Mingchien Joshua Bau.

The foreign relations of China: a history and a survey online

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thermore, in regard to the Shantung Question, although Japan
has made many vague declarations she has in fact had no plan
which is fundamentally acceptable. Therefore the case has been
pending for many years much to the uncxpectation of China.
On September 7 Japan submitted certain proposals for the
readjustment of the Shantung Question in the form of a
memorandum together with a verbal statement by the Jap
Minister to the effect that in view of the great principle of Sino-
Japanese friendship Japan has decided upon this fair and just
plan as her final concession, etc. After careful consideration
the Chinese Government feels that much in Japan's new pro-
is still incompatible with the repeated declarations of the
Chinese Government, with the hopes and expe< tations of the
entire Chinese people, and with the principles laid down in
treaties between China and the Foreign Powers. It these pro-
posals are to be considered the final concession on the part of
Japan, they surely fall short to prove the sincerity of Japan's
desire to settle the question. For instance:

(1) The lea e of Kiaochow expired immediately on China's
declaration of war against Germany. Now that Japan is only in

military occupation of the leased territory the latter should he
wholly returned to China without conditions. There | an be DO

n of any leasehold.

(2) As to the opening of Kiaochow Bay as a commercial port
for the convenience of trade and residence of the nationals of

all friendly powers. China has already on previous occasions
communicated her intentions to do 10 to thi and there


can be no I for the establishment of any purely foreign

settlement again. Agricultural pursuits concern the fundamental

means of existence of the people of a country; and according
to the usual practice of all countries, no foreigners are per-
mitted to in them. The vested rights of foreigners
obtained through lawful processes under the German regime
shall of coins, be respected but those obtained by force and
compulsion during the period of Japanese military occupation
and against law and treaties can in no wise be recognized. And
again, although this same article in advocating the opening of
cities and towns of Shantung as commercial ports agrees with
China's intention and desire of developing commerce, the open-
ing of such places should nevertheless be left to China's own
judgment and selection in accordance with circumstances. As to
the regulations governing the opening of such places, China will
undoubtedly bear in mind the object of affording facilities to
international trade and formulate them according to established
precedents of self-opened ports and sees, therefore, no necessity
in this matter for any previous negotiations.

(3) The joint operation of the Shantung Railway, that is,
the Kiaochow-Tsinan Line, by China and Japan is objected to
by the entire Chinese people. It is because in all countries there
ought to be a unified system for railways, and joint operation
destroys unity of railway management and impairs the rights of
sovereignty; and. in view of the evils of the previous cases of
joint operation and the impossibility of correcting them, China
can now no longer recognize it as a matter of principle. The
whole line of the Shantung Railway, together with the right of
control and management thereof should be completely handed
over to China: and after a just valuation of its capital and
properties one-half of the whole value of the line not returned
shall he purchased back by China within a fixed period. As to
the mines appurtenant to the Shantung Railway which were
already operated by the Germans, their plan of operation shall
be fixed in accordance with the Chinese Mining Laws.

(5) With reference to the construction of the extension of the
Shantung Railway, that is, the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kiaochow-
rlsuchow Lines, China will, as a matter of course, negotiate with
international financial bodies. As to the Chefoo-Weihsien Rail-
wax, it is entirely a different case, and cannot be discussed in
the same category.

(6) The Customs House at Tsintau was formerly situated in
a leased territory, and the system of administration differed
slightly from others. When the leased territory is restored, the
Customs House thereat should be placed under the complete con-
trol and management of the Chinese Government and should not
be different from the other Customs Houses in its system of

(7) The extent of public properties is too wide to be limited
only to that portion used for administrative purposes. The
meaning of the statement in the Japanese memorandum that such


property will in principle be transferred to China, etc., rather
lacks clearness. If it is the sincere wish of Japan to return all
the public properties to China, she ought to hand over com-
pletely the various kinds of official, semi-official, municipal
and other public properties and enterprises to China to be
distributed, according to their nature and kind, to the admin-
istrations of the central and local authorities, to the municipal
council and to the Chinese Customs, etc., as the case may be.
Regarding this there is no necessity for any special arrangement,

(9) The question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from
the Province of Shantung bears no connection with the restora-
tion of the Kiaochow Leased Territory and the Chinese Gov-
ernment has repeatedly urged for its actual execution. It is
only proper that the entire Japanese Army of Occupation should
now be immediately evacuated. As to the policing of the Kiao-
chow-Tsinan Railway, China, will immediately send a suitable
force of Chinese Railway Police to take over the duties. The
foregoing statement gives only the main points which are unsat-
isfactory and concerning which the Chinese Government feels it
absolutely necessary to make a clear declaration. Further, in
view of the marked difference of opinion between the two
countries, and apprehending that the case might long remain
unsettled, China reserves to herself the freedom of seeking a
solution of the question whenever a suitable occasion presents



XXVIII. Policy of Preservation.

XXIX. Policy of Recovery.

XXX. Policy of the Golden Rule.

XXXI. Policy of World Welfare.

XXXII. A Policy Toward Japan in Particular.


We have studied the diplomatic history of China, the
policies of the Great Powers, especially of Japan, the im-
pairments of China's sovereignty, and the questions aris-
ing since the World War. Using these facts and princi-
ples as a basis, we are now ready to offer suggestions for
the construction of a foreign policy for China, applicable
to the present international situation.

The first policy we would advocate for her is the policy
of preservation. In view of her history, the policies of
the Great Powers, particularly Japan, and the new situa-
tion which has arisen since the Great War, and especially
in view of the rich and enormous natural resources which
always tempt Foreign Powers, there is no policy which
should claim the attention of the Chinese so much as that
of preservation. Ever since the opening of China, the
struggle has been between the Great Powers, with their
aggressive designs and endeavors for exploitation and
spoliation on the one hand and China, striving to preserve
her territory and sovereignty, on the other. Shorn of
all hut a few dependencies, and her weakness exposed by
her defeat by Japan in 1894-5, the Great Powers there-
after entered into a general scramble for leases and con-
»ns, which threatened the very integrity of China.
This was not cheeked until the Mind uprising of the

ers, the inauguration of the Open Door Doctrine by

the United Slate-, and the advent of the Chinese devo-
lution of I'M 1. Thereafter, the source of d ingei chat

Instead of international rivalry, the Powers pursued a
policy of international cooperation and control, and the



only Power that seemed to have inherited the evil prac-
tices of the others was Japan. With her policy of terri-
torial expansion in the direction of South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia, and with her design of political
control, she stood as the foe of China's territorial in-
tegrity and political independence. With the advent of
the New International Banking Consortium, however,
which, as we have seen, is an incarnation of the Open
Door Doctrine, Japan's policies of territorial expansion
and political control are checked. The advent of the
New Consortium, however, opens a new source of dan-
ger to China's national life, for in case of her default,
China will be liable to foreclosure and control by the

The first measure to be advocated in this policy is that
China should become strong — that is, she should have a
strong army and navy and a strong, united Government.
As one studies the foreign relations of China, one cannot
but be impressed with the fact that, underlying all her
troubles, and what made foreign aggression possible, is
her weakness. Leases and concessions would not have
been wrested from China except for her inability to re-
sist spoliation. The Twenty-one Demands would not
have been presented save for her relative helplessness.
While this does not exonerate the Powers that committed
the aggressions, it should, nevertheless, point the moral
that the weakness of China not infrequently furnished the
temptation, and made possible the aggrandizement.

The sovereignty of a state cannot be effectively pre-
served, except by the possession of an efficient army and
navy and a strong, united government. Look at the
nations that have preserved their sovereignty intact and
unchallenged. They are the states that possess a strong
army and navy and a strong united government. Japan,
in particular, furnishes the best illustration. Prior to her
victory over China, she was subject to foreign aggression


as much as China, but subsequent to the Chino-Japanese
War, and especially after the Russo-Japanese War, when
she had demonstrated her prowess and ability, her sov-
ereignty remained intact and immune from all external
aggressions ; what is more, she recovered her lost, or
delegated rights of sovereignty.

For sovereignty presupposes competency. Just as a
child or an invalid does not enjoy full sovereignty but is
more or less subject to the control of the mature or strong,
so, likewise, a state failing to possess power or to be com-
petent to assume the tasks of a territorial sovereign does
not enjoy full sovereignty but is liable to be subject to
the control of the strong state or states. While it is true
that the League of Nations guarantees the territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of each constituent
state, which undoubtedly enhances the security of each
state, it must, nevertheless, be remembered that the effi-
cacy of the League, as it now exists, is yet to be proved,
and that, in the near future, the preservation of the sov-
ereignty of each state, it seems, will still necessitate the
possession of adequate physical power and of a compe-
tent, responsible government.

Further, the protection of rights requires the possession
of adequate remedies. In other words, if there is no
remedy, there is practically no right ; or, to put it in
another way, right exists only so long as remedy exists.
Prior to the advent of the League of Nations, there was
no remedy for the protection of the rights of a nation
other than her own armament and the assistance of her
allies. It was for this lack of adequate remedies that the
nations were driven to enter into the armament race and
to stabilize the balance of power by counter-balancing al-
liances. It is also for want of adequate remedies that the
titanic struggle of the World War came i" pass. With
the inauguration, however, of the League of Nations,

which provides certain remedies for the protection of the
rights of nations, thereby securing, or at least aiming to


secure, the rights of each member state, in so far as the
remedies prove to be adequate, the rights of each state
will undoubtedly be better protected and secured than
before the formation of the League. But, despite great
improvement, the rights of each nation arc likely to be
better and more adequately protected and secured by the
possession of a strong army and navy and a stable united
government, which can command respect and redress
wrong, rather than by calling upon the slow-moving and
cumbersome machinery of the League.

The second measure to be advocated respecting the
policy of preservation has to do with foreign loans. The
source of danger since the Chinese revolution of 1911
has changed from territorial partition to international
control. Prior to the Chinese Revolution, the Powers
struggled for concessions and would not have hesitated to
dismember China, if possible and beneficial. Since, how-
ever, the Chinese Revolution, which symbolizes the rise
of Chinese nationalism and hence the national determina-
tion of the Chinese people to preserve their heritage and
liberty, the foreign Powers have seen fit to change their
policy from international rivalry among themselves and
territorial partition of China to one of international co-
operation and control, 1 which was interrupted only by
the Great War and which Japan endeavored to forestall
by the imposition or acquisition of Japanese control, and
which is, however, revived and resumed by the New
Consortium representing the combined policy of the
Powers. Hence the source of danger hereafter will lie,
not in encroachments upon China's territorial integrity,
except possibly from the direction of Japan, but rather
in the loss or forfeiture of political independence through
the abuse of foreign loans. For, in case of default or
bankruptcy, the lending Powers would foreclose and con-
trol China's finances, which means the passing of the


political independence of the Chinese. This danger is
all the more ominous when account is taken of the New
Consortium. While professing high and noble motives
in regard to its activities in China, and embodying
as it does the principles of the Open Door Doc-
trine, it might be compelled, in case of default or bank-
ruptcy, which is not improbable nor impossible under the
existing conditions in China, to demand the control of
China's finances, though much to the regret and disap-
pointment of the authors of the New Consortium.

To forestall this impending danger, a definite policy
relative to foreign loans or rather to the entire situation
as created by the post bellum developments, should be
formulated. To begin with, the commissions allowed to
the Chinese officials handling foreign loans must hence-
forth be abolished and strictly forbidden. As long as
officials are under the most alluring temptation of acquir-
ing a fortune through a loan transaction by virtue of the
commission permitted by the government, so long will
officials vie with one another to gain the opportunities of
contracting foreign loans, regardless of consequences.
Apart from this, foreign loans should henceforth be used
strictly for constructive or productive purposes, which,
under normal conditions, insure the return of interest and
profit and the repayment of the capital, rather than for
administrative or consumptive purposes, which yield no
return but which, on the contrary, necessitate the pay-
ment of the loan through taxes or other loans. Besides,
there should be a proper system of accounting and audit-
ing for receipts and expenditures of the loans as well
as the revenues. As long as the expenditures and re-
ceipts arc not accounted for, nor attested by properly ac-
credited vouchers, so long will the income of the Cov-
ernmenl be exposed to the dangers of extravagance and

Regarding the railway loans to be advanced by the New

Consortium, which has, as one of itS policies, the inter-


nationalization of Chinese railways, the international
finance of Chinese railways should be permitted, being
beneficial to China and conducive to the maintenance of
the Open Door Doctrine. The international administra-
tion and control of Chinese railways, however, should not
be countenanced any further than is absolutely necei
since it involves foreign domination of China's industry
and commerce, and will also affect her political and stra-
tegic security. While foreign technical experts and ad-
ministrative assistants might be employed, executive con-
trol of railways should not pass into the hands of an
international board of control, but should always be in
the hands of the Chinese.

Further, to increase revenue and to insure sound-
ness of national credit, the system of taxation must be
reformed and rehabilitated. As it is a fundamental
principle of public finance that taxation is the founda-
tion of public borrowing, the lack or inadequacy of which
will cause the lowering or breakdown of public credit,
so the contraction of foreign loans must be accompanied
by the reform and rehabilitation of taxation, failing which
serious mishap will inevitably follow, if not actual bank-

Moreover, the finances must be subject to the popular
control through the agency of Parliament. As long as
the finances are not supervised by Parliament, but are
in the hands of the bureaucratic clique, so long will they
be infested with the evils of abuse, extravagance and cor-
ruption, which might lead to foreign control. Hence, to
forestall the danger, popular control of China's finance
is the only remedy.

Finally, the system of taxation and the command of
the army, now decentralized and controlled by the mili-
tary governors, should be centralized and controlled by
the national government, with a view to the eventual abo-
lition of the Tuchun system and the unification of the


The third measure relating to the policy of preser-
vation has to do with China's dependencies. Having
already lost the Loochiu [slands, the Pescadores, Annam,
Burma, the western part of Hi. Form sa and Korea, she
must now preserve her remaining dependencies — Man-
churia, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. Not only for the
sake of prestige and honor must she retain the control of
these dependencies, but also because of the protective
value of these outlying regions, which shelter her from
foreign aggressions. To preserve these, and learning
from past experience, she must first afford them effec-
tive protection. As long as these territories are not
adequately protected but are exposed to the aggression
and conquest of foreign Powers, so long are they liable
to be taken away from China. The Loochiu Islands, it
should be remembered, were conquered by Prince Kat-
suma, of Japan, in 1609, which established her claim to
the suzerainty thereof, and they were accorded Japanese
protection in 1871, when, because of the murder of some
Loochiu shipwrecked sailors on the coast of Formosa by
the native inhabitants, Japan successfully asserted her
claims. Hi was occupied by the Russian troops in 1871,
and the whole of the territory would have been lost had
it not been for the victorious diplomacy of Marquis Tseng
and the martial zeal of General Tso Tsung-tang. An-
nam was subjugated by France and Spain in 1862, the
share of France being Saigon, three provinces of Cochin-
China and the Island of Pulo Condor. Burma was van-
quished by Great Britain, and, in 1S2, Lower Burma was
seized. Thus faliing to afford the necessary protection

which should be the task of the territorial suzerain, China

eventually lost these dependencies.

Furthermore, she musl exercise effective and complete
control of the foreign relations of these dependencies or
territories. As long as they arc permitted t

Online LibraryMingchien Joshua BauThe foreign relations of China: a history and a survey → online text (page 37 of 39)