Johann Friedrich Herbart.

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although feelings accompany the emotions, as well as

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emotions the passions. Morals and aesthetics are,
according to experience, felt, cognized, and desired,
notwithstanding which we are not inclined, as perhaps
in the case of sensuousness, to allow them to extend
through all three principal faculties, as if moral feel-
ings, cognitions, and volitions existed co-ordinate,
equally independent of one another ; but it is a dis-
puted question whether morality has its origin in a
command, in a cognition, or in a feeling. If we ask
experience, the answer is undeniably this : morality is
most often felt, more seldom rightly perceived, and
most seldom willed In this, however, there is nothing
evident excepting insecurity and fluctuation on the
part of empirical psychology, and on the part of
every investigation which has no better foundation.

(6.) The classifications made can be used only in the
preliminary examination, but in no way can they be
used as an exact description of that which takes place
in man, for they separate that which in reality is con-
stantly united. Whether there can be a presentation
in consciousness without feeling and desire, experience
does not indicate ; these movements of the emotional
nature pass over incessantly one into another. It is
evident that to every feeling, something felt, and to
every desire something desired, belong, but whether
in every case each must be a representation in con-
sciousness, experience neither denies nor affirms, for a
representation may be so vague as to be impossible of
recognition. The affirmative answer has, however, the
advantage, because in most cases it is manifestly the
right one. The emotions (Affecten) do not belong in
a class with the passions, yet we can by no means think
of an entirely emotionless passion. Whoever describes

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the history of only a single passionate outbreak must
regard it, with all the emotions aroused by it, as a
single transaction or occurrence. The continuous flow
of this occurrence does not admit of its being pre-
sented as a mosaic painting, the individual bits of
which might be collected from the several divisions of
empirical psychology.

(c.) That the classified mental faculties exist not
only side by side with one another, but in relation to
one another, empirical psychology acknowledges, in
the fact that it employs them throughout in the
elaboration of one and the same material. This
material is supposed to be received by the sensory
[Sinnlichkeit = sensuous phase of the mind], and
this gives rise to the question relating to the causal
action of the outer world upon man. If this should
be denied, then sensuousness must be regarded rather
as a creative faculty. Memory, according to it,
preserves this same material, but, unmodified by this
preservation, fantasy makes it into new forms ; and
again unmodified by these new forms, understanding
constructs notions from it ; also the faculty of desire
transforms it into an object of desire or aversion;
and again fantasies, ideas, desires, etc., are to be pre-
served by the memory and upon occasion replaced
with fresh material, and again subjected to the elabo-
rating faculties, or, in case this appears inconceivable,
is it perhaps only a part of the material which mem-
ory holds fast in its storehouse, and to fantasy will be
surrendered another part, still another to the under-
standing, still another to the faculty of desire, etc. ?
Concerning this question we ask in vain of experience.
So much the more necessary is it that we perceive

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and acknowledge the indispensable, metaphysical pre-
supposition of some kind of a manifold and compli-
cated causal relation of the different faculties to one
another, as well as to the alleged material which they
are to elaborate in common.

59. By the admission of the causal relation just
mentioned, psychology has hitherto fixed the order
of presenting its doctrines. Sensuous presentations
are first treated according to the statement, " Nihil est
in intelTectu, quod non prius f uerit in sensu," and for
the others an order is given which makes them proceed
gradually from the former. The gradual development
of individual man and of peoples, likewise the differ-
ence between the brute and man, furnish a guide here.

Experience shows that we meet with the lower
sensuous phase much more frequently than with any
other phases of the mental life, in reality, however, the
latter never without the former; indeed, this is so
much the case that we have great trouble in giving
even a tolerably definite meaning to the expression
" pure reason." Nevertheless, there are two important
psychological facts which we can not understand oth-
erwise than as incompatible with the causal relation
between sense and reason, viz., pure self-consciousness
and moral volition. What we, in the current of time,
observe always as shifting accidents, that must we dis-
tinguish from our true Ego ; we know the latter appears
to us, independent even of the inner sense, by a so-called
pure apperception. In its general acceptation, apper-
ception signifies the knowing of that which takes place
in our own minds ; and a volition shows itself more
clearly as genuinely moral when it scorns consideration
of advantages and disadvantages as they lie before one

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in experience, in which case the mind rises above sen-
suous feelings and directly opposes them. How is this
elevation possible ? The answer, through free-will, is
one quite commensurable to the inner perception
which is generally conceded in such cases. Hence a
so-called transcendental freedom, independent of all
causality, will be assumed, an assumption parallel with
that of pure apperception. Now, if we attribute both
to reason, as to that which in man stands the farthest
removed from sensuousness, then in this signification
reason is not so much something higher than sen-
suousness, but rather something quite different from
it ; and sensuousness can no longer be considered a
basis, nor even as a condition of all the rest.

Upon this supposition, psychology in the arrange-
ment of its material ought not to present a progress
from sensuousness to reason, but ought to present two
series of observations originally parallel, of which
reason and sensuousness constitute the beginning
points ; the meeting-place of the two, however, in its
manifold modifications, would be the highest region,
and, as it were, the goal. Empirical psychology can
oppose nothing to this demand. In my Introduction
to Philosophy (103 and 107), however, it is already
shown that the idea of the Ego and of transcendental
freedom are contradictory. Hence, also, the idea just
advanced, of a faculty of reason, is not consistent with
truth. The common idea of sensuousness, however,
especially when considered as the source of evil, is not
more correct. The greatest evil is quite as little
purely sensuous as sensuousness is pure evil.

Note. — When in common life we hear it said that one man
has more understanding, another more memory, a third more

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imagination, a fourth a sounder judgment, and yet, upon the
whole, no greater nor less degree of mental health can be
attributed to the one than to the other, then the conjecture
arises that all this distinction of the so-called mental faculties
has more to do with the products of mental activity than with
the internal nature of the latter, whether this nature be sound
or diseased.

Of the mental diseases, the four principal kinds or species
empirically known — idiocy, dementia, madness, hallucination —
will be more closely defined hereafter. It may be useful, how-
ever, to construct here the notion of mental soundness from
the opposites of these terms, namely, susceptibility to reaction,
concentration, repose, and mutual adjustment of all concepts
through one another, since a lack in any one of these four
requisites indicates an approach to mental disease much more
directly than a defect in imagination, memory, or understand-
ing, etc. The requisites mentioned, however, refer plainly
enough to the previously mentioned theory of concepts as
forces whose readiness to move upon the least change in their
strength or combination is quite as perceptible as their ten-
dency to remain at rest in equilibrium. By this theory, the
collection of concepts of the same kind and of those already
in combination, quite as much as every kind of possible recip-
rocal influence, are completely secured by the laws of reproduc-
tion, provided that no foreign influence on the part of the body
disturbs the mental state. Nevertheless, the relation of the
body to the mind can not be more closely estimated without
mentioning some principles of the philosophy of nature, which,
at this point, would be premature. To begin with, the first of the
above-mentioned classifications (55) must be, if not freed from
its indefiniteness, at least recognized in its many significations.

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60. In the representative faculties, the line of de-
markation between the lower and higher runs between
the imagination and the understanding ; in the faculty
of feeling, between sensuous pleasure and aesthetic
feeling ; in the faculty of desire, between the passions
and deliberate choice. On account of the uncertainty
in the definition of these faculties the line can not be
drawn with precision ; psychologists, too, admit that
it can not be sharply defined ; at least, so says Wolff,
in his Empirical Psychology (233). This is so much
the more evident because an analogon rationis is at-
tributed even to the brutes, while no one concedes to
them imagination similar to that possessed by human
beings. The brutes would have, according to this, a
share in the higher faculty of representation, and, on
the contrary, would lack in something that is to be
attributed to the lower faculty. The view held in
regard to the faculty of feeling seems to be some-
what more satisfactory, as no one expects aesthetic
judgment from brutes. Also in uncivilized men the
aesthetic faculty seems to be wanting, and appears to
be a higher degree of culture rather than a faculty
peculiar to human nature. Finally, in regard to the
passions we shall find some, and very wicked ones they
are, which with the noblest have their origin in the
highest regions of human thought, so that it is impos-
flible to reckon them among the lower faculties, or

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among those attributed to brutes. The subject must
then be treated in some other way.

61. To attribute a lower faculty to the brutes in
comparison with man, means to regard the mental
power of the former either as defective, arrested, or

Granted, first, that it is defective in itself in com-
parison with the more complete, wider-reaching, power
of man • for this there are very significant reasons in
the lack of hands and speech. Because of this, the
opportunity of the brute to get concepts from objects
is very much more limited than that of man, and while
the understanding and intelligence of man are most
closely related to speech, the brute at the most can at-
tain to the understanding of only a few signs. The
child, however, in the lowest grades of its education is
in the same state at fii'st ; its knowledge of the use of
its hands is quite as limited as of the use of speech.

Granted, secondly, that this mental power is ar-
rested — ^as it originally might have been greater — then
it is also arrested in the brutes, and, indeed, in a two-
fold manner ; for first, with them, some disturbing ele-
ment enters into their circle of concepts which does
not oppress man so much. In the case of brutes with
mechanical instincts, it is quite clear that this disturb-
ing element is an organic excitation which they obey ;
in the case of others, premature puberty comes into
consideration. Besides this, however, on account of
the comparative smallness of the brain of the brute,
the physical organism probably may not yield to men-
tal excitations as in the case of man.

Granted, thirdly, that this mental power or faculty
be considered suppressed, this may be a faculty sub-

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jected to service, or one entirely subdued ; in that case
this designation is not generally appropriate to brutes,
but rather to the lower faculty of man so far as he
controls himself. But, again, the control is so very
dependent upon the degree of education already ob-
tained, that it fluctuates, according to the kind, be-
tween cunning and morality, according to the degree
to which the uncultured or sick man is proportion-
ately incapable of exercising judgment. Finally, if
exceptions are of any value, among trained animals
there are so many cases of self-control acquired by
practice that a distinction in the mental faculty which
naturally would hold good in all cases can not be
shown; we must rather fall back upon distinctions
which are based upon favoring or hindering the
growth of faculties or upon the training acquired.
Consequently, we are neither necessitated nor author-
ized to regard the human mind as an aggregate of two
specifically different faculties, fitted as it were into
each other. But it appears that the mental excita-
bility, according to the difference in the combinations
and obstructions of concepts, is expressed in an in-
finite variety of forms. All these observations are
independent of metaphysics. The question, however,
whether if once metaphysics be called in, these ob-
servations would be refuted or established, is not to be
discussed here.

To the man who rises to a higher degree of educa-
tion we shall attribute empirically, not merely a sim-
ple, but a versatile capacity to apportion his attention,
as it were, to many different acts — now intentionally
to direct his thoughts, now to change the tone of his
feelings, and again to prescribe for himself at one time

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intermission or, at another, regular effort. It is known
that among brutes little or no trace of this appears. In
regard to the human faculty, attention has already been
drawn to this point in the first part of this work (40-
43). In this sense we shall recognize a higher and a
lower faculty.

62. Between the lower and higher faculties of rep-
resentation, Wolff places attention (however, only the
voluntary, while the involuntary is perhaps even more
important). According to him, the higher faculty
begins with the distinguishing of notions whose char-
acteristics the attention analyzes. This definition is,
indeed, more limited in its compass than is indicated
by ordinary language in the words, understanding and
intelligent^ yet it coincides in part with this distinction
in a remarkable manner. Inasmuch as attention makes
a notion distinct it brings forward in succession with
equal emphasis the partial concepts existing in it. It
levels or evens, as it were, the notion whose character-
istics were heretofore projected unevenly and acci-
dentally. Thus it is according to the nature of the
thing thought, all of whose properties are independent
of the differences which individual thinking brings
into it, that more attention is exercised upon this than
upon that characteristic. Also, it accords with the ex-
planation (given elsewhere) of the understanding,
which accounts for the meaning that the ordinary
custom of speech associates with that word, viz., un-
derstanding is the faculty by which our thoughts are
united according to the nature of the object thought.
Sufficient examples of disproportionate individual
thinking are to be found in common life. Such is
the fragmentary knowledge of the routinist compared

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with the symmetrically elaborated knowledge of the
true scholar. The latter is without doubt a work of
progressive attention.

63. In regard to the boundaries between the lower
and the higher faculties, Kant was guided by the fun-
damental thought: "The union of a manifold can
never occur through the senses. . . . All combination
is a spontaneous [or self-active] act of the power of
representation, which, in order to be distinguished from
sensuousness, must be called understanding" {Ver-
stand) (see Krit. d. R. F., § 15). This very plausible
assertion is, from its nature, speculative. (It occasions
the higher Skepsis, which is described in my Intro-
duction to Philosophy, 22-29 ; also, 98-103.)

In strongly emphasizing this thought Kant has
rendered a great service to speculative philosophy, but
he has only begun the most important investigations
growing out of the above; in no wise has he com-
pleted them, and, while they necessarily must always
hold their place as the foundation of general meta-
physics, everything like this Kantian assertion must
disappear completely from the dogmas of psychology,
for the end of investigation is exactly the opposite of
that which its beginning seems to indicate. The com-
bination of a manifold (of concepts) does not take place
by any process that could be called an act — at least, a
spontaneous act ; it is the immediate result of unity
in the soul. Further, the combination of the mani-
fold depends upon the manner in which the sense-
impressions meet, and this is determined by external
conditions, as already intimated in my Introduction
to Philosophy. Finally, Kant's assertion can not
in any way be supported by empirical psychology.

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When thinking intensely we feel ourselves active, and
then are sometimes conscious of intentionally group-
ing notions according to their characteristics, but,
where we originally unite the manifold of a given in-
tuition {Anschauung) into the notion of an object, we
find ourselves obliged to take the object as it presents
itself; we are limited to this, and know nothing of
acts of spontaneity.

While activity is neither an attribute of the under-
standing nor the source of combinations, the under-
standing has, on the contrary, its seat in a certain kind
of combination ; indeed, the whole higher faculty en-
croaches upon sensuousness, memory, and imagination
(which are usually reckoned among the lower facul-
ties), so that in educated men it is manifested in such
elaborate combinations as are not to be expected in
savages and brutes. Here, first of all, belongs the ex-
tension of the concepts of space and time, which ex-
tend far beyond the sphere of sensuous impressions,
even into infinity. By this we especially recognize the
fact that power to look resolutely into the past and to
anticipate a somewhat remote future is wanting in the
brute and the savage.

Furthermore, there is a great difference between
the mere meeting together of the characteristics of an
object and the distinguishing of these characteristics
from the substance to which they are attributed ; like-
wise between the mere apprehension of a limited series
of occurrences and the deduction of the same from
causes and forces. The second power, but not the
first, belongs to the higher faculties-

This remark, although occasioned by Kant's theory,
belongs to the following :

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64. Little as the logical polish of ideas can serve
for the measure of the intelligence (we have but to
think of the understanding of women, artists, states-
men, merchants) it constitutes, nevertheless, a part of
the difference which we seek. The savage and the
brute also have, without doubt, total impression^ of
objects that resemble one another, complex concepts
of trees, houses, men, etc., but in this case the contrast
between the abstract and the concrete is wanting. The
general notion has not been separated from its exam-
ples. This separation belongs to the higher faculty,
as does also the difference between object and space,
event and time, as likewise the difference between our
Ego and our changing conditions; while one brute cer-
tainly distinguishes itself from the other with which it
contends for food.

65. -Esthetic and moral apprehensions in savages
are rare and limited ; in brutes they seem to be en-
tirely wanting. Choice is much less deliberate, and
upon the whole appears not to be so persistent as in
the case of cultured men. The brute has here, side
by side with the lack of higher powers, a positive
peculiarity, viz., a visibly greater dependence upon
instinct, which is in part periodical, and stands in the
closest connection with the physical organism.

66. All that has been cited gives no conclusive
series of fixed differences either between humanity
and animality, or between the higher and lower facul-
ties. But we have no reason to demand causes and
fixed differences where we meet transient ones suffi-
cient to explain satisfactorily how one could have
come to ask about the difference which is everywhere
assumed to be one and the same. However, if it

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should be thought that the brute is brought too near
to man, the following remarks are of weight on the
opposite side :

We know very little of brutes. We distinguish
their different classes much too little. In the training
of brutes, from which we learn to recognize a percep-
tible versatility of talent, we find in most cases, at the
foundation, that quite as false a notion exists as in the
case of the defective education of the child. The brute
can receive no training save that which is according
to the inner laws of its nature; and, even when we
intend to use the brute only as a brute, the greatest
part of the applied force, even if it was necessary for
the attainment of the aim, is without doubt coarse
abuse. Whoever has observed young brutes, must have
remarked how often they strive to use their fore-feet as
hands — ^a vain effort to overcome the limitations of
their organization. To man, however, instead of in-
solence, a little more gratitude for the advantage of
education, in the possession of which he especially re-
joices, is to be recommended. Besides, while manifold
differences in the mental activity of different brutes re-
main a secret to us, the differences between men are
much more plainly to be perceived. To the question
whether concepts can completely manifest themselves
as forces in man, or whether here, perhaps, something
of the limitation observed in the brutes remains, the
following may furnish a general answer : The hands
of man have been obliged to furnish themselves with
innumerable tools. Language has needed the print-
ing-press. Geniuses reveal the gi'eat extent to which
free mental activity is lacking in an ordinary man, and
idiots show how closely in the human form the bands

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which the physical places npon the mental life may
be tied. Finally, self-control, a work of higher edu-
cation, suffers in every failure in training and educa-
tion. Hence it is sufficiently clear that the human ac-
tivity, as hitherto known, is not to be regarded as a
complete, conclusive exposition of what concepts act-
ing as forces, may be able to accomplish, and the con-
jecture quickly rises that in the other heavenly bodies,
under other conditions of gravitation, atmosphere,
illumination, etc., may be found physical organizations
furnishing much better opportunity for the develop-
ment of the mental activity.



67. The following conspectus shows those aspects
which are considered to belong to the faculty of repre-
sentation :

r . I (aa) According to matter.

A, Production ] ^^^ ^^ experience: ^ ^^^^ According to form.

( (2) of ideas which transcend experience.

B, Reproduction:

According to this outline, we shall examine the
faculty of representation, and in doing so shall con-
sider the usual classification of the assumed mental

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A. The Outer Sense.

68. The production of the material of experience
is principally the work of the outer senses, of touch,
taste, smell, hearing, and seeing.

What is called the material and form of experience is dis-

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