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with obstacles caused by the proceedings of other
Powers." * 8

When the Allied forces had arrived at Peking and re-
lieved the beleaguered legations, Russia pretended to be



THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS 49

the best friend of China : she proposed that the Allied
forces and agents should withdraw from Peking to
Tientsin and there wait for negotiations. 49 Her proposal
failing to receive support, she then attempted to con-
clude a separate treaty of peace with China, with a
view to making Manchuria her exclusive sphere of in-
fluence, if not virtually her protectorate. In November,
1900, Admiral Alexieff made an agreement with the
Tartar General Tseng of Mukden. 50 by which the
Province of Fengtien was to be disarmed, its mili-
tary government was to be invested in Russian hands,
its civil government, though left in the hands of
Chinese officials, was yet to be under the supervision
of a Russian political resident to be stationed at
Mukden. Against the ratification of this agreement,
Japan, Great Britain, Germany and the United States
made formal representations of protest/' 1 Because
of the opposition the agreement failed to obtain the
necessary ratification. Thereupon Russia made a fur-
ther attempt by the conclusion of what was known as
the Lamdorff-Yangyu Convention, - restricting China's
sovereign rights with respect to armament in Manchuria,
the employment of foreign instructors other than Rus-
sians to drill troops in North China, conceding of mining
rights and the construction of railways in Manchuria,
Mongolia, Tarbagatai, Hi, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khoten,
etc., and at the same time granting to Russia a railroad
concession from a point in the Russian Manchurian line
to the Great Wall in the direction of Peking. As against
the pressure of Russia to ratify the convention, the Em-
peror of China, on February 28, appealed to Germany,
Japan, Great Britain and the United States for mediation.
In response vigorous representations were made caution-
ing China not to sign the convention. Thus the second
attempt of Russia was foiled.

'otiations continued. Proposals and counter-
proposals were exchanged, fa addition to the conven-
tion, Russia now pressed for the monopoly of the indus-



50 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF CHINA

trial development of Manchuria to be granted to the

Bank." Against the monopoly, John Hay

1 Likewise, it is unnecessary to state that

Japan and Great P.ritain had more than once entered

ous protests against the Russian demands.

While the negotiations between Russia and China were
thus in an unsettled state, Japan and Great Britain con-
clude! the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30, 1902, 55
directed mainly against the aggressive designs of Russia
in the Far East. In face of this determined opposition,
Russia quickly changed front and concluded the con-
vention of March 26, 1902/'° pledging to restore the
Shanhaikwan-Ncwchang-Sinminting Railway, and to
complete the evacuation of Manchuria in three succes-
sive periods of six months each.

When the specified date for the first stage of evacua-
tion came, Russia only effected a nominal withdrawal.
She of course left the parts that she had pledged to
evacuate, but she concentrated her withdrawn troops in
the strategic centers of Manchuria where she was still
permitted to remain. But when the date for the second
stage of evacuation came, she not only did not fulfill
her engagement, but she shortly after presented seven ar-
ticles as conditions of further evacuation, 81 demanding,
inter alia, the non-alienation of Manchuria and the clos-
ing of Manchuria against economic enterprises of any
other nation except herself. Thereupon Japan, Great
Britain and the United States again made vigorous pro-
tests.

From this point on, Japan stepped into the shoes of
China and waged a diplomatic duel against Russia, lead-
ing finally to the Russo-Jaj anese War of 1904-5. On
August 12, 1903, Japan presented to Russia six articles,
as a basis of understanding, among which she demanded

that the integrity of China and Korea should be mutually
respected, and that reciprocal recognition of Japan's pre-



THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS 51

ponderate influence in Korea and Russia's special inter-
ests in Manchuria should be given." As counter-
proposals, Russia presented, on October 3, 1903, eight
articles. She proposed to respect the integrity of Korea,
but she failed to mention the integrity of China in Man-
churia, as was demanded in the Japanese proposals, which
revealed most clearly the true intention of Russia. She
also proposed that she would recognize Japanese pre-
ponderating influence in Korea, but in return she asked
Japan to consider Manchuria as outside her sphere of
influence. In addition she proposed the creation of a
neutral zone north of the thirty-ninth parallel. 59

In answer to the Russian counter-proposals, Japan
presented to Russia, on October 24, 1903, the irreducible
minimum. She conceded that Manchuria would be out-
side of her sphere of influence, and also the creation of
a neutral zone between Korea and Manchuria, but she
insisted on the engagement "to respect the independence
and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean em-
pires." 60 The Russian note in reply, on December 11,
1903, virtually reiterated the first counter-proposals of
Russia except the clauses regarding Manchuria and
Japan's right to assist Korea in the latter's reform, 01 still
omitting any mention as to the integrity of China in Man-
churia. The Japanese reply of December 23, 1903, re-
emphasized the importance of coming to an amicable
understanding as to where the interests of the two nations
conflicted — Korea and Manchuria — and also suggested
amendments to two counter proposals of Russia, and the
cancellation of the clause for the establishment of a neu-
tral zone.' J The Russian reply of January , 1904," Still
Omitted any mention as to the integrity of China, but in-
sisted on the recognition of Manchuria as being outside
of Japan's sphere of influence and the establishment of

a neutral zone. Japan's la>t proposal eanie on January

13, 1904," refusing to agree to the establishment of a
neutral zone, but conceding Manchuria to be outside



52 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF CHINA

o! Japan's sphere of influence, but this only on condi-
tion of "an engagement on the part of Russia to respect
the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria." To
this last proposal of Japan Russia made no reply. Diplo-
matic relations were thereupon severed and war was
declared by both sides.

During the war the great problem of China was to
maintain neutrality. On February 10, 1904, John Hay
issued a circular note urging the belligerent powers to
respect the neutrality and administrative integrity of
China, and to limit their activities within the zone of
hostility. 00 Later, in 1905, at the instance of the
Kaiser, William II, who feared that the Powers might
take advantage of the Russo-Japanese War to seize
China's territory, John Flay sent out the circular note of
January 13, 1905, 66 requesting that in the final negotia-
tions between Russia and Japan no claims be made at
the expense of China's territorial integrity.

The war was concluded by the Treaty of Portsmouth,
September 5, 1905. 6T Russia recognized the paramount
political, military and economic interests of Japan in
Korea and pledged not to obstruct any measure of pro-
tection and control which Japan might take in Korea
(Art. 2). Russia transferred to Japan, with the consent
of China, the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan and the
southern half of the Russian Railway from Changchun
to Port Arthur. She ceded the southern half of Saghalien
Island to Japan. In the additional articles, the with-
drawal of troops from Manchuria was arranged, and the
railroad guard was fixed at not more than fifteen per
kilometer. To secure China's consent to the transfer
of the lease of Porth Arthur and Talienwan and the
southern portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Japan
concluded the Treaty of December 22, 1905, with China, 68
by which China gave her consent to the transfers made
by Russia to Japan by the treaty of Portsmouth. In



THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS 53

the additional agreement of the same date, the conces-
sion of Antung-Mukden Railway was granted for fifteen
years (Art. 6) and a number of specified places in
Manchuria were opened to trade (Art. 1).

The victory of Japan over Russia was a great inspira-
tion to the Chinese. It stirred the hearts of the Chinese
as nothing had done. It convinced them that an Asiatic
nation, by the adoption of western methods, would be
capable of defeating a European state. Furthermore, the
fact that Japan, so much smaller and less endowed by
nature, and once a disciple of China, should be able to
rise to such eminence in world politics, drove the Chinese
to the irresistible conviction that they could likewise
do the same by following the path of Japan. Thus the
indirect effect of the Russo-Japanese War was the
strengthening of Chinese nationalism.

Shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, the interna-
tional struggle for concessions was again resumed. As if
the Boxer Uprising and the Russo-Japanese War had
temporarily suspended the international rivalry, the new
struggle soon commenced again after the settlement of
the spheres of influence between Russia and Japan. Fol-
lowing the law of historical continuity, the first stage
of the resumed struggle was to complete the undertakings
of the concessions acquired in the great scramble of 1898.
Germany and Great Britain signed, on January 13, 1908, " 9
the Tientsin-Pukow loan agreement, and later, on Sep-
tember 28, 1910, 70 a supplementary loan agreement for
the same railway. Great Britain signed the Canton-
Kowlon Railway loan agreement on March 7, 1907," the
Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway loan agreement
on March 6, 1908, 72 the Peking-Hankow Railway re-
demption loan agreement on October 8, 1906,™ and
another loan agreement for the same purpose on
August 1, 1910. 74 The Peking Syndicate, however, sur-
rendered its mining rights in Shansi for a repayment of



54 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF CHINA

Rung Pin taels, 2,700,000, by the agreement of Janu-
ary 21, 1909."

The new member who became a participant in the
struggle for concessions by virtue of a successful war
was Japan. She was comparatively a late comer in this
contest. Ey virtue of her brilliant victories she suc-
ceeded to the southern half of the Chinese Eastern
Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur by the treaty
of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905. In addition she now
contested other railway concessions. For the Hsinmin-
ting-Mukden and the Changchun-Kirin Railways, she
signed successive agreements, first on April 15, 1907, 78
then a supplementary loan agreement on November 12,

1908. 77 then two detailed agreements on August 18,

1909. 78 one for the Hsinminting-Mukden Railway and
the other for the Changchun-Kirin Railway. On March
27, 1907, 7;| however, Japan transferred the Hsinminting-
Mukden Railway to the control of China. On August 19,
1919, 80 she also signed the memorandum regarding the
reconstruction of the Antung-Mukden Railway.

The United States seemed to be the only power that
was not quite so successful in the international struggle
for concessions. She obtained the Canton-Hankow Rail-
way concession in 1898 after she had failed to secure
the Peking-Hankow Railway. In the supplementary
ment of 1900 it was stipulated that "the object of
making this supplementary agreemenl of equal force with
the original agreement is to permit the benefits being
transmissible by the American Company to their suc-
igns, but the Americans cannot transfer the
rights of this agreement to other nations or people of
other nationalities." 81 But the American China Develop-
ment Company which had this concession allowed the
shares for the Canton-Hankow Railway to fall into
the hands of the Belgians who soon acquired a con-
trolling share in the line and began to assume the di-
rection of the work. Thereupon the Chinese Government



THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS 55

protested. Finally the concession was cancelled on Au-
gust 29, 1905,* 2 by the payment of $6,750,000 gold, which
the Chinese Government borrowed from the Hongkong
Colonial Government on September 9, 1905. 83

Having completed the agreements for the concessions
they had obtained in the past, they now entered into a
contest over the other railway concessions which had
as yet not been appropriated. The struggle of this sec-
ond stage centered around the trunk line running from
Hankow westward to Szechuan and southward to Can-
ton. — commonly known as the Hukuang Railway. In
securing the loan from the Hongkong Colonial Gov-
ernment for the redemption of the Hankow-Canton Rail-
way concession, Viceroy Chang Chi-tung, in his letter of
September 9, 1905, to the British Consul at Hankow, Mr.
E. H. Fraser, 84 promised to give Great Britain the first
option on the future loan for the Canton-Hankow Rail-
way, and so in 1909 when the construction of the railway
was decided upon, Chang Chi-tung approached the British
and Chinese Corporation for a loan. During the nego-
tiation, the British insisted on the Canton-Kowloon terms,
while Viceroy Chang Chi-tung insisted on the Tientsin-
Pukow terms which were much more favorable. As the
British would not accept the Tientsin-Pukow terms,
Chang Chi-tung broke off the negotiations and turned
to a German syndicate and succeeded in signing a loan
agreement. Thereupon the British charged him with
breach nf faith and claimed that the option was ofi
not to any one British syndicate, but rather to the na-
tion as a whole. On the other hand, Chang Chi-tung
retorted that since the British and Chinese Corpora-
tion which represented the British Railway enterprises
in China would not take the concession at Tientsin-
Pukow terms, he was no more hound by the original
pledge, but was free to offer the concession to syndi-
cates of other nationalities. Accusations and recrimina-
tion-, ensued Finally the controversy was settled at the



56 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF CHINA

Berlin conference of bankers when the British capi-
talists agreed to combine with the French and the Ger-
mans and to extend the concession so as to include the
1 lankow-Szechuan Railway. It was agreed that the
French and the English should construct the Hankow-
Canton line under a British engineer, while the Germans
should construct the Hupeh section of the Hankow-
Szechuan line. The preliminary agreement with China
was signed on June 6, 1909, 85 for a loan of £5,500,000
on Tientsin-Pukow terms.

Four days after the conclusion of the preliminary
agreement, the United States protested. She claimed
that an American Syndicate had been granted the right
of participation in the Hankow-Szechuan line together
with the British, basing her claim on the letter from
the Chinese Foreign Office to Minister Conger dated
August 15, 1903, 86 and also the letter of Prince Ching
to Minister Conger dated July 18, 1904." Recalling,
however, the experience with the American China De-
velopment Company in connection with the Hankow-
Canton concession, Chang Chi-tung refused to admit
American interests. Finally a personal cable from Presi-
dent Taft to the Prince Regent of China, on July 15,
1909, 88 changed the attitude of the Chinese Government
and brought American interests into line with the four-
Power group. On May 23, 1910, the four Powers en-
tered into an agreement at a conference of the represen-
tatives at Paris, 80 by which the loan was increased from
£5,500,000 to £6,000,000 to be shared equally by the four
Powers. Their final agreement with China was signed
on May 20, 191 1. 90

The resumption of the international struggle for con-
cessions, as manifested in the Hukuang loan, could not
but produce corresponding reactions. That on the part
of the United States was the neutralization plan of Sec-
retary Knox. Having secured the Chinchow Aigun con-



THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS 57

cession, 91 he proposed to the powers in 1909 92 the neu-
tralization of all the Manchurian railways. According to
his plan, China was to secure a large international loan
from the powers and redeem the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way and the South Manchurian Railway. Thus all the
railways in Manchuria would henceforth belong to China,
but the supervision thereof would be shared or con-
trolled by the Powers concerned. In other words, this
neutralization plan was a concrete assertion and appli-
cation of the open door doctrine in relation to the rail-
ways of Manchuria. It aimed to secure the equal oppor-
tunity of trade by the establishment of an international
syndicate which would supervise the railways, not for
the sake of any single nation, but for the sake of all
nations. It further aimed to preserve the integrity of
China by vesting the property rights of the railways in
the Chinese Government. China and Great Britain re-
ceived the proposal with favor, but Russia and Japan
rejected it. Thus failed the Knox plan of neutralization.
The reaction from China, as provoked by the resump-
tion of the international struggle for concessions, was the
Chinese Revolution of 1911. The Chinese spirit of
nationalism having been stirred to its depths by the Japa-
nese victory over Russia in 1905, the people could not
endure any longer these international struggles at their
expense. Taking lessons from the painful experience of
the Boxer Uprising in 1900, when blinded fury led
them to the fanatical attempt to expel all foreigners, this
time they wisely turned their resentment on the true
source of their weakness, the Manchu Dynasty. Realiz-
ing that Japan had forged her way to the forefront
through the establishment of a strong and efficient gov-
ernment, they also believed that, by taking the reins of
their government from the feeble hands of the Manchus,
they could erect a government of their own, which would
shelter them henceforth from the onslaughts of the
West.



58 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF CHINA

With this deep conviction they waited for the mo-
ment to strike. When the resumption of the interna-
tional struggle for concessions manifested itself again
in the i [ukuang Loan negotiations, the people with their
newly aroused nationalism were determined to put a
stop to this spoliation of their sovereign rights and mort-
gage of their heritage. The gentries of the provinces
affected — Hupeh, Hunan, and Szechuan — made the coun-
ter move and started a campaign for the construction
of the Hukuang railways by the people themselves. To
this end they raised large sums of capital and actually
commenced to construct the lines. The conclusion of
the Hukuang loan in 1911, however, dashed to pieces
their hopes and efforts, and imperiled their investment
in the railways. The explosion of a bomb in Wuchang
on October 10, 1911, brought the situation to a head
and heralded the advent of the Chinese Revolution, which
resulted in the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and
the establishment of the Chinese Republic.

In recapitulation, we may say that this period was one
of international struggle for concessions. The first great
scramble took place in 1898 and the second in 1908-
1911. In the interval between the two acts of the strug-
gle was the conflict between Russia and Japan in 1904-
1905 over the integrity of China in Manchuria and
the definition of their respective spheres of influence.
The reaction on the part of the United States to the
first general scramble was the enunciation of the Open
Door Doctrine in 1899 and 1900, and to the second
Btruggle in 1908-1911 was the Knox neutralization plan.
The reaction on the part of the Chinese to the first
scramble of 1898 was the fanatical Boxer Uprising and
to the second act of the international struggle, the Chinese
Revolution of 1911. During this period we may also say
that the driving factor back of tin's international strug-
gle for concessions was the national greed of the Powers



THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS 59

and the dynamic force of the European balance of power.
We may further state that this period witnessed the
beginning 1 of the foreign loans, that put China on the
broad and dangerous road, which, unless checked early by
popular control, would inevitably lead China to the preci-
pice of bankruptcy and foreign control. We may also
add that this period witnessed the deepest humiliation
and greatest peril that China had ever undergone. As
to how this darkest period of Chinese diplomatic his-
tory was gradually changed into a period on the whole
more favorable and yet in some respects more critical,
it will be seen in the next chapter. 03



NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concern-
ing China, 1895/6; ci. F. H. Huang, Public Debts in China, p. 21.

2. F. H. Huang, ibid., pp. 22-23.

3. Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, No. 52, pp. 321-323.

4. Ibid., No. 22, pp. 113-119.

5. Art. 2, ibid., p. 324.

6. Art. 3, ibid., p. 324.

7. Art. 5, ibid., p. 326.

8. Art 5, ibid., p. 326.

9. MacMurray, op. cit., 1896

10. Hertslet. op. cit., No. 59, pp. 350-354; also Shantung ques-
tion, published by The Chinese National Welfare Society, 1920,
p. 50.

11. !!■ it let, op. cit, \'.». 88, pp. 505-508.

12. [bid., No. 89, pp. 5

13. Ibid., No. 54, pp. 327-328.

14. [bid., No. 55, pp. 329-331.

15. Ibid., No. 22, p. 113.

16. Ibid., No. 22, pp. 113-110.

17. [bid., No. 24. pp. 120-122.
Ibid., No. 25, pp. 122 123.

19. Ibid., No. 25, p. l

20. Ibid., p. 122.

21. Mar Mn '2.

MacMurray, 1 I 8, p. Xi.

2.1. MacMurray, 1898/6; Doc Dip. Chine, 1894 8, p. 49.

24. MacMurray, 1

25. MacMurray, 1898/8.
Shantung op cit, p



60 THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF CHINA

27. MacMurrav, 1915/7.

28. MacMurray, l.s ( >s/13.
MacMurray, 1898/20.

30. Mar Murray, 1903/2.

31. MacMurray, 1908/2.
MacMurray, 1898/12.

33. M. C. Hsu, Railway Problems in China, pp. 41-44; Sir
MacDonald to Lord Charles Beresford, British Blue Book, Af-
fairs of China, Xo. 1, 1899, pp. 344-347.

34. Rockhill, p. 273, Art. 17.

35. MacMurray, 1902/8.

36. Hsu, op. cit., p. 40; Sir MacDonald to Lord Charles
Beresford, British Blue Book, Affairs of China, No. 1, 1899, pp.
344-347.

37. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 128-143.

38. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 141-142, Count Mouravieff to
Tower.

39. U. S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 299.

40. State papers, Vol. 94, p. 686 et seq. ; U. S. For. Rel., 1901,
Appendix, Affairs in China, French text, pp. 306-312, English
text. 312-318.

41. Hertslet, No. 27, pp. 148-170.

42. Hertslet, No. 28, pp. 171-188.
43A. Hertslet, No. 66, pp. 383-391.

43B. Art. 8, Sec. 14, Hertslet, No. 28, p. 180.

44. Hertslet, X,). 100, pp. 566-578.

45. W. W. Willouby, For. Rights and Interests in China, Ap-
pendix, p. 572.

46. MacMurray, 1907/3.

47. Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 151 ; China, No. 1,
1901, No. 256.

48. Ibid., p. 152; China, No. 1 (1901), p. 113, No. 256.

49. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Em-
pire, Vol. 3, p. 305; U. S. For. Rel., 1901, Appendix, p. 19.

50. Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 166-167; China, No. 2, 1904, No. 5,
Jan. 4, 1901.

51. Ibid., p. 169; China, No. 2, 1904, No. 8; No. 13; No. 12;
No. 19.

52. Ibid., p. 174; The Times, February 28th, 1901, p. 5; China,
No. 2, 1904, No. 6, No. 14. Nos. 25 and 42.

53. [bid., p. 193; U. S. For. Rel., 1902, pp. 273-274.

54. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 275.

55. State papers, Vol. 95, pp. 83-84.

56. Hertslet, No. 90, pp. 509-512.

57. Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 242-244 ; China, No. 2, 1904 ; No. 94.

58. Ibid., pp. 303-304.

59. [bid., pp. 308-309.

60. [bid., pp. 324-325.

61. Ibid., pp. 328-329.

62. [bid., pp. 330-331.

63. Ibid., p. 333.



THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS 61

64. Ibid., pp. 337-339.

65. U. S. For. Rel., 1904, p. 118.

66. U. S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 1.

67. State Papers, Vol. 98, pp. 735-740; MacMurray, 1905/8.

68. Hertslet, No. 67, pp. 391-396.

69. MacMurray, 1908/1.

70. MacMurray, 1910/4.

71. MacMurray, 1907/2.

72. MacMurray, 1908/3.

73. MacMurray, 1908/13.

74. MacMurray, 1908/13.

75. MacMurray, 1909/2.

76. MacMurray, 1907/3.

77. MacMurray, 1908/18.

78. MacMurray, 1909/6, 1909/7.

79. MacMurray, 1907/5.

80. MacMurray, 1909/8.

81. The Canton-Hankow Railway Contracts, Irving Press, N.
Y.; F. H. Huang, p. 32.

82. MacMurray, 1905/7.

83. MacMurray, 1905/9.

84. MacMurray, 1905/9.

85. MacMurrav, 1911/5.

86. U. S. For.' Rel., 1909, pp. 155-157; MacMurrav, 1911/5.



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