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cussed in my Introduction to Philosophy (25-29).

The five senses mentioned are enumerated accord-
ing to the organs of sense. There is a larger number
of the different classes of sensuous impressions. More-
over, the organs themselves contain sensitive surfaces,
hence innumerable sensitive places ; with the remark-
able difference that in the case of some senses only a
total sensation arises, while in the case of others every
single spot of the sensitive surface furnishes a separate

69. The feeling of pressure, and that of warmth
and cold, has its organ extended over the whole sur-
face of the body. Pressure is perceived in very many
different ways, according as it is uniform or not uni-
form in the different parts of the sensitive surface and
in the successive moments of time during the con-
tinuance of the sensation. Thus we distinguish sharp,
smooth, rough, elastic, etc. Warmth and cold are
perhaps perceived more in the inner parts of the
nerves, pressure more in the outer.

The sense of touch is originally feeling, but this
feeling has a special application by which it helps to
determine the form of the experience. At the begin-
ning we may remark that in touching, several fingers,
several parts of the tongue — in a word, several por-
tions of the sensitive surface — are brought into play.

70. Taste furnishes very many distinguishable sen-

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sations, which, however, coming simultaneously, inter-
fere with one another. The tongue is, at the same
time, an excellent organ of feeling of every kind.
It receives different kinds of nerves.

71. Odors, like tones, are obtrusive; but they do
not, like the latter, admit of being distinguished into
separate elements. The apparatus of smell is less un-
der our control than the organs of the other senses ;
even when in our power, it suffers much in its func-
tions. Odors may cause death, and may propagate
infectious diseases. They are mostly pleasant or un-
pleasant, seldom indifferent, but none can be long per-
ceived ; each quickly blunts or overtaxes the organ.
In comparison with the savage, and with many brutes,
the susceptibility of the civilized man in regard to this
sense seems to be blunted.

72. Of all the senses, hearing is the richest in the
variety of sensations which it furnishes. Musical tones
are distinguishable, even coming simultaneously. The
distinguishing of vowels is independent of them, and
in addition to these two classes comes the perception
of consonants which appear to belong to the class of
complex noises. The unrhythmical and yet intelligible
speech of man is a noteworthy phenomenon; those
who from birth are quite unmusical yet hear very well
what is said to them.

Probably every musical tone has its own peculiar place in
the organ. Unless this is so, it is not easy to comprehend how
simultaneous tones remain separate, and why they do not pro-
duce a third mixed tone which would destroy the aesthetic ap-
prehension of the interval.

73. Sight distinguishes colors, and, independently
of these, the degrees of light and shade. Every spot

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of the retina of the eye sees individually, and furnishes
a separate sensation. In many eyes which otherwise
possess keen sight, the color-sepse is in part wanting,
while in others it fails entirely. The greatest mo-
bility, the capacity to adapt itself to near and remote
objects, to strong and faint light, finally to cover itself
voluntarily with the eyelid, are peculiarities of this

It will be shown hereafter that mobility aids most especially
the apprehension of the space forms. This apprehension is by
no means so original as it appears; it is learned and passes
through very different steps of development.

Note. — Every sense has its degree of acuteness and delicacy,
its extent and duration. Up to this time, everything that has
been said refers only to sensations, not to perceptions, which
latter presuppose the concept of an object opposed to other ob-
jects and to the subject, and hence bring into play at the same
time most of the so-called mental faculties (by no means merely
those of sense). He who forgets himself and becomes absorbed
in sensuous contemplation (Anschauung), as it is called, is only
in a condition for the reception of mere sensations.

B. The Inner Sense.

74. No perceptible organ of the body indicates an
inner sense ; but, from analogy with the outer senses,
it has been assumed, in order that we may attribute to
it the apprehension of our own conditions in their
actual succession. The inner sense, so far as it is held
to be a special component of our mental constitution
(the explanation is to be found in The Principles
above discussed, see sections 40-43), is consequently
entirely an invention of psychologists, and indeed a
somewhat defective invention ; for they know neither
how to reckon definitely the classes of concepts which

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it furnishes, nor how to point out any semblance of
a law, according to which the extreme irregularity of
its working might be explained. The outer senses
perform their functions, if they can, and, in case
they fail to do so, we know the reason for the failure ;
but the inner sense, at times watching sharply every-
thing that occurs in the innermost recesses of the
heart (also, indeed, inventing much there) is at other
times so dull and so idle that, although we may be
conscious of having had a thought, we feel ourselves
incapable of finding it again. The inner sense is not
able long to endure the strain of intentional effort;
that which we wish to see accurately in ourselves
becomes obscured during the observation. Besides,
wonderful as is that material of experience which the
inner sense furnishes us, just as wonderful does the
mental activity ascribed to it sometimes appear. Not
seldom the self-apprehension seizes upon the most
violent emotions and tames them. Sometimes in the
midst of the most intense labor in the outer world, a
man restrains himself notwithstanding the pressure, in
order to complete his work rightly. The actor, who
represents a cunning deceiver, is conscious, first, of his
own person; second, of the character of his rdlej
third, of the art of simulation and of the appearance
assumed, which are attributed to this character as the
means of the deception. Indeed, the inner sense rises
in a scale of higher and higher powers ad infinitum;
e. g., we may observe our self -observation and again an
observation of that, and so on forever.

Note. — In the controversy between the Cartesians, on the
one hand, and Locke and Leibnitz on the other, the disputed
question is, whether there are concepts without consciousness.

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The simplest and shortest answer is, that if all representation
had to be again represented, then the inner sense would be
obliged to rise in an unbroken series to an infinitely higher
power. In the Leibnitz theory, however, the assertion of uncon-
scious concepts is made to depend on the metaphysical idea of

(7. Forms of Series.

75. Space and time have been explained by a very
incorrect theory, inasmuch as they are regarded as
existing forms of sensuousness which are individual,
single, and independent of one another. Space is the
only completely elaborated series-form. It is produced
especially in connection with sensations of sight and
feeling ; it is, however, not by any means limited to
these sensations, but quite a similar kind of produc-
tion, either complete or within certain limits, occurs
from many other causes, either clearly or vaguely
thought ; sometimes with characteristic accompanying
conditions which cause other series connected with it
to be distinguished from space. Such a series is time.
Another is number. Another is degree or intensive

Less distinct, but nevertheless indispensable, is the
series produced by the putting together of sensations
of the same kind according to the possibility of tran-
sition one to another. From this we have the tone
series (to be distinguished from the scale, which de-
pends upon aesthetic conditions). Similar to it would
be the color surface between the three primary colors,
yellow, red, and blue, if we knew certainly whether all
the colors were connected with the grades of difference
between light and dark (perhaps we should say black
and white), and could be traced back to those three ;

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or whether the color realm does not rather require a
third dimension.

Note. — In the difference between light and dark, as well as
in the tone-series in the contrast between high and low tones, a
concept of succession in the ascent is to be perceived, which dis-
closes the fact that the process of arching and pointing (see § 26)
moves more slowly in the lower and darker, and, on the con-
trary, more quickly in the higher (tones) and lighter (shades). In
music, the bass voice generally moves more slowly than the treble.

Still less distinct, but quite as indispensable, is the series in
every logical arrangement where the varieties are opposed to
one another, and are, at the same time, united in the species.
Not merely the expressions here are space symbols. In the
thing itself there is something through which such expressions
as the circumference or sphere of a notion is called up, although
these words, so far as they are borrowed from space which is
the elaborated series, are only metaphysical.

Quite as necessary in metaphysics is the theory of intelligible
space, which, with perfect clearness, is construed according to all
three dimensions, merely for the convenience of metaphysical
thought without mingling anything sensuous,

76. The concept of a series is shown most compre-
hensively in the notions of integral positive numbers.
But these notions, gradually created and extended
(savages and children have not a little trouble with
them), do not sufl&ce in themselves to express all vari-
eties of progression increasing or decreasing, the pro-
duction of the series in numbers becomes constantly
more artificial and complicated : e. g., between whole
numbers continuous transitions are made by means of
fractions ; also a backward prolongation of the series
may be made by means of minus numbers. Again,
the ideas of surd roots, logarithms, and exponential
quantities, are developed ; finally, we have the count-
less functions resulting from integration, at the foun-

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dation of which lies a differential — 1. e., the idea of a
certain ratio of increase or decrease.

Briefly, for psychologists, arithmetic furnishes the
remarkable example of a concept of a series constantly
becoming more abstracted, which may be traversed in
both directions and by infinitely minute steps.

77. Now, by analogy with this undeniable fact, one
is expected to find it at least probable that also the
geometrical concept of space in which are infinite
quantity and divisibility is a result of a process of pro-
ducing or drawing out {Production) that has gradually
become stationary, but which is in no wise something
original in man. This is so much the more true, in-
asmuch as the infinite plasticity of space notions is
shown continually in that which geometry, in its con-
tinued onward progress, makes out of it. The princi-
ples for the explanation of this production of space
will be found in the third division of this book. Here
we may especially call attention to the notion of a
middle between two opposed sides. This is charac-
teristic of every series. A number lies between num-
bers, a place in space between other places, a point of
time between two points of time, a degree between a
higher and lower degree, a tone between other tones,

Further, we may remark the psychological fact
that we habitually carry with us a certain standard of
measurement, a unit of distance, be it full or empty, in
space, in time, and in the tone-series, and also some-
thing of the same kind in dealing with intensive
magnitudes, as is noticeable in the case of measuring
by the eye, and of beating time. ^

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D. Logical Forms.

78. Philosophers have a bad habit of leaning heav-
ily on logic in diflficult cases — not for the purpose of
following its prescriptions with special care — which
would be very laudable — but to imitate or copy its
procedure, which they have observed in its scientific
development. Warning examples of this are Kant's
categories, put together according to a very defective
table of logical judgments, and also his categorical
imperative which contains nothing but a reminiscence
of the logical relation of the general to the particu-
lar. Therefore, in psychology, one has found it un-
necessary to say anything upon notions, judgments,
and syllogisms, except that to each logical operation
there is doubtless a corresponding faculty in the soul ;
and because logic in order to proceed from the simple
to the complex, treats first of notions, then of judg-
ments, and finally of syllogisms, the psychologist has
unhesitatingly treated the so-called faculties of these
things, viz., understanding, judgment, and reason, in
the same order. But several circumstances make the
fact doubtful whether notions, in the strict logical
sense, really occur in human thinking, and it is a
question whether they are not rather logical ideals
which our actual thinking strives more and more to
approach. In the third division of this book this
question will be answered affirmatively ; besides this,
it will be shown that it is through judgments that no-
tions more and more nearly approach the ideal ; hence,
in a certain sense, judgments precede notions. It will
finally be made clear that from this influence of
judgments very important results, especially for meta-
physical notions, will be found.

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119, For information regarding those ideas which
we call notions we may inquire of dictionaries and
grammars. For each word, the dictionaries show us a
thought which fluctuates between a mass of different
characteristics that are sometimes hardly reconcilable.
The grammars reveal the fact that, wherever strictly
logical demands do not require it, instead of general
notions (as man, tree), we generally think but one in-
dividual, and indicate it by the indefinite article (a
man, a tree). Hence, it is no wonder that most men,
when they are asked what they mean by this or that
word, have not a good verbal definition ready. Hence,
too, men do not present each general notion according
to its content (as ought to be the case in logic) and
then proceed to regard the application to the extent
as something accidental to the notion itself. On the
contrary, they indicate certain total impressions of
many similar objects by means of words, and the sig-
nification of these words, which is in no case firmly
fixed, must, in the use, suggest the connection every
time to such a degree that one may recall prominent-
ly certain characteristics of an otherwise* indefinite

From this we can see how we should burden psy-
chology with a problem based upon misconception if
we should propose to explain the source of truly gen-
eral notions in the human soul.

General notions can not be shown to actually exist,
except in the sciences, where one can plainly see how
they are formed — viz., by positive and negative judg-
ments which afl&rm all the kinds of characteristics that
belong to the definition we seek, and deny all others.

80. Now, on the contrary, it is a fact not to be

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doubted that human thought very often (although not
always) assumes the form of judgments. The combi-
nation of a subject and predicate lies at the founda-
tion of nearly all forms of speech in the languages of
civilized peoples. It must not be forgotten, however,
that the logical demand that the subject and predicate
shall be clearly defined notions, is not complied with
in actual usage.

81. The fact just mentioned may appear a won-
derful psychological phenomenon. Upon the suppo-
sition that a being that forms ideas should recognize
a real or only an apparent world, or even only think
a world as possible, it does not by any means follow
that this thinking and recognition must assume ex-
actly the form of judgments, but one may be tempted
to consider such a remarkable condition as a peculiar
trait in the constitution of human nature.

The representation, considered as a copy of the
objects presented, should resemble the objects them-
selves, and should correspond to them in the most
exact manner ; but no one will consider the connection
of subjects and (for the most part negative) predicates
to be a combination that takes place in the objects.
The painter who sketches for us the person about
whom we inquire, gives us a much more exact knowl-
edge than he who, with words, should enumerate all
the predicates which are perceived by a single glance
at the sketch. Moreover the whole scaffolding of va-
rieties and species which, according to the principles
laid down in the introduction to logic, we may be able
to build into notions, is entirely foreign to reality, and
is never used except in our cognitions expressed in the
form of judgments.

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Note. — To the mind of many a philosopher (e. g., Spinoza)
has occurred the ideal of an intuiting cognition, for which, in-
deed, if it were a reality, a so-called intellectual intuition, non-
sensuous in its origin, and beholding the truth directly, would
be demanded. If contradictory notions were taken for the ob-
jects actually intuited, and as such recommended to us, the
result would be such as has already been in part experienced
by the present age. If we do not desist from following artifi-
cially the cum rations insafiire, psychology may, however, still
be enriched with quite as sad as remarkable facts. On the con-
trary, if we understood how to place false systems at a distance
and to observe them from the right standpoint, we should learn
something from them.

82. The main question which we have to put to
speculative psychology is, "Whence comes the passive
attitude of the subject — viz., that thought to which a
determination must be given by the predicate ? Inas-
much as, in thinking, the subject and predicate come
together in the relation of substantive and adjective,
why are they not so placed at once? Why does it
appear that a real psychic faculty called judgment
must first connect them ?

In view of facts, the following observations are to
be made :

(a,) It is a begging of the question to assert that
all human thought is an unconscious judgment. In
reality, judgment is manifested only in speech, but a
man has many thoughts which he can not express in

(b,) A. man's inclination to communicate with oth-
ers has a great influence upon the development of his
thought in expressed judgments. Perhaps the con-
verse of this is also true ; the reserved man may be
one whose concepts do not readily assume the form of

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judgments. Among children may be observed very
striking differences in regard to talkativeness and re-
serve, even when the latter does not arise from shy-
ness or indolence.

(c.) Expression is often a necessity, and gives re-
lief. The judging in this case is connected with in-
stinct and feeling.

(d.) The decisions which express preference and
rejection are special kinds of judgment in which sub-
ject and predicate are very sharply separated. The
tendency to these is so great that one believes readily
in omens — ^i. e., he is inclined to consider every event
as threatening or favorable. From the repeated at-
tempts of philosophers to refer good and bad to affir-
mation and negation, it may be supposed that between
the judgment on one side, and desire and repulsion on
the other, no fundamental, natural, but rather a psy-
chological, relation must exist.

(e,) Another principal kind of judgment in which
the separation and the fusion of the two component
elements are very observable, presents itself in the
union of the new with that which is already known.
Either that which is known is the subject here, and
the new constitutes the predicate, with changes which
we observe in the things — e. g., the tree blooms ; or
the new is the subject, and is subsumed under a known
predicate— e. g., in all answers to the question, What
is that?

The latter remarks are, it is true, only an enumera-
tion of instances, but, taken psychologically, the gen-
eral is often only to be explained by the particular,
because very frequently particular concepts are made
general by transferring them to others. As the notions

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of irrational quantities arise while the concept of a
division into equal factors is transferred to those num-
bers which do not consist of several equal factors, so
also universal custom, in order to bring all speech into
the form of judgments, may have had a very special
beginning, and we are in no way justified in supposing
that all thoughts which now appear in the form of a
combination of subject and predicate contain in them-
selves the reason for such an arrangement.

Note. — Judgments, such as A = A, or, The stone is not
sweet, are school formulas and school examples. But if the
judgment made be original, then the standpoint of the one
making the judgment is disclosed. Children judge and question
where the adult no longer separates his already united substan-
tive and adjective, and where he is restrained partly by knowing
the limits of human knowledge, partly by custom, and partly by
his inclination to regard things only from a business point of

The process of arching and pointing (see sec. 26) is easily to
be recognized where an answer is given to the question, ** What
is that I" "It is nothing but snow," said a child to whom a
snow-cake was offered. Here the cake was the subject, the ap-
prehension of which occasioned the arching. What kind of a
cake I until the pointing left only the snow remaining. The
final propositions. This cake is not edible ; it will melt, are of
a similar kind. The predicates here come from within— i. e.,
they are contained in the nature of the subject. The case would
be reversed when a person, who hitherto has been accustomed to
see dogs run free, for the first time sees and expresses the judg-
ment that the dog carries goods to the market. He would have
passed by a wagon drawn by horses without expressing any
judgment. The arching causes tension, the pointing satisfies :
hence there is a pleasure in judgment; hence we have hasty
judgments and chatter, which injure observation and thinking.
The observer would have remarked more if he had not gone
away satisfied with one kind of pointing. In the case of the
thinker, the arching would have been more complete and its

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elevation greater. Besides this, the pleasure in judging injures
the constructive power. Critical minds are seldom creative.

The observer goes successively from one arching to another ;
he forms series of judgments. Mere sense-perception does not
separate the predicates ; it is less acute : the arching is defective,
and therefore the pointing is also defective. Often inaccurate
repetition follows upon this. Language, with its many signifi-
cations attached to words, exerts an influence here, provided no
effort be made to secure a constant correction.

83. Logic considers syllogisms to be progressive
nnf oldings of the steps of a thought. Upon this point
only two observations are suggested :

(a.) Very rarely in ordinary speech is such a pro-
gressive development presented in the form of a com-
plete syllogism. The syllogism has nearly always
something tedious in it, unless it be abridged, as in
the enthymeme. This is in no way a fault in the
syllogism (as it is often considered), but merely a re-
minder that logic and psychology are different things.
The concept series, for the most part, deal with the
minor premises, while they only touch the major pre-
mises in passing — so to speak.

(k) Very rarely have the creations of thought
originally (in the act of invention) the accuracy of the

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