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John Leland.

A view of the principal deistical writers that have appeared in England in the last and present century : with observations upon them, and some account of the answers that have been published against them .. (Volume 2) online

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V I E AV



OF Tiix ^r.l^'CIPAr.



DEISTICAL WPvlTERS.



VOL. II,



A

VIEW

OF THE rKINClPAL



^Avi^lJ^k^Ui^



DEISTICAL WRITERS

MAT HAVi: A??EAPvED IN ENGLAND IN THE LAST AND PRESENT
CENTURY.

WITH

OBSERVATIONS X^PON THEM,
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE ANSV/ERS

THAT HAVE BEEN TUBLISHED AGAINST THEM.

IN SEVERAL LETtERS TO A FRIEND.

THE FIFTH EDITION.



By JOHN LELAND, D. D,



TO WHICH IS ADDED,

AN APPENDIX,



CONTAINING



A VIEW OF THE PRESENT f IPvIES,

\7:i H REGARD TO RELIGION AND MORALSj AND OTHER IMPORTANT
SUBJECTS,

By W. L. BROWN, D. D.

rrvINCIPAL OE MAniSCIIAL COLLEGE, PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, AND
MINISTER OF GREYFRIARS CHURCH, ABERDEEN.



IN TV/0 VOLUMES.
VOL. II.



LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL JUN. & W. DAVIES — U'. CREECH, AND

BELL & BRADFUTE, EDINBURGH — AND A. E2.0\Vi:, ABERBELN,

MECCXCVII?,



a^i



CONTENTS



OF THE



SECOND VOL U Jvl E*



LETTER XXV.— P. i.
ORD Bolinghrokes Sentiments concerning the Immoriality
of the Soul and a fixture State, examined,

.LETTER XXVL—F. 27.
Ohfervaticns vn Lord BoHngbroke's Account of the Law oJN^.*
iure,

LETTER XXVIL— P. 46.

An Examinaiion of what Lord Bolingbrcke has offered ccncrni^
ing Rcvclatzcn in general.

LETTER XXVIII.— P. 'j^,
L&rd Bolingbroke s grunge Reprefmiaiion ofthejewijli Rcvth^
iion, excLinined,

LETTER XXrX.— P; 1 17,
Lcrd Eelinghroke s Objedions againft the divine Original and An^
ihority of the Scriptures of the Old Tef anient confdered,

L E T T E R XXX.— P. 136.
Farther Objeflicns of Lord Bolinghroke againfl the Mofaic Writ" -
iugs, and the Scriptures of the Old Tefiament, confidered*

LETTER XXXI.—P. 174.
Refcflions upon the favourable Reprefentation viade by Lord
Bolingbroke, of the excellent Nature and Defgn of the original
Chrfuan Revelation. Thofe Faff ages which feemed defgned tc
cxpoft the DoHrines, and invaUdaie the Proofs and Evidtnces
ef Ckrifliaiiity, confidered.

L E T^



vi CONTENTS.

LETTER XXXII.— P. 212.

Lord Bolingbroke' s Oojedions againji the Laws and Doclrlnes of
Chrijlianity.

LETTER XXXIIL— P. 237.
The Chrijlian Do^lrine of future Retributions vindicated* Con-
ch fion of the Obfervations on Lord Bolivgbrok&s p of humous
Works.

' LETTER XXXIV.— P. 261.
Defgned t'o introduce the ReFicftions on the late Lord Boling-
broke's Letters on the Siudy and Ufe of Hiftory, which ar&
fubjoincd at large,

L E T T E R XXXV.— P. 376.
^The Account of the Deifical Writers clofcd^ with general Rflic*
tions on thpfe Writers,

LETTER XXXVI.— P. 394.
A Summary of the Evidences of Chrifianity,

The C O N C L U S I O N.— P. 428,
In an Addrefs to Deifts and profelTed Chriftians.

APP END I X.— P.451.
RefeElions on the prefent State of Things in theft Nations,

N. B. For a fuller account of the Contents, fee the lic?A
preceding each Letter. And for the fubjeft-matter of the
RefleBions on Lord Bolingbrokes Letters on the Study and UJ^,
(f Hifory, fee the Contents preSxed to that Piece, Vol. II. p.



A

VI E W



DEISTICAL WRITERS, &g.



IN SEVERAL LETTERS TO A FRIEND,



LETTER XXV.

Favourable Declarations of Lord Bolinghroke concerning the
Immortality of the, Soul, and a future State — He reprejents it
as having been believed from the earlief Antiquity, and ar~
knowledges the great Ufefulnefs of that Doclrine — Yet it ap-
pears from many Pajfages in his JFor/is, that he himfelf zuas
not for admitting it — He treats it as an Egyptian Invention,
taken up vAthout Reafon, a vulgar Error, which was rejecled
when Men began to examine— He will not allow that the Soul
is -o.fpiritual Suhftance difiinB from the Body, and pretends
that all the Fhcznomena. lead ms to think -that the Soul dies
with the Body—Refietlions upon this— The Immateriality -oj
the Soul argued from its effential Properties, which are entirely
different from the Properties of Matter, and inco??ipattble with
them — The Author s Ohjedions anfwefed — Concerning the mo-
ral Argument for -a future State drawn from the unequal Bif
tnhutions of this prcfnt State — Lord Bolinghroke s Charge
againfi this Way of arguing, as hlcfphemous and injurious to
divine Providence, coufidcred — His great Inconfflency inft-
tuig up as an Advocate for. the Gcodnefs and Jhfdce cf Provi-
dence — That Maxim, Whatever is, is beft, examined — If rightly
underftood, it is not inconjifent with the BdieJ of a future
State,

SIR,

^1^ AVING confidered the attempt made by Lord Bolingbroke
X L againft God's moral attributes, and againft the doctrine ol:
, VOL. .11. B " V^ - ^



€ A VIEW OF THE DElSTlCAL WRITERS. Ld. XXV.

providence, as excrclfing a care and infpe£lion over the indivi-
duals of the human race, I nov/ come to another part of his
fcheme, and which feems to be defigncd to fet afide the in:mor-
tality of the foul, and a future flate of retributions. I join thefe
together, becaufe there is a clofe connexion between them, and
his Lordmip iVequently leprefents the one of thefe as the con-
fcqucnce of the other.

That I may make a fair reprefentation of his fentiments, I
fliali firil: produce thofe palTages, in which he fecms to exprefs
himfelf very favourably with rerpe6l to the doftrine of a future
Hate, and then Hiall compare them v/ith other paffages which
have a contrary arpe6i, that we may be the better able to form a
iuft notion oi his real deficrn.

He cbferves, that " the doclrine of the im.mortality of the foul,
*' and a future ftate of rewards and punifhments, began to be
*• taught long before we have any light into antiquity ; and when
•' we begin to have any, we find it eflablifhed * : That it was
*' ftrongly inculcated from time immemorial, and as early as the
*' moft ancient and learned nations appear to us," And he ex-
prefsly acknowledges the ufefulnefs of that doHrine to mankind,
as v/ell as its great antiquity. Ke declares, that " the do61rine
•• of future rewards and punifhments, which fuppofes the im-
*' mortality of the f>jn], is no doubt a great reftraint to meni."
That ** it was invented by the ancient theifts, philofophers, and
*' legiflators, to give an additional llrength to the fanftions of the
" law of nature; and that this motive every man vrho believes it
*' may and muft apply to himfelf, and hope the reward, and fear
'* the punlfhment, for his fccret as well as public aFtion-s, nay,
•' for his thouff'nts as well as his a6Honsi:" That *' the greater
'* part of the heathen philofophers did their utmoft to encourage
** the belief of future revv^ards and puniHiments, that they might
*• allure men to virtue, and deter tliem from vice the msre effec-
*' tuaily§." Ke obfcrvcs, that " the hypothefis of a life after
" tiiis ferved two puvpofes: The one was, that it furniihed an
*' anfwcr to the objections of the athcifls with refpecl to the pre-
'* fcnt unequal dilliibution of good and evil." This feems un-

* Bolingbrcke's Works, vol. v. p. 337. t Ibid. vol. iii. p. 559.

?'". § Ibid. p. 3 20.



Let. XXV. lOPvD BOLINGBROKE. 3

necefTary to lilm, becaufe he looks upon the accufation to be
void of any loundation. But the other purpofe, he fays, '* was
** no doubt very necelTary, fmce the belief of future rewards and
*' punifhmeiits could not fail to have fome efFeft on the manners
*' of men, to encourage virtue, and to reftrain vice." Accord-
ingly he calls it " a doctrine ufeful to all religions, and incorpo-
*' rated into all the fyflems of paganifm*." And he fays, ** the
" heathen legiHators might have reafon to add the terrors of ano-
*' ther life 10 that of the judgments of God, and the laws oi
"menf."

And as he ov/ns, that this do6lrine is very ufeful to mankind, •
ib he does not pretend pofitively to deny the truth of it. He
introduces a plain man of common found fenfe declaring his fen-
timents upon this fubjeft, and that though he could not affirm,
he v/ould not deny the immortality of the foul ; and that there
was nothing to tempt him to deny it; fmce whatever other v/orlds
there may be, the fame God ftill governs ; and that he has no
more to fear from him in one world than in another: That, like
the auditor in Tully's firft Tufculan difputation, he is pleafed
with the profpecl of immortality J. Again, he obferves, that
*' reafon will neither affirm nor deny that there is a future ftate:
*' and that the doftrine of rewards and punifiiments in it has fo'
*' great a tZTLC,ZT.zy to enforce the civil laws, and to refrrain the
*' vices of men, that reafon, which cannot decide for it on prin-
" ciples ^of natural theology, will not decide againft it on prin-
*' ciples of good policy. Let this do61rine reil on the authority
" of revelation. A theiftj who does, not believe the revelation,
*' can have no averfion to the do6trine§." After having men-
tioned the fcheine of a fuLure ftate prcpofed in the Analogy of
Reafon' and Ilevelation, part 1. cap. i.he fays, '* This hypothe-
" (is may be received; and that it does not fo much as imply
*' anv thinf< repug-nant to the periefiions of the divine nature."
He adds, " I receive v/iih joy the expeftations it raifes in my
*' mind. — And the ancient and modern Epicureans provoke my
** indignation, when they boafi as a mighty acquifition their pre-
*' tended certainty that the body and the foul die together. If they

* Bollngbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 338. f Ihid. p. 488.

% Ibid. vol. iii. p. 558? 559. § Ibid. vol. y. 3^2. 489-

B 2 '' had



'4 A VIEW OF THE BEISTICAL WRITERS. LeL XX\\

*' had this certainty, could this difcovery be fo very comfort-
*' able ? — I fhould have no difficulty which to chufe, if the option
*' was propofed to me, to exift after death, or to die whole ^'/'

If we were to judge of the author's real fentiments by fuch
pafTages'as thefe, we might be apt to think, that though he was
not certain of the immortality of the foul, and a future itate,
yet he was much inclined to favour that do6lrine, as not only
iifeful, but probable too. But there are other padages by v/hich
it appears, that, notwithftandingthcfe fair profefiions, he did not
really iicknovjledge or believe that doQrine himfeif, ^nd, as far as
his reafoning or authority could go, has endeavoured to weaken,
if not deftroy, the belief of it in the minds of others too.

He reprefents this doftrine as at bell no more than a ufeful
invention. Ke exprefsly fays, that " the ancient theifts, poly-
*' theifts, philofophers, and legiOators, invented the doftrine of
** future rewards and punifhments, to give an additional ilrength
•' to the fanftions of the law of nature t:" and particularly, that
the invention of it was owing to Egypt, the 77iother of good po-
licy, as well as fuperftiticw^. The general prevalency of this
opinion he attributes to the predominant pride of the hurnan
heart; and that " every one v/as flattered by a fyllem that raifed
** him in imagination above corporeal nature, and made him hope
•' to pafs in immortality in the fcilcv/ihip of the gods^. And
after having faid, that it cannot be demonllratcd by reafon, he-
adds, that " it was originally an hypothefis, and may therefore be
" a vulgar error: it was taken upon truft by the people, till it
*' came to be difputed and denied by fuch as did examine ||."
So that he fuppofes, that thofe wlio believed it took it upoit
truft without reafon or examination, and that they who examined
rejefted it. He pronounces, that the reafonings employed by
divines in proof of a future ilate are " problem.atical and futile;"
and that " the imm.ortality of the foul refts on moral proofs, and
*' thofe proof are precarious, to (l^.y no worfe of them**." After
fceniing to fpeak very favourably, in a palTage cited above, of
the hypothelis of a future ilate advanced in Butler's Analogy^

* Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 491, 492. — See alfo ibid. p. 506, 507.
f Ibid. p. a88. % Ibid. p. 352.489. ^ Ibid. p. 237.

11 Ibid. p.35*» *'■ I^id. p. 323. 501.

lie



td. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 5

lie fays, *' it has no foundation in reafon, and is purely imagi-
*' nary." He frequently fiippofes a connexion between the
immortality of the foul and a future (late; that the latter is in
confequence of the former: and lie has endeavoured to fubveit
the foundation of that immortality, by denying that the foul is a
diftincl fubftance from the body. , This is what he hath fet him-
felf pretty largely to fbew in feveral parts of his EJfay concerning
the Nature, Extent, and Reality of Human Knowledge, which
takes up near one half of the third volume of his works; efpe-
cially in tlie iirft, eighth, and ninth fe61ions of that Effay. He
exprefsly aff^rts, " that there is not any thing, philofophically
*' fpeaking, which obliges us to conclude, that we are com-
•' pounded of material and immaterial. fubftance*:" That " im-
*' material rpirits, confidered as diilin6l: fubftances, are in truth
*' the creatures of metaphyfics and theology t:" That " human
" pride was indulged by heathen philofophcrs and Platonic Chrif-
" tians ; and fuice they could not make man participant of the
*' divine nature by his body, they thought fit to add a difHnft
*' fplritual to his corporeal fubftance, and to ?lTume him to be a
*' compound of bothi:" And that " the notions that prevail
*' about foul, fpiritual fubftance, and fpiritual operations and
" thing.i, took their rife in fchools, where fuch doftrines were
*' tau?-ht ^s men would be fent to Bedlam for teaching at this
*' day§." He has a long marginal note, vol. iii. p. ,514, etfeq.
which is pzirticularly defigned to anfvv^er Mr. V/oUafton's argu-
ments for the immortality 01 the foul. He there affirms, that
*' it neither has been, nor can be proved, that the foul is a dif-
*' tincl fubftance united to the body :" That " to fuppofe the foul
*' may preferve a faculty of thinking when the body is deftroy,
*' ed, is aiTumed without any evidence from the phaenomena;
*' nay, againft a ftrong prefumption derived from them:" That
*' whilft we are alive, we preferve the capacity, or rather faculty,
*' of thinking, as we do of moving, and other faculties plainly
" corporeal. When we are dead, all thefe faculties are dead
" with us :" and, as he thinks, " it m.ight as reafonably be faid,
** v/e ftiall walk eternally, as think eternally." He fays, '' th^

* Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iii. p. 363, 364. t ^''■^i^- P" ■^^7-

% Ibid. p. 480. § Ibid. p. 534? 5.1j.

B 3 " word



6 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV.

«* word foul, in philorophical confidcration, taken for a diftin^i
*' fubllancc united to the body," may be paralleled with " the
** primum'inohile, and element of fire,, which were names invent-
** ed to fignify things which have no exiHence;" and adds, that
*' this figmxent of a foul, if it be a figment, received ftrength from
*' the fiiperlritious theology of the heathens'^." Ke reorefents
the hypothehs of two diftincl fubftances in man as more ** incoxi-
*' ceivahlc and abfurd, than that of thofe who fay there is .no fuch
*' thing as material fubdance, or a material world t:'' and yet
he fays, " that there is miaterial fubRance no man can doubt —
** and that thofe who doubted it have either done it to exercife
" their wit, or have been tranfported by overheated imaginations
*' into a philofophical delij-iumi." He pronounces, that for phi-
lofophcrs to maintain that the foul is Tiw immaterial being, is as
if they fliould agree '* that twice two makes five§." And though,
in a paiTige cited before, he introduces a plain man faying. That
as he could not affirm, fo he v/ould not deny a future Hate, yet
he makes him declare, that, " revelation apart, all thephaenomen^
*' from our birth to our death feem rcp^4gnant to the immateriality
*' and immortality of the foul; fo that he is forced to conclude
with Lucretius,

Gigni pariter cum corpore, et una

Crefcerc jzntimus, panterque Jenejccre r.icrde^n'''

That " God had given him reason to diflinguifh and j"^dgc, and
*' external and internal fenfe, by which to perceive and reflect;
" but that this very reafon fhewed him the abfurdity of embrac-
** ing an opinion, concerning bod)^ and mind, which neither of
*' thefe fenfes fupports||."

I believe you will be of opinion, upon confidering what has
been now produced, that Lord Bolingbroke has left us little room
to doubt of his real fentiments in this matter. I fhall now exa-
mine whether he has offered any thing that is of force fufficient
to invalidate a doftrine, the belief of which he himfelf acknow-
ledges to be of great ufe to mankind.

As to that which lies at the foundation of his fchemc, m2. his

* Bollngbroke's Works, vol. iii. p. 510, 517. 518. f Ibid. p. 52?,.

X Ibid. p. 379, ^ Ibid, p. 536. II Ibid. p. 557.

denying



Lei. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKS. 7

denying that the foul is a fpiritual or inimaterial mbilance dii1:ui6t
from the body, I do not find that he has produced any thing
which can be called a proof that fuch a fuppoiition is nnrcafon-
able. He indeed inveighs againil metaphyHcians and divines for
talking about fpiritiial and nnmater'al eflences and fubftances:
he charges them S'^iih fa ntajlical ideas, and di pneuniatical mad^
vej's. BTit fuch inve61ives, v/hich he repeats on all occaHon?,
will hardly pafs for arguments.

He doth not pretend to fay, as foine have done, that fpiritcal
or immaterial fubftance implies a contradiftion. He blarnes Spi-
Tiofa for maintaining that there is but one fabftance, that of mat-
ter; and ailerts, " though v/e do not know the manner of God's
** being, yet we acknowledge him to be immaterial, becaufe a
*' thoufand abfurdities, and fuch as im.ply the rcrongeft contra-
*' diftion, refuit from the fuppofition, that the Supreme Being
" is a fyilem of matter*." He fays indeed, that " of any other
*' fpirit we neither have nor can have any knov/iedge:" and
that " all fpirits are hypothetical, but the Infinite Spirit, the
" Father of Spirits t." But if there are other beings, whofe ef-
fential properties are inconfiftcnt with the known properties of
matter, and particularly if our own fouls arc fo, and if abfurd
confequences would follow from the fuppofing them to be ma-
terial beings, may it not be reafonably argued, that they are
fubftances of a different kind from what we call matter or body?
The only way we have, by his own acknowledgment, of know-
ing different fubftances, is by their different qualities or proper-
ties. He obferves, that " fcnfitive knowledge is not fumcientta
*' know the invs^ard conftitution of fubftances, and their real
" effence, but is fufficlent to prove to \xz their exiftence, and to
*' diiiinguiili then> by their effefts'j::" And that '•' the complex
*' idea v;re have of every fubftance is nothing more than a cora-
" bination of feveral fenhble ideas, which determine the apparent
" nature of it to us." He declares, that ** he cannot conceive a
*' fubftance otherwife than relatively to its, modes, as fomething
" in which thofe modes fubfift§:" and blames th'e philofophers
fox " talking of matter and f^^irit as ii they had a perfetl idea of

* Bolingbroke's Works, vol, iii. p. ^-jt. joj. f Ibid. p. 3^1. 4^7.

+ Ibid. p. 371. § Ibid. p. 59,4.

B 4 ^' both,



3 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL' WRITERS. Let, XXV.

*' both, wlien in truth they knev/ nothing of either, but a few
•' phseiiomena infiifficient to frame any hypothcfis*." Yet he
himfelf fpeaks of material fubilance, as a thing" we perfectly
*' know and are afTured of, whilft we only afTume or guefs at
*' fpiritual or immaterial fubltance+. But we have as much rea-
fon to be affured of the latter as of the former, nnce in neither
cafe the fubftance or elTence itfeif is the objeft of our fenfe, but
we certainly infer it from the properties, which we know in the
one cafe as well as in the other. He does not pretend to deny
that the exiftence of fj^iritual fubilance is pofTibleij:. Why then
jfliould not he allow their aftual exigence, fince there are pro-
perties or qualities, from which it may reafonably be inferred,
that they aftualiy do exift?

He finds great fault with Mr. Locke for endeavouring to fhew,
that the notion of fpirit involves no more ditticulty or obfcurity
in it than that of body, and that Vv^e kno^'7 no more of the folid
than we do of the thinking. fubftance, nor how we are extended
than how we think. In oppofition to' this he afTerts, that we have
clear ideas of the primary properties belonging to body, which
are fblidity and extenfion, but that we have not a pcdtive idea
of any one primary property of fpirit : and the only proof he
brings for this is, that aftual thought is not the efTence of fpirit.
But if, inftead of aftual thought being the elTence of the foul, the
faculty of thinldng be fuppofed to be one of its primary effential
qualities or properties, this is what we have as clear an idea of
as we have of folidity and extenfion §. He himfelf elfevv^here
obferves, that " our ideas of refleftion are as clear and difiinft as
** thofe of fenfation, and convey knowledge that may be faid to
*' be more real |l:" And that " the ideas we have of thought by
" reflection, andoffome few modes of thinking, areas clear as
** thofe we have of extenfion, and the modes of extenfion by fen-
** fation"'^"^." Why, then may we not from thofe ideas, infer a
thinking, as well as-frcm the other a folid extended fubflance?
and that thefe fubllances are abfolutely di]lin6t, and of different
natures, fmce their properties manifeflly are fo? He hath him-
felf ackrlov/ledged enough to fhew the reafonablcncfs of this

* Bolin^broke's Works, vol. iii. p. 509, 510. 512. •)■ Ibid. p. 509.
:[: Iaid.p.5C9. ^ Ibid. p.510, 511,513. || Ibid.p. :'>5. ** Ibid.p.427.

conclufion.



Let. XXV. LORD EOLINGBROK«. 9

conclLifion. " That we live, and move, and think," faith be,
"and that there inuft be fomething in the conOitution of our
** jfyftem of being, beyond the known properties of matter, to
*** produce fuch phasnomena as thefe, are undeniable truths."
He adds indeed, " what that fomething is, we know not; and
" furely it is high time we fliould be convinced that we cannot
" know it ^.^ But though we cannot defcribe its intimate effence,
M^e may know enough of it to be convinced, that it is not matter.
It is to no purpofe to pretend, that there may be unknown pro-
perties of matter, by which it may be rendered capable of think-
ing : for the properties of matter that we do know are inconfiilent
with the power of felf-motion and confcioufnefs. It is true,
that he cenfures thofe 2i% proud dog?natijh, who befcov/ the epi-
thets oi inert, fenfelcfs, J}. lipid, palfive, upon matter ■>": but in his
cahiier mood, when he is not carried away by the fpirit of oppo-
fition, and has not his hypothefis in view, he owns, that *' matter
** is purely paffive, and can aft no otherwife than it is a8.ed
*' uponi." It is therefore inconfiflent v/ith its nsvure to afcrib;;
to it a principle of felf-motion.

He exprefsly acknowledges, that " our idea of thought is not
** included in the idea of matter §." And that intellect is cer-
tainly above the "power of motion and figure, according to all
^' the ideas we have of them-; and therefore (faith he) I embrace
" very readily the opinion of thofe who airume, that God ha»
" been pleaied to fiiperadd to feveral fyrtems of matter, in fuch
*' proportions as his infinite wifdom has thought fit, the power of
" thinking jj. This is an hypothefis he feems fond of; he fre-
quently refers to it, and fays it is little lefs than blafphemv to
deny it •^'". Mr. Locke, as heobferves, fuppofed, that God might,
if he pleafed, give to certain fyftems of created fenfelefs m.atter,
put together as he thinks (it, fome degree of iQmQ, perception,
and thought. But whdt Mr. Locke had advanced as barely pof-
fible, for aught he knew, to Almighty Power, our author affunies
as having been attually done, and as continually done in the or-
dinary courfe of things. But I think we may fafely leave it ta

* Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iii. p. 509. f Ibid. p. s?

X Ibid. vol. V. p. 47Z. § Ibid. vol. iii. p. 364.

11 Ibid. vcL V. p. 3 J. ** Ibid. vol. iii. p. 364,.

an\r



lO * A VIEW OF THE DEISTiCAL WPvITERS. Let. XXW

Zny unprejudiced judgment, whetber it be not more reafonable
and more phiiorophical, toalTign difierent luhftances as tiie fub.*
jecis oi properties To entirely JitFerent, than to fuppofe properties



Online LibraryJohn LelandA view of the principal deistical writers that have appeared in England in the last and present century : with observations upon them, and some account of the answers that have been published against them .. (Volume 2) → online text (page 1 of 52)