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cal or mechanical laws. With the latter, no inner
development comes into consideration.

In the above the relation between psychology and
physiology is indicated. Psychology is the first, the
preceding ; physiology, in case it is to be something
more than a mere empirical science, the second ; for it
must learn from the former to understand the notion
of inner development. We can not have a correct
definition of life without the help of psychology.

Note.— On this difficulty of defining life consult among oth-
ers Treviranus (Biology, vol. i, p. 16). The most comprehensive
empirical characteristic of vitality is assimilation, which, for
this reason, is first mentioned in the foregoing. If an organism
should be found without this peculiarity, we might doubt
whether it could be considered to be living, even if it were
granted that it might possess a soul (a case which may very
well be admitted in the general notion).

161. From the above it is self-evident that the
vital forces may be very different in kind as well as in
degree. For a system of self-preservations might be



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CONNECTION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. 125

different in different essences ; in similar essences the
self-preservations vary according to the difference in
the disturbances; finally, there may be a greater or
smaller nnmber of self-preservations belonging to
them.

From this may be explained the difference in those
parts which are nourished by the same kind of food.
The elements of which the heart and the nerves con-
sist certainly do not differ in their chemical constitu-
ents so much as in their internal structure.

The causal relation between the different parts of
the same living body, likewise that between this body
and the outer world, offers upon the whole no difficulty
whatever. All causality, and especially all cohesion of
matter, depends upon the dissimilarity of the elements.
Hence, for example, the action of the nerves upon the
muscles can excite no special wonder, much less can it
justify hypotheses of electric currents, polarizations,
etc., which are empty vagaries that owe their existence
to the latest hobbies of the physicist. There might
be something true in them, and yet, even then, the most
important questions remain unanswered, and in the
end one riddle take the place of the other.



CHAPTER III

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY.

162. The connection between mind and matter in
the brutes, and especially in man, has in it much that
is surprising, which must be referred to the wisdom of



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126 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Providence ; but this is not where we are accustomed
first of all to seek it, because we consider matter real
so far as it occupies space, and because we regard the
human mind as an original thinking, feeling, and will-
ing existence, so that between the two (matter and
mind) there is no middle term. We may seek beyond
matter, as a spatial manifestation, for the simple es-
sences possessing capacity for internal development
from which this manifestation arises. We may regard
the mind as the soul endowed with power of repre-
sentation. We may remember that to the concepts, as
self-preservations of the soul, other self-preservations in
other essences (in the nervous system) must corre-
spond. Thus we perceive that the chain of self-pres-
ervations belonging together may indeed extend still
further ; that it may run through a whole system of
essences which present themselves as one body ; and we
shall no longer consider it enigmatic if from the foot
to the brain, and even into the soul, a succession of in-
ternal states having nothing to do with the lapse of
time nor with any movement in space is extended for-
ward and backward. Time and space may appear,
however, as accompanying phenomena.

163. First of all, the question concerning the loca-
tion of the soul, which has been wrongly refused a
hearing, presents itself here. It is acknowledged upon
physiological grounds that we can not with any degree
of probability indicate a place but only a region for it
(in the point of junction between the brain and the
spinal cord). Nor is a fixed position necessary, but
the soul may move in a certain region without the
least indication of it being given in its concepts ; nor
can the slightest trace of its movements be found by



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CONNECTION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. 127

making an anatomical investigation. The change of
its seat, however, may be regarded as a very fruitful
hypothesis for the explanation of its anomdous condi-
tions.

Note 1. — This statement has aroused much astonishment,
yet physiologists may remember that their sphere of observation
lies in the regions of space, and they might leave it to the meta-
physician to see that nothing more be allowed to space than be-
longs to it. If they wish, however, to share his cares with him
they must earnestly study metaphysics, and then one will be able
to talk further with them.

Note 2. — We should have no reason for assuming that in all
brutes and in man the seat of the soul is in the same place^
Probably in the brutes, especially in the lower orders, it is in
the spinal cord. Furthermore, we can not assume that each
brute has only one souL In worms whose severed parts con-
tinue to live the opposite assumption is probable. In the hu-
man nervous system may be found many elements whose inner
development widely surpasses the soul of an animal of the low-
er order, (Besides, we must not forget that indications of life
are not indications of soul. In organic parts that* have been
separated from their organism, life may continue for some time
without soul.)

If we wished, however, to attribute to man several souls in
one body, we should beware of thinking of mental activities as
divided among them, rather the latter must be regarded as
being entire in each soul. Secondly, the most exact harmony
among these souls would have to be assumed so that they might
serve for identical examples of the same kind. This is, however,
in the highest degree improbable, and hence the whole thought
is to be rejected. If, in the contest between reason and passion,
it sometimes seems to a man that he has several souls, this is a
psychical phenomenon which can not be considered in connec-
tion with the paradoxical thoughts just mentioned, but which
will be explained later.

164. The whole nervous system in the human body
serves a single soul, and by means of this system the



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128 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

soul is implanted in this body, more a burden than a
help to it, for the body lives as a plant for itself, pro-
vided nourishment and a suitable place be given it^ as
sometimes has to be done for idiots. Stories of some
who were idiots from birth give rise to the thought
that they may be merely vegetating bodies without
souls.

165. With the close causal connection of all parts
in the whole system which we call man, the varied de-
pendence of the mind upon the body can appear in no
way strange. So much more wonderful is it that, upon
the whole, the nervous system appears to be made al-
most entirely to obey the mind. We shall perceive this
more and more when we see how little the physiologi-
cal conditions are necessary to explain the states and
activities of the mind. Yet only in the healthy man
is the nervous system a good servant. In illness it
shows itself disobedient and obstinate, and in many
mental disorders, especially in dementia, the relation
between the nerves and the soul is entirely reversed.
This is an indication that we are not to regard the
healthy condition merely as a natural phenomenon
which could not be otherwise, but in it we have to re-
vere a beneficent arrangement of Providence.

166. It would be hardly necessary to mention the
intercourse with the outer world which is afforded to
the hiiman soul and at the same time limited through
its body, were we not obliged to remark in regard to the
theory, now very wide-spread, concerning a general or-
ganic connection of the whole universe, that we can
not bring the latter into relation with the theories
advanced here if we do not wish to mix up entirely
heterogeneous concepts.



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SPACE AND TIME. 129

Note. — ^There are no tenable grounds a priori for anniversal
causal relation, and experience ends with the feeble glimmer of
light which remote -suns throw on one another.



SECTION SECOND.— EXPLANATIONS OF PHENOMENA.
CHAPTER I.

CONCEPTS OF SPACE AND TIME.

167. It is as yet too early to explain everything in
psychology. Meanwhile much has explained itself in
the foregoing, and the comparison of facts with the
principles established will gradually lead us to further
explanations.

How the world, and we ourselves, as phenomena,
come to appear to ourselves, is the first point upon
which we need a psychological revelation, in order
especially to learn to comprehend the origin of meta-
physical problems. After that the question must be
concerning our position in the world from a practical
[moral] standpoint, especially that we may compare
that which we can be with that which we ought to be.

168. Why we apprehend things in the world in
the relations of space and time, must be answered by
an investigation into the nature of series of concepts
(29). The following serves as an introduction :

In section 28, instead of the definite particular

remainders r, r\ r', of a single concept P, the infinite

multitude of all its possible remainders is given, and

these are considered to be blended with innumerable

concepts n H' n', etc. Thus for the concept P will
12



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130 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

arise a continuous succession of reproductions, each
of which has, however, its own law which depends
upon its remainder r, according to the formula in sec-
tion 25.

Moreover, in section 29, instead of the series a, J, c, eZ,
etc., there is posited a continuous succession, of which
each member like P, with all its possible remainders,
is blended with other members, but each in a peculiar
manner.

Besides, let this succession of blended concepts be
considered to be extended indefinitely on both sides,
and finally let it be remarked that, if it be not made
impossible by accompanying conditions, each member
of the succession may be such that in it several such
successions may cross one another (as in c, section 30).

Moreover, when any one member in this whole
system of concepts moves even in the slightest degree,
the movement is transferred to the next member, and
so on, with the inviolable law that if of three remain-
ders r, r', r', of one and the same concept, r' lies be-
tween T and r'^ then also the concept n' (between n
and n') blended with r' will be reproduced as well as
those concepts which are blended with r and r'. This
relation of intermediary between two others must
always be present, even though the degree of repro-
duction be very slight. This is the general law in all
series.

169. Whether, and in what way, the kind of re-
production is limited, depends upon accompanying
conditions, as follows :

A. If in the sense-perception the series a, J, c^ d,
etc.,— or rather if, instead of the latter, the conceivable
continuum can change its order by all possible trans-



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SPACE AND TIME. 131

positions (e. g,^ sa in acbd^ a dbc^ etc.) — ^then each
time, from the perceived succession, a new succession
arises in the reproduction. But in this case the laws
for reproduction become so involved that no percepti-
ble order remains (as if a number of small arches of
different curvatures were attached to one another).

B. Let it be assumed, however, that the sense-per-
ception is reversed — i. e., the series 5 c is changed into c b
and abed into dcba^ etc., — ^the relation of the interme-
diate concept between two others will never be changed
for any other ; moreover, the series of concepts might
begin here or there, and there be no definite starting-
point. The law of reproduction arising from this fur-
nishes a spatial concept with a progress from each point
in the series toward at least the two opposite sides.

170. Let there be a definite starting-point, and for
the rest let everything be as heretofore ; then arises the
most general form of the concept, namely, that real-
ized in the series of numbers.

171. Let the beginning point be dispensed with;
then the perception series runs without reversal, con-
stantly in one direction; then also the reproduction
can take only this one direction. Now if, while the
perception is at rf, a is at the same time reproduced,
then from d the series abed is recalled back to a ; the
same series, however, will be held in consciousness by
rf, according to another law (as in section 29 c re-
calls b and a). From this arises the representation of
the concept of time.

172. First, for illustration, we may remark that in
the soul the concept of space is not itself extended, but
is necessarily completely intensive, and that time does
not elapse during the representation of the temporal



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132 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

to such an amount as to equal the time represented.
As for number, its fundamental idea is only that of the
more or less ; the one, two, three, etc., together with
the inserted fractions, are only transferred to this fun-
damental idea. The abscissas of analytical geometry
are the true and complete symbols for the notion of
number in its universality.

173. The original apprehension of the eye can not
be spatial ; for the perceptions of all colored places
converge in the unity of the soul and in this every
trace is lost of right and left, above and below, etc.,
which found a place upon the retina of the eye. The
same is true of touching with the tongue and the
hands.

But in seeing the eye moves ; it changes the center
of its surface of sight. By this movement there is a
constant blending of the concepts gained, an incitation
of those which are strengthened by perceptions of what
lies outside the middle of the field of vision, and an in-
numerable multitude of reproductions interlacing one
another — all these are combined, and for them no
words could be found if we, educated as we are, were
to meet them as new objects. Those bom blind who
subsequently attain sight, already know space inas-
much as touch prepares for them successions of re-
productions similar to those which sight furnishes
more conveniently and more rapidly. By this we see
how two widely differing senses produce the same result.

174. The concept of space relations demands a suc-
cession that takes place in the act of representation,
for it depends upon reproductions which are just oc-
curring. In this connection two points are to be ob-
served :



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SPACE AND TIME. 133

(1.) The succession in representation is not a repre-
sented succession.

(2.) It does not require a measurable duration of
time, but only an imperceptibly short interval, espe-
cially as by the movement of the eye in its field of vision
numberless apprehensions of colored surfaces at every
movement arise simultaneously and act upon the con-
cepts previously gained, both strengthening and excit-
ing them. The spatial seeing includes in it an infinite
variety of extremely weak simultaneous reproductions
which are united with the apprehensions actually taking
place, which latter in themselves alone would not be
considered to be spatial. Since in this spatial seeing
it is not necessary that any single reproduction series
should require a perceptible length of time to pass be-
fore the mind, no measurable duration is necessary for
it, and therefore it appears to us as though space intui-
tions are quite simultaneous and entirely free from all
succession in time.

175. In order to distinguish between time and
space perceptions in their origin more accurately, we
may suppose the following case :

From a, two series, ah c d and a B C D^ may begin
both of which are presented to the attention simulta-
neously. Up to this point in the representation there
is nothing temporal nor spatial, nor is there anything
of the kind if, after the whole series of perceptions is
removed out of consciousness, at some later time a is
again brought into consciousness and then both series
are simultaneously reproduced. Such a reproduction is
rather an example of the kind that we are accustomed
to attribute to memory, in which time is consumed, but
no time and no space represented. The matter is dif-



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134 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

f erent if, while D and d are still perceived (or thought)
a again rises (perhaps on account of a concept similar
to it that has just now arisen), and recalls to mind the
remaining terms of its series. For then this successive
recollection of the several terms occurs during a simul-
taneous collective presentation of the whole series as
remarked in section 171. Thus the collective survey of
the earlier and later moments of time and the view of
the time extension would be accomplished, whereas
those persons who could not hold together the begin-
ning and the end of the series, and could not observe
a transition from the former to the latter, would never
know anything of time. We should get still another
result if a should not immediately rise again, but if a
series c 17 8, should enter between D and d which in
the perception goes from D to d and also backward,
and if, moreover, the perception should return also
from D through and B to a, and from d through c
and b to a. By this D and d would diverge, and the
differences between that which was the first and that-
which was the last would be obliterated ; the different
series would in the reproduction converge from all
points toward one another at any new excitation, and
the apprehension would be spatial.

Both propositions in section 174 apply to the repre-
sentation of the temporaL We consume only a short
time in representing to ourselves a whole year or
even a century, provided the partial concepts in the
series here necessary are blended with one another;
the time, however, which we consume is not repre-
sented in the object. The concept of a period of time
arises when one runs through the time series backward
and forward with equal facility.



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SPACE AND TIME. 135

176. It is possible only for educated people to com-
prehend long extensions in time. In its earliest years,
the child can realize only very short periods of time.
The reason lies simply in the necessity for reaction of
the l^ter concepts upon the earlier ones in the series
(section 171). The child has great susceptibility (sec-
tion 47) : for this reason, and, because the complexes
and blendings possess little strength, the impression
of the present moment throws the one previously ap-
prehended too quickly below the threshold of con-
sciousness, and thus long series can not be formed.

177. Psychologically considered, everything tem-
poral and spatial is infinitely divisible ; for it depends
upon such remainders of one and the same concept, as
r, r', r,", etc. (28). If there could be only a definite
number of such remainders, then also a corresponding
number of different laws of reproduction for the same
concept would be possible. But the whole concept is
in no way a complex of such parts as those remain-
ders ; rather, all obscuration by which the remainders
arise is accidental to the concept, and even opposed to
it. Since here the whole precedes the parts, so the
division has no limits, and the possibility of different
laws of reproduction is likewise unlimited. Thus it
happens that for the senses and the imagination, in
space and in time, the whole appears to precede the
parts, and from this arises the contradiction in the
notion of matter. (See Introduction to Philosophy,
section 119.)

Note 1. — Geometry is to be considered in this connection.
On account of the infinite divisibility of space and time it
needed its incommensurable quantities. From this, however,
much evil has arisen for metaphysics, which was so incautious



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136 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

as to consider this view of space to be the primary and only
correct one.

Note 2.— We have proceeded from spatial and temporal re-
lations, but not from space and time. To make the former
dependent upon the latter is an error which can not be explained
here. Empty spaces are seen just as empty intervals (pauses)
are heard, viz., by expecting that which is omitted. Concepts
already present are in these examples carried further forward ; in
the empty spaces or time intervals they sink constantly, how-
ever, until something new is given, which now becomes blended
with the remainders still in the mind. If the transfer be con-
tinued further, and exceed the last conceived limits, then, there
being no other limits, infinity is disclosed. Not only the given
forms, but also the forms gained through free rising concepts
(to which belongs the creation or construction of geometrical
figures), offer very rich material for investigation if we consider
the difference of their apprehension from different points of view.

Note 3. — For the explanation of the beautiful in space, we
must take into consideration not only the favoring in the repro-
duction of the series which variously unite, but especially we
must consider also the effort to blend all things beheld into a
one. The latter act has some analogy with the blending before
the arrest (section 34). All forms approaching roundness re-
spond to this effort, while on the contrary the angular, the ex-
tended, the crooked, resist it. Variegated flourishes please for a
time, but we turn again to the more simple. Works of art are for
the most part interesting for what they say or signify ; the pure
space relations with their peculiar beauty are often forgotten.

178. By way of supplement we may add a word
upon the origin of concepts of intensive magnitudes.
The question here is, What is the origin of the stand-
ard which we use when we characterize our simple
sensations as strong or weak? The reawakening of
similar old concepts alone does not suffice for an ex-
planation ; for, in the first place, the concept does not
adjust itself to the strength of that which is reawak-
ened, although the awakening occurs through its own



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SPACE AND TIME. 137

forces ; in the second place, the result is only a blend-
ing of the old and new, but it is not a measure of one
by the other. We have here one of the numerous ex-
amples of that class of psychological problems which
are scarcely ever observed on account of their simplici-
ty, but whicfi are very difficult to solve. The reason
seems to lie in the law of helps (25). These helps have
their measure, not merely of time, but also of strength,
up to the point to which they endeavor to raise the
old similar concepts. If the approaching new percep-
tion be too weak to furnish free space enough by re-
sistance to the hindrances of the former old concepts
(26), then the effort of the helping concepts remains
unsatisfied and arouses the disagreeable feeling of
weakness, opposed to the pleasant feeling described in
section 37. If the new perception be stronger than
might be necessary here, then the percipient would feel
himself raised out of his accustomed sphere, for the
helps can not make it equal to the former old concepts.
The pleasantness of this feeling lies, nevertheless, in
the favoring of those helps. It is hardly necessary to
mention what is presupposed here, viz., that the old
similar concept is united with some kind of a helping
one. The more there are of these, and the more
equally they work together, so much the more accurate
will be the valuation of the intensive magnitude.

Here belongs the investigation into the time-stand-
ard {Zeitmaass).

Note. — In my lectures upon general metaphysics I shall
discuss in detail the three dimensions of space, likewise the de-
velopment of the idea of number and its relation to logical gen-
eral notions, which discussion has no place here, though it is
indispensable in metaphysics.



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138 RATIONAIi PSYCHOLOGY.

Supplement — The Difference between Series.

In the foregoing, the dependence of the psychical
processes upon the form of the series has already been
made clear. As the latter will appear still more in the
result, it is to the purpose to observe the possible dif-
ferences of the series in general :


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