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New Testament condemns schism quite as severely
as it condemns heresy. He who separates himself
from the church of his fathers, because he con-
ceives that he no longer sympathizes with its
creed, is as truly guilty of schism as he who intro-
duces the war spirit into the church of his fathers
by fighting to remain in that church after it has ex-
pressed an unmistakable wish to have him depart.

Perhaps the conditions are reversed. The neigh-
bor is a heretic. He does not believe in the creed
of the church ; not even in what its doctors regard
1 Matt. X, 23.


as the essentials of that creed. He does not be-
lieve in the apostolic succession, or in the final
authority of the Bible, or in the permanent value
of the sacraments, or in the Nicene definition of
the Person of Christ. Shall he then be turned out
of the church and of Christian fellowship ?

" And John answered and said, Master, we saw one
casting out devils in thy name, and we forbade him,
because he followeth not with us. And Jesus said
unto him, Forbid him not ; for he that is not against
us is for us." ^

The lesson is clear : whoever is trying in the
name of Christ to cast out the evil there is in the
world is a worthy comrade for every one else who
is trying to do the same work in the same way.
There is one bond of Christian union, and only
one, — loyalty to Christ ; not to a definition of
Christ, that is to a creed ; not to a form of Chris-
tian worship, that is to a ritual ; not to a special
organization founded to do Christ's work, that is
to a church order: but to Christ. Whoever is
trying to do Christ's work in Christ's spirit is a
fellow-worker with Christ, and every Christian
should be willing to work in fellowship with every
other fellow-worker with Christ. It would take
me too far from the specific object of this book to
discuss here the question of Christian union ; it
must suffice to say that Christ recognizes no other
basis for such union than personal loyalty to him.
1 Luke ix. 49, 50 ; Mark ix. 38-40.


The substitution of any other basis is the parent of

But there is a breach harder to cure than any or
all of these. One can seek forgiveness for a real
or fancied wrong, proffer it for a wrong which he
has suffered, conquer a personal prejudice, see in
the bigot on the one side or the heretic on the
other a brother Christian, more easily than he can
forgive a wrong perpetrated upon another whom
one loves. Then loyalty seems to require at our
hands vindication of the wronged one. When it
is the wife, the child, the friend, who has been
unjustly treated, loyalty seems to say. Submit not
to that. But even to one thus righteously angry
Christ's teaching and example have a word of
explicit instruction : —

" And [he] sent messengers before his face ; and they
went and entered into a village of the Samaritans to
make ready for him. And they did not receive him,
because his face was as though he would go to Jeru-
salem. And when his disciples, James and John, saw
this, they said, Lord, wilt thou that we command fire to
come down from heaven and consume them, even as
Elias did ? But he turned and rebuked them, and said,
Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of. For the
Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to
save them. And they went to another village." ^

To refuse hospitality in that age was an open
insult. And it was because the Samaritan village
had thus insulted Christ that the disciples wished

1 Luke ix. 52-56.


to call fire down upon it. It was their loyalty
which was angered ; it was their love which wished
to avenge their Master. But their Master told
them that they did not understand ; that not even
love was to be vengeful ; that even love was to be
patient, gentle, forbearing. Two years later these
very disciples went into this inhospitable Samaria
and planted churches, and there some of the ear-
liest victories for the Gospel were won, vindicating
the name of Christ, not by death-dealing fire from
heaven, but by life-giving fire from human hearts,
which God had inspired with his own love. If
there ever was a man who might justly have been
stricken down by a bolt from heaven it was Judas
Iscariot. His betrayal had cost the death of his
Lord; had brought an end to the hopes of the
disciples; had shut them up to darkness and
despair in the house of death ; had pierced the
mother's heart with anguish ; and yet the last
word of Christ to Judas Iscariot was " friend."

But the wrongdoer has not repented, and we
think that we cannot forgive him, because God
does not forgive men until they have repented.
Thus false ethics grow out of false theology. For-
giveness is not dependent on repentance. The
effect of forgiveness is ; the act of forgiveness is
not. " While we were yet dead in trespasses and
sins, God for his great love wherewith he loved us
quickened us together with Christ." Does he
love us and forgive us, and offer to cleanse us
from our sins and lift us back into a higher and


diviner life, because we have repented? Not at
all. We repent because he forgives us and lifts
us up into a higher life. The soul cannot get the
benefit of God's forgiveness if it shuts God out ;
and a man cannot get the benefit of his friend if
he shuts his friend out. One clenched fist does
not make a battle, and one open palm does not
make a greeting. But the Christian is to reach
out the open palm, and whenever it is clasped on
the other side, then the friendship is reestablished.
" If it be possible, as much as lieth in you^ live
peaceably with all men."


Christ's law for the settlement of contro-

In the preceding chapter I have endeavored to
deduce from Christ's j^ersonal directions to his
disciples certain general principles to be recog-
nized by his followers in the settlement of personal
controversies. It is my object in this and a suc-
ceeding chapter to show that these principles
are equally applicable to the settlement of con-
troversies between nations and between classes.
Indeed, the history of civilization is to no incon-
siderable extent the history of the very gradual
adoption of these principles by Christendom, and
their incorporation, first into custom and then into
law. In order to trace the history of this adop-
tion, it is first necessary to state a little more
in detail the principles especially applicable to
controversies between bodies of men, — whether
between different nations or between different or-
ganizations in the same nation. These principles
are two, a negative and a positive one, — first, the
abandonment of force as a method of settling-
controversies ; second, the substitution therefor of
arbitrament by an impartial tribunal.


The first principle finds its clearest statement
in the following passage : " But I say unto you,
that ye resist not evil ; but whosoever shall smite
thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.
And if any man will sue thee at the law and take
away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And
whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with
him twain." ^ A careful scrutiny of this direction
makes it clear that it covers the three forms of
wrong under which men suffer, — personal violence,
legal injustice, governmental oppression. To smite
on the right cheek is an act of personal violence ;
to attempt by law to take away one's coat is an act
of legal injustice ; to impress one to go a mile
in public service without compensation is an act
of governmental oppression.^ Such impressment,
permitted by modern society only in times of war,
was formerly allowed to the government in time
of peace. Christ, referring to these forms of
wrong, — personal violence, legal injustice, gov-
ernmental oppression, — bids his followers oppose
to them only a passive non-resistance. He sets in
operation a new force in the world, what Milton
has well called " the irresistible might of meek-
ness." This might was before Christ's time almost
absolutely unknown.

If these instructions were not in themselves
perfectly clear, they are made so by the inter-
pretation which he has put upon them by his life.

1 Matt. V. 39-41.

2 See Alford's Greek Testament on the passage.


The despotic government under which he lives
sends out its officers to arrest him. He surrenders
himself and is led away. And when one of his
own disciples would resist the band, though he
says, "I could have twelve legions of angels to
rescue me," he will not. He condemns resistance.
" They that take the sword shall perish with the
sword." He is brought into the court. It was a
well-settled principle in the Hebrew law, as it is
with us, that a man accused could not be called
upon to criminate himself. Those who accused
Christ were unable to find any two witnesses who
would agree in their testimony against him, and
finally the High Priest calls Jesus to the stand
and administers the oath to him : " I adjure thee
by the living God that thou tell us whether thou
be the Son of God or no." He protests : " If I
tell you, you will not believe me." Yet he sub-
mits, testifies under oath that he is the Son of
God, and is led away to his death. In this trial,
and following it, he is beaten, spit upon, scourged.
He protests, but does not resist. To each of these
three forms of wrong he submits, — the wrong of
a despotic government, the wrong of a court of
law, the wrong of personal violence.

Is there, then, to be no resistance to wrong-
doing? Many have adduced this principle from
these words. And yet Christ sometimes did resist
wrong-doing. When he went up to the Temple,
a corrupt and wicked government had put cattle

1 Matt. XX vi. 52, 53.


in the one court where the Gentiles might go. He
did not merely utter a verbal protest against it ;
he wove a whip of small cords of the straw that
was at his feet and drove the frightened traders
from the Temple, and with them the cattle, and
overturned the money-changers' tables, and left the
money to roll about the floor. When the Temple
band came to arrest him, and his disciples were
asleep before the gate, he went forward and put
himself between the band and the disciples. They
fell backward to the ground, it is said. For the
moment he confronted the guard and held it at
bay, that his disciples might escape, and then, and
not till then, surrendered himself. Christ used
force to defend others, but never to defend him-
self. The fundamental principle in Christ's teach-
ing is this : Love may use force ; selfishness may
not. There is, says the Book of Revelation, a
wrath of the Lamb. There is a combativeness of
love which is legitimate. If a highwayman de-
mands my purse, I may give it to him rather than
take his life. But if he assaults my wife, or my
children, whom God hath put in my keeping, that
is another matter ; then, if I do not defend those
whom God has intrusted to my defense, I shall be
recreant and a coward. Our lives are so inter-
twined that it is often impossible to tell whether
one is defending himself or another. It is spirit,
not rule or regulation, which Christ prescribes, and
this is the spirit : Love may fight ; selfishness
may not.


To a considerable extent, modern civilization
accepts this principle. In a barbaric community
every man carries a pistol in his hip pocket. In
civilized communities he does not. We trust other
men to be our defenders and protectors. Disinter-
estedness defends the unarmed from wrong-doers.
Even pride, passion, and selfishness go unarmed.

This is the negative principle. But this is only
a preparation for the affirmative principle. Christ
does not leave any to go without a remedy, nor
controversies to remain without a settlement. He
tells his disciples to substitute for force peaceful
arbitrament by an impartial tribunal. " If thy
brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him
his fault between thee and him alone," ^ — that is
conciliation ; " if he will not hear thee, then take
with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of
two or three witnesses every word may be estab-
lished," — that is arbitration ; "if he shall neglect
to hear thee, tell it unto the church," — that is
law; "but if he neglect to hear the church, let
him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publi-
can," — that is non-intercourse. This is Christ's
method of settling controversies. The principle
of non-resistance does not stand alone. It is
coupled with the principle of impartial arbitra-
tion. The surrender of personal force as a means
of self -protection is accompanied by the principle
of appeal to the sense of justice, — first in the
wrong-doer, then in an amicably chosen tribunal,

1 Matt, xviii. 15-17.


last of all, in the community. In the settlement
of personal controversies this means, first, personal
negotiation ; second, friendly mediation ; third, a
leoal tribunal. In the settlement of industrial
controversies it means, first, conciliation ; then
arbitration ; third, appeal to the community. In
the settlement of international controversies it
means, first, diplomacy ; second, international me-
diation ; third, an international tribunal. And
in all these it means the abolition of the pagan
system which makes the individual judge and
jury in his own case ; the abolition of the pistol
and the bowie knife, and the substitution of the
court ; the abolition of the strike and the boycott,
and the substitution of arbitration ; the abolition
of war, and the substitution of international law,
and a tribunal to interpret and apply it.

Christianity, then, and war are absolutely in-
consistent. Christianity proposes, as the method
of settling all contests, an appeal to reason : first,
in the contestants ; then, if that fails, in an imj^ar-
tial tribunal. War prefers appeal to force. For
war is not mere chance quarreling. It is the
publicly recognized method of settling quarrels
between nations. It is provided for and brought
under the regulation of international law. " War,"
says Charles Sumner, " is a public armed contest
between nations, under the sanction of interna-
tional law, to establish justice between them." ^

1 The True Grandeur of Nations, by Charles Sumner. See aw-
thorities there cited which abundantly support this definition.


That it is a public armed contest between nations
will be at once recognized by the reader. Every
such contest is not, however, war. Legitimate
war is carried on under the sanction of interna-
tional law. This law determines measurably what
is a proper occasion for war ; what notice of war
should be given before the first offensive act ; how
that notice should be given ; who are combatants
and who are non-combatants ; what are the rights
of non-combatants, and under what rules and reg-
ulations the war may be prosecuted. It is, for
example, no longer legitimate to make war on a
neighbor for the . ostensible purpose of robbing
him of his territory. It is no longer legitimate
to pillage and destroy the property of inoffen-
sive inhabitants who are not contributing to the
enemy's strength. It is not legitimate to sell
prisoners taken in war into slavery, nor to kill
them in cold blood. International law determines,
in other words, the conditions under which war
may be declared and carried on ; and the avowed
object of this war between nations is to establish
justice between them. " Though war," says Mr.
Whewell, cited by Mr. Sumner in support of his
definition, " is appealed to because there is no
other ultimate tribunal to which states can have
, recourse, it is appealed to for justice. The object
of international law is not to prevent but to regu-
late warfare ; not to contrive some other method
of securing justice between nations, certainly not
to leave nations to suffer injustice without a


remedy, but to make such regulations respecting
war as a means of securing justice as will alleviate
soQiewhat its terrors, and redeem it somewhat from
its essential barbarism." ^

War thus resembles in its essential character-
istics the now obsolete wager of battle. The dif-
ference between the two consists in this : war is a
public armed contest between nations ; wager of
battle was a public armed contest between indi-
viduals. But the latter was, as the former still
is, conducted under the sanction of law, and for
the avowed purpose of establishing justice between
the combatants. The rules for the regulation of
personal battle were definite, explicit, and care-
fully enforced. If an individual were accused
of crime, he could demand battle with his accuser
as a means of determining his guilt or innocence.
Each party was required to swear to the justice
of his cause; his defeat involved him under the
stigma of perjury. He might, under certain cir-
cumstances, employ a champion to fight for him,
much as the king employs an army. The accused
could challenge not only his accuser but the wit-
nesses against him, and, in some cases, even the
court itself. He must prove his innocence by his
victory ; in England he was acquitted if he fought
successfully until the stars appeared. The whole,
system rested on the belief that God was present

1 " The part played by International Law has been not to pre-
vent but to reg'ulate wnviara:' — Encyclopaedia Bn'tannica, art.
" International Law."


with men in battle, and would defend the inno-
cent and give victory to virtue. Condemned by
St. Louis in France in the thirteenth century, it
gradually disappeared, but was not finally and
authoritatively declared illegal in Great Britain
until the year 1819. Abraham Thornton, accused
of murder, demanded the right to vindicate his
innocence by wager of battle. The court sus-
tained his right to do so. The accuser aban-
doned the proceedings, and at the next session
of Parliament trial by battle was, by legislative
act, abolished forever.^

It is the object of Christianity to abolish trial
by battle between nations, as it has already abol-
ished trial by battle between individuals, — not
merely to mitigate the horrors of war, not merely
to reduce the occasions of war, not merely to lessen
the preparations for war, but to put an end to
public war absolutely, as it has put an end to
private war absolutely. Fights there still are
between individuals, but the right to light is not
recognized by law. Fights there may still con-
tinue to be between nations, but the right to fight
will not be recognized by international law when
Christianity has wrought among the nations what
it has wrought within the nations. Christianity
has taken the bowie knife from the belt and the
pistol from the hip pocket. The individual citizen

1 See The True Grandeur of Nations, cited above, and authori-
ties there cited. See, also, Henry C. Lea, Superstition and Force,
Essoy I.


goes unarmed. He submits his controversies to an
impartial tribunal. He trusts for his protection
to a disinterested police. When Christianity has
achieved its mission, nations also will go unarmed.
They will also submit their controversies to an
impartial tribunal, and trust for their protection
to the cooperation of the nations of Christendom.
We shall have no navy, except such as is necessary
to patrol the sea and protect commerce from the
brigands of the ocean. We shall as little think it
necessary to put fortifications and torpedo boats at
our harbors as now to put a moat and the draw-
bridge at the front door of our houses. In brief,
Christianity has already substituted the appeal to
law for the appeal to force in individual contro-
versies. Its work will not be consummated until
it has substituted law for war in controversies
between nations. Law gives might to right ; war
gives might for right ; law establishes justice, war
simply demonstrates power ; law evokes the judg-
ment, war organizes the passions ; law is civiliza-
tion, war is barbarism.

It does not need much space to demonstrate the
evils of war as a method of settling controversies
between nations. Its pecuniary cost is enormous.^

1 The Napoleonic wars added £600,000,000 to the debt of
Great Britain, and exhausted France of all her soldiers. To E. C.
Leslie, Essays in Polit. and Moral Phil., p. 7o.

" The United States presents a contrast with Europe that is
most striking and pregnant with meaning. The extent of territory
is about the same ; the self-governing states in the United States
are thirty-eight, against only seventeen in Europe ; the population


It is estimated that, of the taxes paid by the bur-
dened people of Europe, one third is devoted to
the payment of interest on war debts, and one
third to the maintenance of military equipments.
Let the reader imagine what would be the con-
dition of private industry if every man had to
devote one third of his income to pay for arming
his retainers to protect his house and his property,
and another third to pay interest on debts incurred
in previous protection. Add to this cost that
which is involved in withdrawing from the pro-
ductive power of the nation the whole force of its
standing army, even in time of peace, and devot-

is fifty millions, rapidly increasing-, against 300,000,000 in Europe,
very slowly increasing-. Compare these figures with 27,000 under
arms in the United States, against 3,500,000 in Europe, and a war
expenditure o£ £10,000,000 in the former against £156,000,000
in the latter." Mongredieu, Wealth Creation, p. 100.

Mongredieu, Wealth Creation, p. 106, estimates the costs of
European armaments in time of peace as follows, above the
amounts supposed to be necessary for police purposes in a
" United States " of Europe on the basis of what is now supposed
to be necessary in the United States of America : —

£132,000,000 now spent on war preparations in time of peace.
£150,000,000 which 3,000,000 of men would earn who now earn

£10,000,000 which 500,000 horses would earn which now earn


£292,000,000 total annual cost of war preparations useless if
Europe were on a peace basis.

A. J. Palm, in The Death Penalty, p. 207, estimates the cost of
the Civil War in the United States, exclusive of interest and pen-
sions, at $3,418,000,000, and the market value of the slaves eman-
cipated at $1,200,000, — a costly method of emancipation.


ing that force to destruction in time of war, and
the pecuniary cost of this method of securing jus-
tice between nations transcends all estimate. But
this is the least cost. To this must be added the
loss of human life. The development of the
science of destruction has multiplied this loss
until to-day, so awful are the possibilities of
battle, so wholesale is the murder perpetrated,
that the most military nations are beginning to
react against the gigantic crime. " A¥hen we
recall," says Mr. James M. Beck,^ " that, in one
of the battles around Metz, the use of the mitrail-
leuse struck down six thousand Germans in ten
minutes, and that at Plevna, in 1877, Skobeleff
lost in a short rush of a few hundred yards three
thousand men, and remember that the mitrailleuse
and needle-gun have been since quintupled in
their capacity for destruction, the prospect is one
at which the mind stands aghast and the heart sick-
ens." This loss of human life carries with it the
desolated homes, the fears, the sorrows, the hope
deferred making the heart sick, the accumulated
anguish in innumerable hearts, which the greatest
novelists have endeavored in vain adequately to

Greater even than this is the loss to moral
character. War is the tiger in man let loose. It

1 J. M. Beck, The Distress of Nations : an address delivered
on Thanksg-iving- Day, 1894.

■^ See, for example. The Downfall, by Zola ; War and Peace, by
Tolstoi ; Ground Arms, by tlie Baroness von Suttner ; and Fire
and Sword, and The Dehuje, by Sienkiewicsz.


is the reversion to the brute nature, the employ-
ment of brutal methods. "War," says Douglas
Jerrold, " is murder in uniform." " War," saj^s

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