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Ch. 205 ; Owen v. Homan, 4 H. L. Ca. 997.

« Gaston v. Frankum, 2 De G. & Sm. 561 ; 16 Jur. 507 ; Master v.
Fuller, 4 Bro. Ch. 19 ; 1 Ves. Jr. 513.

« Murray v. Barlee, 4 Sim. 82 ; 3 M. & K. 209. But if the business
relates to her husband's affairs, or to her children's, and not to her separate
estate, her mere employment of a solicitor will not create a charge against
her estate. Callow v. Howie, 1 De G. «& Sm. 531 ; Be Pugh, 17 Beav.

' Bowling V. Maguire, LI. & G. t. Plunket, 1 ; but see Chester v. Piatt,
Sugd. V. & P. 173.

8 Syke's Trust, 2 John. & Hem. 415 ; Croft v. Middleton, 2 K. & J.
194 ; 2 Jur. (n. s.) 528.

» Dowling V. Maguire, LI. & G. t. Plunket, 1.

'" Briscoe v. Kennedy, cited 1 Bro. Ch. 17.

§§ 657, 658.] HOW far may create debts. 251

high authority, that every dealing of a married woman in rela-
tion to her separate estate must be in the nature of an appoint-
ment, or a disposition ; and that a married woman cannot
enter into general contracts, and therefore slie cannot hind her
separate estate by general engagements. ^ It is now, however,
well established in England, that a married woman may con-
tract in relation to her separate estate, and that her contracts
are not in the nature of appointments, or sales of her separate
estate.2 If a married woman can charge her separate estate
only by some contract in the nature of an appointment, then a
loritten instrument is necessary to constitute a valid appoint-
ment ; but if the general contracts of a married woman are
valid contracts to be paid out of her separate estate, then there
is no distinction in principle between ivritten and verbal con-
tracts in that respect ; and it is now substantially settled that
the verbal contracts of a married woman are equally binding
upon her separate estate.^ But a parol contract will not bind
a married woman where the statute of frauds requires it to be
in writing;^ nor is the enforcement of the general engagement
of a married woman, out of her separate estate, in the nature
of a proceeding for the specific performance of a contract.^

' Bolton V. Williams, 2 Ves. Jr. 142 ; Whistler v. Newman, 4 Ves. 145;
Greatly v. Noble, 3 Mad. 94 ; Stuart v. Kirkwall, 3 Mad, 389; Aguilar v.
A.uuilar, 5 ]\Iad. 418; Field v. Sowle, 4 Russ. 114; Chester v. Piatt, Sugd.
V. & P. 173 (13th ed.) ; Murray v. Barlee, 4 Sim. 82 ; Digby v. Irving, 6
Ir. Eq. 149.

2 Owen V. Dickenson, 1 Cr. & Phil. 53; Dowling v. Maguire, Plunket,
19; Master v. Fuller, 4 Bro. Ch. 19 ; Stead v. Nelson, 2 Beav. 245 ; Bailey
V. Jackson, C. P. Coop. 495 ; Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Mad. 261 ; Crosby v.
Church, 3 Beav. 489 ; Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Beav. 323.

^ Murray v. Barlee, 3 M. & K. 223; Clinton v. Willes, 1 Sudg. Pow.
208, n. ; Owens v. Dickenson, 1 Cr. & Pliil. 53; Vaughn v. Vanderstegen,
2 Dr. 183 ; Wriglit v. Chard, 4 Dr. 673 ; Newcomen v. Hassard, 1 Ir. Eq.
274 ; Blatchford v. Woolley, 2 Dr. & Sm. 204 ; Shattock v. Shattock,
L. R. 2 Eq. 182.

* Syke's Trust, 2 John. & II. 415.

* In Burke v. Tuite, 10 Ir. Eq. 467, it was held that contracts of a wife
not in writing could not be satisfied out of her real estate, because such


§ 659. But while tlie general engagements of a married
woman are not in the nature of appointments of her separate
estate, yet in making those engagements the married woman
must have a general intention that such contracts shall be
satisfied out of her separate estate, or they cannot be enforced
against either her or her property. Thus the torts of a mar-
ried wonjan cannot be satisfied out of her separate property,
because there can be no intention to create a charge upon
her estate. So where there is no contract that implies such
an intention, there can be no proceeding against her separate
estate. Thus, where an annuity was charged on her separate
estate, and was set aside for non-compliance with some rule
of law, it was held that the purchase-money of the animity
could not be recovered back out of her separate estate, be-
cause it had never been in the contemplation of either party
that the purchase-money should be paid back, and, as there
was no contract, there could have been no intention of charg-
ing her separate estate.^ And where a married woman had
received money, claiming it as her own, it could not be re-
covered back from her separate estate ; for there had never
been an intention of paying it back at all.^ It is difficult to
reconcile all the English authorities. The common-law prin-
ciple is, that a married woman can make no valid or binding
contract. This principle is recognized in equity ; and all the
cases hold that a married woman can make no contract valid
and binding upon herself personally ; consequently that no
judgment or decree can be made against her personally : that
her contracts can be satisfied only out of her property, and

a contract created an interest in land. This would be so if the contract
■was in the nature of an appointment. And see Shattock v. Shattock, L. R.
2 Eq. 192; Johnson v. Gallagher, 2 De G., F. & J. oU.

' Jones V. Harris, 9 Ves. 480 ; Aguilar i'. Aguilar, 5 Mad. 414; Bolton
V. Williams, 4 Bro. Ch. 297; 2 Yes. Jr. 138; Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De
G., F. & J. 593; Shattock i-. Shattock, L. K. 2 Eq. 182; Callow v. Howie,
1 De G. & Sm. 531.

2 Wright V. Chard, 4 Dr. 673.


that they can be satisfied out of her property only when she
contracts upon the faith and credit of her separate property.
The whole position is anomalous, and has been produced by
the conflicting practices of courts of law and courts of equity.
Vice-Chancellor Kindersley considers the law in a ti-ansition
state, and not yet established clearly in all points, and says,
" that the tendency is, having put a married woman in the
position of a single woman in relation to her se{)arate prop-
erty, to carry that position to its fullest extent, short of mak-
ing her personally responsible." ^ Lord Justice Turner stated
the true principles, thus far established, as follows : " In order
to bind her separate estate by a general engagement, it should
appear that the engagement was made with reference to and
upon the faith and credit of that estate ; and the question
whether it was so or not is to be judged of by the court, upon
all the circumstances of the case." ^

§ 660. It is thus established in England, that a wife's gen-
eral contracts may be satisfied out of her separate estate, if
they were entered into with reference to, or upon the faith and
credit of such estate ; and that the contract of a married
woman, being a nullity unless made with reference to her
separate estate, will be presumed by the court, unless some-
thing else appears, to be made in reference to her separate
estate, and therefore binding upon it.^ This rule has been
sanctioned and adopted in the States of Connecticut,^ Maryland,^

1 Wright t'. Chard, 4 Dr. G85.

* Johnson V. Gallagher, 3 De G., F. & J. 515, approved in Leeds Bank-
ing Co. 12 Jur. (n. s.) 984.

8 Ante, §§ 657-659.

■• Inilay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 149. Wells v. Thorman. 37 Conn.
319; Donald v. Plumb, 8 Conn. 447 ; Leavitt v. Beirne, 21 Conn. 1.

5 Chew V. Beall, 13 Md. 348; Cook v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492. The
early cases, Tarr v. Willi:>ms, 4 Md. Ch. 68; Williams v. Donaldson, 4 ]\Id.
Ch. 414; and Ikliller v. Williamson, 6 Md. 219, were the other way; but the
last case, 11 Md. 492, setms to ettablish the English rule. Jackson v. West,
22 Md. 21.


Alabama,^ Kentucky,^ North Carolina,-^ Missouri,* Florida,^
and Georgia.^ In New York, Chancellor Kent held that
a married woman is not to all intents and purposes a single
woman in regard to her separate estate, but only so far as the
instrument of settlement or trust makes lier a single woman ;
and, instead of holding that she has the full power of a single
woman over her separate estate, unless restrained by the in-
strument of trust, the distinguished chancellor held that she
has no power unless it is specially given ; that her incapacity
is the general rule, and the exception is to be strictly shown
in every case." But this doctrine was overruled on appeal ;^
and a modified rule has been acted upon, which concedes the
power of the married woman to contract debts to be satisfied
out of her separate estate, unless restrained by the instrument
of conveyance, but limits her power to a power of contracting

' Ozley V. Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 382 ; Forrest ». Robinson, 4 Porter, 44 ;
Saddler v. Houston, 4 Porter, 208 ; Bradford v. Greenway, 17 Ala. 797 ;
Henry v. Smith, 17 Ala. 797 ; Puryear v. Beard, 14 Ala. 122 ; Puryear v.
Puryear, 16 Ala. 486; Collins i?. Lavenberg, 19 Ala. 682; Sprague v. Tyson,
44 Ala. 338.

* Bell V. Kellar, 13 B. Mon. 381; Lillard v. Turner, 16 B. Mon. 374;
Coleman v. Woolley, 10 B. Mon. 320; Jarmon v. Wilkinson, 7 B. Mon.
293. In Burch v. Breckenridge, 16 B. Mon. 482, it was held that the gen-
eral contract of a married woman could not be enforced against h^r separate
real estate, unless it was in writing. Long v. White, 5 J. J. Marsh. 226.
Now altered by Rev. Stat. c. 47, § 17; Daniel v. Robinson, 18 B. Mon.
301 ; Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 329-385; Stocker v. Whitlock,
3 Met. 244 ; Hanley v. Downing, 4 Met. 95.

3 Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. 311 ; Frazier v. Brownlow, 3 Ired. Eq.
237; Newlin v. Freeman, 4 Ired. Eq. 312.

* Whitesides v. Carman, 23 Mo. 457 ; Segond v. Garland, 23 Mo. 547 ;
Coats V. Rot>inson, 10 Mo. 757; Claflin v. Van Wagoner, 30 Mo. 252.

* Lewis V. Yale, 4 Flor. 418.

« Wylly V. Collins, 9 Ga. 223; Roberts v. West. 15 Ga. 123; Fears v.
Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Weeks v. Sego, 9 Ga. 201.

' Methodist Church v. Jaques. 3 John. Ch. 78.

8 Ibid.; 17 John. 548-585; Dyett v. Coal Co. 7 Paige, 9; 20 Wend.
670; Powell v. Murray, 2 Edw. Cli. 636 ; Wadham r. Society, &f., 2 Kern.
415 ; Albany Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 Comst. 9 ; Cruger v. Cruger, 5 Barb. 227 ;
10 Barb. 597.


in relation to her separate estate, or for the benefit of such
estate, or for her own personal benefit upon the faith and
credit of such estate.-^ By this rule her general engagements,
which have no reference at the time to her separate estate, or
to her own benefit, cannot be enforced against such separate
property .2 In Virginia, the weight of authority seems to be
in favor of the English rule.^ In Vermont, the rule is sub-
stantially the same as the doctrine followed in New York.^
In Wisconsin, the rule is substantially the same as in New
York.-^ And so in New Jersey.^

§ 661. In Pennsylvania, the doctrine held by Chancellor
Kent, in the case of ^Methodist Church v. Jaques, has been
fully adopted and firmly settled by the courts. By the prac-
tice in that State, a married woman cannot sell, convey,
alienate, or in any way charge her separate estate, unless
such power is expressly given to her in the deed of trust or
settlement. Therefore no contract made by her, whether it
is a general engagement by bond, note, or bill of exchange,
or a special contract in relation to her separate estate, is
valid, and it cannot be enforced in any manner." In South

* Ibid.; Gardners. Gardner, 7 Paige, 112; Cuinming r. Williamson, 1
Sandf. 17; Dickennan v. Abrahams, 21 Barb. 551; Coon v. Brook, 21
Barb. 5-10.

2 Curtis V. Engel, 2 Sand. 287; Knowles v. McCamloy, 10 Paige, 343;
Vanderlieyden v Mallory, 3 Barb. Ch. 10; 1 Conist. -153 ; Yale v. Dederer,
18 N. Y. 265; 22 N. Y. 456, overruling, s. c. 21 Barb. 286 ; L'Amoureu.x
V. Van Rensselaer, 1 Barb. Oh. 34; Rogers v. Ludlow, 3 Sand. 104; Corn
Exchange v. Babcock, 57 Barb. 222, 231 ; Hey wood i;. City of HnlTalo, 14
N. Y. 540; Barnett v. Liditenstein, 39 Barb. 1!)4; Kvho v. Tabor, :>'2
Barb. 125; White v. McXiitt, 33 N. Y. 371 ; Noyes v. Blakeman, 3 Sand.

* Nixon V. Rose, 12 Grat. 425; Woodson v. Perkins, 5 Grat. 346. But
Tucker P., in Williamson v. Beekman, 8 Leigh, 20, expressed a diiFerent

■• Frary v. Booth, 37 Vt. 78; Partridge v. Stocker, 36 Yt. 108.

* Todd V. Lee, 15 Wis. 365; 16 Wis. 480.
« Perkins v. Elliott. 23 X. J. K<]. frJi].

' Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Kawle, 231; Lyne v. Crouse, 1 Barr, 111;


Carolina, in the case of Ewing v. Smith ,^ the English rule
was at first estal)lished ; but the decision in that case was
reversed, and the rule, as held in Pennsylvania, was laid down
and is now steadily acted on.^ But a contract, whether made
by the wife or trustee, for tlie protection, preservation, or
benefit of the trust estate, or in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the trust, can be enforced. ^ The rule, as held in
Pennsylvania and South Carolina, is also held in Rhode
Island,^ Tennessee,-^ and Mississippi.^ In New Hampshire,
her separate estate is not bound by a general engagement,'^
nor is it in Massachusetts.^

§ 662. No action at law can be maintained, upon her con-
tracts against a married woman personally, although she is
entitled to the beneficial interests of property in trust for her
sole and separate use ; nor can a bill in equity be filed against
a married woman as a sole defendant in order to make her
personally liable. There is no case in which a court has made
a personal decree against a married woman. She may make

Rogers v. Smith, 4 Barr, 93; Thomas v. Fohvell, 2 Whart. 11 ; Dorance v.
Scott, 3 Whart. 309; Wallace v. Coston, 9 Watts, 137.

' Ewing V. Smith, 3 Des. 417.

2 Ibid.; Frazier tJ. Center, 1 McCord, Ch. 270; Magwood v. Johnston,
1 Hill, Ch. 228; Robinson v. Dart, Dudl. Eq. 128; Clark v. Makenna,
Cheves, Eq. 163; Reid v. Lamar, 1 Strob. Eq. 27; Rochell v. Tompkins,
1 Strob. Eq. 114; Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75; Mayer v. Galluchat,
6 Rich. Eq. 1 ; Brown v. Postall, 4 Rich. Eq. 71.

2 Cater r. Eveleigh, 4 Des. 19; James v. Mayrant, 4 Des. 591; Mont-
gomery V. Eveleigh, 1 McCord, 2(57 ; Magwood v. Johnston, 1 Hill, Ch.
228; Clark v. Makenna, Cheves, Eq. 1G3; Reid r. Lamar, 1 Strob. Eq. 27;
Rachell v. Tompkins, 1 Strob. Eq. 114; Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75.

* Mctcalf V. Cook, 2 R. I. 355.

' Ware v. Sharp, 1 Swan, 489; Morgan v. Elam, 4 Yerg. 375; Mar-
slall V. Stevens, 8 Humph. 159; Litton v. Baldwin, 8 Humph. 209.

** Armstrong v. Stoval, 26 Miss. 275; Dotey v. Mitchell, 9 Sm. «& M.
435; Montgomery v. Agricultural Bank, 10 Sm. & M. 567; Dickson v.
Miller, II Sm. & M. 594; Prewttt v. Land, 36 Miss. 495.

' Bailey v. Pearson, 29 N. H. 77.

8 Willard v. Eastman, 15 Gray, 328 ; Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 388.


her separate property answerable for lier engagements ; but
where her trustees are not made parties to a bill, and no par-
ticular fund is sought to be charged, but only a personal decree
is sought against her, the bill cannot be sustained.^ But the
party claiming a debt must file a bill against her and her trus-
tees, and must pray payment of his demand out of her personal
estate in the hands of trustees, to which she is absolutely en-
titled, and also out of the income of her real estate, including
arrears of rent and accruing interest or rents, if there is no
clause against anticipation, until the claim and costs have been
satisfied.^ The death of the husband, either before or while
the suit is pending, will not defeat it, nor change its character ;
for although the death of the husband puts an end to the sepa-
rate use, and gives the woman an entire and perfect right of
dealing as a single woman, yet, if the contracts were made
while she was married, no judgments or decrees can ever be
entered against her personally ; for at law such contracts have
no validity, and the death of the husband does not give them
a validity which they cannot otherwise have.^ Determined
cases go thus far, that the general engagements of the wife
operate upon her personal property, and upon the rents and
profits of her real estate, and her trustees are obliged to apply
her personal estate, and the rents and profits of real estate
when they arise, to the satisfaction of such general engage-
ments ; but courts do not use any direct processes against tlie
separate estate of the wife, and the manner of reaching her
separate property is by decree to bind the trustees to apply the
personal estate in their hands, and the rents and profits of the

1 Sir T. Plumer, in Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Mad. 262.

* Hulme V. Tenant, 1 Bro. Ch. 20; Standford v. Marshall, 2 Atk. G8 ;
Murray v. Barlee, 4 Sim. 82 ; 3 M. & K. 209 ; Field v. Sowle, 4 Russ. 112 ;
Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. 182; Bullpin v. Clarke, 17 Ves. 365; Jones v.
Harris, 9 Ves. 492; Stuart v. Kirkwall, 3 Mad. 387; Robertson r. Johnson,
36 Ala. 197.

^ Field V. Sowle, 4 Russ. 112; Ileatly v. Thomas, 15 Yes. 596; Kenge
15. Delavall, 1 Vern. 326.

VOL. II. 17


real estate, according to the justice of the engagement to be
carried into effect. There is no case where the remedy against
the wife has been carried to the extent of decreeing, that the
trustees shall sell or mortgage her separate real estate to raise
money to meet her general engagements. ^ But Mr. Lewin
thinks, that if the instrument of trust is so worded as to place
the entire interest and inheritance of the real estate at her dis-
posal, the general engagements of the wife may bind the whole
corpus of the real estate, whether corjnis or income.^ In all
proceedings to enforce the general engagements of a married
woman upon her separate property, it must be remembered
that such engagements are enforced in equity, not because a
married woman can make a valid contract in law or equity,
but because in justice and equity a married woman's honest
engagements ought to be answered.^ Of course the propo-
sitions of this section apply only in those States where the
English doctrine prevails. They have no application in those
States where a married woman can make no charge upon her
separate estate not specially authorized in the instrument of

§ 663. Two conflicting principles are struggling in the
courts : one is, that the engagements of the wife are charges
on her separate property, equivalent to so many assignments
or appointments, to be satisfied out of her separate property in
the order of their date ; * the other is, that the wife's general
contracts are not charges, but create a liability, the remedy
for which, if the woman is single, is against the person ; but,
if she is married, there is no remedy against the person, but

' Per Lord Thurlow in Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. Ch. 20 ; Broughton v.
James, 1 Coll. 26; Nantes v. Carrock, 9 Ves. 189.

^ Lewin on Trusts, 5-48, 552.

3 Cummins v. Sharpe, 21 Ind. 331; Pentz v. Simonson, 2 Beasl. 232;
Glass V. Warwick, 40 Penn. St. 140. But see Maclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 367 ;
Hanly v. Downing, 4 Met. (Ky.) 95.

* Sbattock V. Shattock, L. R, 2 Eq. 182.


the law gives an equitable execution against her separate
property. On this last principle, which is the one generally
adopted, her separate property is liable, pari passu, as assets.^
The remedy being wholly equitable, the statute of limitations
does not apply to a proceeding against the separate property
of the married woman ; ^ and in case the nature of the property
is such that the legal title to it cannot be reached by a legal
execution, the equitable interest cannot be reached by a decree
in equity.^ Thus if there has been a bona fide assignment, or
conveyance, or mortgage to a purchaser,* or if there is a clause
in the settlement against anticipation, ° the equitable execution
cannot reach the property. Nor can charges after her decease
be imposed upon her separate estate ; and as a husband is
bound to bury his wife, it would seem that her separate estate
could not be made liable for her funeral expenses.^

§ 664. The savings and accumulations by a married woman,
out of her separate estate, are governed by the same rules as
the separate estate itself, as " the sprout is to savor of the root
and go the same way." " The same rule applies to the savings
out of an allowance for maintenance on separation.^ But sav-

1 Anon. 18 Ves. 258; Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G., F. «& J. 520.
"" Norton v. Turville, 2 P. Wms. 144 ; Vaughan v. Walker, G Ir. Ch.
471 ; 8 Ir. Ch. 458.

^ Nantes v. Carrock, 9 Ves. 182.

* Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 Do G., F. & J. 620.

* Murray v. Barlee, 4 Sim. 95.

^ Gregory v. Lockyer, C Mad. 90.

' Gore V. Knight, 2 Vern. 535; Malony v. Kennedy, 19 Sim. 254 ;
Humpherey v. Richards, 2 Jur. (n. s.) 432; Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375;
Churchill v, Dibben, 9 Sim. 447, n. ; 2 Kcnyon, 85; Messenger v. Clarke,
6 Exch. 392; Merritt v. Lyon, 3 Barb. 110; Hoot v. Sorrell, 11 Ala. 386 ;
Kee V. Vasser, 2 Ired. Eq. 553; Gentry v. McReynolds, 12 Mo. 533;
Rogers v. Fales, 5 Barr, 104 ; Yardley v. Raub, 5 Whart. 123 ; Towers v.
Hagner, 3 Whart. 57 ; Young i\ Jones, 9 Humph. 551 ; Rush v. Vought,
55 Penn. St. 437 ; Miller v. Williams, 5 Md. 226, 236.

® Brooke v. Brooke, 25 Beav. 347 ; Messenger v. Clarke, 5 E.xch.


ings out of money given by the husband to the wife for house-
hold and personal purposes belong to the husband. ^

§ 665. If the husband and wife live together, and the hus-
band receives from the trustees the income of the wife's sepa-
rate estate, the wife or her representatives cannot claim to
recover from the husband, or his estate, more than one year's
income.^ Whether one year's income can be recovered or not
is a matter of great conflict of opinion and authority in Eng-
land. There are many cases that hold that one year's income
can be recovered,^ and as many that it cannot.'* Mr. Lewin
says, that the better opinion is, independent of authority, that
the wife can recover nothing ; and lie pertinently asks if she
could recover any thing of the trustees on the ground of a mis-
application of the income. The principle is, that the court
presumes the consent of the wife to the husband's receipt de
anno in annum, and the wife's assent is presumed to continue
until revoked by something expressed or implied.^ If, there-
fore, the wife did not in fact consent, but required the separate

> Barrack v. M'CulIock, 3 K. & J. 114; Mews v. Mews, 15 Beav. 529.

2 Hayue v. Little, 26 Beav. ] ; Ex parte Elder, 2 Mad. 286 n. ; Brodie
V. Barry, 2 Ves. & B. 36 ; Rowley v. Unwin, 2 K. & J. 138.

3 Powell V. Hankey, 2 P. Wms. 82; Fowler v. Fowler, 3 P. Wins. 353;
Squire v. Dean, -4 Bro. Ch. 325 ; Smith v. Camelford, 2 Ves. Jr. 716 ; Dol-
biac V. Dolbiac, 16 Ves. 12G ; Arthur v. Arthur, 11 Ir. Eq. 511.

* Burdon v. Burdon, 2 Mad. 286 ; Warwick v. Edwards, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab.
170; Thomas v. Bennett, 2 P. Wms. 341; Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves.
7; Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves. 190; Aston v. Aston, 1 Ves. 267; Parkes v.
White, 11 Ves. 225; Brodie v. Barry, 2 Ves. »& B. 36; Thrupp v. Harman,

3 M. & K. 613 ; Lea v. Grundy, 1 Jur. (n. s.) 953; Corbally v. Grainger,

4 Ir. Eq. 173 ; Mackey v. Maturin, 15 Ir. Eq. 150 ; Howard v. Digby,
2 CI. & Fin. 643; 4 Sim. 601; Arthur u. Arthur, 11 Ir. Eq. 513; Beres-
ford V. Armagh, 13 L. J. (n. s.) Ch. 235 ; Caton v. Rideout, 1 Mac. & G.
519 ; 2 H. & Tw. 55.

* Lewin on Trusts, 550 ; Caton v. Rideout, 2 H. & Tw. 41 ; McGlinsey's
App. 14 S. & R. 64 ; Towers v. Hagner, 3 Whart. 48 ; Naglee v. Inger-
soll, 7 Barr, 204 ; Yardley v. Raub, 5 Whart. 123 ; Methodist Church v.
Jaques, 3 John. Ch. 77.


income to be paid to herself, the court will give her the arrears
out of her husband's estate, back to the time of her dissent.^
But the court will not pay any attention to idle complaints not
seriously insisted upon, but will demand very clear evidence of
an earnest and persistent claim on the part of the wife.^ If
the income has not come to the hands of the husband, but is
still in the hands of a receiver, the acquiescence of the wife
will not be presumed, and it will belong to her.^ If the wife
is insane or incapable of assenting, the husband's estate must
account for the whole income received by him; but his estate
will be allowed in equity for payments made for his wife's benefit
which ought to have fallen upon her separate estate.* And the
court may order the income of an insane woman's estate to be

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