The Crisis of the Naval War online

of the English Channel.

Admiral Mayo was also informed that it was proposed to provide
sufficient "heavier than air" craft of various types for the Fleet, both
to insure adequate air reconnaissance and to drive off hostile aircraft.
The Grand Fleet was at the time already provided with three seaplane
carriers, and the _Furious_ and other special vessels were being fitted
to carry aircraft. Many of the armoured vessels and light cruisers of
the Fleet had also been fitted to carry aircraft, whilst the Harwich
light cruiser force possessed one seaplane carrier; two carriers were
devoted to anti-submarine work, and three were employed in the
Mediterranean.

It was further stated that machines for naval reconnaissance were
working from several East Coast stations, and that lighters to carry
seaplanes for more extended reconnaissance and offensive work were under
construction. The work carried out by our naval aircraft off the Belgian
coast, comprising the duty of keeping the coast under constant
observation, of spotting the gunfire of ships, of fighting aircraft and
bombing objectives of importance, were also mentioned, as well as the
work in the Mediterranean, where there were four bases in the Aegean.

The extensive anti-submarine patrol work round the British Isles and in
the Mediterranean was touched upon, there being "heavier than air"
stations at the time at

Houton Bay.
Dundee.
South Shields.
Bembridge.
Calshot.
Portland.
Killingholme.
Yarmouth.
Felixstowe.
Westgate.
Dover.
Newhaven.
Cherbourg.
Plymouth.
Newlyn.
Scilly.
Fishguard.

Steps were being taken to extend the number of stations as soon as
possible, the new programme including stations at such places as

Padstow.
Wexford.
Queenstown.
Berehaven.
Loch Foyle.
Loch Ryan (or in the Hebrides).
Shetlands.
Peterhead.

In the event of the United States being in a position to co-operate in
the work, it was recommended that the three main seaplane stations in
Ireland should be taken over by the Americans, and equipped, manned and
controlled entirely by United States personnel.

In regard to the convoy system a full description of the whole
organization was given, with the results up to date, and details of the
vessels available and still needed for its protection.

Full information was afforded on the subject of the arming of merchant
ships and fitting other defensive measures to them, and the routeing
system in use for merchant ships was described in detail.

In the remarks on our anti-submarine warfare it was pointed out that
anti-submarine measures were carried out both on the surface, under
water, and in the air.

The surface measures were described as follows:

In twelve of the twenty-two areas into which the waters round the United
Kingdom were divided, regular _hunting flotillas_ were at work,
comprising trawlers and motor launches fitted with hydrophones. Before
the institution of the convoy system a few fast vessels, such as
destroyers or "P" boats, had been formed into hunting flotillas, but the
convoy work had necessitated the withdrawal of all these vessels, and
the work of the flotillas had suffered in consequence, the speed of
trawlers being too slow to offer the same prospect of success in such
anti-submarine measures. The flotillas of motor launches which had been
formed were of considerable utility in fine weather, but they could only
operate in comparatively smooth water.

At the time of Admiral Mayo's visit a force of thirty-two trawlers to
work with about six sloops or destroyers was being organized as vessels
became available, to operate in the North Sea with a view to engaging
enemy submarines on passage in those waters.

It was also pointed out to Admiral Mayo that the coast patrol vessels
which were not actually in the hunting flotillas were all engaged in
anti-submarine work and did frequently come into action against the
German submarines.

Finally Admiral Mayo was informed that the convoy system itself was
looked upon as an offensive measure since the German submarines would,
in order to attack vessels under convoy, be forced into contact with the
fast craft engaged in the work of escort and thus place themselves in
positions in which they could themselves be successfully attacked.

Admiral Mayo, during his stay in European waters, inspected some of our
naval bases and paid a visit to the Grand Fleet.

He crossed to France in order that he might see the work being carried
out at French ports by vessels of the United States Navy, and while
returning from this visit he honoured the British Navy by accompanying
Sir Reginald Bacon and myself in H.M.S. _Broke_ to witness a bombardment
of Ostend by the monitor _Terror_. On this occasion Admiral Mayo's flag
was hoisted in the _Broke_ and subsequently presented to him as a
souvenir of the first occasion of a United States Admiral having been
under fire in a British man-of-war. It is satisfactory to record that
subsequent aerial photographs showed that much damage to workshops,
etc., had been caused by this bombardment.

The Admiral and his Staff very quickly established themselves in the
high regard of British naval officers, and it was with much regret that
we witnessed their return to the United States. My own associations with
the Admiral had led to a feeling of great friendship. He left behind him
his Chief of Staff, Captain Jackson, who to our great regret had been
seriously injured in a motor accident.

Admiral Benson's visit took place later in the year. I had written to
him urging him to come across so that he might have first-hand knowledge
of the state of affairs and of the policy being followed. During his
visit the same questions were discussed as with Admiral Mayo, and
important action was taken in the direction of closer naval co-operation
between the Allies by the formation of an Allied Naval Council
consisting of the Ministers of Marine and the Chiefs of the Naval Staff
of the Allied Nations and of the United States. This proposal had been
under discussion for some little time, and, indeed, naval _conferences_
had been held on previous occasions. The first of these during my tenure
of office at the Admiralty was on January 23 and 24, 1917, and another
was held during the visit of Admiral Mayo and at the instigation of the
Government of the United States on September 4 and 5, 1917. On this
latter occasion important discussions had taken place, principally on
the subject of submarine warfare, the methods of dealing with it in home
waters and in the Mediterranean, and such matters as the provision of
mercantile shipping for the use of our Allies.

There was, however, no regular council sitting at specified intervals,
and it was this council which came into being in the early part of
December. Its functions were to watch over the general conduct of the
naval war and to insure co-ordination of the effort at sea as well as
the development of all scientific operations connected with the conduct
of the war.

Special emphasis was laid upon the fact that the individual
responsibility of the respective Chiefs of the Naval Staff and of the
Commanders-in-Chief at sea towards their Governments as regards
operations in hand as well as the strategical and technical disposition
of the forces placed under their command remained unchanged; this
proviso was a necessity in naval warfare, and was very strongly insisted
upon by the Admiralty.

The attention of the Council was directed at the earliest meetings to
the situation in the Mediterranean, where naval forces from the British
Empire, France, Greece, Italy, Japan and the United States were working,
and where the need for close co-operation was most urgent. The real need
in the Mediterranean, as was frequently pointed out, was the inclusion
of the naval forces of all the Allied nations under one single command.
In 1918 strong efforts were made to carry out this policy, and indeed
the actual Admiralissimo was selected, but the attempt failed in the
end.

Both these distinguished American officers were reminded, as indeed they
must have seen for themselves, that the successful combating of the
submarine danger depended largely on the manufacture of material, and
that the resources of this country, with its great fleet and its large
and increasing armies, were so seriously taxed that the execution of the
plans of the Admiralty were being constantly and gravely delayed. The
Admiralty was, indeed, seriously embarrassed by difficulties in the
adequate supply of mines and other means of destroying submarines as
well as of fast craft of various descriptions. The Admiralty, as was
pointed out, were doing not what they would like to do, but what they
could do, both in the way of offensive and defensive action. The
supplies of raw material and labour controlled in large measure the
character and extent of the operations at sea.


CHAPTER VII

PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES


It is difficult to give an idea of the truly magnificent work achieved
by the patrol and minesweeping services during the year 1917 without
showing how these services expanded after the outbreak of war in 1914.

When war was declared the only vessels immediately available for the
work consisted of seven torpedo gunboats manned by officers and men of
the Royal Navy, and fourteen trawlers manned by fishermen. All these
vessels were fitted for regular minesweeping work, and the crews of the
trawlers formed a part of what was known as the "Trawler Reserve." Other
trawlers, exceeding eighty in number, became, however, almost
immediately available at the outbreak of war under the organized Trawler
Reserve which had been set up a year or two preceding the outbreak of
war. Men belonging to this reserve had been trained in the work of
minesweeping and were paid a small retaining fee.

As soon as the German methods of indiscriminate minelaying and submarine
attacks upon merchant ships commenced, a great expansion of this force
became necessary. The matter was handled energetically by the Admiralty
at the time, and by the end of 1914 over 700 vessels (yachts, trawlers
and drifters) were employed on patrol and minesweeping duties, and the
Admiralty had also commenced to build vessels of the trawler type
specially for this work.

By the commencement of 1917 there were in use some 2,500 yachts,
trawlers and drifters, the great majority of them manned by fishermen or
men of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. and officered by trawler or drifter
skippers or officers of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., many of them having
temporary commissions in these services.

Early in the war the coast of the United Kingdom had been divided into
areas for purposes of patrol and minesweeping, and each area was under
the command of a naval officer on either the active or retired list.

The Chart D shows the respective areas at one period. No very important
changes took place in the delimitation of the areas during the war, and
the chart may therefore be considered generally representative of the
organization. Chart E shows the zones into which the Mediterranean was
divided.

[Transcriber's note: Charts D and E are maps of the waters around the
United Kingdom, and the waters of the Mediterranean, respectively, with
patrol zones marked.]

In December, 1917, the number of vessels of different classes actually
appropriated to various areas is given on the next page in Table A for
the British Isles and Table B for the Mediterranean.

TABLE A: AUXILIARY PATROLS IN HOME WATERS.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
Boom Defence Drifters, etc. |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + |
Boom Defence Trawlers. | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | |
Patrol Paddlers. | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | |
Paddle or Screw Minesweepers. | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | |
Motor Boats. | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | | | |
Motor Drifters. | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | |
Other Drifters. | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | |
Net Drifters. | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | | |
Motor Launches. | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | | | |
Whalers. | | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | | | | |
Trawlers. | | | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | | | | | |
Yachts. | | | | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - + - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - + - + - + - + - -+ - -+
Area No. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
I | 5| 44| 4| 6| 22| 2|11| | 3| | | 6|
II | 6|119| 7| 15| 72|112| 6| | 8| | 60| 83|
IV | 1| 27| | 12| 10| 3| | | | | 15| 10|
V | 1| 20| | 8| 12| 1| 7| | | | | |
VI | 6| 51| 1| 24| 9| 14|14| |13| | 20| 23|
VIII | 1| 51| | 16| 25| | 4| | 9| | | |
IX | 1| 93| 3| 6| 25| 1| 4| | 8| | 7| 25|
[ | 2| 16| | 6| 27| | | 2| | | | |
X -[ | | 53| | 6| | 19| | | | | | |
- | | 30| | 6| 28| | 2| | 7| | | 5|
- | 1| 29| | 33| 42| | | | 9| | 3| 13|
XI | 2| 70| | 31|101| | | |19| | | 2|
| 1| | | | | 30| | | | | | |
XII | 2| 35| | 26| 22| 10| | | 6| | | 10|
| | 18| | 5| 18| | | | | | | |
| | 14| | 2| 25| 2| | | | | | |
| | 6| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 4| 37| | | 1| | | | |
XIII | 1| 27| | 19| 15| | | | 5| | | |
XIIIA | | 54| | 21| 19| | | | | | | 1|
XIV | 2| 44| | 14| 41| | | | | | | 2|
| | 6| | 6| 6| | | | 5| | | |
XV | 3| 46| | 8| 59| 2| | | | | 3| |
XVI | 3| 19| | 12| 13| | | | | | | 1|
| | 9| | 6| 16| | 5| | 5| | | |
XVII | 3| 26| | 12| 68| 1| | | 4| | | 1|
| 1| 10| | 6| 31| | | | | | 4| 2|
XVIII | | 31| | | 11| 4| | | | | 4| |
XIX | | 7| | 8| | | | | | | | |
XX | | 8| | 6| 4| | | | | | | 1|
XXI | 1| 15| | 16| 11| | 6| | 7| | 2| 3|
XXII | 1| 10| | 6| 14| | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - + - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - + - + - + - + - -+ - -+

TABLE B: AUXILIARY PATROLS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ZONES

- - - - - - - - + - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - + - + - + - + - -+ - -+
I | 7| 9| | 19| | | | | | | | |
VI | 1| 12| | 42|116| | | | | | | |
VIII | 2| 61| | 21| 25| | | | | | 2| 2|
V | 1| 51| | 18| | | | | | 5| | |
X | 1| 47| | 17| 6| | | | | 5| | |
| 2| | | 12| | | | | | | | |
| 2| 22| | | 4| | | | | | 2| |
| 1| 4| | 11| | | | 7| | | | |
- - - - - - - - + - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - -+ - + - + - + - + - -+ - -+

It will be seen that the total number of British patrol and minesweeping
craft, exclusive of the stationary boom defence vessels, was at this
time 3,084. Of this number 473 were in the Mediterranean, 824 were in
the English Channel between The Nore and Falmouth, 557 were in Irish
waters or on the west coast of England, and the remaining 1,230 were on
the east coast of England and the east and west coasts of Scotland and
the Orkneys and Shetlands.

The work of these vessels was almost entirely of an anti-submarine or
minesweeping nature.

The trawlers were engaged in patrol duty, convoy escort service, and
minesweeping. The drifters worked drifting nets fitted with mines as an
anti-submarine weapon, and also in the case of the Dover area they laid
and kept efficient a barrage of mine nets off the Belgian coast. Some
were also fitted with hydrophones and formed hunting flotillas, and some
were engaged in minesweeping duties, or in patrolling swept channels. At
Fleet bases a small number were required to attend on the ships of the
Fleet, and to assist in the work of the base. The whalers, being faster
vessels than the trawlers, were mostly engaged on escort duty or on
patrol. The motor launches were employed for anti-submarine work, fitted
with hydrophones, and worked in company with drifters and torpedo-boat
destroyers, or in minesweeping in areas in which their light draught
rendered it advantageous and safer to employ them instead of heavier
draught vessels to locate minefields, and in the Dover area they were
largely used to work smoke screens for operations on the Belgian coast.

As the convoy system became more general, so the work of the small craft
in certain areas altered from patrol and escort work to convoy duty.
These areas were those on the East Coast and north-west of Scotland
through which the Scandinavian and East Coast trade passed, and those in
the Channel frequented by the vessels employed in the French coal trade.
The majority of these ships were of comparatively slow speed, and
trawlers possessed sufficient speed to accompany them, but a few
destroyers of the older type formed a part of the escorting force, both
for the purpose of protection and also for offensive action against
submarines attacking the convoys, the slow speed of trawlers
handicapping them greatly in this respect.

The difficulty of dealing with submarines may be gauged by the enormous
number of small craft thus employed, but a consideration of the
characteristics of a submarine and of the great volume of traffic
passing up and down our coasts will assist in a realization of the
varied and difficult problems set to the British Navy.

For instance, the total number of vessels passing Lowestoft during the
month of April, 1917, was 1,837 British and Allied and 208 neutral,
giving a _daily_ average of 62 British and Allied and 7 neutral ships;
and as Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has mentioned in his book, "The Dover
Patrol, 1915-17" (page 51), an average of between 80 to 100 merchant
vessels passed Dover daily during 1917. A study of these figures gives
some idea of the number of targets offered daily to ordinary submarines
and minelaying submarines in two of the areas off our coasts. When it is
borne in mind that the Germans had similar chances of inflicting heavy
losses on our mercantile marine all round the coasts of the United
Kingdom, and that it was obviously impossible to tell where an
underwater attack would take place, it will be realized that once
submarines reached our coasts, nothing short of an immense number of
small craft could deal satisfactorily with the situation, and afford any
degree of protection to trade. Minelaying by submarines was a
particularly difficult problem with which to deal; the enemy frequently
changed his methods, and such changes when discovered involved
alterations in our own procedure. Thus for some time after the
commencement of minelaying by submarines, the whole of the mines of one
submarine would be laid in a comparatively small area. It was fairly
easy to deal with this method as a dangerous area was proclaimed round
the spot where a mine was discovered, and experience soon showed the
necessary extent of area to proclaim. Later the submarines laid mines in
groups of about six. This necessitated the proclamation of more than one
area, and was naturally a more difficult problem. At a further stage the
submarines scattered their mines in even smaller numbers, and the task
of ensuring a safe channel was still further increased. The most
difficult artifice to deal with, however, was the introduction by the
Germans of a delay action device in their mines, which caused them to
remain at the bottom for varying periods after being laid. The ordinary
mine-sweep, the function of which was to catch the mooring rope of the
mine and drag the mine clear of the channel, was, of course, ineffective
against the mine on the bottom, and there was no guarantee that mines
might not be released from the bottom and rise to a depth at which they
were dangerous, _after the channel had been swept and reported clear_.
To deal with this danger a chain-sweep to work on the bottom was
introduced, but its use presented many difficulties, especially over a
rocky bottom.

When a regular swept and buoyed channel was in use the enemy had little
difficulty in deciding on the positions in which to lay mines by reason
of the presence of the buoys. This fact constituted the principal
disadvantage in the use of a buoyed channel, but in certain places where
the traffic was heavy the procedure was inevitable, and it greatly
simplified the work of the patrol craft and minesweepers; the only
precautions possible lay in the use of alternative marked channels, and
in the laying of defensive deep minefields outside the channel in which
enemy submarines might compass their own destruction. As rapidly as our
supply of mines admitted, this latter device was adopted in positions
where the minefields could not constitute a danger to our own
submarines. False buoyed channels with mined areas round them could also
be laid in which to catch the submarine. Another device was that of
altering the position of light vessels and buoys with the object of
putting a submarine on to a shoal.

The situation with which our patrol and minesweeping craft had to deal
having now been stated, it remains to speak of the magnificent manner in
which they accomplished their task.

I regret very deeply that, in spite of a strong desire to undertake the
task, I have neither the information nor the literary ability to do
justice to the many deeds of individual gallantry, self-sacrifice and
resource performed by the splendid officers and men who manned the small
craft. No words of mine can adequately convey the intense admiration
which I felt, and which I know was shared by the whole Navy, for the
manner in which their arduous and perilous work was carried out. These
fine seamen, though quite strange to the hazardous work which they were
called upon to undertake, quickly accustomed themselves to their new
duties, and the nation should ever be full of gratitude that it bred
such a race of hardy, skilful and courageous men as those who took so
great a part in defeating the greatest menace with which the Empire has
ever been faced.

There are, however, just two cases in 1917, typical of many others,
which I cannot forbear from mentioning. The first occurred off the East
Coast of England.

On August 15 the armed fishing craft _Nelson_ and _Ethel and Millie_
were attacked by gunfire by a German submarine on the surface at a range
of four to five miles.

The submarine first concentrated her fire on the _Nelson_, which
immediately slipped her trawl and went to action stations. The third
shot from the submarine pierced the trawler's bows, and, having
established the range, the submarine poured a well-directed fire into
the _Nelson_, under which she rapidly began to settle down.

The seventh shot struck the skipper, Thomas Crisp, D.S.C., R.N.R.,
taking off both his legs and partly disembowelling him.

In spite of the terrible nature of his injuries he retained
consciousness and gave instructions to the mate, who was his son, to
send a message by carrier pigeon to the senior officer of his base
reporting that he was engaged with the enemy; he then bade him fight to
the last.

The _Nelson_, armed with one small gun, replied to the enemy's fire
until the heavy heel which she had assumed made it impossible to bring
the gun to bear. As she was then on the point of sinking the mate
decided to abandon her and take to the boat, and begged his father to
give them leave to carry him. This, however, the old man sternly refused