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laws, and always their houses and goods.

The other species of war is when an entire people, with all the families
of which it is made up, being driven out by famine or defeat, removes
from its former seat, and goes in search of a new abode and a new
country, not simply with the view to establish dominion over it, but
to possess it as its own, and to expel or exterminate the former
inhabitants. Of this most terrible and cruel species of warfare Sallust
speaks at the end of his history of the war with Jugurtha, where in
mentioning that after the defeat of Jugurtha the movement of the Gauls
into Italy began to be noticed, he observes that "_in the wars of the
Romans with other nations the struggle was for mastery; but that always
in their wars with the Gauls the struggle on both sides was for life_."
For a prince or commonwealth, when attacking another State, will be
content to rid themselves of those only who are at the head of affairs;
but an entire people, set in motion in the manner described, must
destroy all who oppose them, since their object is to subsist on that
whereon those whom they invade have hitherto subsisted.

The Romans had to pass through three of these desperate wars; the first
being that in which their city was actually captured by those Gauls who,
as already mentioned, had previously taken Lombardy from the Etruscans
and made it their seat, and for whose invasion Titus Livius has assigned
two causes. First, that they were attracted, as I have said before, by
the fruitful soil and by the wine of Italy which they had not in Gaul;
second, that their population having multiplied so greatly that they
could no longer find wherewithal to live on at home, the princes of
their land decided that certain of their number should go forth to seek
a new abode; and so deciding, chose as leaders of those who were to go,
two Gaulish chiefs, Bellovesus and Siccovesus; the former of whom came
into Italy while the latter passed into Spain. From the immigration
under Bellovesus resulted the occupation of Lombardy, and, subsequently,
the first war of the Gauls with Rome. At a later date, and after the
close of the first war with Carthage, came the second Gallic invasion,
when more than two hundred thousand Gauls perished in battle between
Piombino and Pisa. The third of these wars broke out on the descent into
Italy of the Todi and Cimbri, who, after defeating several Roman armies,
were themselves defeated by Marius.

In these three most dangerous contests the arms of Rome prevailed; but
no ordinary valour was needed for their success. For we see afterwards,
when the spirit of the Romans had declined, and their armies had lost
their former excellence, their supremacy was overthrown by men of the
same race, that is to say by the Goths, the Vandals, and others like
them, who spread themselves over the whole of the Western Empire.

Nations such as these, quit, as I have said, their native land,
when forced by famine, or by defeat in domestic wars, to seek a new
habitation elsewhere. When those thus driven forth are in large numbers,
they violently invade the territories of other nations, slaughtering the
inhabitants, seizing on their possessions, founding new kingdoms, and
giving new names to provinces; as was done by Moses, and by those tribes
who overran the Roman Empire. For the new names which we find in Italy
and elsewhere, have no other origin than in their having been given by
these new occupants; as when the countries formerly known as Gallia
Cisalpina and Gallia Transalpina took the names of Lombardy and France,
from the Lombards and the Franks who settled themselves there. In the
same way Sclavonia was formerly known as Illyria, Hungary as Pannonia,
and England as Britain; while many other provinces which it would be
tedious to enumerate, have similarly changed their designations; as when
the name Judæa was given by Moses to that part of Syria of which he took
possession.

And since I have said above that nations such as those I have been
describing, are often driven by wars from their ancestral homes, and
forced to seek a new country elsewhere, I shall cite the instance of the
Maurusians, a people who anciently dwelt in Syria, but hearing of the
inroad of the Hebrews, and thinking themselves unable to resist them,
chose rather to seek safety in flight than to perish with their country
in a vain effort to defend it. For which reason, removing with their
families, they went to Africa, where, after driving out the native
inhabitants, they took up their abode; and although they could not
defend their own country, were able to possess themselves of a country
belonging to others. And Procopius, who writes the history of the war
which Belisarius conducted against those Vandals who seized on Africa,
relates, that on certain pillars standing in places where the Maurusians
once dwelt, he had read inscriptions in these words: "_We Maurusians who
fled before Joshua, the robber, the son of Nun_;"[1] giving us to know
the cause of their quitting Syria. Be this as it may, nations thus
driven forth by a supreme necessity, are, if they be in great number,
in the highest degree dangerous, and cannot be successfully withstood
except by a people who excel in arms.

When those constrained to abandon their homes are not in large numbers,
they are not so dangerous as the nations of whom I have been speaking,
since they cannot use the same violence, but must trust to their address
to procure them a habitation; and, after procuring it, must live with
their neighbours as friends and companions, as we find Æneas, Dido, the
Massilians, and others like them to have lived; all of whom contrived to
maintain themselves in the districts in which they settled, by securing
the good will of the neighbouring nations.

Almost all the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to be
from the cold and barren region of Scythia, because from the population
there being excessive, and the soil ill able to support them, they are
forced to quit their home, many causes operating to drive them forth and
none to keep them back. And if, for the last five hundred years, it has
not happened that any of these nations has actually overrun another
country, there are various reasons to account for it. First, the great
clearance which that region made of its inhabitants during the decline
of the Roman Empire, when more than thirty nations issued from it in
succession; and next, the circumstance that the countries of Germany and
Hungary, whence also these nations came, are now so much improved that
men can live there in comfort, and consequently are not constrained
to shift their habitations. Besides which, since these countries are
occupied by a very warlike race, they serve as a sort of bulwark to keep
back the neighbouring Scythians, who for this reason do not venture to
attack them, nor attempt to force a passage. Nevertheless, movements on
a great scale have oftentimes been begun by the Tartars, and been at
once withstood by the Hungarians and Poles, whose frequent boast it is,
that but for them, Italy and the Church would more than once have felt
the weight of the Tartar arms.

Of the nations of whom I have been speaking, I shall now say no more.


[Footnote 1: Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Jesu latronis filii Navae.
_Procop. Hist. Bell. Vand. II._]



CHAPTER IX. - _Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between
States_.

The occasion which led to war between the Romans and Samnites, who for
long had been in league with one another, is of common occurrence in
all powerful States, being either brought about by accident, or else
purposely contrived by some one who would set war a-foot. As between
the Romans and the Samnites, the occasion of war was accidental. For in
making war upon the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the
Samnites had no thought of involving themselves with the Romans. But the
Campanians being overpowered, and, contrary to the expectation of Romans
and Samnites alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the Romans, on whose
protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour them as
dependants, and to accept a war which, it seemed to them, they could not
with honour decline. For though they might have thought it unreasonable
to be called on to defend the Campanians as friends against their own
friends the Samnites, it seemed to them shameful not to defend them
as subjects, or as a people who had placed themselves under their
protection. For they reasoned that to decline their defence would close
the gate against all others who at any future time might desire to
submit themselves to their power. And, accordingly, since glory and
empire, and not peace, were the ends which they always had in view, it
became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship.

A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the
Carthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed by the Romans of the
citizens of Messina in Sicily, and this likewise came about by chance.
But the second war with Carthage was not the result of chance. For
Hannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the Saguntans, who were the
friends of Rome in Spain, not from any desire to injure them, but in
order to set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity of
engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into Italy. This method of
picking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful States when they
are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations. For if I desire
to make war on a prince with whom I am under an ancient and binding
treaty, I shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the friend of
that prince, very well knowing that when I attack his friend, either the
prince will resent it, when my scheme for engaging him in war will be
realized; or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or baseness in
not defending one who is under his protection will be made apparent;
either of which alternatives will discredit him, and further my designs.

We are to note, therefore, in connection with this submission of the
Campanians, what has just now been said as to provoking another power to
war; and also the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to its
own defence, is prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant, - that
remedy being to give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects
for its defender; as the Campanians gave themselves up to the Romans,
and as the Florentines gave themselves up to King Robert of Naples, who,
after refusing to defend them as his friends against Castruccio of Lucca
by whom they were hard pressed, defended them as his subjects.



CHAPTER X. - _That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the
Sinews of War_.

Since any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his
pleasure bring it to a close, a prince before he engages in any warlike
enterprise ought to measure his strength and govern himself accordingly.
But he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself as to his strength,
which he will always do, if he measure it by money, by advantage of
position, or by the good-will of his subjects, while he is unprovided
with an army of his own. These are things which may swell your strength
but do not constitute it, being in themselves null and of no avail
without an army on which you can depend.

Without such an army no amount of money will meet your wants, the
natural strength of your country will not protect you, and the fidelity
and attachment of your subjects will not endure, since it is impossible
that they should continue true to you when you cannot defend them.
Lakes, and mountains, and the most inaccessible strongholds, where
valiant defenders are wanting, become no better than the level plain;
and money, so far from being a safeguard, is more likely to leave you a
prey to your enemy; since nothing can be falser than the vulgar opinion
which affirms it to be the sinews of war.

This opinion is put forward by Quintus Curtius, where, in speaking of
the war between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, he
relates that the latter, from want of money, was constrained to give
battle and was defeated; whereas, could he have put off fighting for a
few days the news of Alexander's death would have reached Greece, and
he might have had a victory without a battle. But lacking money, and
fearing that on that account his soldiers might desert him, he was
forced to hazard an engagement. It was for this reason that Quintus
Curtius declared money to be the sinews of war, a maxim every day cited
and acted upon by princes less wise than they should be. For building
upon this, they think it enough for their defence to have laid up great
treasures; not reflecting that were great treasures all that is needed
for victory, Darius of old had conquered Alexander, the Greeks the
Romans, and in our own times Charles of Burgundy the Swiss; while the
pope and the Florentines together would have had little difficulty in
defeating Francesco Maria, nephew of Pope Julius II., in the recent
war of Urbino; and yet, in every one of these instances, the victory
remained with him who held the sinews of war to consist, not in money,
but in good soldiers.

Croesus, king of Lydia, after showing Solon the Athenian much besides,
at last displayed to him the boundless riches of his treasure-house, and
asked him what he thought of his power. Whereupon Solon answered that he
thought him no whit more powerful in respect of these treasures, for as
war is made with iron and not with gold, another coming with more iron
might carry off his gold. After the death of Alexander the Great a tribe
of Gauls, passing through Greece on their way into Asia, sent envoys to
the King of Macedonia to treat for terms of accord; when the king, to
dismay them by a display of his resources, showed them great store of
gold and silver. But these barbarians, when they saw all this wealth,
in their greed to possess it, though before they had looked on peace as
settled, broke off negotiations; and thus the king was ruined by those
very treasures he had amassed for his defence. In like manner, not
many years ago, the Venetians, with a full treasury, lost their whole
dominions without deriving the least advantage from their wealth.

I maintain, therefore, that it is not gold, as is vulgarly supposed,
that is the sinews of war, but good soldiers; or while gold by itself
will not gain you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you gold.
Had the Romans chosen to make war with gold rather than with iron all
the treasures of the earth would not have sufficed them having regard
to the greatness of their enterprises and the difficulties they had to
overcome in carrying them out. But making their wars with iron they
never felt any want of gold; for those who stood in fear of them brought
gold into their camp.

And supposing it true that the Spartan king was forced by lack of money
to risk the chances of a battle, it only fared with him in respect of
money as it has often fared with others from other causes; since we see
that where an army is in such straits for want of victual that it must
either fight or perish by famine, it will always fight, as being the
more honourable course and that on which fortune may in some way smile.
So, too, it has often happened that a captain, seeing his enemy about to
be reinforced, has been obliged either to trust to fortune and at once
deliver battle, or else, waiting till the reinforcement is complete, to
fight then, whether he will or no, and at whatever disadvantage. We find
also, as in the case of Hasdrubal when beset, in the March of Ancona,
at once by Claudius Nero and by the other Roman consul, that a captain,
when he must either fight or fly, will always fight, since it will seem
to him that by this course, however hazardous, he has at least a chance
of victory, while by the other his ruin is certain.

There are many circumstances, therefore, which may force a captain to
give battle contrary to his intention, among which the want of money may
sometimes be one. But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be the
sinews of war, any more than those other things from the want of which
men are reduced to the same necessity. Once more, therefore, I repeat
that not gold but good soldiers constitute the sinews of war. Money,
indeed, is most necessary in a secondary place; but this necessity good
soldiers will always be able to supply, since it is as impossible that
good soldiers should lack money, as that money by itself should secure
good soldiers. And that what I say is true is shown by countless
passages in history. When Pericles persuaded the Athenians to declare
war against the whole Peloponnesus, assuring them that their dexterity,
aided by their wealth, was sure to bring them off victorious, the
Athenians, though for a while they prospered in this war, in the end
were overpowered, the prudent counsels and good soldiers of Sparta
proving more than a match for the dexterity and wealth of Athens. But,
indeed, there can be no better witness to the truth of my contention
than Titus Livius himself. For in that passage of his history wherein
he discusses whether if Alexander the Great had invaded Italy, he would
have succeeded in vanquishing the Romans, three things are noted by him
as essential to success in war; to wit, many and good soldiers, prudent
captains, and favourable fortune; and after examining whether the
Romans or Alexander would have had the advantage in each of these three
particulars, he arrives at his conclusion without any mention of money.

The Campanians, therefore, when asked by the Sidicinians to arm in their
behalf, must have measured their strength by wealth and not by soldiers;
for after declaring in their favour and suffering two defeats, to save
themselves they were obliged to become tributary to Rome.



CHAPTER XI. - _That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has
Reputation rather than Strength._

To mark the mistake made by the Sidicinians in trusting to the
protection of the Campanians, and by the Campanians in supposing
themselves able to protect the Sidicinians, Titus Livius could not have
expressed himself in apter words than by saying, that "_the Campanians
rather lent their name to the Sidicinians than furnished any substantial
aid towards their defence._"

Here we have to note that alliances with princes who from dwelling at a
distance have no facility, or who from their own embarrassments, or from
other causes, have no ability to render aid, afford rather reputation
than protection to those who put their trust in them. As was the case in
our own times with the Florentines, when, in the year 1479, they were
attacked by the Pope and the King of Naples. For being friends of the
French king they drew from that friendship more reputation than help.
The same would be the case with that prince who should engage in any
enterprise in reliance on the Emperor Maximilian, his being one of those
friendships which, in the words of our historian, _nomen magis quam
praesidium adferunt_.

On this occasion, therefore, the Campanians were misled by imagining
themselves stronger than they really were. For often, from defect of
judgment, men take upon them to defend others, when they have neither
skill nor ability to defend themselves. Of which we have a further
instance in the Tarentines, who, when the Roman and Samnite armies were
already drawn up against one another for battle, sent messengers to the
Roman consul to acquaint him that they desired peace between the two
nations, and would themselves declare war against whichsoever of the two
first began hostilities. The consul, laughing at their threats, in the
presence of the messengers, ordered the signal for battle to sound, and
bade his army advance to meet the enemy; showing the Tarentines by acts
rather than words what answer he thought their message deserved.

Having spoken in the present Chapter of unwise courses followed by
princes for defending others, I shall speak in the next, of the methods
they follow in defending themselves.



CHAPTER XII. - _Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to
anticipate or to await it._

I have often heard it disputed by men well versed in military affairs,
whether, when there are two princes of nearly equal strength, and the
bolder of the two proclaims war upon the other, it is better for that
other to await attack within his own frontier, or to march into the
enemy's country and fight him there; and I have heard reasons given in
favour of each of these courses.

They who maintain that an enemy should be attacked in his own country,
cite the advice given by Croesus to Cyrus, when the latter had come to
the frontiers of the Massagetæ to make war on that people. For word
being sent by Tomyris their queen that Cyrus might, at his pleasure,
either enter her dominions, where she would await him, or else allow her
to come and meet him; and the matter being debated, Croesus, contrary to
the opinion of other advisers, counselled Cyrus to go forward and meet
the queen, urging that were he to defeat her at a distance from her
kingdom, he might not be able to take it from her, since she would have
time to repair her strength; whereas, were he to defeat her within her
own dominions, he could follow her up on her flight, and, without giving
her time to recover herself, deprive her of her State. They cite
also the advice given by Hannibal to Antiochus, when the latter was
meditating a war on the Romans. For Hannibal told him that the Romans
could not be vanquished except in Italy, where an invader might turn to
account the arms and resources of their friends, whereas any one making
war upon them out of Italy, and leaving that country in their
hands, would leave them an unfailing source whence to draw whatever
reinforcement they might need; and finally, he told him, that the Romans
might more easily be deprived of Rome than of their empire, and of Italy
more easily than of any of their other provinces. They likewise instance
Agathocles, who, being unequal to support a war at home, invaded the
Carthaginians, by whom he was being attacked, and reduced them to sue
for peace. They also cite Scipio, who to shift the war from Italy,
carried it into Africa.

Those who hold a contrary opinion contend that to have your enemy at a
disadvantage you must get him away from his home, alleging the case of
the Athenians, who while they carried on the war at their convenience in
their own territory, retained their superiority; but when they quitted
that territory, and went with their armies to Sicily, lost their
freedom. They cite also the fable of the poets wherein it is figured
that Antæus, king of Libya, being assailed by the Egyptian Hercules,
could not be overcome while he awaited his adversary within the bounds
of his own kingdom; but so soon as he was withdrawn from these by the
craft of Hercules, lost his kingdom and his life. Whence the fable runs
that Antæus, being son to the goddess Earth, when thrown to the ground
drew fresh strength from the Earth, his mother; and that Hercules,
perceiving this, held him up away from the Earth.

Recent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this view. Every one
knows how Ferrando, king of Naples, was in his day accounted a most wise
prince; and how two years before his death there came a rumour that
Charles VIII of France was meditating an attack upon him; and how, after
making great preparations for his defence, he sickened; and being on the
point of death, among other counsels left his son Alfonso this advice,
that nothing in the world should tempt him to pass out of his own
territory, but to await the enemy within his frontier, and with his
forces unimpaired; a warning disregarded by Alfonso, who sent into
Romagna an army, which he lost, and with it his whole dominions, without
a battle.

Other arguments on both sides of the question in addition to those
already noticed, are as follows: He who attacks shows higher courage
than he who stands on his defence, and this gives his army greater
confidence. Moreover, by attacking your enemy you deprive him of many
opportunities for using his resources, since he can receive no
aid from subjects who have been stripped of their possessions; and when
an enemy is at his gates, a prince must be careful how he levies money
and imposes taxes; so that, as Hannibal said, the springs which enable a
country to support a war come to be dried up. Again, the soldiers of
an invader, finding themselves in a foreign land, are under a stronger
necessity to fight, and necessity, as has often been said, is the parent



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