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THE




WORKS



$2A /S04



OF



FEB 20



OHN LOCKE,



IN NINE VOLUMES*



THE NINTH EDITION.



VOLUME THE SECOND.



L O N D O Ni

PRINTED FOR T. LONGMAN, B. LAW AND SON, J. JOHNSON,

C.DILLY, G. G. AND J. ROBINSON, T. gADELL, J. SEW ELL,

IV. OTRl'DGE, W. RICHARDSON, F. AND C. RIVING TON,

W. GOLDSMITH, T. PAYNE, LEIGH AND SOTHEBY,

S. HAYES, R. FAULDER, B. AND J. WHITE>

W. LOWNDES, G. AND T. WILKIE,

jkUlt J. WALKER.



1794'



CONTENTS



OF THIS



VOLUME.

Page
Eflay on Human Underftandlng, book ill. cli. 7, Sec, I

A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Perfonal

Identity - - - . 299

Appendix to the Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion con-
cerning Perfonal Identity - - 319
Of the Condudl of the Underftanding - 321
Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a

Gentleman _ - ~ 403

Elements of Natural Philofophy ^ - 413

A New Method of a Common-Place-Book « 44s

Index to the Effay concerning Human Underftanding.
— ■^-— Additional Pieces in this Volume.



&$ THE



THE



CONTENTS



OF THE



Essay on Human Understanding continued.



BOOK III.



Of Words,



CHAP. VII.

Of particles.

SECT.

It Particles conneifl parts, or
whole fentences together.
2. In them confifts the art of
well fpeakirig.
3, 4. They (how what relation
the mind gives to its own
thoughts.

5. Inftance in But.

6, This matter but lightly
touched here.



CHAP. VIII.

Of abftraft and concrete terms,

SECT,

1. Abftraft terms not predi-
cable one of another, and
why.

2. They fhow the difference
of our ideas.



CHAP. IX.
Of the imperfedlien of words,

SECT.

1. Words are ufed for re-
cording and communicat-
ing our thoughts.

2. Any words will ferve for

recording.
Vol. IL



^5* H-



^5'



5. Communication bywords,
civil or philofophical.

4. Theimperfeclionofv/ords,

is the doubtfulnefs of their
fignification.

5. Caufes of their imperfec-
tion.

6. The names of mixed modes
doubtful : firft, becaufe
the ideas they Hand for,
are fo complex.

7. Secondly, becaufe they
have no ftandards.

8. Propriety not a fufEcient
remedy.

9. The way of learning thefe
names contributes aifo to
their doubtfulnefs.

10. Hence unavoidable obfcu*
rlty in ancient authors.
Names of fubilances, of
doubtful ugniiicarion.
Names of fubilances re-
ferred, firft, to real eflcn-
ces, thcit cannot be kno'A n,
Secondl/, to co-exifting
qualitiesjwhich are known
but imperfeftly.
With this imperfcdion
they may fervc for civil,
but p.ot well for philofo-
phical ufe.

Inftance, liquor of the
nerves.

Inftance, gold.
The names of fimple ideas,
the Isaft doubtful.

ig. And



II.



12.



17-
18.



The CONTENTS.



J 9. And next to them, fimple
modes.

20. The moft doubtful, are
tlie names of very com-
pounded mixed modes
and fubftances.

21. Why this imperfeftion
charged upon words.

22, 25. This ihould teach us mo-
deration in impofing our
own fenfe of old authors.



CHAP. X.

Of the abufe of words,

SECT.

I. Abufe of words.
2, 3. Firftj words without any,
or Without clear ideas.

4. Occafioned by learning
names, before the ideas
they belong to.

5. Secondly, a fteady appli-
cation of them.

6. Thirdly, affefted obfcu-
rity, by wrong applica-
tion.

7. Logic and difpute have

much contributed to this.
J?. Calling it fubtilty.
9. This learning very little

benefits fociety.
10. But deftroys the inftru-
ments of knowledge and
communication,
n . As ufeful as to confound
the found of the letters,

1 2. This art has perplexed re-
ligion and juftice.

13. And ought not to pafs for
learning.

14. Fourthly, taking them for
things.

1 5. Inftance in matter.

1 6. This makes errours lading.

17. Fifthly, fetting them for
what they cannot fignify.

J S. V. g. putting them for the
real eflences of fubftances.

19. Hence we thiak every
change of our idea in fub-



20.

21.
22.

24.
25-



26—31.

32.

33'

34-



ftances, not to change the

fpecies.

The caufe of this abufe, a
fuppofition of nature's
working always regularly.
This abufe contains two
falfe fuppofitions.
Sixthly, a fuppofition tkat
words have a certain and
evident fignilication.
The ends of language :
firft, to convey our ideas.
Secondly, to do it with
quicknefs.

Thirdly, therewith to con-
vey the knowledge of
things.

How men's words fail in
all thefc.

How in fubftances.
How in modes and rela-
tions.
SevcRthly , figurative fpeech
alfo an abufe of language.



CHAP. XI.

Of the remedies of the foregoiag
imperfedions and abufes,

SECT.

1 . They are worth Peeking,

2. Are not eafy.

3. But yet neceffary to phi>
lofophy.

4. Mifufe of words, the caufe
of great errours,

^, Obftinacy.

6. And wrangling.

7. Inftance, bat and bird,

8. Firft remedy, to ufe no
word without an idea.

9. Secondly, to have diftinft
ideas annexed to them in
modes.

1 0. And diftinft and conform^
able in fubftances.

11. Thirdly, propriety.

12. Fourthly, to make known
their meaning.

15. And that three ways.

14, Firft,



The CONTENTS.



14. Firft, in fimple idea? by
fynonimous terms, or
fhowing.

15. Secondly, in mixed modes
by definition.

16. Morality capable of de-
monftration.

1 7. Definitions can make mo-
ral difcourfes clear.

1 8. And is the only way.

19. Thirdly, in fubftances, by
ftiowing and defining.

20, 21, Ideas of the leading qua-



22.



23-



24.



25.
26.



27-



lities of fubftances, arc
belt got by Ihowing.
The idea's of their powers,
beft by definition,
A refle<ftion on the know-
ledge of fpirits.
Ideas alfo of fubftances
mutt be conformable to
things.

Not eafy to be made fo.
Fifthly, by conftancy in
their fignification.
When the variation is to
be explained.



BOOK IV,

Of Knowledge and Opinion^,



CHAP. I.

Of knowledge in general,

SECT.

I. Our knowledge converfant

about our ideas.
2,"TCnowIedge is the percep-
■ tion of the agreement,
\ or dilagreement, of two
ideas. —

3. This agreement fourfold,

4, Firft, of identity, or di-
verfity.

5. Secondly, relation,

6, Thirdly, of co-exiftence.
*], Fourthly, of real exiftence.
S. Knowledge adual or ha-
bitual.

9. Habitual knowledge, two-
fold.



CHAP. II.

Of the degrees of our knowledge.

SECT,

1. Intuitive.

2. DemonftrativCo

3. Depends on proofs,

4. But not fo eafy.



Not without precedent
doubt.

Not fo clear.

Each ftep muft have in-
tuitive evidence.
Hence the miftake ex praj-
cognitis & pragconceiTis.
Dcmonftration not limited
to quantity.

Why it has been fo thought,
Senfitive knowledge of
particular exiftence.
Knowledge not always
clear, where the ideas are
fo.

CHAP. III.



Of the extent of human knowledge.



10—13,
14,



^S-



S E



Firft, no farther than \vc
have ideas.

Secondly, no farther than
we can perceive their
agreement or difagree-
ment.

Thirdly, intuitive know-
ledge extends itfelf hot to
all the relations of all our
id.^as,

4, Fourthly^



The CONTENTS.



4. Fourthly, not demonftra-
tive knowledge.

5. Fiithly, fenfitivc know-
ledge, narrower than ei-
ther.

6. Sixthly, our knowledge,
therefore, narrower than
our ideas.

7. How far our knowledge
reaches.

g. Firft, our knowledge of
identity and diverfity, as
far as our ideas.

^. Secondly, of co-cxiftence,
a very little way.

10. Becaufe the connexion be-
tween moft fimple ideas
is unknown.

11. Efpecially of feeondary
qualities.

J 2 — 14. And farther, becaufe all
connexion between any
fecondary and primary
qualities is undifcovera-
ble.

1 5. Of repugnancy to co-exift,
larger.

16. Of the co-exiftence of
powers, a very little way,

17. Of fpirits yet narrower.

2 8. Thirdly, of other relations,
it is not eafy to fay how
far. Morality capable of
demonftration,

5 0. Two things have made
moral ideas thought in-
capable of demonftration.
Their complcxednefs and
want pf fenfible reprefcn-
tations.

ao. Remedies of thofe difficul-
ties.

ai. Fourthly, of real exift-
ence; we have an intui-
tive knowledge of our
own, demonllrative of
God's, fenfitive of fome
few other things,

22. Our ignorance great.

zy Firft, fine caufe of it, want
of ideas, either fuch as we
have no conception of, or



fuGh as particulartf we
have not.

24. Becaufe of their remote*
nefs, or,

25. Becaufe of their minutc-
nefs.

26. Hence no fcience of bo-
dies.

•27. Much lefs of fpirits.

28. Secondly, want of a dif-
coverable connexion, be-
tween ideas we have.

29. Inftances.

30. Thirdly, want of tracing
our ideas.

31. Extent in refpedl of uni-
verfality.



CHAP. IV.

Of the reality of our knowledge.

SECT.

1 . Objedion, knowledge plac-
ed in ideas, may be all
bare vifion.
2, 3. Anfwer, not fo, wher«
ideas agree w ith things.

4. As, firft, all fimple ideas
do.

5. Secondly, all complex ide-*
as, except of fubftances.

6. Hence the reality of ma-
thematical knowledge.

7. And of moral.

8. Exiftence not required to
make it real.

9. Nor will it be lefs true,
or certain, becaufe moral
ideas are of our own mak»
ing and naming.

10. Mif-naming difturbs not
the certainty of the know-
ledge.

1 1 . Ideas of fubftances have
their archetypes without
us.

12. So far as they agree with
thefe, fo far our know-
ledge coacernijig them is



The CONTENTS.



1 3. In our inquiries about fub-
flances, we muft confider
ideas, and not confine our
thoughts to names, or
fpecies fuppofed fet out
by names.
14, 15. Objeclionagainlia change-
ling being fomething be-
tween man and beaft an-
fwered.

16. Monfters.

17. Words and fpecies.

18. Recapitulation.

CHAP. V.

Of truth in general.
SECT.

1. What truth is.

2. A right joining, or fepa-
rating of figns j i, e. ideas
or words.

3. Which make mental, or

verbal propofitions.

4. Mental propofitions are

very hard to be treated of.

5. Being nothing but joining,
or feparating ideas, with-
out words.

€. When mental propofitions
contain real truth, and
when verbal.

7. Objedion again ft verbal
truth, that thus it may be
all chimerical.

8. Anfwered, real truth is
about ideas agreeing to
things.

5. Falftiood is the joining of
names, otherwife than
their ideas agree.

10. General propofitions to be
treated of more at large.

11. Moral and metaphyfical
truth.

CHAP. VI.

Of univerfal propofitions, their

truth and certainty,
SECT.

I , Treating of words, necef-
fary to knowledge.



2. General truths hardly to
be underftood, but in ver-
bal proportions.

3. Certainty two-fold, of
truth, and of knowledge.

4. No propofition can ,be

known to be true, where
the effence of each fpecies
mentioned, is not known.

5. This more partl^ularlj-
concern^ fubftances.

6. The truth of few univerfal
propofitions concerning
fubilances, is to be known.

7. Becaufe co-exifience of
ideas in few cafes is to be
known.

8, 9. Inftance in gold.
10. As far as any fuch co-ex-
iftence can be known, fo
far univerfal propofitions
may be certain. But this
will go but a little way,
becaufe,
II, 12, The qualities, which make
our complex ideas of fub-
ftances, depend moftly on
external, remote, and un-
perceived caufes.
15. Judgment may reach far-
ther, but that is not know-
ledge.

14. What is requifite for our
knowledge of fubftances.

15. Whilft our ideas of fub-
ftances contain not their
realconftitutions, we can
make but few general, cer*
tain propofitions concern-
ing them.

16. Wherein lies the general
certainty of propofitions.

CHAP. VII.
Of maxims.

SECT.

1 , They are felf-evident.

2, Wherein that felf-evidencc
confifts.

3, Self-evidence not peculiar
to jeceiyed axioms.

4. Pirft,



. The CONTENTS.



4. Firft, as to identity and
diverfitv, all propofitions
are equally felf-evident.

5. SecoiMly, in co-exiftence,
we have few felf-erident
propofitions,

6. Thirdly, in othei relations
we m^> have,

-J-. Fourthly, concerning real
exigence, we have none.
$, Thefe axioms do not much
influence our other know-
ledge.
9. Becaufe they are not the
troths the firft known.

10. Becaufe on them the other
parts of oor knowledge
do not depend.

fl. What ofe thefe general
maxims have.

J 2. Maxims, if care be not
taken in the ufe of words,
may prove contradi<Slions.

15. Inftance in vacuum.

14. They prove not the exift-
ence of things without us,

15. Their application danger-
ous about complex ideas.

16 — 18. Inftance in man.

19. Little ufe of thefe maxims,
in proofs, where wc have
clear and diftind ideas.

20. Theirufedangeroiis,where
our ideas are confufed.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling propofitions.

SECT.

I. Some propofitions bring
no increafe to our know-
ledge.
1, 5. As, firft, identical propofi-
tions,

4. Secondly, when a part of
any complex idea is pre-
dicated of the whole.

5. As part of the definition
of the term defined.

6. Inftance, man and palfry,

7. For this teaches but the
fignification of words.



8. But no real knowledge-
5. General propofitions, con-
cerning fubftance3, arc
often trifling.
JO. And why.

1 1 . Thirdly, cfing words va-
rioufly, is trifling with
them.

12. Marks of verbal propofi-
tions, Firft, predication
in abftrad.

13. Secondly, a part of the
definition, predicated of
any term.



CHAP. IX.
Of our knowledge of exiftence.

SECT. \

1. General, certain propofi- ;
tions concern not exift- <
ence. ;

2. A threefold knowledge of j
exiftence. /

3 . Ourknowledge of our own •
exiftence, is intuitive.



CHAP. X.
Of the exiftence of a God.

SECT.

1 . We are capable of know-
ing certainly that there »
a God.

2. Man knows that he him-
felf is.

3. He knows alfo, th^t no-
thing cannot produce a
being, therefore fome-
thing eternal.

4. That eternal being muft
be moft powerful,

5. And moft knowing.

6. And therefore God.

7. Our idea of a moft perfe^
being, not the fole proof
of a God.

8. Something from eternity.

9. Two {oris of beings, co-
gitative and iacogitative.



The CONTENTS,



lo, Incogitative being cannot
produce a. cogitative.
l€, 12, Therefore there has beea
an eternal wifdom.

13. Whether material, or no.

1 4. Not material, firft, becaufe
every particle of matter is
not cogitative.

^ tS* Secondly, one particle
alone of matter caanot be
cogit2tive.

16. Thirdly 5, a fyftem of in-
cogitative matter cannot
be cogitative.

17* Whether in motion or at
reft.
18, 19, Matter not CO -eternal with
an eternal mind.



CHAP. XI.

/' Of the knowfedge of the exigence
of other things.

$ E C T.

1, Is to be had only by fen-
fation.

2. Inltance, whitenefs of this
paper.

5. This, though not fo cer-
tain as demoiiftration, yet
may be called knowledge,
and proves the exiftence
of things without us.

^. Firft, becaofe we cannot
have them bat by the in-
lets of the fenfes.

J. Secondly, becaufe an idea
from adual fenfation, and
another from memory, are
ver' diilincl perceptions.

€. Thirdly, p!-,afure or pain,
which acccmpaniet adual
fenfation, accompamc': not
the returning of thofe
ideas, without the external
objedsc

7« Fourthly, our fenfes aiTift
one another's teftimony of
tlie exiftence of outward
Jhis^s,



8. This certainty is as grszt
as our condition needs.

9. But reaches no farther
than ad«al fenfation,

10. Folly to expea demoR-
ftration i6 every thiag«

11. Paft exiikace is known bjr

memory.

12. The exiftence of fpiiits
not knowable.

£j. Taxticahr pTopofiticms
concerning exiilence, arc
knowable.

14. And general prc^ofiticmt
concerning abftradi ideas.



CHAP. XIL

Of the improvemeat of our kEoar-
ledge,

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not &-aaHi
maxims.

2. (Theocca£ori©f th^Et^s^

nion,)

3. But from the coKipariis^
clear asid diftiiid ideas-

4. Dacgerous to build mpast
precarious principles.

5-. This no certaiii wa.y ta
trnth.

6. But to compare clesr,
complete ideas under fiea-
dy names*

7. The trae method of ad-
vancing knowledge, IS b^
confidering our sbftrad
ideas.

8. By which, morality, alfo,
msy be made clearer*

9. But knowledge of bodia
is to be improved caly bf
experience.

10. This may procure ys con-
venience, not fcience,

EI. We are fitted for moral
knowledge, and natural
improvements.

12. But mufl beware of hypo-
thefes and wrong princi-
ples.

13, The



The CONTENTS.



r J. The true ufe of hypothe-
fes.

14. Clear and diftinft ideas,
with fettled names, and
the finding of thofe, which
(how their agreement or
difagreement,are the ways
to enlarge our knowledge.

15, Mathematics an inftancc

of it.



CHAP. XIII.

Some other confideratlons concern-
ing our knowledge.

SECT.

1 . Our knowledge partly ne-
ceffary, partly voluntary.

2. The application volun-
tary ; but we know as
things are, not as we
pleafe.

3. Inftances in number, and
in natural religion.



CHAP. XIV.
Of judgment.

SECT.

1 . Our knowledge being ffiort,

we want fomething elfe.

2. What ufe to be made of
this twilight eftate.

3. Judgment fupplies the want

of knowledge.

4. Judgment is the prefunung

things to he fo, without
perceiving it.



CHAP. XV.
Of probability.

SECT.

1 . Probability is the appear-
ance of agreement, upon
fallible proofs.

2. It is to fupply the want of
knowledge.



3. Being that, which makes
us prefume things to be
true, before we know them
to be fo,

4. The grounds of probability-

are two ; conformity with
our own experience, or
the teftimony of other*
experience.

5. In this all the arguments,
pro and con, ought to b«
examined, before we come
to a judgment.

6. They being capable of
great variety.



CHAP. XVI.

Of the de5;rees of afTent.

SECT.

1. Our affent ought to be re-
gulated by the grounds of
probability.

2. Thefe cannot be alwayt
actually in view, and then
we muft content ourfelves
with the remembrance,
that we once faw ground
for fuch a degree of affent.

3 i The ill confequence of this,
if our former judgment
were not rightly made.

4. The right ufe of it, is
mutual charity and for-
bearance.

5. Probability is either of
matter of fad, or fpecula-
tion.

6. The coDcarrent experience
of all other men with ours
produces affurance ap-
proaching to knowledge.

7. Unqueftionable teftimony
and experience for the
moil part produce confi-
dence.

8. Fair teftimony, and the
nature of the thing indif-
ferent, produces alfo con*
iident belief, .

9. Ex-



The CONTENT S.



9. Experience and teilimo-
nies clafliing, infinitely
vary the degrees of pro-
bability.

10. Traditional teftimonies,
the farther removed, the
lefs their proof.

1 1 . Yet hiflory is of great ufe,

1 2. In ihin^c^s, which fenfe can-
not difcover, analogy is
the great rule of probabi-
lity.

15. One cafe, where contraYy
experience lefTens not the
tertimony.

14, The bare teftimony of re-
velation is the higheft cer-
tainty.



i^. The next is demonftratioft
by rtafo ling.

16. To fup(^Iy the narrownefs
of this, we have nothing
but judgment upon pro-
bable reafoning.

17. Intuition, demonftration,
^ judgment.

18. Confequences of words,
andconfequenccs of ideas.

19. Four forts of arguments :
firft, ad verecundiam.

20. Secondly, ad ignorantiam.

21. Thirdly, ad hominem.

22. Fourthly, ad judicium.

23. Above, contrary, and ac-
cording to reafon.

24. Reafon and faith not op-
pofitc.



CHAP. XVII.
Of reafon,

SECT.

1. Various fignifications of
the word reafon.

2. Wherein reafoning con-

fifts.

3. Its four parts.

4. Syllogifm, not the great
inftrument of reafon.

5. Helps little in demonftra-
tion, lefs in probability.

6. Serves not to increafe our
knowledge, but fence
with it.

7. Other helps fliould be
fought.

8. We reafon about particu-
lars.

5. Firft, reafon fails us for
want of ideas.
I ;o. Secondly, becaufe of ob-
I fcure and imperfcft ideas.

/ II, Thirdly, for want of in-
I termediate ideas.

12. Fourthly, becaufe of wrong

principles.

13, Fifthly, becaufe of doubt-
• ful terms.

j. 14. Our higheft degree of
i knowledge is intuitive,

I without reafoning.



CHAP. XVIII.

Of faith and reafon, and their dif-
tin(^ provinces.

SECT.

1. Necefiary to know their

boundaries.

2. Faith and reafon what, as
contra-diftinguiflied.

3. No new fimple idea can be
conveyed by traditional
revelation.

4. Traditional revelation may

make us know propofi-
tions, knowable alfo by
reafon, but not with the
fame certainty that reafon
doth.

5. Revelation cannot be ad-
mitted, ag^inft the clear
evidence of reafon,

6. Traditional revelation much

lefs.
7. Things above reafon,
S. Or notcontrar) to reafon,

if revealed, are mcWtcr of

faith.
9. Revelationin matters where

reafon cannot judge, or

but probably, ought to be

hearkened to,
h 10. hi



The CONTENTS.



10. In matters, where reafon
can afford certain know-
ledge, that is to be heark-
cncd to.

11. If the boundaries be not
fet between faith and rea-
fon, no enthufiafin, or ex-
travagancy in religion,
can be contradidcd.



CHAP. XIX.
Oi enthufiafm.

SECT.

1 . Love of truth neceflary.

2. A forwardnefs to didate,
from whence.

3. Force of enthufiafm,

4. P^eafon and revelation.

5. Rife of enthufiafm.
6, 7. Enthufiafm.

g, g. Enthufiafm miftaken for
keing and feeling.
I o. Enthufiafm, how to be dif-
covered.

11. Enth'ufiafm fails of evi-
dence, that the propofi-
tion is from God.

12. Firmnefs of perfuafion, no
proof that any propofition
is from God.

13. Liglit in the mind, what.

14. Re\ elation mufi: be judged
of by reafon.

J 1^, 16. Belief, no proof of reve-
lation.



CHAP. XX.
Of wrong alTent, or errour.
SECT.

i, Caufes of errouc.



2. Firll, want of proofs.

3. Obj. What fhall become
of thofe who want them,
anfwered.

4. People hindered from in-
quiry.

5. Secondly, want of flcill to
ufe them.

6. Thirdly, want of will to

ufe them.

7. Fourthly, wrong meafures
of probability ; whereof,

8 — 10. Firrt, doubtful propofiti-
ons, taken for principles.

1 1 . Secondly, received hypo^
thefes.

1 2 . Thirdly, predominant paf-
fions.

13. The means of evad.ing
probabilities, ift, fuppof-
ed fallacy.

14. 2dly, fuppofed arguments

for the contrary.

15. What probabilities deter-

mine the alTent.

1 6. Where it is in our power
to fufpend it.

17. Fourthly, authority.

18. Men not in fo many er-
rours, as is imagined.



CHAP. XXI.

Of the divifion of the fciences.



SECT.

Three forts.
Firlt, Phyfica.
Secondly, Pradica.



Thirdly, XrfXSHiOTiy.r;.

This is the firlt djvifion of
the object? of knowledge.



OF



O F



Human Underftanding.



BOOK III,



CHAR VIL



©/ Particles.



Particles
conned
parts, or
whole fen*
tences toge»=
ther.



§. I. T) ESIDES words which are names
X3 of ideas in the mind, there are
a great many others that are made ufe of,
to %nify the connexion that, the mind
gives to ideas, or propofitions, one with an-
other. The mind, in communicating its
thought to others, does not only need figns of the ideas
it has then before it, but others alfo, to fhow or inti-
mate fome particular ad:ion of its own, at that time, re-
lating to thofe ideas. This it does fcveral ways j as is,
and is not, are the general marks of the mind, affirming
or denying. But beiides affirmation or negation, without
which there is in words no truth or falfnood, the mind
does, in declaring its fentiments to others, conne^l not
only the parts of proportions, but whole fentences ojne
to another, with their feveral relations and dependen-
cies, to make a coherent difcourfe.

§. 2. The words, whereby it fignifies
what connexion it gives to the feveral affir-
mations and negations, that it unites in one
continued reafoning or narration, are gene-
rally called particles ; and it is in the right ufe of thefe,
that more particularly coniifls the clearnefs and beauty
of a good ftyle. To think well, it is not enough that a

Vol. 1L B mau



In them con-
fifts the art of
well-fpeak-
ing.



2 Of Particles. Book j,

man has ideas clear and diftindl in his thoughts, nor
that he obfervcs the agreement or difagreement of fome
of them J but he muit think in train, and obferve the
dependence of his thoughts and reafonings upon one
another. And to exprcfs well fuch methodical and ra-
tional thoughts, he muft have words to Ihow what con-
nexion, reliridlion, diftinclion, oppofition, emphafis,
Sec. he gives to each refpe(5live part of his difcourfe.
To rriiflake in any of thefe, is to puzzle, inftead of in-
forming his hearer ; and therefore it is that thofe words



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