Mingchien Joshua Bau.

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larly that of Japan? The student strike and economic
boycott following the Shantung decision further evi-
denced the true spirit of Chinese nationalism. Can a
nation that is able to rise as one man to protest against
the wreckage of their heritage and injustice to their
national cause be so supine as not to give a death blow
to any Power that would deprive them of their inde-
pendence ? It is certain that any policy on the part
of Japan to control China will meet the united resistance
of 400,000,000 democratic and liberty-loving Chinese.

In the fourth place, Japan's policy to control China
will inevitably encounter the opposition of Western Pow-
ers. China is such a large and rich country and the
commercial interests of the other Powers therein are so
immense that the Western nations will not permit Japan
to control her alone. Should there be any necessity for
control, the Powers would unite and effect a scheme of
international control, rather than allow Japan to control
China alone. "In the long run, if China requires 'advice'
or control, it must come from an international con-
cert. . . ." 14 Again, the formation of the New Inter-
national Banking Consortium at the close of the World
War should convince the Japanese that the Western
Powers would not let Japan gain a stranglehold on
China's finance, but, if necessary, would internationalize
the control. The failure to exempt South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia from the scope of the New Con-
sortium should further convince Japanese statesmen that
the Powers, by the advent of the New Consortium, are
determined to forestall any attempt on the part of Japan
to gain territorial expansion or political control in


Finally, were she able to overcome these obstacles and
acquire control of China, it is doubtful whether Japan
would be able to solve the Chinese question. Fundamen-
tally, the Chinese must solve their own questions, deter-
mine their own destiny, work out their own salvation.
Japan may render assistance in the solution, but she can
scarcely perform the task which the Chinese must do
for themselves.

The solution of Chinese questions does not lie in politi-
cal control. It lies rather in sympathetic assistance and
cooperation. It does not permit of insolent affront to
the sovereignty of China. It rather calls for the pro-
tection of a genuine "Asiatic" Monroe Doctrine. It does
not require that Japan should be the overlord and master
of China. It rather desires that Japan should be the help-
meet and friend of China.

Turning now from the Chinese question, we come to
Japan's policy of paramount influence. As we have seen,
this policy is a product partly of the population problem
of Japan and partly of the Chinese question. Based on
the needs of a surplus population, this policy aims to ac-
quire the largest sphere of influence and trade predomi-
nance. Founded on the necessity of the Chinese question,
this policy proposes to secure a leading role or a special
position in China. Regarding this policy we do not differ
with Japan. We grant that she may gain paramount
influence in China if she is capable of doing so. Our only
request is that she should do so in a fair and legitimate


First of all, she 01US1 nut achieve her paramountcv in

trade by unfair means. 18 She must ii"t try to exclude

:i competition b) preferential rates or other means

of prejudicial discrimination. ( >n the contrary, she must

maintain the principle of the equal opportunity of trade,

a- required by the < >pen I k>or doctrine.

Secondly, she must not attempt to achieve her para-
mount influence by disregarding Chinese sovereignty.


She should not have occupied the Tsingtau-Tsinan Rail-
way lying within Chinese jurisdiction and in defiance of
the repeated protests of China. She should not have
established police stations in Shantung and Manchuria 16
in evident usurpation of Chinese sovereignty, nor sin mid
she have stationed her troops along the Chinese Eastern
Railway, which was assigned to the protection of the
Chinese Government.

Finally, to claim special interests in China, she must
fulfill special duties toward that country. As right and
duty are correlatives, Japan cannot enjoy special rights
in China without fulfilling special duties. As it is, how-
ever, she not only has failed to fulfill special duties aris-
ing from geographical propinquity and racial kinship,
but has grossly disregarded her duties and trespassed
upon the rights of China. Her seizure of the German
railway and mines in Shantung, her police stations, her
troops along the Chinese Eastern Railway, not to men-
tion Group V of the Twenty-one Demands — all testify
so loud against the violation of her special obligations
that she has almost forfeited any special rights that she
might have acquired by reason of her sacrifices in the
Russo-Japanese War, or by virtue of geographical pro-
pinquity and racial kinship. If, therefore, Japan desires
to claim special rights in China, she must fulfill special
duties arising out of such propinquity and kinship. In
other words, the similar natural advantages that give
her, as claims, special rights in China impose on her
corresponding special duties. Thus, provided Japan
observes the principle of equal opportunity of trade and
the integrity of China and fulfills the special duties re-
quired by her special rights, China will have no objection
to any attempt on the part of Japan to gain a position
of paramount influence.

Thus far, we have dealt with the errors of Japan in
solving her own population problem and the Chinese


question, and in reaching the position of paramount influ-
ence in China. We will now go deeper into these causes
and probe the more fundamental wrongs. As policies are
national attitudes of one state toward the other formulated
usually in the best interest of each state, the more funda-
mental errors of Japan's policy in China lie in the atti-
tude of the Japanese, or at least of the responsible Japa-
nese statesmen. In other words, the wrongs are moral.

The first fundamental error is Japan's selfishness. She
is intent upon the satisfaction of her own needs. In
a passion of blind selfishness, she overlooks the rights
of China. She needs coal, iron and steel. She feels she
has a right to obtain the same from China, by fair means
or foul. She needs an outlet for her surplus population ;
so she demarcates South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia as her colonies, and steadily encroaches upon
these regions, giving no heed to Chinese sovereign rights.
When she desires to attain a paramount position in China,
she does so by excluding foreign influence and by in-
fringing upon China's sovereignty. As she desires, for
her own welfare and dominance, to gain the political
control of China, she commits open and covert assaults
on China's sovereignty. She regards her own interests
so much that she neglects those of China and sometimes
attains her own ends at the expense of her neighbor. In
other words, she does not regard the rights of China
as her own, but rather as a means to her own gain and
ascendency. To put it in another way, she subordinates
the rights and interests of I hina to those of her own.
This is not the application of the Golden Rule, but rather
its subversion and violation.

The second fundamental error is her attitude of con-
tempt toward the Chinese. Having defeated china in
1895, she does not regard her as an equal. I laving ■

Come Russia in L905, her attitude toward (hina grows

worse. In tin of some Japanese, the Chinese are


destined to suffer the Eate of the Koreans. That is the
reason why the Japanese Government has not infrequently
deliberately insulted China and wantonly ohstructed the
legitimate exercise of China's sovereign power. For
instance, when China notified the Japanese Government
of the cancellation of the war zone, 17 she resented and
called this perfectly legitimate action on the part of the
Chinese Government "improper, arbitrary, betraying, in
fact, want of confidence in international good faith re-
gardless of friendly relations," declaring also "that even
if your Government actually cancels the communications
concerning the creation of a war zone, the Imperial Gov-
ernment will not permit the movement and actions of
their troops within a necessary period to be affected or
restricted by such act of cancellation." 1S

Japan must realize, however, that the Chinese people,
however disorganized, are man for man the equal of the
Japanese, both in intellect, physical power and moral
caliber, and are capable of becoming as great a nation
as Japan, if not greater. In the face of much plain facts,
why should Japan entertain contempt for China and thus
possibly sow the seed of her own fall ? The late Bishop
Bashford said: ". . . It is incredible that the Chinese
people, outnumbering the Japanese sixfold, man for man
equaling if not surpassing them in industry and commerce,
having been stronger as a military power than fapan
over twenty-nine hundred of her three thousand years
of history, should reverse history and the laws of sur-
vival and remain permanently weaker than Japan." 19

The third fundamental error is Japan's attitude of
hopelessness in regard to China. She is so convinced
of her inevitable destruction that she regards her at-
tempt to gain political control of the latter as a benevolent
act. She is so sure of China's incapacity to regenerate
herself that, except for her intervention, she believes that
China is bound to fall under the control of the Western
Powers. In view of this firm conviction, she feels no


guilt in attempting to seize the reins of government in
China. On the contrary, she feels it so imperative a
remedy for China's illness that she must postpone
Group V for future discussion. However correct the
diagnosis of the Japanese statesmen in relation to the
condition of the Peking Government, she nevertheless
fails to see the source of salvation already visible in the
Chinese body politic, — the rising spirit of Chinese nation-
alism. Bankruptcy and downfall may threaten the
Chinese Government, but the Chinese people, awakened
and fully determined to preserve their own liberty, will
one day turn calamities into blessings. If Japanese
state-men could only see this better side of the Chinese
national life, they would probably change their attitude
of pessimism and antagonism to one of hopefulness and

The last, but not the least, fundamental error is the
general lack of good-will on the part of Japan towards
the Chinese. With the exception of a minority, there
are numerous Japanese who would not desire to see a
strong and united China, but would rather see China
weak, divided, and, still better, controlled by Japan.
Prince Yamagata said: "Japan wants a weak and inca-
pable China; and a weak China under a weak emperor,

sub j eel to Japan's influence, would be the ideal state."-"
>unt [shii said: "Japan could not regard with equa-
nimity the organization of an efficient Chinese army such
as would 1m- required by her active participation in the
war. nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a
liberation of the economic activities of tin- nation of
400,000,000 people." 85 "Japan views with great alarm
the moral awakening of the four hundred million

Chinese," said Baron Makino. From these utterances

of the highest Japanese authorities, one cannot but con-
clude, though mOSl reluctantly, that Japan entertains little
gOOd-will towards China. Yet Japan must realize that
the rise of ( liina a- a -leat power is inevitable. |n>t


as the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of Germany,
Italy and Japan, so the twentieth century shall witness
the rise of modern China. There is no force on earth,
except the Chinese themselves, that can hold hack this
outcome. Will Japan stand in the way of China's prog-
Such an attitude is unworthy of SO great a people
as the Japanese who profess to exemplify the canons of
Bushido and who have demonstrated such prowess in the
Russo-Japanese War.

The first step in the revision of Japan's policy is to
change her entire attitude toward China. She musl do
away with these fundamental errors. She must liberate
herself from the bondage of selfishness and regard the
rights and interests of China as sacred as her own. Into
the bargain, she must discard her contempt for the
Chinese and assume an attitude of due respect and cor-
diality. Further, she >hould not concentrate her mental
gaze on the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese
Government, so evident now, thus inducing an attitude
of hopelessness regarding the future, but should rather
note the promising and vigorous aspect of Chinese na-
tional life — the younger generation and the awakened
nationalism. Lastly, she should not desire to see China
weak and divided, but she should rather cherish abound-
ing good-will and become her friend and counselor in
her period of reconstruction.

I laving thus fundamentally changed her national atti-
tude towards China, Japan should then revise her policy.
She cannot apply her five policies at the same time, as
she has so far attempted to do. They are irreconcilable
and inconsistent with one another. She cannot adopt the
policy of territorial expansion and political control, and
yet at the same time expects to achieve commercial ex-
pansion or to enforce the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Simi-
larly, she cannot adopt the policy of economic exploita-
tion or of commercial expansion and the "Asiatic" Mon-


roe Doctrine, and yet at the same time aim to seek
territorial expansion and political control. She must
choose the one or the other.

Should she choose the policy of territorial expansion
and political control, she should then abandon the policy
of commercial expansion, outright, for such a policy will
inevitably kill the good-will of the Chinese and hinder
commercial relations. Similarly, she should honestly dis-
avow the "Asiatic" Monroe Doctrine, for a policy of terri-
torial expansion and political control will so violate the
principle of her "Asiatic" Monroe Doctrine that it will
become like sounding brass. Besides, she must be fully
prepared to fight the Chinese, as the latter are deter-
mined to preserve their homes and liberty. In that case,
she will have to lay upon herself and her people the
crushing burden of militarism, with the inevitable con-
sequences of exorbitant taxation, the high cost and low
standard of living, a low intellectual and moral standing,
and the backwardness of industry and degeneration of
race. 24 She must further be prepared to meet the united
opposition of the Great Powers, particularly Great Britain
and the United States, who, pledged as they are to the
Open Door doctrine, will not let Japan alone to extend
her territorial limits in China or gain the political con-
trol there. It is practically certain that any attempt on
the part of Japan to seek- territorial expansion or politi-
cal control will result in tin- ruin of Japanese trade in
China, the nullification of her "Asiatic" Monroe Doctrine,
the bitter opposition of the Chinese, the curse of mili-
tarism and the opposition and disapprobation of the
Powers. 25

On the other hand, should Japan adopt the policy of
commercial expansion and an "Asiatic" Monroe Doctrine,

she must first abandon tin- policy of territorial expansion

and political control, which, a- we have seen, are incon-
sistent and irreconcilable with the policy of commercial
expansion and her "Asiatic" Monroe Doctrine, llav-


ing done so, she can then consistently seek the good-
will of the Chinese by the maintenance of a genuine Mon-
roe Doctrine which she proposes to employ as a means
to protect the territorial integrity and political independ-
ence of China. Having thus won the good-will of the
Chinese, her commercial expansion and position of para-
mount influence will naturally and inevitably follow. In
other words, she should revert to the days preceding her
victories over Russia and observe strict adherence to
the principles of the Open Door, with this difference,
however, that the passive pledge to respect the integrity
and independence of China should be changed to a posi-
tive engagement to protect the same. In this case, Japan
can remain in peace with China and maintain friendship
with the other Powers. Thus can she attain her destiny
of becoming the leader and protector of the Far East for
the next generation.

A i this parting of the ways, which road will Japan
take? It is fondly hoped and sincerely prayed that her
sagacious statesmen will make the right choice.


1. Vide supra, chapter on the Policy of Territorial Expansion.

2. Statesmen's Year Book, 1920, p. 75.

3. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, p. 271.
3A. Statesmen's Year Book, 1920, on Dec. 31, 1918, p. 1018.

4. F, II. King, The Farmers f Forty Centuries, pp. 424 - 42.

5. Bashford, China. An Interpretation, p. 396.

6. lapan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 723, on Dec 31, 1^18.

7. Korea, 16, 619, 431, lapan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 703, Dec
31, 1917; British Isles, 45. 516. 259, Statesmen's Year Book, 1920,

p. 13, census taken April 2, l'Ml.

8. lapan Year Book 1920 21, p. 703, on Dec 31, 1917.

9. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 34, June. 1918, Returns by
the Foreign Dept of Japan.

10. Vide supra, chapter on the Policy of Paramount Influ-

11. Millard's Review, Oct. 9, 1920, p. 309, J. 0. I'. Bland, on
China's New Strong Man — Chang Tso-hin, quoted from North
China Daily News.


12. Vide supra, chapter on the Policy of Political Control.

13. For a full account of Japan in Korea, see Mackenzie,
t'a Fight for Freedom.

14. Editorial, "The Nation," London, May 8, 1915, quoted in
Millard. Our Eastern Question, pp. 239-241.

15. Vide supra, chapter on the Policy of Paramount Influence.

16. Editorial, Millard's Review, Feb. 1". 1921, p. 637 et scq.

17. The Shantung Question, Presented bj China to the Paris
Peace Conference, published by the Chinese Natl. Welfare Soc.
of America. March, 1920, App., Note of Ian. 7, 1915, p. 61.

18. Ibid., pp. 61-62, Note of Jan. 9, 1915.

19. Bashford, China and Interpretation, p. 409.

20. Millard, < >ur Eastern Question, p. 168.

21. Millard. Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 99.

22. 23. H. K. Tong, article on How Japan's Policy Is Under-
mining Her Position in China, Millard's Review, Aug. 9, 1919,
p. 388.

24. Cf. Tokio Nichi Nichi. translated in Japan Weekly Chroni-
cle, quoted in Millard's Review, Oct. 23, 1920, pp. 402-403. the
Statement of Osaki Yukio : "The low intellectual and moral
Standing of this nation and the backwardness of various indus-
tries here are due to many causes. But the most important of
them is the sway militarism holds over the country. . . . Mili-
tarism has never long kept company with national prosperity, as
conclusively proved by the history of the Tsing Dynasty of
China, of Germany, Russia. Austria and Turkey. Militarism is
a principle ruinous to the state."

25. While defense may be made that the United States, in
of the Monroe Doctrine, extended westward in accordance

with her manifest destiny and at the expense of Mexico, the
vital difference must be pointed out that the United Stati
tended in the direction of practically unoccupied or most sparsely
populated regions, and not infrequently by way of purchases,
whereas Japan aims to extend over regions well occupied and
populated by the Chinese and in deliberate violation of China's
sovereign rights.



XVIII. Extraterritoriality and Consular Juris-

XIX. Concessions and Settlements.

XX. Leased Territories.

XXI. Spheres of Influence or Interest.

XXII. The Most Favored Nation Treatment.

XXIII. Tariff Autonomy.



We have so far surveyed the policies of the Great
Powers in China, dealt in Part II with Russia, France,
Germany, Great Britain and the United States, and in
Part III, exclusively with Japan. We will now proceed
to consider the impairment of China's sovereignty, as
represented by Extraterritoriality and Consular Jurisdic-
tion, Settlements and Concessions, Leased Territories,
Spheres of Influence, the Most Favored Nation Treat-
ment, and Tariff Autonomy. We will begin with the
first-named — Extraterritoriality and Consular Jurisdic-

By extraterritoriality is meant "a form of privilege or
exemption consisting of a limitation of territorial sov-
ereignty with regard to certain persons and certain places,
which under international law enjoy the privilege of
remaining outside the jurisdiction of the state in whose
territory they are situated;" 1 or, in short, it is "an ex-
clusive exemption from the operation of the local law." -

Defined as such, it is a privilege granted in limitation of
territorial sovereignty. In international law it is a funda-
mental principle that the territorial sovereign exercises
supreme power over all the people, natives or aliens, re-
siding within the limits of his territory. With the con-
cession of this privilege, however, the supreme power
of the territorial sovereign is limited or unpaired to the
extent that aliens enjoying this form of special privilege
are exempted from the jurisdiction of his tribunals.

Again, it is a privilege that confers the righl to exercise
jurisdiction over the nationals in a foreign territory.



This right is usually exercised hy legislation through the
legislative organ of the government, thus making laws

to govern nationals abroad, and through the investment of
authorities accruing from laws thus made in consular and
diplomatic officers residing abroad, and also in the estab-
lishment of consular courts and other extraterritorial
courts for the administration of justice in the case of
nationals. In brief, it extends jurisdiction over the
realm of another state and functions with respect to ad-
ministration of justice over nationals abroad on behalf
of the territorial sovereign.

Besides, it is a privilege granted with the consent of
the territorial sovereign by way of conventions or treaties,
which form the basis of the privilege and without which
no foreign Power has the inherent right to enjoy the
same. Considered in this light, it is, consequently, merely
a delegated power from the territorial sovereign to for-
eign states enjoying the privilege. As such, in accordance
with the established rules of interpretation, the exercise
of the delegated power must be founded on express or im-
plied grant; any undelegated or unsurrendered Power is
construed to remain intact with the territorial sovereign;
and, in case of doubt, the uncertainty will be absolved in
favor of the sovereign grantor. In other words, the rule
of strict construction will apply.

Further, it is a privilege granted only for so long a
period as the territorial sovereign is not capable of ful-
filling the duties of administering justice and affording
protection to life, liberty and property in accord with
modern or Western standards of civilization. This, ipso
facto, means that as soon as the territorial sovereign is
capable and ready to fulfill the necessary duties, the
privilege should be surrendered. It is thus a temporary
privilege exacted to penalize the territorial sovereign for
the relative backwardness of its judicial system, and with
the implied obligation to surrender the same as soon as
the judicial administration of the territorial sovereign


has advanced to a certain degree of proficiency. "The
case of Japan," said ( tppenheim, "is an example of the
readiness of the Powers to consent to the withdrawal of
consular jurisdiction in such states as soon as they have
reached a certain level of civilization." 3

Having stated the general principles underlying extra-
territoriality, we will now briefly sketch its historical de-
velopment in China. Prior to the advent of the Maritime
Powers, China was accustomed to make reciprocal con-
cession of extraterritorial jurisdiction to the neighboring
Oriental states. That is, in extending extraterritoriality
to the other Oriental states, she demanded and acquired

Online LibraryMingchien Joshua BauThe foreign relations of China: a history and a survey → online text (page 22 of 39)