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less than decisive in the case of religion, which must be quite differ-
ent from what it is if it did not have the right to maintain that
which it declares to be true of itself, namely, that it is an act of
freedom and a gift of grace, an effect of the supersensuous permeating
the natural phenomenal life of the soul and an act of free devotion
the natural motivation.

The fourth problem arises, when we examine the rational law of
the religious nature or of the having of religion which lies in the
being and organization of the reason. The having of religion may be
demonstrated as a law of the normal consciousness from the immanent
feeling of necessity and obligation which properly belongs to religion,
and from its organic place in the economy of consciousness, which
receives its concentration and its relation to an objective world-
reason only from religion. But precisely because religion is reduced
to this, it is clear that this is only a reduction which abstracts from
the empirical actuality just as the categories of pure reason do. This
abstraction, then, should under no circumstances itself be regarded
as the real religion. It is only the rational a 'priori of the psychical
appearances, but not the replacement of appearances by the truth
free from confusion. The psychical reality in which alone the truth
is effective should never be forgotten out of regard for the truth.
This is, however, the fact in the Kantian theory of religion in two
directions.

It is always noticeable that the a priori of the practical reason is
treated by Kant quite differently from the theoretical. In case of
the latter the main idea of the synthesis, immanent in experience, of
rationalism and empiricism, is retained, and the a priori of the pure
forms of intuition and of the pure categories is nothing without the
contents of concrete reality which become shaped in it. It may be
very difficult actually to grasp the codperation of the a priori and
the empirical in the single case, and Kant's theory of the categories
may have to be entirely reshaped and approximated to a priori
hypotheses requiring verification, but the principle itself is always
the disposition of the real and genuine problem of all knowledge. In
case of the practical a priori Kant did, it is true, firmly emphasize
the formal character of the ethical, sesthetical, and religious law,
but, in doing this, does not lose quite out of sight the psychical
reality. They appear not as empty forms which attain to their
reality only when filled with the concrete ethical tasks, the artistic
creations, and the religious states, but as abstract truths of reason,
which have to take the place of the intricacies of usual consciousness.
A.t this point one has always been right in feeling a relapse on the



286 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

part of Kant into the abstract, analytical, conceptual, rationalism,
and for this very reason Kant's statements about these things are
of great sublimity and rigor of principle, but scanty in content. It
is more important in case also of this a priori of the practical reason
to keep in mind that it is a purely formal a priori and in reality
must constantly be in relation with the psychical content, in order
to give this content the J&rm core of the real and the principle of
the critical regulation of self. So the a priori of morals is not to
be represented abstractly merely by itself, but it is to be con-
ceived in its relation to all the tasks which we feel as obligatory, and
it extends itself from that point outwards over the total expanse of
the activity of reason. Likewise the a priori of art is not to be
denoted in the abstract idea of the unity of freedom and necessity,
but to be shown in the whole expanse which is present to the soul as
artistic form or conception. Thus, in especial degree, religion is not
to be reduced to the belief of reason in a moral world-order, and
simply contrasted with all supposed religion of any other kind, but
the religious a priori should only serve in order to establish the
essential in the empirical appearance, but without stripping off this
appearance altogether, and from this point of the essential to correct
the intricacies and narrowness, the errors and false combinations of
the psychical situation. Kant, by his original thought of the a priori,
was urged in different ways to such a view, and construed epistemo-
logically the empirical psychological religion as imaginary illustra-
tions of the a priori. But that is occasional only and does not
dominate Kant's real view of religion. This is and still remains only a
translation of the usual moral and theological rationalism from the
formula of Locke and Wolff into the formula of the critical philosophy.
The same revision occurs in quite a different direction. If religion
is an a priori of reason, it is, once for all, established together with
reason, and all religion is everywhere and always religious in the same
proposition as it is in any way realized. Schleiermacher expressly
stated this in his development of the Kantian theory, and, in so far
as the practical reason is always penetrated with freedom, and con-
sequently religion itself is established with the act of moral freedom,
this was also asserted by Kant himself. Such an assertion, however,
contradicts every psychological observation whatsoever. It is true
such observation can prove that religious emotions adjust them-
selves easily to all activities of reason, but it must sharply distin-
guish what is nothing more than the religiousness of vague feeling
of supersensual regulations, which usually are joined with art and
morals, from real and characteristic religiousness, in which, each
single time, a purely personal relation of presence to the super-
sensuous takes place. But this whole problem signifies nothing else
than the actualizing of the religious a priori, which actualizing



PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION 287

always occurs in quite specific and, in spite of all difference, essen-
tially similar psychical experiences and states. This problem of the
actualizing of the religious a 'priori and of its connection with con-
crete individual psychical phenomena, Kant completely overlooked
in his abstract concept of religion, or rather, deliberately ignored,
because, as he wrote to Jacobi, he saw all the dangers of mysticism
lurking in it. This fear was justified; for, as a matter of fact, all the
specific occurrences of mysticism, from conversion, prayer, and con-
templation to enthusiasm, vision, and ecstasy, do lurk in it. But
without this mysticism there is no real religion, and the psychology
of religion shows most clearly how the real pulse of religion beats in
the mystical experiences. A religion without it is only a preliminary
step, or a reverberation of real and actual religion. Moreover, the
states are easily conceived in a theory of knowledge, if one sees in
them the actualizing of the religious a priori, the production of
actual religion in the fusion of the rational law with the concrete
individual psychical fact. The mysticism recognized as essential by
the psychology of religion must find its place in the theory of know-
ledge, and it finds it as the psychological actualizing of the religious
a priori, in which alone that interlacing of the necessary, the rational,
the conformable to law, and the factual occurs, which characterizes
real religion. The dangers of such a mysticism, which are recognized
a thousandfold in experience, cannot be dispelled altogether by the
displacement of mysticism, for that would mean to displace religion
itself. It would be the same, if one should try to avoid the dangers
of illusion and error, by keeping to the pure categories alone, and
ceasing to employ them in the actual thinking of experience. Rather,
they can be dispelled only in that the actualizing of the rational
a priori is recognized in the mystical occurrences, and thus the
intricacies and one-sidedness of the mere psychological stream of
religiousness be avoided. The psychological reality of religion must
always remember the rational substance of religion, and always bring
religion as central in the system of consciousness into fruitful and -
adjusted contact with the total life of the reason. Thus the psycho-
logical reality corrects and purifies itself out of its own a priori, with-
out, however, destroying itself; or rather, the actual religion in the
psychical category of the mystical occurrences will subside to a more
or less degree. Thus we have the irrational prevailing here in its third
form, which like the two others was contained in the very outset of
the critical system, in the form of the once-occurring, factual, and
individual, which, of course, has a rational basis or a rational element
in itself, but is besides a pure fact and reality. Just this is the
excellence of the rationalism, immanent in experience (the critical
system) , that it makes room for this feature beside the general and
conceptual rationality. It did not make room for it to the extent



288 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

really required, and it especially left no space for it in its abstract
philosophy of religion. This space must again be opened by the
theory of the actualizing of the religious a priori, and there again
lies another improvement of the critical system under the influence of
modern psychology.

If we summarize all this, we have a quantity of concessions by the
formal epistemological rationalism to the irrationality of the psycho-
logical facts and a repeated breaking down of the over-rigorous
Kantian rationalism. Contrariwise, however, the pure psychological
investigation is also compelled to withdraw from the unlimited
quantity and the absolute irrationality of the multifarious (and of
the confusion of appearance and truth) to a rational criterium,
which can be found in the rational a priori of the reason only, and in
the organic position of this a priori in the system of consciousness in
general. By this rationalism alone may the true validity of religion
be founded, and by this alone the uncultivated psychical life may
be critically regulated. Religion will be conceived in its concrete
vitality and not mutilated; it will constantly be brought out of the
jumble of its distortions, blendings, one-sidedness, narrowness, and
exuberance back again to its original content, and to its organic
relations to the totality of the life of reason, to the scientific moral
and artistic accomplishments. That is everything that science can
do for it, but is not this service great enough and indispensable
enough to justify the work of such a science? We do not stop with
nothing more than "varieties of religious experience" which is the
result of James's method; but neither do we stop with nothing more
than a rational idea of religion, which overpowers experience, as was
still so in the case of Kant. But we must learn how intimately to
combine the empirical and psychological with the critical and norma-
tive. The ideas of Hume and of Leibnitz must once more be brought
into relation with the continuations of Kant's work, and the com-
bination of the Anglo-Saxon sense for reality with the German
spirit of speculation is still the task for the new century as well as
for the century past.



SHORT PAPERS

A short paper was contributed to this Section by Professor Alexander T.
Ormond, of Princeton University, on "Some Roots and Factors of Rehgion."
The speaker said that rehgion, like everything else human, has its rise in man's
experience. It has also doubtless had a history that wiU present the outlines of
a development, if but the course of that development can be traced. " But in the
case of religion our theory of development wiU be largely qualified by our judg-
ment as to its origin; while, regarding origin itself, we have to depend on hypo-
theses constructed from our more or less imperfect acquaintance with the races,
and especially the savage races, of the present. The primitive pre-religious man
is a construction from present data, and wiU always remain more or less hypo-
thetical. This will partially explain, and at the same time partially excuse, what
we will agree is the unsatisfactory character of the anthropological theories as
accounts of the origin of religion. But there are other reasons for this partial
failure that are less excusable. One of these is the rather singular failure of the
leading anthropologists, in dealing with the origin of religion, to distinguish
between fundamental and merely tributary causes. For instance, if we suppose
that man has in some way come into possession of a germ of religiousness, many
things wiU become genuine tributaries to its development that when urged as
explanations of the germ itself would be obviously futile. There must be a cause
for the pretty general failure to note this distinction which is vital to religious
theory, and I am convinced that the principal cause is a certain lack of psycho-
logical insight and of pliilosopliical grasp in dealing with the problem of the first
data and primary roots of religion in man's nature.

"In the first place, it is needful in dealing with the religion of the hypothetical
man that we should have some idea of what constitutes religion in the actual
man. Now, back of all the outward manifestations of rehgion, wiU stand the
religious consciousness of the man and the community, and it wiU be this that will
determine the idea of religion in its most essential form. The developed idea
of religion, therefore, arising out of this germinal impression, would take the form
of a sense (we may now call it concept) of relatedness to some being akin to man
himself, and yet transcending him in some real though undetermined respects.
Anything short of this would, I think, leave rehgion in some respects unaccounted
for; while anything more would perhaps exclude some genuine manifestations of
religion.

" If the idea of religion arises out of an impression, then it will not be possible
to deny to it an intellectual root. I make this statement with some diffidence,
because if I do not misinterpret them, some recent psychologists have practically
denied the intellectual root in their doctrine that religion can have no orig-
inal intellectual content. If I am not further misled, however, these writers
would admit that a content is achieved by the symbolic use of experience. This
is perhaps aU I need argue for here; since our epistemology is teaching us
that the distinction between symbolism and perception is only that between the
direct and the indirect; while here it is clear that its use in developing the signi-
ficance of the religious impression would have all the directness and, therefore, aU
the cogency of an immediate inference.

" Let us now restore the intellectual and emotional elements of religion to their
place in a synthesis; we will then have a concrete religious experience out of
which may be analyzed at least two fundamental factors. The first of these is
what we may call the personal factor in religion. We are treading in the foot-



290 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

steps of the anthropologists when we find among the most undeveloped savages
a tendency to personify the objects of their worship. When it comes to the ques-
tion of determining the role that this personalizing tendency has actually
played in the development of religion, the anthropologists divide into two
camps, one of these, led by Max MiiUer, regarding it as a symbolic interpretation
put upon the impression of some great natural or cosmic object or phenomenon;
while others, including Herbert Spencer and Mr. Tylor, prefer to seek the originals
of religion in ancestral dream-images and ghostly apparitions. These writers
thus start with completely anthropomorphic terms, and their problem is to
de-anthropomorphize the elements to the extent necessary to constitute them data
of religion. The second factor standing over against the personal, as its opposite,
is that of transcendence. By transcendence I mean that deifying, infinitating
process that is ever working contra to the anthropomorphic influence in the
sphere of religious conceptions. The School of Spencer regard this as the only
legitimate tendency in religion. We do not argue this point here, but agree that
it is as legitimate and real a factor as that of personality. The root of this factor,
if our diagnosis of the idea of religion be correct, is to be sought in the original
impression of religion, and it no doubt has its origin in man's feeling-reaction
from that impression. We have pointed to submission as one of the religious
emotions. Now submission rests on some deeper feeling-attitude, which some
have translated into the feeling or sense of dependence. This, however, is not
adequate, since men have the sense of social dependence on finite beings, and we
have it with reference to the floor we are standing on. Rather, it seems to me,
we must translate it into the stronger and more unconditional feeling of help-
lessness. One real ground of our religious consciousness is the sense or feeling of
helplessness toward God; the sense that we have no standing in being as against
the Deity. This radical feeling utters itself in every note of the religious scale,
from the lowest superstitious terror to the highest mystical self-annihilation.

"These two factors, the forces of personalization and transcendence, are in-
separable. They constitute the terms of a dialectic within the religious con-
sciousness by virtue of which in one phase our religious conceptions are becoming
ever more adequate and satisfying, while from another point of view their in-
sufficiency grows more and more apparent. And, on the broader field of religious
history, they embody themselves in a law of tendency, which Spencer has only
half -expressed, by virtue of which the objects of religion are on one hand becoming
ever more intelligible; on the other, ever more transcendent of our conceptions."



A short paper was read by Professor F. C. French, Professor of Philosophy in
the University of Nebraska, on " The Bearing of Certain Aspects of the Newer
Psychology on the Philosophy of Religion." The speaker said in part:

"The relation of science to religion has received, to be sure, much study, but
to most minds liitherto this has meant the relation of only the physical sciences to
religion. The older psychology was largely speculative and metaphysical in
character. There were, of course, some who employed the empirical method in
psychology, but they were so far from comprehending the full scope of mental
phenomena that, at best, their work gave the promise of a science rather than
a science itself.

It is not the fact that the newer psychology takes account of the physiological
conditions of mental life; it is not the fact that the subject is now pursued in
laboratories with instruments of precision, that gives it its full standing as a
science: it is much more the fact that the psychology of to-day has found a place
in the natural system of mental things for those strange and relatively unusual
phenomena of consciousness which to the scientifically minded seemed totally
unreal and to the superstitious manifestations of the supernatural. . . .



SHORT PAPERS 291

" In showing that the abnormal can be explained in terms of the normal,
psychology does now for the phenomena of mind what the physical sciences
have long done for the phenomena of nature. . . .

" Psychology as a science postulates the reign of natural law in the subjective
sphere just as rigorously as physics postulates the reign of law in the objective
sphere. . . .

"It is not in the unusual and the abnormal that the reflective mind is to see
God. It is not through gaps in nature that we are to get glimpses of the super-
natural. Rather is it in the very nature of nature, rational, harmonious, law-
conforming, subject to scientific interpretation, that we have the best evidence
that the world is made mind- wise, that it is the work of an intelligent mind, that
there is a rational spirit at the core of the universe.

" For science the transcendent does not enter into the perceptual realm external
or internal. It is, indeed, hard for the religious mind to admit this fact in all
its fullness. Until it does, however, religion must always stand more or less in
fear of science. Once give up the perceptual, in all its bearings, to science, and
religion will find that it has lost a weak support only to gain a stronger one.
Ultimately, I believe, we shall find that the full acceptance of science in the mental
domain as well as in the physical will strengthen the rational grounds of theistic
behef."



SECTION C — LOGIC



SECTION C — LOGIC



{Hall 6, September 22, 10 a. m.)

Chairman: Professor George M. Duncan, Yale University.
Speakers: Professor William A. Hammond, Cornell University.

Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Columbia University.
Secretary: Dr. W. H. Sheldon, Columbia University.

The Chairman of this Section, Professor George M. Duncan, Pro-
fessor of Logic and Mathematics at Yale University, in introducing
the speakers spoke briefly of the scope and importance of the sub-
ject assigned to the Section; expressed, on behalf of those in attend-
ance, regret at the inability of Professor Wilhelm Windelband to
be present and take part in the work of the Section, as had been
expected; congratulated the Section on the papers to be presented
and the speakers who were to present them; and announced the
final programme of the Section.



THE RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES

BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. HAMMOND

[William Alexander Hammond, Assistant Professor of Ancient and Medieval
Philosophy and Esthetics, Cornell University, b. May 20, 1861, New Ath-
ens, Ohio. A.B. Harvard, 1885; Ph.D. Leipzig, 1891. Lecturer on Classics,
King's CoUege, Windsor, N. S., 1885-88; Secretary of the University Fac-
ulty, Cornell; Member American Psychological Association, American
Philosophical Association. Author of The Characters of Theophrastus,
translated with Introduction ; Aristotle's Psychology, translated with Intro-
duction.]

In 1787; in the preface to the second edition of the Kr. d. r. V., Kant
wrote the following words: "That logic, from the earliest times,
has followed that secure method " (namely, the secure method of a
science witnessed by the unanimity of its workers and the stability
of its results) " may be seen from the fact that since Aristotle it has
not had to retrace a single step, unless we choose to consider as
improvements the removal of some unnecessary subtleties, or the
clearer definition of its matter, both of which refer to the elegance
rather than to the solidity of the science. It is remarkable, also, that
to the present day, it has not been able to make one step in advance,
so that to all appearances it may be considered as completed and
perfect. If some modern philosophers thought to enlarge it, by
introducing psychological chapters on the different faculties of
knowledge (faculty of imagination, wit, etc.), or metaphysical chapters
on the origin of knowledge or different degrees of certainty accord-
ing to the difference of objects (idealism, skepticism, etc.), or, lastly,
anthropological chapters on prejudices, their causes and remedies,
this could only arise from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of
logical science. We do not enlarge, but we only disfigure the sciences,
if we allow their respective limits to be confounded ; and the limits
of logic are definitely fixed by the fact that it is a science which has
nothing to do but fully to exhibit and strictly to prove the formal
rules of all thought (whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be
its origin or its object, and whatever be the impediments, accidental
or natural, which it has to encounter in the human mind). " — [Trans-
lated by Max Miiller.] Scarcely more than half a century after the
publication of this statement of Kant's, John Stuart Mill (Intro-
duction to System of Logic) wrote: "There is as great diversity''
among authors in the modes which they have adopted of defining
logic, as in their treatment of the details of it. This is what
might naturally be expected on any subject on which writers have
availed themselves of the same language as a means of delivering
different ideas. . . . This diversity is not so much an evil to be



RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES 297

complained of, as an inevitable, and in some degree a proper result
of the imperfect state of those sciences " (that is, of logic, jurispru-
dence, and ethics). "It is not to be expected that there should be



Online LibraryMo.) Congress of Arts and Science (1904 : Saint LouisCongress of Arts and Science : universal exposition, St. Louis, 1904 → online text (page 32 of 68)