The Crisis of the Naval War online

Queenstown Every 4 days. Atlantic ports.
Falmouth Every 8 days. Gibraltar.
Plymouth Every 4 days. Atlantic ports.

About 150 vessels sailed every eight days in convoys varying in strength
from 12 to 30 ships.

There was still a good deal of Atlantic trade that was not sailing under
convoy. This comprised trade between Gibraltar and North and South
America, between the Cape, South America and Dakar, and the coastal
trade between North and South America. It was estimated that an
additional twenty-five to thirty ocean escorts and eleven destroyers
would be needed to include the above trade in convoy.

The Mediterranean trade is dealt with later.

The question of speed was naturally one of great importance in the
convoy system. As has been stated earlier, the speed of a convoy like
that of a squadron or fleet is necessarily that of the slowest ship, and
in order to prevent delay to shipping, which was equivalent to serious
loss of its carrying power, it was very necessary that convoys should be
composed of ships of approximately the same speed. In order to achieve
this careful organization was needed, and the matter was not made easier
by the uncertainty that frequently prevailed as to the actual sea speed
of particular merchant ships. Some masters, no doubt from legitimate
pride in their vessels, credited them with speeds in excess of those
actually attained. Frequently coal of poor quality or the fact that a
ship had a dirty bottom reduced her speed to a very appreciable extent,
and convoy commodores had occasionally to direct ships under such
conditions to drop out of the convoy altogether and make their passage
alone. Obviously this action was not taken lightly owing to the risk
involved. Decision as to the sea speed of convoys was taken by the
convoy officer at the collecting port, and he based this on the result
of an examination of the records in the different ships. As a rule
convoys were classed as "slow" and "fast." Slow convoys comprised
vessels of a speed between 8 and 12-ВЅ knots. Fast convoys included ships
with a speed between 12-ВЅ and 16 knots. Ships of higher speed than 16
knots did not as a rule sail in convoys, but trusted to their speed and
dark hours for protection in the submarine area. The Gibraltar convoy
(an exception to the general rule) contained ships of only 7 knots
speed.

With the introduction of convoys the provision of efficient signal
arrangements became a matter of importance. The issue of printed
instructions to each master and the custom introduced of assembling the
masters to meet the captain of the escorting cruiser before sailing, so
that the conduct of the convoy might be explained, had the effect of
reducing signalling to a minimum, but it was necessary that each ship
should have a signalman on board, and the provision of the number of
signalmen required was no easy matter. A good wireless installation was
essential in the escorting cruiser and in the Commodore's ship in order
that the course of the convoy could be diverted by the Admiralty if the
known or suspected presence of submarines rendered it necessary, and
also for the purpose of giving to the Admiralty early information of the
position of a convoy approaching the coast, so that the escorting
destroyers could be dispatched in time.

Fortunately for us, German submarines constantly used their wireless
installations when operating at sea, and as a consequence our wireless
directional stations were able to fix their positions by cross bearings.
This practice on the part of the enemy undoubtedly went far to assist us
both in anti-submarine measures and in diverting trade to a safe course.

The introduction of the convoy system rendered the provision of
anti-submarine protection at ports of assembly a matter of great
importance, owing to the very large number of vessels that were
collected in them. Some of the ports were already in possession of these
defences, but amongst those for which net protection was prepared and
laid during 1917 were Halifax, Sydney (Cape Breton), Falmouth, Lamlash,
Rosslare (on the south-east coast of Ireland), Milford Haven, Sierra
Leone and Dakar. This involved extensive work, and was undertaken and
carried out with great rapidity by Captain F.C. Learmonth and his staff,
whose work in the production of net defences during the war was of
inestimable value, not only to ourselves, but to our Allies, for whom
large supplies of net defences were also provided. The U.S.A. also
adopted our system of net defence for their harbours on entry into the
war. Many anxious months were passed at the Admiralty and at the ports
named until the anti-submarine defences were completed.

The escort of the convoys through the submarine zone imposed very heavy
work upon the destroyers, sloops and other screening vessels. This was
due partly to the fact that there were not sufficient vessels to admit
of adequate time being spent in harbour to rest the crews and effect
necessary repairs, and partly to the nature of the work itself and the
weather conditions under which so much of it was carried out. It will be
realized by those who have been at sea in these small craft that little
rest was obtainable in the Atlantic between the west coast of Ireland
and the mouth of the Channel and positions 800 to 400 miles to the
westward, except in the finest weather. When to this is added the
constant strain imposed by watching for the momentary appearance of a
periscope or the track of a torpedo, and the vigilance needed,
especially on dark and stormy nights, to keep touch with a large convoy
of merchant ships showing no lights, with the inevitable whipping up of
occasional stragglers from the convoy, some idea may be gathered of the
arduous and unceasing work accomplished by the anti-submarine escorts.

It had been my practice during 1917 to call for returns from all
commands of the number of hours that vessels of the destroyer and light
cruiser type were actually under way per month, and these returns showed
how heavy was the strain on the destroyers, particularly those engaged
in convoy work.

For several months, for instance, the destroyers in the flotillas
stationed at Devonport were under way on an average for just under 50
per cent. of the month.

This meant that several destroyers in these flotillas averaged quite 60
per cent. or even 70 per cent. of their time under way, as other vessels
of the flotilla were laid up during the periods under review for long
refits due to collision or other damage, in addition to the necessary
four-monthly refit.

Anyone familiar with the delicate nature of the machinery of
destroyers - which needs constant attention - and the conditions of life
at sea in them will appreciate the significance of these figures and the
strain which the conditions imposed on those on board as well as on the
machinery.

It was evident in November, 1917, that the personnel and the machinery,
whilst standing the strain in a wonderful manner, were approaching the
limit of endurance, and anxiety was felt as to the situation during the
winter.

Reports came in from the Grand Fleet indicating that the work of the
destroyers engaged in protecting the ships of the Scandinavian convoy
was telling heavily on the personnel, particularly on the commanding
officers, and one report stated that the convoy work produced far
greater strain than any other duty carried out by destroyers. No mean
proportion of the officers were suffering from a breakdown in health,
and since the _whole_ of the work of the Devonport, Queenstown and North
of Ireland flotillas consisted of convoy duty, whilst only a portion of
the Grand Fleet destroyers was engaged in this work, the opinions
expressed were very disquieting in their relation to the work of the
southern flotillas.

However, the destroyers held on here as elsewhere, but it is only just
to the splendid endurance of the young officers and the men who manned
them to emphasize as strongly as I can the magnificent work they carried
out in the face of every difficulty, and without even the incentive of
the prospect of a fight with a foe that could be seen, this being the
compensation given in their work to the gallant personnel of the Dover,
Harwich and Grand Fleet flotillas. The convoy flotillas knew that their
only chance of action was with a submarine submerged, a form of warfare
in which the result was so very frequently unknown and therefore
unsatisfactory.

Under the new conditions the Admiralty took upon itself responsibility
for the control of the ships of the Mercantile Marine in addition to its
control of the movements of the Fleet. Indeed the control of convoys was
even more directly under the Admiralty than was the control of the
Fleet. In the latter case the proper system is for the Admiralty to
indicate to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, or to other Commands
the objective, and to supply all the information possible regarding the
strength of the enemy, his intentions and movements and such other
information as can be of use to the Commander-in-Chief, but to leave the
handling of the force to the Commander-in-Chief concerned. This is the
course which was usually followed during the late war. It was my
invariable practice when at the Admiralty.

In the case of convoys, however, a different system was necessary owing
to the difficulty of transmitting information, the great delay that
would be caused were this attempted, and the impossibility of control
being exercised over all convoys at sea except by the Admiralty.
Consequently the actual movements of convoys for the greater part of
their passage were directed by the Naval Staff. Owing to ships not
showing lights at night, convoys were diverted clear of one another by
wireless signal if they were getting into dangerous proximity; they were
directed to alter course as necessary to avoid areas in which submarines
had been located, and occasionally it became necessary to alter the
destination of some ships as they approached home waters. The movements
of all convoys were "plotted" from day to day, indeed from hour to hour,
on a large-scale chart at the Admiralty, and it was easy to see at a
glance the position of all the ships at any given time.

As the convoy approached home waters the ships came within the areas of
the Commanders-in-Chief, Coast of Ireland, Devonport, and Portsmouth,
and the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol, and were taken in
charge by one or other of them. At each port a staff existed which kept
a constant record of the movements of ships passing through or working
in the Command, and enabled the Commander-in-Chief to take instant
action if occasion arose.

The success of the convoy system in protecting trade is best shown by
the figures relating to the year 1917 on the succeeding page (p. 144).
In considering these figures the loose station-keeping of the ships in
the Scandinavian convoy must be borne in mind. A large proportion of the
ships in this convoy were neutrals, and it was naturally not possible to
bring these vessels under discipline as was the case with convoys
composed of purely British ships. Consequently there was much
straggling, and the losses were proportionately heavier than in most of
the Atlantic convoys. The comparatively heavy losses in the Gibraltar
convoys were probably due to these convoys traversing two dangerous
submarine zones. The extraordinary immunity of the French coal trade
convoy from serious losses is remarkable and is probably due to the
short passage which enabled most of the distance to be traversed at
night and to the ships being of light draught.

The table on the following page would not be complete were no reference
made to the heavy losses which were experienced during the year amongst
ships which were _unescorted_ through the danger zones, owing to the
fact that no escorting vessels were available for the work.

LOSSES IN HOMEWARD BOUND CONVOYS, 1917.

PORTS OF DEPARTURE OF CONVOYS.
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
| | No. of | No. lost | Percentage |
| Particulars | Ships | in | of |
| of Convoys. | convoyed | convoys | losses |
| | | | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
| | To end | | | |
| NEW YORK AND | of | 447 | 5 | 1 |
| HAMPTON ROADS | Aug. | | | |
| Started in May. | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 1,000 | 11 | 1 |
| | Oct. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 1,280 | 11 | .93 |
| | Nov. | | | |
| - - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| GIBRALTAR | of | 122 | 2 | 1.6 |
| Started in July | Aug. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 359 | 8 | 2.2 |
| | Oct. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 484 | 12 | 2.5 |
| | Nov. | | | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
| | To end | | | |
| SCANDINAVIAN. | of | 3,372 | 42 | 1.2 |
| Started in April.| Aug. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 4,800 | 6 | 1.3 |
| | Oct. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 5,560 | 3.63 | 1.1 |
| | Nov. | | | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
| | To end | | | |
| FRENCH COAL | of | 8,871 | 16 | .18 |
| TRADE | Aug. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 12,446 | 20 | .16 |
| | Oct. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 14,416 | 24 | .16 |
| | Nov. | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

In the Dakar convoy at the end of November and in the Halifax convoy 150
ships had been brought home without loss, whilst in the Sierra Leone
convoy 1 ship had been lost out of 90 convoyed.

LOSSES IN OUTWARD BOUND CONVOYS STARTED IN AUGUST

PORTS OF COLLECTION OF CONVOYS.
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
| | No. of | No. lost | Percentage |
| Particulars | Ships | in | of |
| of Convoys. | convoyed | convoys | losses |
| | | | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
| | To end | | | |
| MILFORD | of | 86 | Nil. | Nil. |
| HAVEN. | Aug. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 360 | Nil. | Nil. |
| | Oct. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 535 | 3 | .56 |
| | Nov. | | | |
| - - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| LAMLASH. | of | 35 | 1 | 2.8 |
| | Aug. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 175 | 2 | 1.1 |
| | Oct. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 284 | 2 | .7 |
| | Nov. | | | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
| | To end | | | |
| PLYMOUTH. | of | 42 | Nil. | Nil. |
| | Aug. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 246 | Nil. | Nil. |
| | Oct. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 414 | 1 | .23 |
| | Nov. | | | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
| | To end | | | |
| FALMOUTH. | of | 14 | Nil. | Nil. |
| | Aug. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 146 | Nil. | Nil. |
| | Oct. | | | |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | To end | | | |
| | of | 185 | Nil. | Nil. |
| | Nov. | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

In the convoys starting from Queenstown 180 ships had been sent out up
to the end of November without loss.

There were naturally loud complaints of these losses, but these were
inevitable in the absence of escorting vessels, and no one realized the
dangers run more than those responsible for finding protection; every
available vessel was not only working at highest possible pressure, but,
as has been mentioned, breakdowns from overwork amongst escorting craft
were causing very considerable anxiety.

The following figures show the dangers which were run by unescorted
vessels:

Losses amongst British merchant
steamships in 1917 by submarine
attack, under separate escort, under
Period convoy or unescorted.

Ships under Ships Ships
separate under unescorted.
escort. convoy.

Quarter ending June 30 ... 17 26 158

Quarter ending September 30 ... 14 29 148

October and November ... 12 23 90

In considering the above table it should be pointed out that a large
proportion of the losses shown under the heading "Ships unescorted" took
place amongst ships which had either dispersed from a convoy or which
were on their way to join up with a convoy at the port of assembly. It
was unfortunately quite impossible to provide escorts for all ships
either to their ports of discharge or from their loading ports to the
ports of assembly for the convoy, as we had so few vessels available for
this work. Thus, in the month of November, 1917, out of 13 vessels
engaged in the main oversea trade that were lost, 6 were in convoy, 5
had left or had not joined their convoy, and 2 were not joining a convoy
and were unescorted.

November was the month of smallest British losses during the period of
unrestricted warfare in 1917, and it is of interest to examine the
losses for that month. The total number of ships lost was 51. As many as
1,197 vessels entered or left home waters in _overseas trade_ exclusive
of the Mediterranean trade. Of this aggregate 87.5 per cent, were in
convoy, and the total number of these vessels sunk (13) was divided
amongst the following trades: North America, 1; Gibraltar, 5; West
Africa and South America, 1; the Bay of Biscay, Portugal and Spanish
ports west of Gibraltar, 5; Scandinavian, 1. In the same month there
were 2,159 _cross-Channel sailings _and ten losses, nine of these
vessels being unescorted.

Particulars of the locality of the total British losses of 51 ships for
the month of November are as follows:

East Coast north of St. Abb's 1
East Coast between St. Abb's and Yarmouth 4
East Coast, Yarmouth to the Downs 4 (2 by mine)
English Channel 21 (7 by mine)
Bristol Channel 4
Irish Sea 2
Bay of Biscay 2
South of Cape St. Vincent 1
Mediterranean 11
East of Suez 1 (by mine)

In order to give some idea of the great volume of traffic on the East
Coast and the consequent difficulty of affording proper protection, it
may be mentioned that in the month of October, 1917, the number of
vessels passing between Spurn Head (River Humber) and St. Abb's Head (to
the northward) was 740 going north and 920 going south. Of this total
only 223 of the northward - and 413 of the southward-bound vessels were
in convoy or under escort, the total losses being eleven, all amongst
the unaccompanied ships.

Mention should be made here of the very serious situation which arose
during the year 1917 owing to the success attending the attacks by enemy
submarines on oil tankers bringing oil fuel to the United Kingdom for
the use of the Fleet. A great many of these tank vessels were of great
length and slow speed and presented the easiest of targets to the
torpedo attack of a submerged submarine. So many vessels were sunk that
our reserve of oil fuel became perilously low. Instead of a reserve of
some five or six months we were gradually reduced to one of about eight
weeks, and in order to economize expenditure of fuel it actually became
necessary at one time to issue directions that the speed of oil-burning
warships was to be limited except in cases of the greatest urgency. Such
an order in war was a matter of much gravity; the great majority of our
light cruisers and destroyers were fitted to burn oil fuel only, as well
as our latest and most powerful battleships. The crisis was eventually
overcome by drawing upon every source (including the Grand Fleet) for
destroyers to escort the tankers through the submarine danger areas, and
by the assistance given us by the Ministry of Shipping in bringing