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52 II. K. Tong, art. on Japan's Railway Program in China,
Millard's Review, June 12, 1920, p. 65.

53. Pooley, p. cit., pp. 162 163.

54. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, pp. C7-68; MacMurray,

55. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 21.

56. Poolev, op. cit.. p. 191.

57. Millard's Review. June 23, 1917, pp. 67-69.
MacMurray, l'>17/9.

59. MacMurray, 1918/7.

60. For a list of loans made by the Japanese from January 1,
1909, to October 25, 1918, sec Millard, Democracy and the Eastern
Question, p. 187.

61. H. K. Tong, art. on Japan's Seeking China's Tobacco
Monopoly, Millard's Review, June 8, 1918, p. 49 et seq.

62 H. K. Tong, article on America Protests Against the
Chinese Trading Monopoly, Millard's Review, November 9, 1918,
p. 388 et seq.

63. H. K. Tong, article on Japan's Conditions for Remitting
Her Share of Boxer Indemnitv, Millard's Review, October 26,

1918, p. 303 et seq.

64. H. K. Tong, article on Japan's Newest Intrigue for Pos-
session of China's Iron Mines, Millard's Review, January 18,

1919, p. 233 et seq.

65. Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 192.


As we have already indicated, the policy of territorial
expansion is one of two ways for solving the population
problem of Japan. Barred by the Gentlemen's Agree-
ment with the United States, and by the colonies of Great
Britain, Japan was forced to alleviate the congestion
and consequent economic misery of surplus population,
by finding an outlet on the Asiatic mainland. Confined
within the narrow limits of her small islands, she was
in constant fear of being some day deprived of any
channels of expansion and smothered. Unless she face
stagnation, congestion, and misery, she must seek some
territory to which she can send her surplus sons and

Searching for an outlet, she finds that her first avail-
able region of colonization is her own northern Island,
Hokkaido, which can hold five times as many people
as its present population of 2,200,000. 1 But the Island
is mountainous and its winter severe and protracted.
The second available territory is Korea, which can at
least support twice as many people as her present popu-
lation of about 15,000,000. But Korea has a density of
population of 169 per square mile and offers no great
attraction for Japanese settlers. 2 The third region that
Japan logically looks to for amelioration on the main-
land is South Manchuria. Though as thickly populated
as Korea, great natural resources and the fertility of the
soil nevertheless ofTcr many attractions fur Japanese

Aside from the natural attraction afforded by the
country, Japan feels that she has a special claim to South



Manchuria. By the Sino-Japanese War, she obtained
possession of the Liaotung peninsula forming the pro-
jection of the southern half of Manchuria, but because

of the tripartite intervention she was constrained to dis-
gorge this territory. Though deprived of the cession,
she still cherishes the desire and hope of some day re-
gaining it. What is more, she fought Russia and so
saved South Manchuria from her clutches. She staked
her whole national existence on the struggle; she spent
about a billion yen and lost over one hundred thousand
lives. Therefore,

"Considering that every inch of South Manchurian soil
was soaked with Japanese blood and that their coffers
were left sadly depleted by the war, it would not have
been surprising if the Japanese in the wake of the great
conflict had been tempted to regard Manchuria as their
own territory by right of conquest, and to adopt these
discriminating measures calculated to advance their
trade." 3

Again, it was said :

"Manchuria is consecrated to Japan by the blood of
dead Japanese soldiers." 4

Furthermore, the traditional ambition for a Greater
Japan impels the government to the policy of territorial
expansion in the direction of Eastern Asia. Yoshida,
the great teacher of "Patriotic Schools," among whose
famous disciples were ECido, Inouye and Ito, advocated
the expansion of Japan in Asia by force of arms. His
program included the acquisition of the Kurile Islands,
Saghalien, Kamchatka, Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, and
a large part of Eastern Siberia — with a view to the ex-
pansion of Japan into an Eastern Asiatic power. 8

For these reasons therefore — the economic pressure of
surplus population, the special claim to South Manchuria


and the traditional ambition of a Greater Japan — the
Yamato race has set her heart on the domination, if
not the annexation, of South Manchuria. Professor
Tomizu, M.P., of the Tokio Imperial University, said
in 1912, 7 "the present is the best possible occasion for
the solution of the South Manchuria question, which
Japan must settle sooner or later. She has already missed
several opportunities for annexing Manchuria, and the
longer the solution is postponed the more difficult it
becomes." In the memorandum submitted by the Black
Dragon Society advocating a defensive alliance between
Japan and China, which was believed to be the fore-
runner of the Twenty-one Demands, among the terms
sel forth there was the provision which betrayed the
intention to seize the sovereign rights of South Man-
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia: "China agrees to
recognize Japan's privileged position in South Man-
churia and Inner Mongolia and to cede the sovereign
rights of these regions to Japan to enable her to carry
out a scheme of local defense on a permanent basis." 8

Thus, bent on the control, and if possible, the posses-
sion of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia,
Japan used, as the basis of her expansion, Article 6 of
the Railroad Convention between Russia and (Tina of
1896, ,J which she had inherited from Russia by virtue of
ssion of the Southern Portion of the Chinese East-
ern Railway from Changchun to Dalny and Port Arthur,
and by virtue of the confirmation of the transfer by the
Chine e Governmenl by the Treaty of December 22,

1905, ] providing that Japan's rights in South Manchuria

should, "as far as circumstances permit, conform to the
original agreements concluded between China and Rus-
si;i" ( Art iel. 2), \rtielc of the original granl to Russia
read: "la society aura le droil absolu el exclusif de ('ad-
ministration '1'- ses terrains." " By virtue of this article,
although the original grant was qualified by special pro-
visions for tin- prol i : i"n and preservation of tin- Chinese


sovereignty, 11 she exercised actual sovereignty over the
railway zone of 70.54 square miles. 13 She permitted no
Chinese soldiers and police to enter the zone except with
special permission, and on the other hand, she maintained
exclusive police and military guards within the zone. 14
Thus, she divided the sovereignty of South Manchuria by
means of this narrow strip of railway zone which is
entirely under Japanese jurisdiction, or, to use another
expression, she thus created an impcrium in imperio,
which could be used for the future expansion of Japa-
nese jurisdiction over South Manchuria. Further, she
established Japanese settlements at most of the stations
along the railway and attempted thereby to found a series
of Japanese towns. — "Thus, there will be a strip of ter-
ritory running through the heart of South Manchuria
which to all intents and purposes will become a Japanese
Colony." "

More than this, she adopted the policy of settlement
under the Japanese jurisdiction and sovereignty. By
stretching the interpretation of the extra-territorial rights,
she established police boxes, and even jails and houses
of detention in connection with her consulates. She main-
tained that the assumption of the police power over her
own subjects was but a corollary of extra-territorial juris-
diction, which, however, was not claimed by the other
treaty Powers enjoying similar privileges :

"In short, the establishment of stations for Japanese
police officers in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia is based on consular jurisdiction and its aim is
efficiently to protect and discipline Japanese subjects, to
bring about a completely satisfactory relationship between
the officials and people of the two countries, and gradu-
ally to develop the financial relations between Japan and
China. The Chinese Government is requested speedily to

the demands precisely as it has the establish-
ments of consulates and consular agents in the interior


of South Manchuria in pursuance of the policy to main-
tain the friendly relations between China and Japan." 15

And, maintaining that contention, she made repeated
attempts to secure the recognition of the right to sta-
tion police in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia. On October 18, 1916, 1S she submitted this demand:

"According to the new treaty concluded last year re-
specting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia,
Japanese subjects shall have the right of residence, travel
and commercial and industrial trade in South Manchuria
and the right to undertake agricultural enterprises and
industries incidental thereto in the Eastern part of Inner
Mongolia jointly with Chinese subjects. The number of
Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia will, therefore, inevitably increase gradually.
The Imperial Government of Japan considers it neo
to station Japanese police officers in these regions for the
purpose of controlling and protecting their own subjects.
[t is a fact that a number of Japanese police officers have
already been stationed in the interior of South Manchuria
and they have been recognized by the local officials of
the localities concerned since intercourse has been con-
ducted between them. The Imperial Government of Japan
proposes gradually to establish additional stations for Jap-
anese police officers in the interior of South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia whenever and wherever

Thus. Japan aimed to extend her sovereignty wh< i

ubjectS should go in South Manchuria and Eastern

Inner Mongolia. Following this policy to its 1

Conclusion, and especially in view of the fact that the

whole of South Manchuria has been thrown open to
Japanese subjects by the Treat} of May 25, I'M 5. r<

in 1 .; South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia (Ar-
ticle 3), she can extend her nty, wherever her

subjects go. Thus, under the guise of peaceful settle-


ment, the process is. in reality, a political invasion, paving
the way for territorial absorption.

Not contented with the policy of settlement under
Japanese jurisdiction and sovereignty, Japan, in 1915,
made the bold attempt to capture the sovereignty of South
Manchuria and Eastern [nner Mongolia by means of the
Twenty-One Demands. In group Two of the original
demands, Article Two provided for the Japanese owner-
ship of land. It read: "Japanese subjects in South Man-
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right
to lease or own land acquired either for erecting suitable
buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming." 18
Land in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia
being very cheap, the grant of the privilege of owning
it would give her and her subjects the opportunity to own
the entire territory of these two regions by systematic
purchase and manipulation of land prices through Japa-
nese banks operating therein. The Chinese Official State-
ment of 1915 regarding the Chino-Japanese negotiations
on the Twenty-one Demands said: "Should Japanese sub-
jects be granted the right of owning land, it would mean
that all the landed property in the region might fall
into their hands, thereby endangering China's territorial
integrity." 20

Side by side with the demand for the right to own
land, Japan demanded the exercise of police power in
important places in China. In Group V. Article 3, of the
original demands, we read :

"Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the
Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute
between Japanese and Chinese police to settle cases which
caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason
necessary thai the police departments of important places
(in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese
and Chinese, or that the police departments of these
places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may


at the same time help to plan for the improvement of
the Chinese Police Service."

As the police power is a concrete symbol of sovereignty,
this demand for the joint administration of police is
tantamount to a demand for the sovereignty of China.
While, however, the demand covered the whole of China,
it was meant to apply particularly to South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia. The Chinese official state-
ment of 1915 regarding the negotiations runs as follows:

"The proposal that there should be joint administra-
tion by China and Japan of the police in China was
clearly an interference with the republic's domestic affair,
and consequently an infringement of her sovereignty.
For that reason the Chinese Government could not take
the demand into consideration. But when it was ex-
plained by the Japanese minister that this referred only
to South Manchuria, and he suggested that his govern-
ment would be satisfied if China agreed to engage Japa-
nese police advisers for that territory, the Chinese Gov-
ernment accepted the suggestion." - 1

Whatever the intention of this demand, had it been
granted, Japan would have acquired the power of jointly
administrating the police in important places of China,
especially in South Manchuria and probably Eastern Inner
Mongolia, which would have virtually meant the cession
.(■reign rights in these regions, — which the Black
Dragon Society had petitioned the Japanese Government
to obtain. Coupled with the right of owning land, such
an arrangement would have rendered the regions in ques-
tion actual colonies of Japan.

Failing in this move, Japan made of the * !hangchiatung
Affair another attempt to wrest th( pity of South

Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia from the hands
oi the Chinese Government. Barring the usual satis-
faction for the ( hangchiatung Affair, she demanded the

employment ot' Japanese military advisers in South Man-


churia. and of military instructors in the Cadet schools,
and the establishment of police stations in South Man-
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia. 11 Mad these de-
mands been conceded, it would have meant the Japanese
control of the military development of South .Manchuria
and granting of the police power over Japanese subjects
in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Finally, when the new Consortium was being organized
in 1919-1920, Japan qualified the participation of her
financial group with the reservation that South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia should be excluded from
its scope. 28 * 24 Thus, by this diplomatic stroke, she at-
tempted to secure the recognition of the Great Power- as
to her special political status in these regions and her
right to exclusive exploitation of the same. Hence, if
China should in the future come under the control of
the New Consortium and thus lose her independence.
Japan would have saved these two regions from a similar
fate, and would be free to snatch them from the grip
of the Consortium and incorporate them under her own
sovereignty. 38

It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that Japan did
entertain the design of controlling, if not of possessing,
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Im-
pelled by the economic pressure of an increasing popu-
lation at home, supported by the special claim growing
out of the Russo-Japanese War, and inspired by the tra-
ditional ambition of a Greater Japan, she has set her
heart on the policy of territorial expansion in these two
regions. Using Article Six of the Russo-Chinese Rail-
way Convention of 1896 as a basis, she planned to extend
her sovereignty over these regions, by the creation of the
imperium in itnperio in the railway zone, the establish-
ment of police stations, and the repeated attempts to wrest
the police power from the Chinese Government.*



1. K. K. Kawakami, Japan in World Politics, p. 58.

2. Ibid., p. 58.

3. Ibid., p. 131.

4. Patrick Gallagher, America's Aims and Asia's Aspirations,
p. 407.

5. J. O. P. Bland, article on Moral Factors in Japanese
Policies, Asia, March, 1921, p. 217.

6. John Spargo, Russia as an American Problem, p. 150.

7. Shin Ninon, editor, Count Okuma, April, 1912, quoted in
Pooley, Ja' Policy, p. 76n.

8. Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, pp.

[acMurray, 1896/5.
Ki. MacMurray. 191)5/18.

11. The society shall have the absolute and exclusive right of
administration of its territories.

12. Cf. U. S. Foreign Relations, 1910, pp. 203-205, the letter
of the Secretary of State of the United States Government to
the Russian Ambassador on April 9, 1908.

13. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, p. 268.

14. [bid., p. 208; Millard's Review, Nov. 8, 1919, p. 399.

15. Lancelot Lawton, The Empires of the Far East, Vol. 2, p.

16. MacMurray, 1917/2; W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights
and Interest in China, pp. 84-85; Japanese Minister's Aide
Memoire, Oct. 18, 1916.

18. MacMurray, 1917/2; W. W. Willoughby, op. cit, p. 83 et

19. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 20.
Ibid., p. 12.

21. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

22. MacMurray, 1917/2.

23. T. \\ . Lamont, Preliminary Report on the New Consortium
for China, p. 7.

24. Documents concerning tin- new consortium released to
by tin- Department of State on March 30, 1921, the letter

of M. Odagiri of tin- VTokahoma Sp< to Mr. T. \V.

Lain. .nt of tlu- J. P. M. I 19.

I "!' a complete account of the new consortium, vide infra,
■ in the .New International Banking Consortium,
26. Japan's recenl tern Siberia may or may

not effect her pollCJ of territorial expansion in South Man-
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia lor an account of Japan
and Siberia, see John Spargo, Ru n Problem,

Chapter V, p. lw el seq.


In the two preceding chapters we have examined the

policies of economic exploitation and territorial expan-
sion, — two of Japan's solutions for her population prob-
lem. We come, now, to the third policy — that of para-
mount influence.

This policy is actuated in the first place by Japan's
desire to obtain and possess the largest Chinese sphere
of influence. Being China's closest neighbor and of the
same racial and linguistic family, she feels that she ought
to have the largest influence. When the battle of con-
cessions commenced in 1898 — which resulted in the Pow-
ers demarcating their respective spheres of influence on
the map of China — Japan was not yet a full-fledged
Power. She had therefore to be content with the de-
marcation of Fukien as her humble share. When, by
dint of extraordinary exertion, and by reason of her vic-
tory over Russia, she had achieved the position of a
great Power, she found, to her regret, that all the re-
gions in China had already been occupied as Spheres of
other Powers, and sin- had again to be contented with
.South Manchuria which she had won by the sword and
vu Inner .Mongolia attained by cordial agreement
with Russia. When, however, the World War broke
out, leaving China free for her expansion, she promptly
seized the opportunity and extended her sphere of influ-
ence as far as China and the other Powers would allow
her. This she did, partly to the end that in case of an
eventual break-up or partition of China, she would be
able to secure the Largest share of territory. "It was
because European Powers were bent upon dividing China



into so many spheres of influence that Japan was obliged
to step in and take such measures as might be neces-
sary to safeguard her position in the Far East against
any emergency that might arise from an unhappy con-
dition in China." '

This policy is again a concomitant of Japan's other
policies — economic exploitation and territorial expansion.
Economic exploitation requires the existence of a sphere
of influence, and quite logically, the fullest measure of
economic exploitation requires the possession of the
largest sphere of influence. In order, therefore, to carry
out this policy to the fullest satisfaction, the acquisition
of the largest sphere of influence is highly desirable, if
not quite necessary. Likewise, territorial expansion de-
mauds the existence of a sphere of influence wherein a
Power entrench itself against the authority of the ter-
ritorial sovereign and the intrusion of other Powers.
While it is not indispensable, the possession of the largest
sphere of influence will nevertheless help to consummate
the annexation of the regions desired.

In the case of Japan and China this policy is ani-
mated by the former's desire to displace the predominat-
ing Western influence by her own paramount interest.
She feels chagrined over the presence of such an influ-
ence in a land where, by virtue of the similarity of lan-
guage .and race, she feds that she ought to have the
! share. She is also afraid that the presence of
a dominating Occidental influence may imperil the inde-
pendence of ( hina and so jeopardize her own existence.
Therefore, to check the further extension of such an
influence, she proposes to displace it with her own para-
mount interest. Supporting this view is the following
statement :

"It must be frankly admitted that ever since China

opened her doors i Western nations, her territory has
been regarded as a happy hunting ground by com'


rs of all, but especially of European countries. Her
inefficiency, her impotency and the general disorgani-
zation and corruption of her administrative system have
been such as t invite a veritable universal scramble over
concessions. . . . To tin- Japanese, it is certain that, un-
less they take the necessary measures of precaution, the
whole province of China will sooner or later be held in
the grip of Western interests. Of course she could not,
even it' . - he would, undertake to safeguard all the vast
dominion of China, hut she must by all means forestall
the establishment of preponderating Western influence
in such sections of that domain as are contiguous or
adjacent to her own territories." -"•'

This policy is, moreover, motivated by Japan's consid-
eration of her own special position in China. She fought
war with Russia, partially because of China's incapacity
to resist Russian aggression in Manchuria. By dint of
supreme sacrifice, she saved Manchuria, and so rendered
China a distinct and invaluable service. She also feels
her exalted mission of Chinese guardianship. Ik-ing the
only nation in Eastern Asia that has been able to resist
successfully the Western onslaught, she feels that she
has the duty of extending her protection to the other
nations of Eastern Asia, particularly China. Further,
her own economic, and to a certain extent, her own politi-
cal existence depends upon China's prosperity and inde-
pendence. Should her neighbor ever come under West-
ern control, or what is worse, should she ever be par-
titioned, Japan would be left alone in the world. With
the Western Powers entrenched on the opposite shore
of her sea, her own days of independence would be num-
bered. As preserver of Manchuria and protector of
China, dependent as she is upon her and inseparately
interwoven as is her destiny and well-being with that
of China, she is therefore impelled by a high sense of
justification to put forth her claim of a special position
in that country.


Turning now to the ways in which this policy has hcen
executed, we find that Japan first established her para-
mount influence in South Manchuria. As we have seen,
soon after she had obtained the transfer of the railway
and mine leases, she organized the South Manchuria Rail-
way Company, which is the Japanese Government all but
in name and which dominates the economic life of South
Manchuria. Besides this, she closed the door of South
Manchuria to the railway enterprises of other nations.
She vetoed the Hsinminting-Fakuman concession granted

Online LibraryMingchien Joshua BauThe foreign relations of China: a history and a survey → online text (page 17 of 39)