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widow to the heirs in the husband's family, who being
nearest to him are, for this purpose, nearest to the widow.
This may possibly have been the view of Nilakantha, in the
Vyav. May. Chap. IV. Sec. ]0, paras. 26, 28, (6) and would
make her position similar to that of a widow of a separated
coparcener as thus conceived, (c) The Mitakshara makes
the share simply Stridhana, {d) inherited as described in
Bk. I. Introd. pp. 146, 310 ; and in Bk. I. Chap. IV. pp.
501 ss, 517 ss. {e)

§ 7 A. 1. c. — Partition hetiueen reunited coparceners. — In
the case of a partition between reunited coparceners, the
shares are equal, notwithstanding that the portions brought

sons, ibid. 325, comp. 349. Yet her daughter and daughter's son
succeed to it, showing it is regarded as stridhana, ihicl. 103. Ex-
ceptionally she is allowed to dispose of what she inherited from her
husband, ibid. 188, but not what she inherited from her father, ihid,
165. She may alienate to relieve her necessities, ibid. 248, or to pay
debts and funeral expenses, &c., ibid. 281, though even in such cases
the sanction of the kinsmen may be required, ihid. 303.

In 78 Dekhan Castes it was found that a widow could give away
property if her husband had died divided from his family but not
otherwise ; Steele, L. C. 373. By some she is allowed to dispose even
of immoveable property given by her parents, ibid. 236.

(a) See above, p. 777.
[h] Stokes, H. L. B. 105.

(c) Mit. Ch. II. Sec. 8, paras.-2, 7 ; Stokes, H. L. B. 85.

(d) See above, and 2 Str. H. L. 402.

(e) See also 2 Str. H. L. 411, 412; Steele, Law of Caste, 62, 63.



784} PAETITION— INTRODUCTION. [bk. ii J 7 a 2.

in on reunion were unequal, (a) Regarding the descent of
shares in a reunited family, see Bk. I., Introd. pp. 140
sqq.

§ 7 A. 2. — Partition, of naturally indivisible property. —
Naturally indivisible property must be disposed of, so that
the coparceners severally may derive from it the maximum
of advantage, a principle readily deducible from the text
of Brihaspati, May. Chap. IV. Sec. 7, para. 22. (h) Thus
roads or ways, wells, tanks, and pasture-grounds ought to be
used by all the coparceners. (c) The proceeds of an hereditary
office are to be divided, or it may be enjoyed in turns, (d)
Places of worship and sacrifice not being divisible, the copar-
ceners after* separation are entitled to their turns of
worship, {e) Where such a mode of enjoyment is impracti-

(a) May. Chap. IV. Sec. 9, para. 2 ; Stokes, H. L. B. 92. The
Smriti Chandrika, Chap. XII. para. 4, understands the prohibition
against inequality to be directed only against the allotment of a
quarter share to the eldest son, and allows an inequality in a new
distribution proportionate to that of the shares brought in on
reunion. This is expressly controverted by the Vyav. May., and is
reconciled with Brihaspati's rule, " Brothers reunited share each
other's wealth," only by a forced construction. See Smriti Chan-
drika, Chap. XII. para. 15; Chap. XIII. para. 14. The Smriti Chan-
drika, Chap. XII. para. 6, also assigns to reunited copaixeners shares
in any separate acquisition equal, for each, to half what the acquirer
retains. See p. 698, note {b), and above, § 7 .a.. 1 b, p. 778.

(b) Stokes, H. L. B. 78 ; Viram. Tr. p. 3 ; Coleb. Dig. Bk. V. T.
366, Comm.

(c) Steele, L. C. 60, 61.

(d) Steele, L. C. 216, 218, 229, from which it will be seen that local
or family custom in many cases allows a greater or less advantage to
seniority.

(e) Anund Moyee et al v. Boykantnath Roy, 8 C. W. R. 193 C. R.
A refusal to deliver up an idol for the plaintiffs to perform worship
was held by Pontifex, J., to constitute a cause of action, Delendronath
v. Odit Churn Mullick, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 390. It is generally a pri-
vilege of the eldest to retain the household gods. Steele, L. C 222,
417.



BK.n, J7a2.] rights & DUTIES ARISING ON PARTITION. 785

cable or inconvenient, the property may be sold, and its
proceeds divided, or the rights of the coparceners otherwise
equitably adjusted by agreement. Clothes in use, vehicles,
ornaments, furniture, books and tools are to be kept by
the coparceners who use them, (a) But see also above, § 5
B. ad Jin., page 730. As already pointed out (page 731 )
the family dwelling has by some been regarded as indivi-
sible property. This doctrine has not been received by the
Courts, except to the limited extent above indicated. A
suit for the partition of a family dwelling may be brought
by the purchaser at an execution sale of the rights of a
coparcener, according to Jhuhhoo Lall 8ahoo v. Khooh Lall
et al. (6) But in Bombay a partial partition cannot be
enforced, (c)

A division of the right, to worship may be made by assignment
of turns, Mitta Kanth v. Niranjun et al, 22 C. W. E. 438, S. C. ; 14
Bang. L. R. 166. Property dedicated to the service of a family idol
is disposable only by the assent of all the members, and this cannot
put an end to a dedication to a public temple, acccording to a dictum
of Sir M. Smith, Komvur Doorganath Roy v. Ram Chunder Sen, L.
E. 4 I. A. at p. 58. A religious fund or dedication is indivisible
according to Viram, 249. Narayan Sadanand v. Chintamayi, I. L. R.
5 Bom. 393, agreeing with Rajah Vimnah Valia v. Bavi Vurmah
Kunhi K'ldty, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 235, pronounces a religious endow-
ment inalienable. It refers to Khtisdhhand v. Mdhadevgiri, 12 Bom.
H. 0. R. 214, and many other cases ; but Mancharam v. Pransliankar
I. L. E. 6 Bom. 298 S. 0. Bom; H. C. P. J. 1882, p. 120, recognizing
the general principle, allows an exception in favour of persons in the
line of succession, referring to SitdrdmbUat v. Sltdrdm Ganesl\ 6 Bom.
H. 0. R. 250 A. C. J. Such a transaction does not defeat the intended
succession ; it only accelerates it. In the absence of a son, and with
the consent of the heir, a holder of a temple grant may alienate it
for the maintenance of the worship, Steele, L. C. 237. By custom
the rights of a particular * tirth-upadya' to minister to pilgrims is
divisible and alienable, Ih. 85.

The interest of a temple servant in land held by him as remuneration
may be sold in execution, LotUhar v. Wdgle, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 596.

(a) Manu IX. 200, 219; Mit. Chap. I. Sec. 4, pi. 16, 19.

(6) 22 0. W. E. 294.

(c) See above, p. 699.
99 H



786 PARTITION — INTRODUCTION. [bk. u, § 7 b 1.

A division of rents and other profits of land or houses
called Phalavibhaga^ is permissible, and constitutes a valid
partition, though distinguished from the ordinary distribu-
tion in specie. The rule extends to the division of the profits
of a Yatandari village, (a) But such a distribution cannofc
be taken as conclusive of partition. (6) With the recent
case quoted on this point, however, compare also Somangouda
V. Bharmangoiida. (c) The Smriti Chandrika, Chap. XV.,
paras. 3, 4, says that a phalavihliaga, which has discriminat-
ed the rights of the co-sharers to the produce of the land,
leaves them severally without a separate title to the land
itself, [d) But this does not seem consistent with principle, (e)

§ 7 B. 1. Debts. — Debts due to the family may be distri-
buted or assigned to a single member as part of his share. (/)

(c) Huvee Bhudr v. B.npsltunkur Shunkerjee et al, 2 Borr. 730.

(6) See above, p. 603.

(c) 1 Bom. H. C. R. 43.

{d) So Amritrao v. Abaji, above p. 703. See however above, p. 694,
note [cl), and Virasvdmiv. Ayydsvdmi, 1 M. H. C. R. 471.

(e) See above, pp. 694, 703.

(/) Where there has been a dishonest or wanton expenditure of
the family funds by one member, " a prodigal is to receive his share
after deducting the amount he has dissipated on other than the
necessary samskaras of the family," Steele, L. C. p. 62.

It may be noted that between Hindlls the rule of damdupat, or
limitation of interest to the amount of the prhicipal, applies even in
the case of a mortgage where no account of the rents and profits has
to be taken. The rule has not been abrogated by A.ct XXVIII. of
1855 or by the Limitation Acts, Ganpat Pandurang v. Adarji Badabhai,
I. L. R. 3 Bom. at p. 333. See Steele, L. C. 265, 266. The rule of
damdupat is not applicable except where the defendant is a Hindu,
JVanchand Hansrdj v. Bapusaheb Rustambliai, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 131. It
is sometimes ignorantly supposed that the regular judicature of the
British Courts has increased the oppression of agriculturist debtors
and small proprietors. The incorrectness of this opinion is shown by
Steele, L. 0. 269, 271 ; M, Elphinstone's Report on the Deccan, Bom.
Jud. Sel. vol. IV. p. 143, 193; Grant's Rep. ibid. p. 241, 242; Brigg's
Rep. ibid. 249; Chaplin's Rep. ibid. 260; Pottinger's Rep. ibid. 298,
326,328,337; Chaplin's Rep. ibid. 489, 495; Robertson's Rep. ibid-
589.



bk.ii,§7b1.] PAETITION OF DEBTS. 787

An immediate payment of his share of such debts can-
not be claimed by any member from his co-parcener, (a)
The common debts due by the family are to be distributed
in the same proportion as the shares of the common pro-
perty _, (b) and the debts incurred in carrying on a joint busi-
ness override the rights of the co -sharers in the property
acquired by means of it (c) ; but the common property and the
other members of a joint family are not answerable for a
member's separate deht.{d) From a passage in the Mayukha,
1. c, para, 2, it might appear that the discharge of the
family debts is a necessary preliminary condition to a
partition. The passage of Katyayana, however, which is
cited by Nilakantha, is differently rendered by Colebrooke. (e)
Nai-ada, as translated by Jolly, p. 1 5, directs the
brothers- only to pay according to the shares, if they
separate, and Jimutavahana (/) says of another passage

(a) Laksliman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik, I. L. R. 1
Bom. 561.

{b) May. Chap. IV. Sec. 6 ; Stokes, H. L. B, 72. When one of se-
veral co-sharers in an estate pays the whole revenue,his suit to recover
contribution from the other co-sharers not resting on contract cannot
be brought in the Small Cause Court. Nolim Krishna Chakravarti v.
Bam Kumar Chakravarti, I. L. R 7 Calc. 605. See Act IX. of 1872,
Sec. 69 ; Ram Tulml Siii^h v. Biseswar Lall Sahoo, L. R. 2 I. A. 131
143; Gadgeppa Desai v. Apaji Jivanrao, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 237; for
the circumstances under which contribution can and cannot be
recovered.

(c) Johurra Bibee v. Shreegopal lesser, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 470.

{d) Narsinghbhat v. Chenapa bin Ningapa, S. A. No. 205 of 1877 ;
Bom. H. C. P. J. F. for 1877, p. 329; and above Bk. I. Chap. YI. Sec.
3 {b), Q. 2, p. 586 ; 2" Str. H. L. 335 ; MahablesJtvar v. Sheshgiri,
Bom. H. C. P. J. 1881, p. 183. A vatandar's mortgage of his vatan
property is not valid against his heirs either under Reg. XVI. of
1827 or under Bom. Act III. of 187-1, Kdlu Naraijan v. Hanmdpd, I.
L. R. 5 Bom. 435.

(e) Dig. Bk. V. T. 369,

(/) See Coleb. Dig. Bk. V. Chap', II. T. Ill; Smriti Chandrika,
Chap. II. Sec. 2, para. 20.



788 PARTITION — INTEODUCTION. [bk. ii, § 7 b 1.

of Narada, Pt. II., Chap. XIII., si. 32, that it is intended
to inculcate the obligation of paying the father's debts,
(as that which says " when sisters are married " merely
prescribes the duty,) not to regulate the time of partition.
The Smriti Chandrika, Chap. II. Sec. 2, p. 23, says, that if
there are assets, the debts should be paid before partition.
But Yajiiavalkya (quoted para. 18) prescribes merely that
the debts and the assets shall be equally distributed. In
other passages (a) a distribution of the debts amongst the
coparceners is recognised, and the Dayakrama-Sangraha,
Chap. VII., para. 28, {b) expressly declares that the debts
may bo discharged subsequently to partition.

If a distribution of the debts is made, the coparceners
severally, who desire to secure themselves against further
claims on the part of the creditors, should obtain the assent
of the latter to that arrangement, (c) Without this tho

(a) May. Chap. IV. Sec. 4,. para. 17; Stokes, H. L. B. 52; Mit.
Chap. I. Sec. 3, para. 1, ibid. 381; Coleb. Dig. Bk. I. Chap. V. Text
149, 185; Bk. V. Chap. III. Text 111, and Jagannatha's Coram.
Chap. VI. Text 375.

{b) Stokes, H. L. B. 516.

(c) See 1 Str. H. L. 191, and the atithorities qnoted there; and the
case of Bholanatli Sirkar v. Baharam Khan ct al, 10 C. W. R. 392 C. R.
The sous of deceased members arc answerable after partition only for
their proper shares of a father's debt, according to Coleb. Dig. Bk.
I. T. 182-5. See Narada, Chap. I. 3ec. III. para. 2, Tr. p. 15 ; Vishnu,
Tr. p. 45. The Saras vati Vilasa, Sec. 96 ff, understands this as
relating to a separate paternal d^t distinguished from a family debt
binding all, but in Boorga Persacl v. Kcsho Persad, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 656
S. C, L. R. 9 I. A. 27, the Judicial Committee say of sons of a mem-
ber of a joint family (according to the statement at the beginning
of the judgment : " But it appears to their Lordships that the plain-
tiffs were not liable for the whole debt for which their father and other
joint members of the family were originally liable, the debt having
been apportioned amongst the several members of the family who
had separated and several bonds given for the several portions of the
debt. It appears therefore to their Lordships that the High Court
was right, and that the infants were nob bound to pay the whole of



BK. II, § 7 B 1.] RIGHTS & DUTIES AEISING ON PARTITION. 789

assets may be followed in their hands, (a) though a sepa-
rated son, it is said, is not answerable during the father's
life for any debt contracted by his father, (h) In Mahada v.
Narain Mahadeo, (c) the Bombay Sudder Court ruled that

the debt for which the father was at one period jointly liable with
the other members of the family, and that they were liable only for
the father's portion of the debt." This they were ordered to pay,
though their ostensible guardian was not the legal guardian and had
no right to defend the suit in their name. If several bonds for the
several shares of the debts had been accepted by the creditors in
discharge of the original joint debts, there could of coursebe no claim
except upon the several obligors. But the Hindu Law seems apart
from that to impose only a several obligation on the co- sharers
except in virtue of any of them possessing himself of the whole estate
or more than his share of it. See above, pp. 80, 610.

In an opinion given at 2 Str. H. L. 283, Colebrooke says that
the distribution of the debts in a partition is to be regarded
merely as an adjustment amongst the parceners not affecting a
creditor's right against all or any of them. The caste rules, as at
Borradaile's Collection, Lith. 41, seem merely to contemplate a parti-
tion of the debts, but so far as property subject to a charge had been
taken the taker would probably be liable for the common debt. See
Steele, L. C 59, 219, 409.

(a) See Coleb. Dig. Bk. I. Chap. V. T. 167, note; T. 169, and
Jagannatha's Comm. ; Coleb. in 2 Str. H. L. 283.

{b) Coleb. Dig. loc. cit. and Amrut Boiv Trimbuck v. Trimbuck
Row Amrutayshwur, Bom. Sel. Ca. 249. See 2 Str. H. L. 277. And
that a minor cannot be called on during his minority, ibid. 279. In
Bagmal et al v. Sadasliiw et al, S. A. No. 70 of 1864, Arnould and
Tucker, J J., held that separated s(3ns are liable after the father's
death for debts incurred by him before the partition. As to the per-
sonal liability for a father's debts see above, p. 80 ; and below, Bk. II.
Chap. I. Sec. 1, Q. 5. As to the liability of the property, see
Jamiyatram v. Purbhudds, 9 Bom. H. C. R. 116, referred to in the
Introduction to Bk. I. p. 77 ; and also pp. 169, 642. In Harreedass v.
Ghirdurdass, S. D. A. Sel. Ca. 46, on attachment of a parcener's
share it was made liable for its proportion of the funeral expenses of
the parcener's mother. See Smriti Chandrika, Chap. XIII. paras.
12, 13.

(c) 3 Morris, 346.



790 PARTITION — INTRDCCTION. [bk. ii, 1 7 b1.

the wtole of the family property remains liable for a debt
(properly) contracted by any member, althougb another may
have obtained a decree for a partition, (a) For the separate
debt of a single coparcener, the common property is not
liable, but the creditor may, as we have seen, make the
share available by enforcing a partition, (h) In the common
case of a mortgage acquiesced in by the co-sharer seeking
a partition he is liable generally in proportion to his share
in the mortgaged property to the charges upon it. (c)
This does not enable him to redeem his own share alone,
the obligation being indivisible, but he may redeem the
whole, (d) and as a condition of giving up their proper sliares
to the co-owners he may require payment to him of such sums
by way of contribution as shall be found due according'
to the nature of the original transaction and on a genera!
adjustment of the accounts amongst the co-sharers, (e)
AVhile the mortgagee is thus secured against any "^ frag-
mentation'* of his security he must serve all co-sharers with
notice of intended foreclosure under the Bengal Law, ( /) and
if he obtains a decree on the mortgage debt and executes it by
sale against the mortgaged property must sell both his own
and the mortgagor's interest therein. And even though the
mortgagor's interest only is specified as the object of sale
yet the mortgagee who has promoted the sale is bound by an
estoppel against afterwards setting up his own right, (g)

(a) See Narada, Pt. I. Chap. III. si. 16.

(5) See supra, § 6 b; also pages 163, 263, 576, 578.

(c) Bliyruh Chunder Mudduck v. Nuddiarchand Paul, I2C.W. R.
291 ; Laljee Sahoy r. Fakeerckand, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 135.

{d) The practice has sometimes been otherwise, see Mussf. Phool-
hash Koonwar v. Lalla Jogeshwar Sahoy, L. R. 3 I. A. at p. 26. See
Norender Narain's case, below.

(e) Rama Gopal v. Pllo, Bom. H. C. P. J. F. 1881, p 161.

(/) Norender Narain Singh v. Dwarka Lai Mundun, L. R. 5 I. A.
Bt p. 27.

ig) See Hari v. Lakshman, I. L. R. 5. Bora. 614, quoting Si/ed
Jmam Momtazooddeen Mahomed v. Bajkumar Ghose, 14 Beng. L. R. lOS



BK.ii, §7b2.] eights k DUTIES ARISING ON PARTITION. 791

In Sahaji Savant v. Vithsavant (a) a one-sixth share was
awarded to two brothers by a decree for partition. They
were dispossessed under a dfecree obtained by the mortgagee
of an undivided one-sixth from the common ancestor. (6)
It was held that they could not obtain a fresh partition in
execution of their former decree, though it was suggested
they might have a remedy against their former coparceners
by an independent suit.

§ 7 B. 2. Other liabilities, that is provisions for the main-
tenance or portions of persons not entitled to shares, as
described above. Section 6 B, (c) may be distributed by
agreement amongst the co-sharers. But the estate' at large is
liable, at least in the hands of the members of the family
making a partition, (d) and coparceners, who desire to limit
their responsibility, must obtain the assent of the persons
interested. At Calcutta it has been held (e) that the pur-
chaser of part of an estate, subject to a charge, may be sued
singly for the whole amount due, and the same principle
would probably be applied in the case of a purchaser with
notice of the lien or liability to a charge of the kind we are.

F. B.; Narsidds Jiiram v. Joglehar, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 57; Ind. Evid.
Act, Sec. 115 ; Chooramun Singh v. Shaik Mahomed Ali, L. R, ,9 I. A,
21, 25.

(a) Bora. H. C P. J. F. 1881, p. 193.

ih) Ramchandra Dikshit v. Sdvitribdi, 4 Bom. H. C. R. 73 A. C. J.
and per Lord Hardwicke in Peyin v. Lord Baltimore, 2 W. & T., L.
C. 844.

(c) See also pp. 77, 163, 164, 235, 776, 780 ; Bk. II Chap. II. Sec. 1,
Q.9; Narhar Singh v. Bugnath Kuer, I. L. R. 2 All. 407 ; above,
pp. 251, 252.

(d) Ramacliandra Dikshit v. Savitribai, 4 Bom. H. C. R. 73 A. C. J.,
referred to above ; Adliiranee Narain v. Shona Malee et al, I. L. R. 1
Calc. 365; Narada, Part II. Chap. XIII. paras. 25-29; Manu V. 143.

(e) Trosonno Coomar Sein v. The Bet>. B. F. X. Barboza, 6 C. W. R.
253 C. R.



792 PARTITION — INTRODUCTION. [bk. ii, J 7 b 2,

now considering, (a) Lastly, if contrary to the knowledge
and expectation of tlie co-parceners who made the partition^
an absent co-parcener supposed to be dead should come
forward to claim his share, or the widow of one deceased
should give birth to a son, the proper share of this additional
parcener must be made by proportionate deductions from the
shares distributed, {h) The coparceners in existence how-
ever or begotten at the time of a partition, and those only,
are entitled to shares. After-born members of the family
share only with their father or those united with him. (c)

A son who has for money relinquished his share to his
father stands thenceforth in the position of a separated son. {d)
But as a separated son he succeeds in preference to the
widow, though the father can dispose of the estate, (e)

After a partition has been made a son born to a copar-
cener (including a father in relation to sons separated from
him in such partition) succeeds to the share and to the
acquisitions of the separated coparcener to the exclusion of



(a) S. Bhagabati Dasl v. Kanailal Mitter et al, 8 B. L. R. 225; B.
Golack Chunder Base v. B. Ohllla Bayeo, 25 C W. R. 100 C. R.

{b) Mit. Chap. I. Sec. 6, paras. I, 8; Stokes, H. L. B. 393-5;
May. Chap. IV. Sec. 4, para. 35; Stokes, H. L. B. 56; Coleb. Dig.
Bk. V. Chap. VII. Sec. 2, T. 394.

(c) Yekeyamian v. Ajniswarian et al,4i. M. H. C R. 307; Mifc. Chap.
I. Sec. 6, pi. 4; Stokes, H. L. B. 394.

(i) Steele, L. C. 56, 58, 61.

(e) See Balkrishna Trimhak v. Savitribai, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 54. The
descendant who has taken a part of the property in discharge of his
claims and left the family, (Steele, L. 0. 213), has thus forfeited his
rights as a co-sharer in any further partition, but not as heir on
failure of the members who remained united and their represen-
tative descendants. These rights are reciprocal. (Steele, L. C. 233,
422.) Amongst some castes this heirship of the brethren excludes
the daughter except as to gifts from her father (Steele, L. C. 425) and
even the widow {ib. 424, 423,) though in fewer cases.



BK. II, § 7 B 2.] RlGHte & DUTIES ARISING ON PARTITION. 793

his former co-sbarers. (a) He stands ou the same footing
towards the paternal estate as a son who remained united
with his father when a separation occurred between the latter
and his other coparceners, (b) This does not^ however, pre-
vent a gift of a moderate amount to a separated son (c) as
to one unseparated.

Partition does not finally close all claims of the father
and sons on each other (d) or deprive a separated son of
his right of inheritance in competition with another heir,
as for instance a reunited coparceuer not a son. (e) In case
of absolute indigence, their claims on each other revive. (/)
So too the claim of a mother or a wife to support is not
extinguished by the allotment to her of a share, (g)

A suit on an alleged partition which the plaintiff fails to
establish does not bar a subsequent suit by him as a copar-
cener for partition of the property set forth as undivided, {h)

(a) Gaut. Ad. 28, para. 26; Mrada, Pfc. II. Chap. XIII. para. 44;
Steele, L. C. 59, 406 ; Note (c) above, p. 792.

(6) SeeMifc. Chap. I. Sec. 6, para. 2; Vyav. May. Chap. IV. Sec. 4,
paras. 33, 34.

(c) Mit. Chap. I. Sec. 6, paras. 13, 14, 15. See Lakshman Dada
Naik V. Ramchandra Dada Naik, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 561, 567, S. C, L.
E. 7 I. A. 181. Not by will against au unseparated son, ih.

(d) Vtram. Tr. p. 54, 218. See 2 Macn. 114, 148 ; Hirata, quoted
in Coleb. Dig. Bk. Y. T. 23.

(e) Yiram. Tr. p. 218; Bamappa Naiken v. Sithammdl,!. L. R. 2
Mad. 182.

(/) Steele, L. C 40, 178, 179 ; Smriti Chandrika, Chap. II. Sec. 1,
para. 31 ss; Himritsing v. Ganpatsing, 12 Bom. H. C. R. 94; Ram-
chandra V. SakJiaram Vagli, I. L. R. 2 Bora. 346; Savitribai v.
Laxmilai, I. L. R. 2 Bom. at p. 590. See Sree Cheyfania Anunga
Deo V. Fursuram Deo, Mori. Dig. p. 442, No. 38. So also a guru
and a chela are bound to support each other in distress ; Steele, L.
C. 442.

{g) Coleb. Dig. Bk. V. T. 88, Comm. See 1 Str. H. L. 67, 175;
Smriti Chandrika, Chap. II. Sec 1, para. 3 ss. Steele, L. C. 40,
states the duty generally.

(Ii) Koncrrav v. Garurav, I. L. E. 5 Bom. 589.
100 H



794 PARTITION — INTRODUCTION. [bk. ii, § 7 b 2.

The execution of a decree for partition of an estate
subject to payment of land revenue is to be made by the
Collector, (a)

Repugnant conditions cannot be annexed to the separate
estates taken under a partition, (b)

(«) Act X. of 1877, Sec. 265- Rules for the performance of the



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