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mind and matter,' and he sums up his case by saying that
' to endow an extended substance with an indivisible spiritual
activity ' such as ' self-consciousness would be a metaphysical
impossibility beyond the power of God' (e). 'Therefore,'
says Father Maher, ' the intellect or the rational soul of man
is evidently distinct from the body through which it operates
and which it employs, and being distinct is essentially capable
of surviving it' " (i). {Fortnightly, p. 818.)

In reply I need only refer the reader back to chapter xxi.,
and especially to pp. 464 — 473, in order to let him see what a
travesty this is of my argument. Mr. Mallock professes to
give my reasoning as far as possible in "my own words," but
he omits to tell his readers that these words are taken from
half a dozen widely separated parts of my book, and that
more than half of them are extracted from later chapters



6o6 REPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM.

which presuppose the thesis to have been already proved.
As Mr. Maliock gives no hint that his quotations are from
different contexts, I have inserted the Greek letters so that
the reader may be able to examine them himself. Here they
are: (n) p. 230, (/3) p. 231, (y) p. 472, (§) P- 497^ (0 P- 499»
(i) p. 535 !

Mr. Maliock next confounds two different things carefully
distinguished by me, the simpliciiy and the spirituality of
mental activities. He then represents me as proving the
spirituality of the soul by the non-spatial character of its
activities. This proof he triumphantly refutes as a mere
assumption that " what is unimaginable cannot exist," and
confirms his refutation by my own statement elsewhere *' that
imagination is not a test of possibility," and by my doctrine
that the consciousness of the lower animals though also non-
spatial is essentially dependent on the organism and
perishes with the latter. " It is idle, therefore, to argue that
man's life contains a principle independent of the material
organism, merely because the phenomena of man's conscious-
ness are non-spatial or non-extended, and between the non-
extended and the extended there is an absolute contrariety,
for there is the same contrariety between the mind and the
body of an animal, and yet the two arise and perish together.
. . . The whole argument from the contrariety between
conscious life and matter is therefore valueless." (76/rf.p. 819.)

My answer is to refer the reader to page 469, where I
explicitly point out the difference between the spirituality and
the simplicity or non-spatial character of a mental activity.
I there state formally at the beginning of the thesis concern-
ing the spirituality of the soul that the principle of conscious
life in the lower animals though non-spatial is yet not
spiritual. I then prove, not from consciousness — which the
animals possess — but from self-consciousness, from thoui^Jit and
from free volition, of which the animals are devoid, that the
human soul is spiritual. Nowhere in this proof do I appeal
to the " non-spatial " quality of consciousness. My argument
is not, it is unimaginable Jwiv non-spatial consciousness can l)e
dependent on an extended organism, but that it is positively
unthinkable that self-consciousness, thought, or free-volition
can be acts of a bodily organ.

(3) Mr. Maliock next attacks my thesis that animals are
devoid of intellect, ascribing the following six arguments to
me. I shall distinguish them with capitals :

(A) " The principal contents of the intellect according to
Father Maher are these — 'attention, judgment, reflection,
self-consciousness, the formation of concepts, and the pro-
cesses of reasoning.' According to Father Maher, the



REPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM. 607



animals possess none of these; for as each of these is a part
of the intellect, if the animals possessed one of them they
would possess in some degree at all events that mysterious
faculty which he argues is possessed by man alone." {Ibid.
p. 820.) Having elaborately refuted this " argument,"
Mr. Mallock continues: (B) "But attention, judgnient, and
self-consciousness are not the faculties of intellect on which
Father Maher mainly relies when he is endeavourmg to show
that in the animals intellect is demonstrably absent. The
crucial faculty of the intellect on which his argument mainly
rests is the faculty of forming concepts. If nothing else is
evident, this at least he says is so — that men can form
concepts and the animals can not. In the forming of concepts
—these are his own words — 'the spiritual activity of the
intellect is best manifested.' Let us consider this point," &c.
(Ibid. p. 821.) (C) " Father Maher shows his secret and
uneasy sense of how weak and unconvincing are his tico main
lines of argument by his endeavour to supplement them with
others which unfortunately are weaker still. These supple-
mentary arguments are as follows : First, all the actions and
feelings of animals are purely sensuous." (D) Secondly,
animals unlike men make no progress, the geese of the days
of Moses were as wise as the geese of to-day. (E) Thirdly,
though the lower kinds of mental activity — such as memory
and imagination — are referable by physiological science to
particular portions of the brain, the highest faculties of all
cannot be so located. Though nominally they " may employ
as their instrument" this portion of the brain or that, they
are free within limits, if necessary, to use any portion they
please. The higher faculties then are demonstrably separable
from matter. (F) Finally, man's powers are admittedly
superior to those of the lower animals ; but there is no corres-
ponding difference between the animal brain and the human ;
therefore man's superior powers are demonstrably inde-
pendent of the brain. Let us therefore take these arguments
in order." [Ibid. p. 822.)

I have given this long extract to make it quite clear that
I am not mis-stating Mr. Mallock's representation of my
reasoning, and in order that the reader may be able to
observe for himself Mr. Mallock's methods of criticism. Let
him now turn back to pp. 583 — 586, where he will find this
thesis stated in special type, and my four arguments given.
He will notice that of the six "arguments" ascribed to me
and then triumphantly refuted by Mr. Mallock, only one
(D) has been used by me in any form. I invite him to
compare Mr. Mallock's representation with the original,
pp. 583, 584, and then to draw his own conclusions. That I



6o8 REPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM.

could not have used these statements as arguments to prove
the alleged thesis would have been evident to any cautious
reader had Mr. Mallock only given the references. Here
they are: (A) with its quotation refers to pp. 231 — 234;
(B) to pp. 235—237 ; (D) to pp. 583, 584 ; (E) to p. 571 ; (F) to
p. 502 ; (C) I cannot find anywhere. In other words, my
proof of this most important thesis is, according to Mr. Mallock,
scattered in fragments throughout 350 pages dealing with
many different topics. Yet he has been good enough to say
with respect to my proofs that I have " expressed and
arranged the arguments with great skill and lucidity."

Further, the reader will observe that of the five " argu-
ments " ascribed to me, but which I have not used, to prove
that animals are devoid of intellect, four are based on
fragments extracted from the body of the book, where I
treat of Human Psychology, not from the Supplement on
Animal Psychology, where alone I deal with this question.
I have deliberately separated the discussion of the faculties
of man from that of the animals, because our assurance
regarding the former is based on introspection, whilst regard-
ing the latter it rests on mere analogical inference, (cf. pp. 580,
581.) A reader may accept the chief truths with respect to
the former, yet profess nescience concerning the latter. As
regards the "arguments" in detail, (A) (B) and (C) are
obviously utterly absurd. (D), the reader can contrast with
the original on pp. 583, 584.1

If the reader compares (E) with the original on p. 571, he
will see that the scope of my section on the localization of
brain functions is totally misrepresented by Mr. Mallock.
He will also be not a little astonished to discover how
Mr. Mallock has changed my conclusion respecting the power
of the vital principle to heal wounds of the brain and to adapt
other portions to perform the functions of the injured parts.
My words were : These objections establish "that the principle

1 Against (D) Mr. Mallock objects (i) that many nations of
mankind have not progressed, and (2) that "in all progress in the
arts the human hand has admittedly played as large a part as the
intelligence." It may be replied: (i) The rudest savage who
points an arrow-head or kindles a fire exhibits an intellectual,
"progress" separated by a chasm from that of the brute, whilst
the immense variety in the stages of human civilization proves the
vast capacity for such progress in man compared with the rigid
limitations of the animal. (2) Mr. Mallock's second objection is
subverted by his first. The lowest savages, whom he places on
almost the same level as the ape, have as perfect a hand as the
most civilized man. The backwardness of animals in general and
the forwardness of civilized man must therefore be explained by



kEPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM. 600



whicli dominates tJie living organism has within certain limits
the power of adapting to its needs and employing as its
instruments other than the normal portions of the brain."
(p. 571.) What Mr. Mallock makes me say is: "Although
normally they (the highest mental faculties) may employ as
their instrument this portion of the brain or that, they are free
within limits, if necessary, to use any portion they please. The
higher faculties, then, are demonstrably separable from matter.''
Comment is unnecessary. The same is true with respect to
F. See p. 502.

(4) Finally, Mr. Mallock completes my confutation thus :
" All these arguments (A, B, C, D, E, F) imply the supposition
that by observation, inference, or otherwise we can learn with
complete precision what the mental life of the animals is, . . .
but when in a supplement Father Maher comes to deal with
Animal Psychology ... he turns round on himself and
bluntly and contemptuously denies the very postulate on
which the whole of his previous contention rested. He tells
us practically that we can know nothing about the animal
mind at all. . . . How can he base an argument for man's
essential difference from animals on the fact that the animals
are incapable of universal concepts, attention, judgment,
emotions not wholly sensuous, if all our knowledge of their
character is merely remote conjecture." (p. 824.) The italics
throughout are mine.

Mr. Mallock himself has created the alleged contradiction
by ascribing to me these five arguments which I have not
employed. He further strengthens that charge by telling his
readers that after having made use of these arguments which
imply "that we can learn with complete precision what the
mental life of animals is," I "turn round on myself," &c.
Now the reader will observe (i) that I have not used the
alleged "arguments;" (2) that it is at the beginning of my
first discussion of the mental faculties of the lower animals
that I warn the reader bcforehdind of the exact nature of the
evidence and of the limitations to our knowledge of animal

some other cause. But the argument has been finally disposed of
by recent facts. There have been many examples in late years of
men deprived of their hands or arms from infancy, who exhibit the
greatest dexterity and skill in the use of their feet and toes. If
then, as is the case, men without hands have acquired the arts of
painting, drawing, knitting, sewing, playing the violin, using
hammer and chisel, &c., there can be little doubt that were they
endowed with the fore-paw of the gorilla, which is so much superior
to the human foot as a prehensile instrument, there are few
important mechanical arts from which such persons would be
precluded.



6io REPLY TO MR. W . H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM.



minds through absence of introspection and language, and
(3) then infer, not from the absence of concepts or judgments,
which are unobservable, but from the absence of certain
modes of action and of language in which intellect, were it
present, would inevitably manifest itself, that this faculty is
absent. For this purpose it is not necessary " to know with
complete precision " the positive qualities of the mental life
of animals. I then confirm this proof with two additional
arguments ex coiicessis, based on the admissions of opponents.
The reader will thus see what little ground there is for the
charge of self-contradiction, and from these examples of his
methods he will be able, to appreciate at its just value
Mr. Mallock's general criticism.



INDEX.



Abstract Concepts. See Con-
cept.

Abstraction, and attention 232,
233, 236, 250; intuitive 294;
comparative 299 ; scholastic
theory of 305, 313 ; meanings of

307.
Accident. See Substance.

Active, powers 34, 208 ; touch

74 — 78 ; intellect 308.
Actus elicitus 217; humanus 395.
.Esthetic emotions 435 — 440.
Agnosticism, Spencer on 122 ;

outcome of monism 524.
Altruism 280, 430.
Analysis of sensation 48 ; and

synthesis 298; of judgment 315

— 318 ; of ratiocination 320 seq.
Analytic judgments 266, 289.
Anger and Fear 429, 430.
Animals, psychology of 14, 15;

579 seq. ; its difficulties 580 ;

sentient 582 ; irrational 583 seq. ;

instinct of 586 seq. ; souls of

593-
Antinomies, Kant's 267.

Apperception, Leibnitz on 263 ;
transcendental unity of 266 ;
historical sketch 358 ; nature of
359, 360 ; and perception 359 ;
and education 360.

Appetency, faculties of 29 ; sen-
suous 208 — 220 ; and movement
210; rational 378 seq. j and
emotion 426, 428.



Appetitus ; elicitus et natural is
208 ; irascibilis 209, 426.

A Priori Forms, Kant's 117 seq.,
267 ; Spencer on 286.

Assent and consent 318, 319.

Assistance, theory of 258, 553.

Association, mental and idealism
IXC — 114; and perception 125
seq.; and memory 180 seq.;
laws of 181 seq. ; reduction of
laws 184 seq. ; physiological
counterpart 188 ; cooperative
and obstructive 189 ; secondary
laws 190 ; history of doctrine
201 seq.; indissoluble 204 ; and
the beautiful 437.

Association ism, school of 230;
and necessary truth 282 — 286 ;
and conscience 337 — 340.

Attention, motor force of 219;
supra-sensuous 232, 233 ; Balmez
and Lotze on 243 — 247 ; and
abstraction 297, 298 ; special
treatment of 345 seq. ; expectant
219, 350; and volition 346, 406;
and genius 351.

Auditory Perception 145, 146.

Automata, conscious 503, 582.

Automatic movement 218.

Axioms, cf. Necessary truths.

Beauty, cognition of i66, 435 —

438.
Being, idea of, Rosmini on 264 ;

origin of 296, 297.



n



INDEX.



Belief, history of views on 326—
328 ; nature of 328 ; and know-
ledge 329, 330 ; causes and
reasonsof 331— 334; effects 335.

Berkeleyan theory of vision 108.

Binocular vision 142 — 144.

Body, perception of my own 104,
105, 127 — 132; idealist theory
of no — 113; primary qualities
of 152 seq.; dependence of mind'
on 499 seq. ; union with soul

553 seq.
Brain, structure of 44, 45 ;

development of 150—152 ;

relation to thought 241, 468 —

470, 496 — 502 ; functions of

564—572.
Bridgman, case of Laura 135.

Categories, Kantian 267, 268,

Causes, Aristotle's four 555. j

Causality, Hume on no ; Kant |
119, 120; principle of 291;
notion of 368 — 370 ; and free-
will, principle of 419.

Character 391—393.

Chemistry, Mental 204.

Child, growth of knowledge of its
own body 131, 132; of other
objects 133, of other minds 134,
of distance 141 ; growth of its
brain 150, 151 ; periods of
development 151, 152 ; its
memory 200 ; power of move-
ment 212 — 217 ; its intellect
297 — 302; acquisition of language
303 ; powers of attention 354 ;
consciousness of self 361 seq. ;
cognition of time 373 seq. ; self-
control 387.

Choice, deliberate 382; and free-
will 409—411.

Co-action, physical 395.

Ccenesthesis 63, 69, 71.

CoGiio, ergo sum, Descartes'
starting-point 257, 258.

Cognition. See Knowledge.

Colour, sensations of 84, 85 ;
blindness 173.

Common sensibility 69 ; sense 96 ;
sensibiles 153 seq.



Comparative Psychology 15, 579
seq. ; abstraction 298.

Comparison, supra-sensuous 233,
242 — 246 ; and discrimination
298, 299 ; and judgment 315.

Conation, 30, 384. See Appe-
tency.

Concepts, nature of abstract and
universal 235—238, 240 ; con-
troversy on 248 — 251 ; Bain,
Sully, and Stout on 272—278 ;
formation of 292 seq. ; Aquinas
on 304 — 313 ; direct and reflex
universal 294, 295, 310; and
spirituality of soul 467, 471, 472.

Conceptualism 248. See Con-
cepts.

Conscience, scholastic view of
335 ; modern theories of 336 —
344 ; authority and genesis of
339, 340 ; a spring of action 342 ;^
sentiments of 440, 441.

Consciousness and Psychology
II, 26 ; latent 355 ; grades of-
361 ; development of 362 ;
unity of 240, 366 ; discontinuity
of 366 ; duality of 106, 466 ;
double 9, 487—492 ; and free-
will 406—413.

Consent and Assent 318, 319;

and free-will 409 — 412.
Conservation of energy 42 1 , 5 1 7.
Contact, sense of 71 seq. ; double

131-

Contiguity, association by 183,

186, 187, 188.
Continuity of pleasure 223, 225;

attention 348 ; of consciousness

366.
Contrast, association by 181,

184; feelings of 224, 225, 432,

433, 436.
Corresponding points of retina

142.
Cosmology, and Metaphj'sics 3 ;

and Psychology 6.
Creation of soul 573 seq.; Ladd

on 576.
Criticism, Kant's theory of 265

seq.
Curiosity 433, 434.



INDEX.



Ill



Darwinism. Cf. Evolution,
Decision 382, 409—411.
Deductive method in psychology

5, 18, 461 ; reasoning 321, 322.
Deliberate action 381, 395, 408.
Delusion and illusion 171.
Desire and belief 172, 333 ;

analyzed 378; and pleasure 379;

Aquinas on 380 ; volition and

intention 384 ; and free-will 41 7.



seq.



and



Determinism 394
fatalism 397, 398.

Development, of external per-
ception 125 seq. ; cerebral and
mental 150 — 152; of power of
movement 212 — 217 ; of thought
and conception 295 seq. ; of self-
consciousness 361 seq. ; of cog-
nition of time 373 seq.; of self-
control 385 — 392 ; of language
456 seq.

Discipline, moral 390, 391.

Discrimination 232, 272, 273,

298, 315-

Distance, perception of 139 seq.

Dogmatism and criticism 266.

Double contact 131 ; conscious-
ness 487 — 492 ; aspect theory
492, 505 seq. See Monism.

Doubt, Cartesian 257, 258.

Dreams, nature of 176 — 178.

Dualism, epistemological 102
seq. ; psychological 553.



Education of senses 125 seq. ;
of memory 200 ; of locomotive
faculty 212 — 217; of attention
354 ; and apperception 360 ; of
will 385 seq. ; and rivalry 434.

Ego and Mind i, 2, 104 seq.;
cognition of 361 seq. ; false
theories of 474 seq. ; mutations
of 487 seq. See also Self and
Mind.

Emotions 221, 425 seq. ; various
427 seq. ; genesis and nature of
443 ; Aquinas on 444 ; classifi-
cation of 446 ; expression of 449
seq.



Empirical Psychology 3—5,
I9> 26, 394, 460. See Experi-
mental.

Empiricism 230, 254, 270, 475.

Energy, conservation of 421, 512

—524-

Entelechy 560, 561.

Epistemolo(;y 98, 271, 368.

Essence, abstraction of 302, 305,
307, 312 ; and Substance 559.

Ethics and Psychology 8 ; and
genesis of conscience 337 seq. ;
and free-will 399 seq. ; and im-
mortality 529 seq.

Evolution, and intuitive necessary
truths 286 ; and conscience 340,
341 ; and expression of emotions
450 — 454 ; and efficiency of
mind 513, 514; and origin of
soul 578 ; and origin of instinct
588 seq.

Expectation, 219, 350, 376, 2,77-

Experimental Psychology 17, 54

—61, 137—139-
Expression of emotions 449 seq.
Extension, tactual ^2) 5 visual

87 ; immediate perception of

106 ; abstract idea of 371 ;

virtual of the soul 469.
External world, reality of 99

seq.; perception of loi seq.



Faculties, defined 28, 36; classi-
fication of 28 seq. ; attacks on
36 — 39 ; mutual relations of 39,
40; intellectual 229 seq.

Fallacy and illusion 171.

Fancy 170.

Fatalism and determinism 397,

398.

Feeling, defined 221 ; faculty of
221, 226, 442, 443 ; Aristotle's
theory 222 seq. ; modern theories
226 seq. ; nature of 40, 41, 226,
227 ; and emotion 425 seq. ;
genesis and nature of 443 — 446.

Form, Kantian 117 seq., 263 —
270; and matter 555—558-

Formal Object 64, 96, 241, 305



IV



INDEX,



Free-will 394 seq. ; and Psycho-
logy 394 ; defined 395 ; proof
ethical 398 ; psychological 406 ;
metaphysical 413 ; objections
against 416 seq.

Function and faculty 28, 29, 314,
320 ; of the brain 565.

Fundamental sense 94, 95.



General notion. See Concept.

Generalization 294, 295, 299.

Generationism 572.

Generic images 237; Sully, Stout,
and Peillaube on 276 — 278.

Genesis and validity of cognition
98 seq. ; of belief 283 ; of moral
judgments 339, 340 ; of con-
ceptions 367.

Genetic method 14.



Habit 183, 188, 190, 388 seq.

Hallucination 171 — 179.

Hearing, sense of 80 — 83 ; per-
ceptions by 145.

Hedonistic Paradox 380.

Heuristic method 256.

Hypnotism, history of 594 ;
induction of 595 ; nature of 595
seq. ; theories of 598 ; pheno-
mena 599 seq. ; ethics of 601.

Hypothetical Realism 102 seq.



Ideas, Hume's view of no ; and
impressions 163 ; association of
181 seq. ; motor force of 218,
219 ; universal 235 — 238 ; con-
troversy about 247 seq. ; origin
of 252 seq. ; theory of innate
253, 257, 265; adventitious 257.
See Concepts.

Idealism, theory of 99, 108 seq. ;
and physical science 113, II4;
and other minds 100, ill, 1 16;
various meanings of 263 ; German
270; and materialism 114, 271 ;
monistic 494.

Idealization 166, 167.

Identity, recognition of 195, 238,



240 ; consciousness of 362 — 366 ;
mind's 464 seq.; Hume, Mill,
and James on 475 seq. ; ruptures
of 487 seq.

Identity-hypothesis 515.

Illative faculty 332.

Illusions 171— 179.

Images, Aquinas on 86 ; and im-
pressions 163 ; and concept 273
— 276 ; generic 237, 276 — 278.

Imagination, sensuous 92, 164
seq. ; productive 165 ; aesthetic
166; scientific 167; and illusions
171 seq.

Imitation 214, 456.

Immortality 525 seq. ; and
Theism 525 ; teleological proof
of 526 ; ethical 529 ; universal
belief in 533 ; ontological proof
533 ; objections to 537 seq.

Impulsive action 211 seq., 381,

384-
Innate ideas 253, 255—257, 265;

intuitions 282, 283.
Inconceivability of opposite as

test of truth 283—288.
Indissoluble association 283,329.
Inductive method in Psychology

5, 6, II seq., 460; reasoning

321, 322.
Inertia, Law of 517, 523.
Inference, unconscious 28, 107,

127 ; analysed 320 — 324.
Infinite, idea of 370, 371.
Inseparable association 283, 329.
Instinct 213 seq. ; and voluntary

action 214, 216, 384; moral 337;

expressive 449 seq. ; animal 586;

origin of 588 seq.
Intellect and sense-perception

126; supra-sensuous 229 seq.,

467 ; functions of 292 seq., 314.
Intellectus agens 303 seq. ;

possibilis 308.
Intention and motive 384, 385.
Intentionalis 30, 52.
Interest 353, 354.
Internal senses 32, 93—96.
Introspection, method of 11

seq. ; difficulties of 20 seq. ;

how improved 25.



Index.



Intuition, intellectual of neces-
sary truth 289—291 ; moral



Judgment, supra-sensuous 233 —
235, 243 ; synthetic a priori 266 ;
defined 314 ; analysis of 315 —
318 ; moral t,z7.



Knowledge of mental states 11
seq. ; faculties of 29 seq. ; schol-
astic view of 51 seq., 304 seq. ;
genesis and validity of 98, 324,
325> 339» 367 ; of other minds
no, III, 116, 133, 514; of
extension loi seq., 137 ; of
animal minds 580; relativity
of 157 — 161 ; theories of general
255 seq. ; and belief 329, 330 ;
of self 361 seq.; of the soul's
nature 459 seq.



Language and Psychology 13, 14;
and thought 302, 303 ; and free-
will 405, 406 ; origin of 454 —
458 ; cerebral seat of 567, 568 ;
peculiar to man 585.

Laughter 439, 440, 445.

Liberty, physical and moral 395.

Life, future 525 seq. ; origin of
547; definitions of 551, 552.
See Soul.

Local character of sensations 73 ;
signs 130, 131, 136.

Localization of sensations 128
seq. ; of brain functions 565 seq.

Locomotive faculty 211 seq., 220.

Locus of the soul 562 seq.

Logic and Psychology 7 ; of cogni-



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