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and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind
whatsoever.

group v

Article 3 : Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and
the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute
between Japanese and Chinese police to settle eases which
caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason
necessary that the police departments of important places
(in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and
Chinese r thai the police departments of these places
shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the
same time help to plan for improvement of the Chinese
Police Service.



THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 259



The Policy of Paramount Influence

group I

Article I : The Chinese Government engages to give
full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Gov-
ernment may hereafter agree with the German Govern-
ment relating to the disposition of all rights, interests
and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaty or
otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shan-
tung.

Article 2: The Chinese Government engages that
within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no
territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third party
under any pretext.

Article 3 : The Chinese Government consents to
Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to
join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway.

Article 4 : The Chinese Government engages in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to
open by herself as soon as possible certain important
cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as Commer-
cial Ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly
decided upon in a separate agreement.



GROUP II

Article 1 : The two Contracting Parties mutually agree
that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the
term of lease of the South Manchuria Railway and the
Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period
of 99 years.

Article 5: The Chinese Government agrees that in re-
spect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the
Japanese Government's consent shall he firsl obtained
before action i^ taken : —

i a ) Whenever permis ion is granted to the subject of

a third rower to build a railway or to make a loan
with a third Power for the purpose f building



260 THE POLICY OF JAPAN IN CHINA

a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner

Mongolia.
(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power

pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and

Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.
Article 6: The Chinese Government agrees that if
the Chinese Government employs political, financial or
military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall
first be consulted.

Article 7: The Chinese Government agrees that the
control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway
shall be handed over to the Japanese Government for a
term of 99 years, dating from the signing of this agree-
ment.

group v

Article 5 : China agrees to grant to Japan the right
of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiu-
kiang and Xanchang. another line between Xanchang and
Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chao-
chow.

Article 6: If China needs foreign capital to work
mines, build railways and construct harbor works (in-
cluding dock-yards) in the Province of Fukien, Japan
shall be first consulted.

Article 2: Japanese hospitals, churches and schools
in the interior of China shall be granted the right of own-
ing land.

Article 7: China agrees that Japanese subjects shall
have the right of missionary propaganda in China.



The Policy of Political Control

group v

Article 1 : The Chinese Central Government shall em-
ploy influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial
and military affairs.



THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 261

Article 3: Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and
the Chinese Government have had many cases of dis-
pute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle cases
which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this
reason necessary that the police departments of impor-
tant places ( in China ) shall be jointly administered by
Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of
these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that
they may at the same time help to plan for the improve-
ment of the Chinese Police Service.

Article 4: China shall purchase from Japan a fixed
amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more)
of what is needed by the Chinese Government or that
there -hill he established in China a Chino-Japanese
jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are
to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.



The Policy of Asiatic Monroe Doctrine

group IV

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease
to a third Power any harbor or bay or island along the
coast of China.



It may, therefore, be said that the original Twenty-
one Demands constitute to-day the best one-piece historic
document that embodies all the five policies of Japan in
China. Produced as they were under the favorable
opportunity of the World War. supported a- they were
by the majority of the Japanese electorate, revealing as
they did in the dearesl and fullest manner the intentions
and desires of the Japanese people regarding China at
that time, and divided as they were into five groups in
correspondence with the five policies of Japan, wt
can hence reaffirm our conclusion that they constitute

to-day tin- hot exponent of Japan's policies in China.



262 THE POLICY OF JAPAN IN CHINA



NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI

1. Putnam Wcale, The Fight for the Republic in China, p. 128.

2. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far Hast. p. 176.

3. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far Fast, pp. 176-
179.

4. Ibid., p. 179.

5. Ibid., p. 179. For instance. Prof. K. Hayashi of Kcio Uni-
versity, and a member of the Diet, tendered his resignation to
his party and registered his protest: "Why were such abominable
demands in the first place framed by the Cabinet? ... It is
absolutely an insult to our neghbor's sovereignty. Those desires,
if accepted, were, that China would consent to be a protectorate
of Japan."

6. Kawakami, Japan in World Politics, p. 168; Japan and
World Peace, p. 167.

7. The Original Twenty-one Demands can be found in the
Chino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, pp. 19-22.



XVII
THE WISDOM OF JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA

It is but fitting and proper that we should conclude
this Part with a discussion of the wisdom of Japan's
policy in China. As the shortest road to convince people
is to appeal to their self-interest, we propose to treat
the subject from the point of view of the welfare and
destiny of Japan, rather than from the point of view of
China's interests, or those of the Far East, or of the
world.

As we recall, Japan's policies in China turn on two
fundamental problems, the population problem of Japan
herself and the Chinese question. As we have also seen,
the population problem of Japan results in the adoption
of two policies towards China — those of economic ex-
ploitation and territorial expansion. Regarding the policy
of economic exploitation, we have no quarrel with Japan.
In fact, we entertain for her the highest good-will and
the expectation that she may succeed in converting her-
self from an agricultural to an industrial and commercial
nation. Particularly with reference to Japan's needs
for iron, coal and steel, we sympathize with our neigh-
bor and arc finite willing to extend our cooperation.
What we desire in this matter is that Japan should try
to reach her ends in fair and legitimate ways. As long
as she does so, we have absolutely no grievances, but
on the contrary, we wish our neighbor unprecedented
success.

What we do oppose is Japan's policy of territorial ex-
pan-ion in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia which form integral part- of ( hina. She claims

that inasmuch as she has preserved the integrity of

263



2(A THE POUCY OF JAPAN IX CHINA

Manchuria by her sacrifice in the Russo-Japanese War,
she is entitled to the territory. 1 But she should recall
that she fought the war, not primarily for the preserva-
tion of Manchuria, but rather for self-preservation. The
indirect effect happened to be the preservation of Man-
churia, but that does not entitle her to the ownership
and sovereignty of South Manchuria and Eastern [nner
Mongolia. The best she can ask is that she should be
compensated for her sacrifice in forms of economic con-
cessions in these regions, and these China has ah
granted. To claim that inasmuch as she has preserved
South Manchuria in a war of self-defer therefore

entitled to the territory, is to claim more than justice
and equity would allow her.

Further, these regions, while not yet thickly popu-
lated, are nevertheless quite well peopled by about
20,000.000 Chinese. 2 For Japan to expand her territorial
limits so as to include this territory is to bring under
her jurisdiction regions already well occupied by the
Chinese. Hence any attempt on the part of Japan to
annex these lands will meet the hostile opposition of
the people therein and the Chinese residing in China
proper. For Japan to cut these integral parts of China
from the body of the Chinese nation will create a con-
dition of Chinese irridenta, which will sit up eternal
walls of hatred between the two peoples. I'esides, even
though she might be able to absorb thi is, Japan

would be confronted with the alternatives of being ousted
by the united resistance of the Chinese in these regions
and in China proper, or of subjugating tin- Chini
China proper. As Japan is hound to attempt the subju-
gation of the Chinese in China proper as a measure of
self-defense, the annexation of South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia will inevitably lead to eventual
struggle between the Chinese and the Japanese. Unless,
therefore, the Japanese are prepared to go the length of
fighting the Chinese people and making them eternal



WISDOM OF JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 265

enemies, her policy of territorial expansion in South
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia is fraught with
serious perils.

Furthermore, just as Japan needs an outlet for her
surplus population, so China needs an outlet for her own.
If Japan's increasing population needs Manchuria for
an outlet, China's 400,000,000 will likewise increase and
need the same relief. If Japan's claim to Manchuria,
as based on the need of an outlet for surplus popula-
tion, be valid, then China's claim to the same territory,
in addition to her recognized ownership and occupation
thereof, is ten times better than that of Japan. Sup-
porting this claim of China, it is well said by an impartial
observer : 3

"Told, as we have been over and over, that Japan
must have an outlet for her excess of population and
that Manchuria is the natural outlet, it is well to bear
in mind that China also has a crowded population and
that in the new condition in which the awakening Chinese
people find themselves a movemenl toward the relief of
the present congested conditions is bound to manifest
itself in an attempt at redistribution. This will mean
pressure outward. Manchuria is a natural outlet for
Kcess of China's population more truly than that
of Japan; and, as far as rights to this open field art- con-
cerned. China ha- the better claim. The pressure of ex-
population seeking an emigration outlet will prob-
able l)e greater Er< a than from japan -for there
an-' 400*000,000 Chin. compared with 70,000.000
Japanese and Korean-, and the former are also no [ess
adepl at 'replenishing the earth' than are the latter.

". . . To enter Manchuria the I hinese have but to step

through the breach in the lm cat wall at Shanhaikwan or
to sail aero>s the ninety miles of water between tin- Shan-
tun- Peninsula and the Liaotung Peninsula. As many
Chinese farmhand- come and go between Chili and Shan

Provinces and Manchuria each year as there are

Japanese in South Manchuria after ten years of occupa-
tion. What people, then, would it Seem, have the h



Online LibraryMingchien Joshua BauThe foreign relations of China: a history and a survey → online text (page 21 of 39)