Lannen v. Al-
bany G. Co., 44 N. Y. 459; Guille



40]



COMPENSATION.



153



example." The defendant threw a squib into the market-house
where it first fell; a person, to save himself, threw it off, and
where it then fell it was again thrown for like reason and struck
and injured the plaintiff. The defendant's act so directly caused
the injury that trespass would lie. A defendant stopped his
team and negligently left it in a business street without being
hitched or otherwise secured. "It started and ran violently along
the street and collided with another team, which, though proper-
ly hitched, was frightened, broke from its fastenings and ran
across the street against a horse and sleigh belonging to the
plaintiff, injuring the horse. It appeared that while the de-



V. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 10 Am.
Dec 234; Scholes v. North London
R. Co., 21- L. T. (N. S.) 835; Pas-
tene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87; Vanden-
burgh V. Truax, 4 Denio 464, 47
Am. Dec. 268; Lowery v. Manhat-
tan R. Co., 99 N. Y. 158, 52 Am.
Rep. 12, 12 Daly 431; Lewis v.
Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 52 Am. St. 146,
31 L.R.A. 220; Grimes v. Bower-
man, 92 Mich. 258, quoting the text;
Chicago City R. Co! v. Cooney, 95
111. App. 471; Postal Tel. C. Co. v.
Zopfi, 93 Tenn. 369, Choctaw, etc.
R. Co. V. Halloway, 114 Fed. 458,
15 Am. Neg. Rep. 230, 52 C. C. A.
260, and cases cited; Coleman v.
Bennett, 141 Tenn. 70,5; Lothian v.
Rickards, 12 Aust. Com. L. R. 165;
Reid V. Friendly Societies' H. Co.,
NewZeal. L. R. 3C. A. 238; South-
western Tel. & T. Co. V. Shirley
(Tex. Civ. App.),5N. C. C. A. 784,
155 S. W. 663; Goldsmith v. Chi-
cago, etc. R. Co., 176 111. App. 336;
Atkeson v. Jackson Est., 72 (Wash.)
233, 5 N. C. C. A. 519, 130 Pac.
102; Campbell v. United R. Co., 243
Mo. 141; Thoreson v. St. Paul T. &
L. Co., 73 Wasli. 99; Louisville &
N. R. Co. V. Woodford, 152 Ky. 398.
Tlie connection between the sale
of unlabeled poison and the death of
a child who takes it is not broken



because its mother left the poison
within the infant's reach, slie not
knowing it to be poison, nor by the
infant's act in taking it. Wise v.
Morgan, 101 Tenn. 273, 44 L.R.A.
548.

In Slieridan v. Brooklyn & N. R.
Co., 36 N. Y. 39, 9 Am. Neg. Cas.
619, 93 Am. Dec. 490, a child was
on the platform of a car by direc-
tion of the conductor. By the rush-
ing of another passenger for the pur-
pose of getting off the car the child
was pushed therefrom. Such con-
duct was not a justification to the
defendant for its negligence in plac-
ing the child on the platform.

In Macer v. Third Ave. R. Co., 47
N. Y. Super. 461, 5 Am. Neg. Cas.
731, the plaintiff's injuries were
increased by an effort made by the
defendant's servant to prevent them.
The original negligence was the
proximate cause.

A workman who is injurid by a
defective instrument used by a fel-
low-workman lias a cause of action
against the master. Uyan v. Milb'r,
12 Daly 177.

57 Scott v. Shepherd. 2 W. Bl. 892.
7 Am. Neg. Rep. 582; Owen v. Cook.
9 N. D. 1.34. 47 L.R.A. 046: Bradley
v Andrews, 51 Vt. 530: I^e Struve
V Mc(iuire, 25 Ont. L. R. 87, 401.



154 SUTHERLAND ON DAMAGES. [§40

fendant's horses were running and before they had collided
with the other horses a crowd of persons came into the street,
hallooed and raised their hats for the purpose of stopping the
horses, which caused them to swerve from the course they were
taking, and in this manner they came in contact with the second
team. The law was said to be well settled that when the plaintiff
lias l)een injured in his person or 'property by the wrongful act
or omission of the defendant or through his culpable negligence
the fact that a third party by his wrong or negligence con-
tributed to the injury does not relieve him from liability. Re-
ferring to the facts, it was observed : "The running away, from
the starting of the defendant's team till the collision, was a
single transaction ; and whatever influence the interposition of
the crowd had in occasioning the collision, it was not the sole
cause ; the running away, which occurred through the defend-
ant's negligence, was, in part at least, the occasion of it ; both
causes, therefore, in the most favorable view for the defendant,
must have contributed to it ; and as the defendant is responsible
through his negligence for one of the agencies through which
the collision occurred, under the rule we have stated, he is
liable," Again : "All the consequences which actually resulted
in this case from the running away of the defendant's team
might, we think, reasonably have been expected to occur from
the running away of any team under similar circumstances in
the principal business street of a town ; and the running away
of the defendant's team was the efficient cause of the injury to
the plaintiff's horse because it put in operation the force which
was the immediate and direct cause of the injury." ®* In
another case a team of horses, attached to a truck and unattended
in a street, were stopped, after going a few yards, by a stranger,
who, in trying to drive them to where they had been left, drove
the truck against a push cart standing in the street, overturned
the cart and injured the plaintiff'. The negligence of the person
wlio had charge of the horses was the proximate cause of the

58 Griggs V. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 230; McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Al.

81, 1 Am. Nog. Cas. 311, 100 Am. len 292; McCahill v. Kipp, 2 E. D.

Dec. 199; Billman v. Indianapolis, Smith 413; Pearl v. Macauley, 6

etc, R. Co., 7G Ind. TOR, 40 Am. Eop. App. Div. (N. Y.) 70.



§ m



COMPENSATION. ^^^*



injury. They should not have been left in the nii.i.lK' o( the ear-
riage way obstructing travel, besides subjecting other trav-
elers to danger. The condition which authorized tiie bystander
to stop the horses also authorized him to drive theui to a positi.ui
where they would cease to be an obstruction au<l a menace to
travel. A danger to be fairly anticipated from leaving horses
unattended in a public street is that, if they start to run off, the
persons who attempt to stop them may be careless or ignorant
of the management of horses and thus jeopardize the .afety of
people on the highway. In such cases so leaving the horses is
the proximate cause of the accident.^^

x\n assessor altered an assessment after it had been perlected
■uid lodged with another officer and after his power over it had
ceased- he altered it in such a manner that the property of the
plaintiff was rated at a higher sum. The selectmen made out
a rate-bill by which the plaintiif was charged with an increased
amount and procured a tax warrant which they placed in the
hands of the collector. The plaintiif refusing to pay the i legal
portion of the tax, the selectmen, with knowledge ot all the
facts, directed the collector to levy and collect it. The levy
was made, the plaintiff paid the tax and afterwards brought an
action on the case against the assessor for the injury. Ihe jury
were rightly instructed that the action of the selectmen in
directing the levy, although it might make them liable would
not affect the right of the plaintiff to recover against the defend-
ant for the wrongful alteration and he was entitled to recover
for the injury resulting from the levy.- An officer who makes
a false return of non est to a summons is not relieved from
liability because an order for service by publication intervened
between his act and a judgment by defaidt. ^^'^ - ;;;;;
the natural result of such return, and the further action of the
ourt wa. the legitimate consequence of it." It is neg hgence
to leave a railroad turntable in such condition that it may be
revolved by children,^^ and the negligence continues so as to
5S Williams V. Koehler, 41 App. e^ Stat. v. Finn, S7 Mo. 310.

Div. (N. Y.) 426. 62Kuons v. St. Ixm.s. etc. R. Co.,

60 Bristol Mfg. Co. V. Gridley, 28 l^"0"9

Conn. 201, 27 id. 221, 71 Am. Dec. ^^ ^^^ ^^^^
56.



156 SUTHERLAND ON DAMAGES. [§40

render the owner liable for an injury caused to a child by the
revolving of the table by other children.^^ A person who has
the management and control of a public place of amusement
to which he invites the public, on payment of an admission fee,
to attend and at which he sells to his customers intoxicating liq-
uors, who sells to one in attendance there liquor in such quantity
as to make him drunk and disorderly, well knowing that when
in that condition he is likely to commit assaults upon others
without provocation or cause, is bound to exercise reasonable
care to protect his other patrons from the assaults and insults
of such person, and for a failure to so do is liable to a person
assaulted by him.^* It is a probable consequence of an arrest that
the fact may be published in a newspaper, and that the plain-
tiff may show in an action for false imprisonment.^^

§ 41. Same subject. The subject under consideration is well
illustrated by those cases in which a party has suffered a special
injury at the hands of third persons in consequence of the
speaking of slanderous words. Where the injurious act of the
third person is shown with the requisite certainty to have been
the consequence of the defendant's speaking such words the
action has been sustained.^^ In case for slanderous words by
reason of which the plaintiff was turned out of her lodgings
and employment it appeared that the defendant complained to
E., the mistress of the house and his tenant, that her lodgers,
of whom the plaintiff was one, behaved improperly at the
windows ; and he added that no moral person would like to have
such people in his house. E. stated in her evidence that she
dismissed the plaintiff' in consequence of the words, not because
she believed them, but because she was afraid it would offend her

63 Nagel V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 65 Grimes v. Greenblatt, 47 Colo.

75 Mo. 653; Boggs v. Same, 18 Mo. 495.

App. 274 ; Morrison v. Kansas City, 66 Sunley v. Metropolitan L. Ins.

etc. R. Co., 27 id, 438; Gulf, etc. Co., 132 Iowa 123 ; Fuller v. Fenner,

R. Co. V. McWhirter, 77 Tex. 356, -^q g^rb. 333; Hallock v. Miller, 2

19 Am. St. 755, 12 Am. Neg. Cas. ^^^^,^ gg^. ^^^^^^ ^. g^j^^^.^ g ^ow.



351; Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211;



623.

64 Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, 83
Minn. 40, 53 L.R.A. 803; Romnel Bateman v. Lyall, 7 C. B. (N. S.)
V. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579; Moone 638; Williams v. Hill, 19 Wend.
V. Smith, 6 Ga. App. 649. 305.



41]



COMPENSATION. l^T



landlord if the plaintitt' remained. The action was held main-
tainable, the special damages, which were its gist, being the
consequence of the slanderous words used. The witness' state-
ment that she did not dismiss the plaintilf because she believed
the words spoken was not allowed to defeat the action. Lord
Denman, C. J., said: "It would be speculating too hnely on
motives, and such a disposition in the court would too often put
it in the power of the unwilling witness to determine a cause
against the plaintiff. The proper question is whether the injury
was sustained in consequence of the slanderous words having
been used by the defendant." '' But the injury must be the
natural and proximate consequence. Damage caused by the
repetition of the words by a third person who heard them uttered
by the defendant is too remote,^^ unless the latter authorized or
suggested their repetition, or there was some duty on the hearer
to repeat them.'" Such a spontaneous and unauthorized com-
munication, it is said, cannot be considered as the necessary
consequence of the original uttering of the words.

If the injury inilicted is not the reasonable and natural result
of a wrongful act of the defendant, but was caused by such
act of a third person, though it was remotely induced by defend-
ant's conduct, he is not liable.^^ Thus, in an action by one

67 Knight V. GibbB, 1 Ad. & E. 43. v. Harrison 1 Esp. 48 ; I'il" - -

68 Ward V. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211 ; Hood, 5 Bmg. N. C. 97; AUsop
Sch Jdt V. Mitchell, 84 111. 195, 25 v. Allsop, 5 ^-^N 534 ; Bentley .
, ' ..f. Reynolds, 1 McMuU. 16, 30 Am.
'".r^Lfv. KeUy, Ry. . Moo. Def 251 . UndCiU v. Welto,.. ..
157 ■ Parkes v. Prescott, L. K. 4 Ex. Vt. 40 ; ch. 24.

: ^"ndillon V. Maltby, Oar. ^ "Ward v. Weeks ,B,ng. ^U.

TT ji ic T T Ipnn nffs V Davis, 18/ i-'ca. i^o,

M 402- Derrv v. Handley, 16 L. i. Jennings v. ^a, '

m. 4UZ,, xjKi^iy J' ri (V ^ mo r r, \ 451; Beckham v. Sea-

(N. S.) 263; Schoeptlm v. Coffey, 109 C. C. A. '^^^'

162 N Y. 12, and cases cited; Hast- board A. I. R. 127 Ga. ooO 1.

Lgs ;. Stet;on, 126 Mass. 329, 30 L-RA.(N S.) 476; Se^th v. Com^

Am Rep 683; Elmer v. Fessenden, monwealth E. ^o-, -41 in. -o ,

T^^mZ" 359 5 LR ^- 724; Haehl L.R.A.(N.S.) 978, 132 Am. St. 204

151 Mass 359 5 L.K^A^7 ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ Prze/dxianski.

'■ JiT Cole :' Gevman?\, L. 170 Ind. 1, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 972. ,27

Soc 24 Fel 113 59 C. C. A. 593, Am. St. 352; Claypool v. VMgniou.,

6?! R a' 410 See Riding v. 34 Ind. App. 35; St«Phenson v.

f -l' f'FxDiv 91- Kelly V. Part- Corder, 71 Kan. 475, 114 Am. St.

Smith, 1 Ex. 'I'^f'f^!^^^^.^ ^ 500, 66 L.R.A. 246; Logan v. Cin-

mgton, 5 B. & Ad. b4t) , moriia . .• + i? Pn 130 Kv 202;

Langdale, 2 B. & P. 284; Ashley ciiinati, etc. R. Co., 139 Kv.



158 SUTJIEIJLAND ON DAMAGES. [§ 41

engaged in the business of butchering for selling diseased sheep
as sound and healthy it appeared that the plaintiff had engaged
one G. to take some of the mutton which might be on hand and
sell it; but in consequence of a report that the plaintiff had
purchased the defendant's diseased sheep G. refused to perform
his contract. The defendant was not liable for G.'s refusal,
nor for damages suffered by the plaintiff in consequence of his
customers refusing to deal with him by reason of that reportJ^
In an action against several persons, some of whom had sold
the plaintiff's husband liquors on the day of his death and others
of whom had done so previously, and were charged with having
caused him to become an habitual drunkard, death was held to
be the result of the sales last made and the fact that the liquor
last obtained was drank because he was an habitual drunkard
did not make those who had antecedently sold him liquor jointly
liable with the other defendants, because the latter's intervening
acts were independent and the proximate cause of the wrong. '^
This principle does not apply where the intervening act of a
third person is not direct, wilful or criminal, as where a person
who is intoxicated is run over by a train while lying on a track
situated between his home and the place where he procured the
liquor which produced that condition.'* If there intervenes

Bellino v. Columbus C. Co., 188 Mass. habitual drunkard of the plaintiff's

430 ; McVay V. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., husband. Earp v. Lilly, 217 111.

113 App. Div. (N. Y.) 724; Fanizzi 582.

V. New York, etc. R. Co., id. 440; 74 Schroeder v. Crawford, 94 111.

Penny v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 153 357: Emory v. Addis, 71 111. 273;

N. C 296, 32 L.R.A.fN.S.) 1209; Currier v. McKee, 99 Me. 364 (in-

Baker v. Thompson, 228 Pa. 543; toxicated person injured in self-de-

Marsh v. Giles, 211 Pa. 17; Chi- fgnse by person whom he assaulted

cago, etc. R. Co. v. Jackson, 40 Tex. „.i,j,e intoxicated).

Civ. App. 273. See Adler v. Pruitt, ,j-^^^ Indiana court announced a

169 Ala. 213, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 889; , , ^. ^.^ 4- ^t *■ a ■ 4\ „

' ^ ' rule contrary to that stated m the

_„ ^ ■ . „ . „.,, ^ ,, text in Krach v. Heilman, 53 Ind.



517; Collier v. Early, 54 Ind. 559.
But these cases are much restricted



72 Grain v. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522, 41
Am. Dee. 765; Butler v. Kent, 19
Johns. 223, 10 Am. Dec. 219.

73Tetzner v. Naughton, 12 111. '^^' '^""^"P ''■ Wagner, 85 Ind. 529,
App. 148. See Shugart v. Egan. S3 44 Am. Rep. 42, and are in effect
J]] 5(3 overruled by Terre Haute & I. R. Co.

The rule is otherwise if the wrong v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 355, 3 Am.
"omplained of is the making of an Neg. Gas. 48, 49 Am. Rep. 168.



§ 42]



COMPENSATION. 1 ^^^



between the defendant's act or omission a wilful, nialicions and
criminal act committed by a third person, which act defendant
had no reason to apprehend, the connection botwoon the original
wrong and the result is broken.''^

§ 42. Same subject. Where the immediate cause of the in-
jury is the wrongful act of a third person the injured party
has, of course, an action against him; and this, in some early
cases, was thought to bar an action against any antecedent actor
more remotely responsible; but it now seems to l)e settled that
the liability of the more immediate i)arty does not relieve any
other party whose act can properly be treated as the efficient
and proximate or concurrent cause. A vendor of property, who
had been paid for it, was induced by the defendant's false and
malicious representation that he had a lien on it and was en-
titled to control its custody, to refuse to deliver it, whereby
the purchaser suffered injury; he was entitled to his action
although he had a remedy on his contract against the vendor.
Ivnowhigly making a false claim of lien was the gravamen of
the action and the special damage alleged, namely, the non-
delivery of the property, was sufficiently connected with the
wrongful act to support the action.'^ In one case it appeared
that the defendant, being about to sell a public house, falsely
represented to 11, who had agreed to purchase it, that the re-
ceipts were £180 a month; V>. having, to the knowledge of the
defendant, communicated this representation to the plaintift",
who became the purchaser instead of B., an action was main-
tainable for the circuitous deceit practiced.''^

A stage-coach by the negligence of the driver was precipitated
into a dry canal; the lock-keeper thereafter negligently (.pcnod

75 Soutliwestern P. C. Co. v. Reitz- This was .Ion.- without tlw knowi-

er (Tex. Civ. App.), 135 S. W. 237; edge of \V.

Shugart v. Egan, 83 111. 56; Mars veCrccn v. r.iitton. 2 Cv. M. & U.

V. Delaware & H. C. Co., 54 Hun 707.

625; Roach v. Kelly, 104 Pa. 24, 77 pilmorc v. Hood. •"> P.ing. \. C

75 Am. St. 685, stated in § 16; ,^_ ^^^ La„g,idg,. v. Levy. 2 M.

White V Conly, 14 Lea 51 In the ^ ^^. .^^^ ^ _^^ ^. , .,„„,.i,ij,^._ 4 i,i.

last case W. and C quarreled and / j ;,.,,^,;,, ^. „,„„.. s C. IV

fought: during the fight W.'s son ■^■^' ■ ^"^'

stabbed C. and caused his death. (N- S.) 6;,.,: § 11.0.



160 SUTHERLAND ON DAMAGES. [§ 42

the gates of the canal and a passenger was drowned therein.
Under Lord Campbell's act '* the Irish court of qneen's bench
held that the death of the passenger was "caused" by the negli-
gence of the driver. O'Brien, J., said : "The precipitation of the
omnibus into the lock was certainly one cause of her death, inas-
much as she would not have drowned but for such precipitation.
It is true that the subsequent letting of the water into the lock
was the other and more proximate cause of her death, and that
she would not have lost her life but for such subsequent act,
which was not the necessary consequence of the previous pre-
cipitation by the negligence of the defendant's servant. But in
my opinion the defendant is not relieved from liability for his
primary neglect by showing that but for such subsequent act the
death would not have ensued." '^ A railroad company placed
a push-car in the hands of a foreman to be used for specific pur-
poses ; he loaned it for another purpose, and while the borrower
was using it the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of
the borrower. The company was liable though such injury
occurred at a time when there was no relation between it and the
man who ran the car.^° A railroad company must answer for
an injury to a passenger caused by an obstacle left on its depot
platform by its licensee. ^^

Cases may be stated where the wrongful conduct of one person
affords the opportunity or occasion for the illegal acts of another
or for an injury from other causes; as where a street-car driver
permits boys to ride on the platform without paying fare and
on their being ordered to get off one of them pushes another,
who is injured. In such cases the injury is too remote,^^ unless

78 9 and 10 Vict., ch. 93. 81 Irwin v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,

79 Byrne v. Wilson, 15 Irish C. L. 81 Kan. 649, 26 L.R.A.(]Sr.S.) 739.
(N.S.) 332-342; Eaton v. Boston, 82 Lott v. New Orleans, etc. R.
etc. R. Co., 11 Allen 500, 87 Am. Co., 37 La. Ann. 337, 55 Am. Rep.
Dec. 730; Spooner v. Brooklyn City 500; Cuff v. Newark, etc. R. Co.,
R. Co., r,i N. Y. 230, 13 Am. Rep. 16 Am. Neg. Cas. 668, 35 N. J. L.
570, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 587; Noe v. .30, 10 Am. Rep. 205; Scholes v.
Rapid R. Co., 133 Mich. 152. North London R. Co., 21 L. T. (N.

80 Erie R. Co. v. Salisbury, 66 N. S.) 835; Marks v. Rochester R. Co.,
J. L. 233, 55 L.R.A. 578, 10 Am. 41 App. Div. 66. See McGhoe v.
Neg. Rep. 584. The court divided, Norfolk & S. R. Co., 147 N. C. 142,
6 to 5. 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 119.



42]



COMPENSATION.



161



it was such as would probably result ; and the same rule applies
where inaction offers an opportunity for injury. The neglect
of duty by bailees and agents renders them liable for losses
resulting, in co-operation with such neglect by the torts of
third persons.*^ The cases collected in the note following will
give the reader an insight into various branches of the subject
of consequential damages.^*



83 Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me.
1G3; Mason v. Tliumpson, 9 Pick.
280, 20 Am. Dec. 471; Shaw v.
Berry, 31 Me. 478, 52 Am. Dec. G28 ;
Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N, H. 553, 66
Am. Dec. 745; Sasseen v. Clark, 37
Ga. 242; Clute v. Wiggins, 14 Johns.
175; McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt.
316.

84 Quinette v. Bisso, 5 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 303, 136 Fed. 825, 69 C. C.
A. 503; Smith v. Maginnis, 75 Ark.
472; Florida East Coast R. Co. v.
Wade, 53 Fla. 620; Chicago & E. R.
Co. V. Dinius, 170 Ind. 222; Dobyns
V. Yazoo, etc. R. Co., 119 La. 72;
King V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 13
Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 201; Campbell
V. Railway T. Co., 95 Minn. 375;
Luehrmann v. Laclede G. L. Co.,
127 Mo. App. 213; Adams v. Lan-
cashire, etc. R. Co., L. R. 4 C. P.
739; Smith v. Dobson, 3 M. & Gr.
59; Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Ex. 240;
Greenland v. Chaplin, id. 243;
Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 392; Col-
lins V. Middle L. Com'rs, L. R. 4
C. P. 279; Harrison v. Great North-
ern R. Co., 3 H. & C. 231; Butter-
field V. Forrester, 11 East 60;
Martin v. Great Northern R. Co.,
16 C. B. 179; General Steam Nav.
Co. V. Mann, 14 C. B. 127; Holden
V. Liverpool G. Co., 3 C. B. 1 ; Cot-
ton V. Wood, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 568;
Flower v. Adam, 2 Taunt. 314;
Ellis V. London, etc. R. Co., 2 H.

6 N. 424; Singleton v. Williamson,

7 H. & N. 410; Skelton v. London,
etc. R. Cfo., L. R. 2 C. P. 631;

Suth. Dam. Vol. L— 11.



Tiiompaon v. Nortlieastern H. Co.,
2 15. & S. 106; Bridge v. Grand
Junction R. Co., 3 .M. c'v: \V. 244;
Glover v. London, etc. K. Co., 3
Q. B. 25; The Flying Fish. 34 L. J.
(Adm.) 113; Everard v. Hopkins, 1
Bulst. 332; Hughes v. Quentin, 8 C.
& P. 703; Peacock v. Young, 21 L.
T. (N. S.) 527; Priestley v. Mac-
lean, 2 F. & F. 288; Sneesby v.
Lancashire R. Co., L. R. 9 Q. B.
263; Smith v. Condry, 1 How. 35,



Online LibraryJ. G. (Jabez Gridley) SutherlandA treatise on the law of damages : embracing an elementary exposition of the law, and also its application to particular subjects of contract and tort (Volume 1) → online text (page 19 of 144)