The Crisis of the Naval War online

equal difficulties. Early in February, 1917, we had available for
general convoy or patrol work only fourteen destroyers stationed at
Devonport and twelve sloops at Queenstown, and owing to repairs and the
necessity of resting officers and men periodically, only a proportion of
these were available at any one time. A number of these vessels were
required to escort troop transports through the submarine danger zone.
During the month of February six sloops were diverted from their proper
work of minesweeping in the North Sea and added to the patrol force at
Queenstown, and eight destroyers were taken from the Grand Fleet and
sent to southern waters for patrol and escort duty. There were obvious
objections to this weakening of the North Sea forces, but it was
necessary in the circumstances to ignore them.

This total of forty destroyers and sloops represented the whole
available force at the end of February. Simultaneously a careful
investigation showed that for the institution of a system of convoy and
escort for homeward-bound Atlantic trade alone to the United Kingdom,
our requirements would be eighty-one destroyers or sloops and
forty-eight trawlers (the latter vessels being only suitable for
escorting the slow 6-7-knot ships of the trade from Gibraltar to the
United Kingdom). For the outward Atlantic trade from the United Kingdom
our estimated requirements were forty-four additional destroyers or
sloops.

The deficiency in suitable vessels of this class is best shown by the
following table, which reveals the destroyer position at different
periods during the year 1917:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mediterranean.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
Pembroke. |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ |
Queenstown. | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | |
Bunerana. | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | |
North Channel. | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | | |
Scapa and Invergordon. | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | |
The Tyne. | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | | | | |
The Humber. | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | |
Lowestoft. | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | | | | | | |
The Nore. | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | | | |
Portsmouth. | | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | | | | | | | | |
Devonport. | | | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | | | | | |
Dover. | | | | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | | | | | | | | | | |
Harwich Fleet. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - - - + | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Grand Fleet. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - + - -+ - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - -+ - + - -
January. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Flotilla Leaders | 10| 2| 3| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Modern destroyers | 97|45|18|14|13| | | | | | | | | |29
|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
construction | | |11| 6|16| 9| | 9|11|15| 4| | | | 8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
P boats | | 2| 5| | 4|10| 4| 1| | | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - + - -+ - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - -+ - + - -
June. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Flotilla Leaders | 10| 3| 4| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Modern destroyers | 95|23|29|38|15| | | 5| | | | 4| 32| |29
|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | |[B]| |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
construction | | |10| 5|16| 7| |29| 1|11| 4| | | | 8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
P boats | | 2| 6| | 8| 9| 4| 1| | | | | | 5|
- - - - - - - - - - + - -+ - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - -+ - + - -
November. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Flotilla Leaders | 11| 4| 6| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Modern destroyers |101|24|26|37| 9| | | 4| | | |29| 35| |32
|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | |[B]| |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
construction | | |10| 4| 8|12| 2|30| |11| 4| | | | 8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
P boats | | 2| 6| |31| | | 1| | | | | |10|
- - - - - - - - - - + - -+ - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - -+ - + - -

[Footnote A: Includes destroyers detached for protection work in other
commands.]

[Footnote B: Includes United States destroyers.]

There was the possible alternative of bringing only a small portion of
the trade under convoy by taking all the available fast small craft from
patrol duty and utilizing them to escort this portion of the trade, but
it was felt that as this would leave the _whole_ of the remaining trade
entirely without protection, and no fast patrol craft would be on the
trade routes to pick up the crews of any merchant ships that might be
sunk by submarines, the step was not justified.

The next point for consideration was the possibility of obtaining
destroyers or sloops from other sources with which to increase the
forces for trade protection. The only commands on which it was possible
to draw further were the Grand Fleet, the Harwich and Dover forces, the
destroyers of old types working on the East Coast, or the destroyers and
"P" boats protecting our cross-Channel communications west of the Dover
Command.

It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or Dover flotillas
materially, as we were already running the gravest risks from the
inadequacy of these forces to deal with enemy destroyers and submarines
operating in southern waters from Zeebrugge or from German ports, and in
addition the Harwich Force furnished the sole protection for the weekly
convoy running between the Thames and Dutch ports, besides being much
required for reconnaissance and offensive operations in the Heligoland
Bight so far as it could be spared for this purpose. However, the
emergency was such that destroyers were taken from Harwich, as the force
obtained new vessels of a faster and more powerful type. The destroyers
on the East Coast and in the Portsmouth Command were already inadequate
to afford proper protection to the trade and the cross-Channel
communications, as evidenced by our losses. Here again, however, in
order to meet the very serious situation, some destroyers were
eventually transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at the expense
of still less protection and fewer opportunities for offensive action
against submarines. There remained only the Grand Fleet destroyers on
which we could draw yet further. It had always been held that the Grand
Fleet required a total force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla
leaders for the double purpose of screening the ships from submarine
attack when at sea and of countering the enemy's destroyers and
attacking his heavy ships with torpedo fire in a fleet action. We had
gradually built the destroyer force of the Grand Fleet up to this figure
by the early spring of 1917, although, of course, it fell far short of
requirements in earlier months. It was well known to us that the High
Sea Fleet would be accompanied by at least eight flotillas, or
eighty-eight destroyers, when proceeding to sea at its _selected_
moment, and it was quite probable that the number might be much higher,
as many more vessels were available. At our _average_ moment, even with
a nominal force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders, we
could not expect that more than seventy destroyers and eight leaders
would be present with the Fleet, since, in addition to those absent
refitting, a considerable number were always engaged on trade protection
or anti-submarine work in northern waters which could not join up in
time to accompany the Fleet to sea. When the Scandinavian convoy was
started in April, 1917, one flotilla leader and six destroyers from the
Grand Fleet were used for its protection; other vessels in northern
waters also depended on Grand Fleet destroyers for protection. Any
further transference, therefore, of destroyers from the Grand Fleet to
southern waters for trade protection was a highly dangerous expedient,
involving increased risk from submarine attack on the heavy ships in the
event of the Fleet proceeding to sea, as well as disadvantages in a
Fleet action. The necessity, however, was so great that the risk had to
be faced, and for some months of 1917 from eight to twelve Grand Fleet
destroyers were used for trade protection in the Atlantic, principally
from Irish ports, in addition to those protecting trade in the North
Sea.

It is interesting to note the number of persons who claim to have been
the first to urge the Admiralty to adopt convoys as a method of
protecting merchant ships against submarine attack. The claimants for
this distinction are not confined to Great Britain; the great majority
of them are people without any knowledge of the sea and naval matters,
certainly none of them possessed any knowledge of the number of vessels
needed to afford protection to the ships under convoy, nor of the
vessels which we could produce for the purpose at the time.

Possibly the facts related above may serve to show that convoys were
commenced by Admiralty direction, and that they were started as soon as
and extended as rapidly as the necessary protecting vessels could be
provided. Those who argued then, or who have argued since, that we
should have reduced the number of destroyers with the Grand Fleet will
not, I think, meet with any support from those who served in that Fleet,
especially from the officers upon whom lay the responsibility for
countering any move of the High Sea Fleet.

The entry of the United States into the war early in April eased the
situation somewhat. First it was hoped that the United States Navy would
assist us with destroyers and other small craft, and secondly it was a
fact that the great majority of the material imported into countries
contiguous to Germany came from the United States. There was reason to
anticipate that steps would be taken by the United States authorities in
the direction of some form of rationing of these countries, and in these
circumstances it was justifiable to reduce gradually the strength of our
blockading squadron of armed merchant vessels known as the 10th Cruiser
Squadron. By this means we could at once provide additional vessels to
act as convoying cruisers.

Vice-Admiral W.S. Sims had arrived in this country in March, 1917, after
passing through an exciting experience, the ship in which he crossed
(the United States steamer _St. Louis_) being mined outside Liverpool.
He came to visit me at the Admiralty immediately after his arrival in
London, and from that day until I left the Admiralty at the end of the
year it was my privilege and pleasure to work in the very closest
co-operation with him. My friendship with the Admiral was of very long
standing. We had during many years exchanged views on different naval
subjects, but principally on gunnery questions. I, in common with other
British naval officers who had the honour of his acquaintance, had
always been greatly struck by his wonderful success in the post of
Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy. That success was
due not only to his intimate knowledge of gunnery, but also to his
attractive personality, charm of manner, keen sense of humour, and quick
and accurate grasp of any problem with which he was confronted. It was
fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that Admiral Sims should have been
selected to command the United States forces in European waters, for to
the qualities mentioned above he added a habit of speaking his mind with
absolutely fearless disregard of the consequences. This characteristic
has led him on more than one occasion into difficulty, but in the
circumstances with which we had to deal in 1917 it was just the quality
that was needed. It was a very difficult matter for those in authority
in the United States, separated as they were by 3,000 miles of sea from
the theatres of war, to realize the conditions in European waters, for
the Admiralty was not concerned only with the North Sea and Atlantic,
and the terse and straightforward reports of Admiral Sims, and his
convincing statements, went a long way towards bringing home to the
United States people at that time the extreme gravity of the situation
and the need for immediate action. He was consistently backed up by that
great ambassador, the late Mr. W.H. Page, who also honoured me with his
confidence, and to whom I spoke perfectly freely on all occasions.

The assistance from the United States that it was hoped was now in sight
made the prospect of success following on the adoption of the convoy
system far more favourable, and preparations were put in hand for the
institution of an ocean convoy system on a large scale. In order to gain
some experience of the difficulties attending the working of cargo
ships, directions were given for an experimental convoy to be collected
at Gibraltar. The necessary officers were sent out to Gibraltar with
orders to assemble the convoy, to instruct the masters in the work that
lay before them, and to explain to them the system of sailing, the
manner in which the convoy would be handled, and the protection that
would be afforded. This naturally took time, and the convoy did not
arrive in England until after the middle of May. The experience gained
showed, however, that the difficulties apprehended by the officers of
the Mercantile Marine were not insuperable, and that, given adequate
protection by cruisers and small fast craft, the system was at least
practicable. It was accordingly decided to put it into operation at
once, and to extend it as rapidly as the increase in the numbers of our
destroyers and sloops permitted.

The North Atlantic homeward-bound trade was brought under convoy in May,
1917, and the Gibraltar homeward-bound trade in July, but for some
months it was impossible to provide for the institution of a complete
convoy system. At first some 40 per cent, of the homeward-bound trade
was convoyed. Then the system was gradually extended to include first 60
per cent., then 80 per cent., and finally 100 per cent, of the homeward
Atlantic trade and the trade from Gibraltar, trawlers being used as
escorts for the Gibraltar trade, as the majority of the ships therein
engaged were slow. But trawlers are unsatisfactory escort vessels.

In the early stages of the convoy system difficulties were experienced
from the fact that all the available destroyers and most of the sloops
were used as escorts, with the result that the ships not under convoy
were left with but little protection.


CHAPTER V

THE CONVOY SYSTEM AT WORK


As has been mentioned in Chapter II., the first ships to be brought
under a system of convoy were those engaged in the French coal trade and
in the trade between Scandinavia and the United Kingdom.

In the case of the _French coal trade_, commencing in March, 1917, the
steamships engaged in the trade were sailed in groups from four
different assembly ports, viz.:

Southend to Boulogne and Calais.
St. Helens to Havre.
Portland to Cherbourg.
Penzance to Brest.

Between Southend and Boulogne and Calais the protection was given by the
vessels of the Dover Patrol in the course of their ordinary duties, but
for the other three routes special escort forces were utilized, and
daily convoys were the rule.

Owing to the great demand for coal in France, sailing vessels were also
used, and sailed under convoy from several of the south-west ports.

A large organization was required to deal with the trade, and this was
built up under the supervision of Captain Reginald G.H. Henderson, C.B.,
of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, working under
Vice-Admiral (then Rear-Admiral) Sir Alexander Duff, head of the
Division, in conference with the Commanders-in-Chief, Portsmouth and
Plymouth, under whose direction and protection the convoys were run. The
immunity of this trade, carried out in the infested waters of the
English Channel, from successful attack by submarines was extraordinary.
No doubt the small size of the vessels concerned and their comparatively
shallow draught were a contributory cause to this immunity. The figures
for the period March to August, 1917, show that 8,825 vessels crossed
the Channel under convoy, and that only fourteen were lost.

The history of the _Scandinavian and East Coast convoys_ dates back to
the autumn of 1916, when heavy losses were being incurred amongst
Scandinavian ships due to submarine attack. Thus in October, 1916, the
losses amongst Norwegian and Swedish ships by submarine attack were more
than three times as great as the previous highest monthly losses. Some
fear existed that the neutral Scandinavian countries might refuse to run
such risks and go to the extreme of prohibiting sailings. Towards the
end of 1916, before I left the Fleet, a system of "protected" sailings
was therefore introduced. In this system the Commander-in-Chief, Grand
Fleet, fixed upon a number of alternative routes between Norway and the
Shetland Islands, which were used by all vessels trading between
Scandinavia and Allied countries. The particular route in use at any
given moment was patrolled by the local forces from the Orkneys and
Shetlands, assisted when possible by small craft from the Grand Fleet.
The Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands was placed in charge of
the arrangements, which were carried out by the Senior Naval Officer at
Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands. At this period the intention was that
the shipping from Norway should sail at dusk, reach a certain rendezvous
at dawn, and thence be escorted to Lerwick. The shipping from Lerwick
sailed at dawn under protection, dispersed at dark, and reached the
Norwegian coast at dawn. Difficulties, of course, arose in the event of
bad weather, or when the slow speed of the ships prevented the passage
of about 180 miles being made in approximately twenty-four hours, and by
April, 1917, it was evident that further steps were necessary to meet
these difficulties, which were again causing heavy losses. Early in
April, then, by direction from the Admiralty, a conference was held at
Longhope on the subject. Admiral Sir Frederick Brock, Commanding the
Orkneys and Shetlands, presided, and representatives from the Admiralty
and the Commands affected were present, and the adoption of a complete
convoy system to include the whole trade between the East Coast and
Norway was recommended. This proposal was approved by the Admiralty and
was put into force as soon as the necessary organization had matured.
Escorting vessels had with difficulty been provided, although in
inadequate numbers. The first convoys sailed towards the end of April,
1917.

The system may be described briefly as follows. The convoys all put into
Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands, both on the eastward and westward
passages, so that Lerwick acted as a junction for the whole system. From
Lerwick, convoys to Scandinavia left in the afternoon under the
protection of two or three destroyers, and, with some armed patrol
vessels in company up to a certain stage, made the Norwegian coast at
varying points, and there dispersed, and the destroyers then picked up
the west-bound convoy at a rendezvous off the Norwegian coast shortly
before dark, and steered for a rendezvous between Norway and the
Shetland Islands, where an escort of armed patrol vessels joined the
convoy at daylight to assist in its protection to Lerwick. From Lerwick
convoys were dispatched to various points on the coast of the United
Kingdom; those making for southern ports on the East Coast were escorted
by a force composed of some of the old "River" class or of 30-knot class
destroyers, and trawlers belonging to the East Coast Command based on
the Humber, and those making for more northerly ports or ports on the
West Coast were escorted merely by armed patrol vessels, as the danger
of submarine attack to these convoys was not so great.

The main difficulty was the provision of the destroyers required for the
proper protection of the convoys, and to a lesser degree the provision
of armed patrol vessels of the trawler, whaler, or drifter types.

The conference held early in April, 1917, had reported that whilst
stronger protection was naturally desirable, the very least force that
could give defence to the convoys between Lerwick and the East Coast
ports would be a total of twenty-three destroyers and fifty trawlers,
whilst for each convoy between Lerwick and Norway at least two
destroyers and four trawlers were needed. The destroyers for the latter
convoys were provided by the Grand Fleet, although they could ill be
spared. The total number so utilized was six. It was only possible to
provide a force of twenty old destroyers and forty-five trawlers for the
East Coast convoys instead of the numbers recommended by the conference,
and owing to the age of a large majority of these destroyers and the
inevitable resultant occasional breakdown of machinery, the number
available frequently fell below twenty, although it was really
marvellous how those old destroyers stuck to the work to the eternal
credit of their crews, and particularly the engineering staffs. The
adoption of the system, however, resulted during the comparatively fine
summer weather in a considerable reduction in the number of merchant
ships lost, in spite of the fact that great difficulty was experienced
in keeping the ships of the convoys together, particularly at night,
dawn frequently finding the convoy very much scattered.

It became obvious, however, that with the approach of winter the old
destroyers of the 30-knot class would have the greatest difficulty in
facing the heavy weather, and very urgent representations were made by
Sir Frederick Brock for their replacement by more modern vessels before
the winter set in. All that could be effected in this direction was
done, though at the expense of some of the Channel escorts. Urgent
requests for good destroyers were being received at the Admiralty from
every Command, and it was impossible to comply with them since the
vessels were not in existence.

Certain other steps which may be enumerated were taken in connection
with the Scandinavian traffic.

The convoys received such additional protection as could be given by the
airships which were gradually being stationed on the East Coast during
the year 1917, and decoy ships occasionally joined the convoys in order
to invite submarine attack on themselves. This procedure was indeed
adopted on all convoy routes as they were brought into being, the rule
being for the decoy ship to drop behind the convoy in the guise of a