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bilite de la trouver du cote de la Pologne — le seul ou son influence
pourroit etre employe avec succes. — They mean to draw Alopeus
out further "afin de preparer imperceptiblement les esprits aux
ouvertures qui vont suivre."



6. Alopeus to Ostermann, June 22/JuLY 3, 1792. [M. A., Hpyccia,
III, 29]

Par le compte que j'ai eu l'honneur de rendre de la conversation
du Comte de Schoulenbourg avec le Prince de Nassau, j'ai prevenu
en partie les orders de Votre Excellence contenus dans l'Apostille de
sa depeche du 10 Juin, 1 mais pour me mettre en etat de les remplir
encore plus particulierement, j'ai saisi le pretexte du besoin de
quelque eclaircissement que j'avois demande au Ministre, et je me
suis rendu hier au soir ches lui. Alors j'ai amene insensiblement la
conversation a ce qu'il m'importoit d'eclairer. Elle m'a conduit a des
resultats, qui a ce que j'ose me flatter, repandront le jour necessaire
sur les vues des Cours de Vienne et de Berlin. II n'existe pas de con-
cert eventuel entre elles, mais il y a eu naturellement des pour-
parlers sur le genre des indemnites auxquels elles devroient aspirer.
Le remboursement des fraix en argent comptant paroissant impossi-
ble et ayant meme l'inconvenient de grever la France d'une nouvelle
masse de dettes, qui la tiendroit garotte et influeroit ainsi sur son
existence politique, il a paru au Comte Schoulenbourg que l'Autriche

1 I have been unable to find this apostil.



APPENDIX XIV 537

pourroit faire des acquisitions territoriales sur la France sans que ce
Royaume en fut affoibli dans sa valeur politique. La Cour de Vienne
n'y trouve d'autre inconvenient que le sentiment de haine et l'odieux
dont elle se chargeroit de la part de la plus grande partie de l'Europe;
mais dans le fond ce n'est peutetre que le desir de realiser son projet
de l'echange de la Baviere auquel elle paroit toujours attachee. Ici
on n'y trouve plus les memes dangers qu'autrefois, pourvu que par
de nouvelles acquisitions la balance soit maintenue. L'impossi-
bilite d'en faire sur la France, tant a cause de l'eloignement que par
la necessite de ne pas echancrer ce Royaume comme la Pologne, a.
laquelle un role subalterne doit etre assigne, motive l'idee de cher-
cher les indemnites pour la Prusse en Pologne meme. Le Comte de
Schoulenbourg m'a assure de ne pas encore connoitre les vues du
Roi son Maitre a cet egard; mais il s'est propose de Lui en parler.
La lisiere de la Pologne, qui uniroit le Royaume de Prusse a la Silesie,
en fait l'objet, et il croit que la Russie pourroit egalement faire
l'acquisition de l'Ukraine Polonoise, a fin de former de ses nouvelles
acquisitions sur les Turcs une masse contigue avec ses anciennes pos-
sessions. C'est la en gros l'idee que ce Ministre a concu de la nature
et du genre des indemnites. . . .



APPENDIX XIV

On Razumovski's Conversations with Cobenzl of

June 30 and July i, 1792, Regarding

the Polish-Bavarian Plan

The chief source for the account given in the text is Razumovski's
letter to Bezborodko of July 4, which is supplemented by Ph. Cobenzl's
dispatch to L. Cobenzl of September 13 (this latter printed in Vivenot,
ii, pp. 202 f.).

With the aid of Razumovski's report I am able to present this in-
cident for the first time, I believe, in its true light. It has long been
partially known through the Vice-Chancellor's above-cited dispatch
of September, through a few vague references in the Prussian records,
and more recently through a brief and very unsatisfactory resume of
the ambassador's report published by Wassiltchikow, Les Razou-
tnowski, ii , pp. 139 f ., and erroneously dated July 23 (instead of
June 23/ July 4). None of these sources afforded a precise clue as to



53§ APPENDIX XIV

the date of the incident, or sufficed to show in what relation it stood
to the development of the Polish-Bavarian plan. Sybel surmised
that these conversations took place in May, just about the time of
Schulenburg's first overture to Spielmann; and he conjectured that
it was Razumovski who first suggested to the Austrians the idea of
reviving the Bavarian Exchange project ("a pregnant hint which
was enough to inflame the Vice-Chancellor's mind"), thus leading
Spielmann to propose that plan to Schulenburg. 1 Very similar ac-
counts are given in Hausser 2 and Sorel. 3 Heidrich 4 and Heigel 5 are
much nearer the truth as to the time and the significance of Razu-
movski's insinuations to Cobenzl, though Heidrich is certainly wrong
in supposing that the ambassador made his suggestions at the im-
pulse of the Austrians.

The text of the Russian ambassador's report follows.

Razumovski to Bezborodko, June 23/JuLY 4, 1792. "Tres se-
cret." [M. A., ABdpia, III, 54]

Monsieur le Comte.

L'Echange de la Baviere projette sous le regne de feu l'Empereur
Joseph et dont les negotiations entamees sous les auspices de Sa
Majeste Imperiale Notre Souveraine, parvinrent malheureusement
a la connaissance du cabinet de Berlin et en furent traversers d'une
maniere si eclatante, cet echange n'a point cesse d'etre, dans le secret
du cabinet de Vienne, une maxime d'Etat. J'eus lieu de la soup-
conner de bonne source et je mis la plus grande attention a m'en
convaincre. La visite que le Roi doit rendre au retour de Francfort
a l'Electeur Palatin a Munick a redouble ma vigilance; enfin, apres
m'etre captive, j'ose le dire, quelque confiance de la part du minis tere
d'ici depuis que l'Imperatrice ma Souveraine a daigne m'honorer
de la sienne en me conferant le poste que j'ai l'honneur de remplir,
j'ai voulu m'assurer si le projet en question entrait dans les plans
actuels du cabinet autrichien. Dans une conversation familiere
avec Mr. le Vice-Chancelier Comte de Cobenzl j'ai hasarde de toucher
cette corde et ce que j'en ai dit a ete fonde sur ma profession de foi
a. l'egard de cette cour, sur les protestations sinceres auxquelles m'au-

1 Op. cit., ii, pp. 209 f.

2 Deutsche Geschichte, i, p. 358.

3 U Europe et la Revolution franqaise, ii, pp. 467 f.

4 Op. cit., p. 225, note 1.

6 Deutsche Geschichte, i, p. 537.



APPENDIX XIV 539

torisent les dispositions loyales et bienveillantes de l'lmperatrice
envers la Maison d'Autriche, et Son invariable attachement aux
principes de notre alliance; que Sa Majeste Imperiale prenait par
consequent l'interet le plus vif au bien etre et a. la prosperite solide
de la Maison d'Autriche, etc. etc. Nous nous rimes des complimens
et cela en resta la.

Le lendemain, Dimanche 20 Juin/i Juillet, au sortir de l'audience
des ambassadeurs ches LL. MM. je trouvais Mr. de Cobenzl: il me
prit a part et me dit "Saves vous que notre conversation d'hier m'a
roule sans cesse dans l'esprit. La maniere franche et amicale dont
nous avons parle m'a engage a. en faire part au Roi; il vous sait bien
bon gre des bons sentimens que vous temoignes. Vous aves penetre
notre Secret; nous n'en avons point pour votre cour et vous alles en
juger. Nous envisageons la circonstance presante des affaires de
l'Europe comme la plus favorable a. effectuer l'echange de la Bavierre
contre les Pays Bas. Mais avant d'y songer, avant de faire la plus
petite demarche, le Roi veut consulter l'lmperatrice avec la franchise,
la confiance la plus illimitee, et l'intention de Se regler entierement
d'apres les conseils et les mesures qu'Elle lui suggerera. Le Roi
souhaiterait que vous en fissies l'ouverture; et m'autorise en meme
terns a, en ecrire a. l'Ambassadeur Comte de Cobenzl, le tout sous le
plus grand secret, car personne ne s'en doute ici; et le Roi, vous,
moi, et Mr. de Spielmann sont et seront les seuls qui en seront in-
struits. De sorte que si l'lmperatrice ne juge point a, propos que le
projet ait lieu, il sera comme non avenu et restera enseveli entre les
personnes qui en sont les depositaires.

L'opposition de la cour de Berlin, a t'il continue, est le plus grand
obstacle qui pourrait s'y rencontrer. Sans doute les termes amicals
ou nous sommes avec elle peuvent nous mettre a, l'abri du moins des
consequences funestes qui suivirent ce projet sous l'Empereur Joseph,
mais ils n'obtiendront [sic] surement pas son agrement sans que le
Roi de Prusse de son cote fasse une acquisition. Cette acquisition
serait comme de raison aux depens de la Pologne, et nomement de
Dantzig et Thorn convokes depuis si longtems et dont on ne saurait
l'empecher de s'emparer a, la premiere circonstance favorable; ce
qui meme eut ete fait deja sous un ministere plus habile. Nous
n'hesiterions done pas d'y souscrire, et quoique par notre echange
nous perdrions a peu pres 2 millions de revenus, nous ne croirions pas
acheter trop cher l'arrondissement et la stabilite de nos possessions.

Tel a ete le precis de ce que m'a dit le Comte de Cobenzl. En le



54-0 APPENDIX XV

quittant j'eus une conversation avec le Baron de Spielmann a peu
pres de la meme teneur. II me dit au surplus que le General Bishoffs-
verder avec lequel il s'est lie dans les differens voyages qu'il a faits
ici, lui avait temoigne dans son dernier sejour tres confidement [sic]
des dispositions tres opposees au Systeme de non agrandissement
qu'il professait dans le public et dont on a fait la base du traite de
Berlin (ce dont j'ai eu moi meme dans le terns des notions positives)
et qu'il lui avait touche meme quelque chose de conforme a. l'objet
dont nous nous entretenions presentement. Enfin l'un et l'autre me
dirent au nom de leur maitre qu'il considerait la reussite de ce projet
comme tenant absolument a, la volonte et bonne disposition de l'lm-
peratrice et qu'on se conformerait entierement a. ce que Sa Majeste
Imperiale jugerait a. propos de decider. Je repondis par les memes
assurances que ci dessus, mais j'ajoutais que peutetre dans un ar-
rangement pareil faudrait-il avoir egard a des convenances relatives
aux interets de Sa Majeste Imperiale et que j'y comptais avec la
meme confiance a laquelle je venais d'inviter le ministere de S. M.
Apostolique envers nous. Cette clause ne parut nullement deplaire
et apres m'avoir fait les protestations les plus vives des obligations
qu'on nous aurait, nous convinmes que j'expedierais un courier et
hier au soir on m'envoya le paquet ci joint pour l'Ambassadeur
Comte de Cobenzl.

En suppliant V. Exc. de porter cette depeche a. la connaissance de
Sa Majeste Imperiale, j'ose esperer, Monsieur le Comte, de n'etre
point desapprouve dans la marche que j'ai suivie. J'avais de fortes
presomptions sur l'existence du projet d'echange, jamais moment
ne m'a paru plus favorable pour l'effectuer que la Situation actuelle
de l'Europe. C'est sous ce point de vue que j'ai cru devoir provo-
quer la confidence qui m'en a ete faite, et qui soumise entierement
au bon plaisir de Sa Majeste Imperiale ne saurait porter aucun preju-
dice ni a. nos interets, ni a. nos vues dans la supposition ou elles ne
seraient point analogues a, celles qu'on a ici. . . .



APPENDIX XV

On the Date of Spielmann's Plan Discussed on Pages 351 f.

This plan was brought to light through the document published
in Vivenot, ii, pp. 348-351, and there entitled "Protokoll aufge-
nommen zwischen Spielmann und Haugwitz." This document is in



APPENDIX XV 541

-the form of an unsigned agreement or convention between the two
Courts. It is undated, but it was sent to Vienna along with Spiel-
mann's report of November 6. The question at issue is: when was
this plan drawn up and presented to the Prussians?

It should be remarked, in the first place, that the original document
does not bear the title 'Protokoll' or any other title. Spielmann
refers to it in his report only as a 'plan.' Secondly, while he did not
attach a date to it, some one has written on the back of it: "N. B.
Dieser hochst wichtige Vortrag muss zwischen dem letzten Bericht
des B. Spielmann d. d. x. 15. und der preussischen Verbale Note
vom 25. x. redigirt worden [sein]." While one cannot be certain, it
is probable that this note was added immediately upon the receipt
of the document, and that it indicates the idea then formed at Vienna
as to the date of composition of the plan.

The only direct evidence to be obtained from the report of No-
vember 6 is the following passage with which that dispatch begins:
"Ueber welchen beyderseitigen Entschiidigungsplan ich mit Graf en
Haugwitz unter Voraussetzung der Allerhochsten Genehmigung iiber-
eingekommen bin, bevor nach der Hand die ganze Reihe der spdtem
Ungliicksfalle eingetreten ist, 1 geruhen E. Exc. aus der gehorsamst
hier anverwahrten Beylage zu ersehen." Although by no means
clear, this passage is enough to refute the statement made by Sybel 2
and Sorel 3 that this 'protocol' represents an agreement reached be-
tween Haugwitz and Spielmann after the Note of Merle (October
25) and on the basis of that note. For on this theory, how explain
the reference to "the whole series of the later disasters"? How ex-
plain the fact that the Note of Merle is not mentioned, and that
the principles of the ' protocol ' are utterly different from those of the
Prussian declaration of October 25? One must do violence to the
whole history of the affair to represent a Prussian minister agreeing
after the Note of Merle to make his master's occupation in Poland
dependent on the conclusion of the Exchange treaty with the Bava-
rian House. Sybel has evidently given Spielmann's negotiation a
quite fictitious denouement. The "agreement of Merle," of which
he speaks, most certainly never took place.

Heidrich has already pointed this out, but I am equally unable to
agree with his theory. He declares that the 'protocol' represents an

1 The italics are mine.

2 Geschichte der Revolutionszcil, ii, pp. 362 f.

3 L' Europe ct la Revolution franqaise, iii, p. 168.



542



APPENDIX XV



agreement effected between Spielmann and Haugwitz on the journey
westward from Frankfort, or at least before the latter minister's de-
parture from Luxemburg for Verdun (September 26). For this view
I can see only two possible grounds: (1) the passage cited above from
Spielmann's dispatch of November 6, to which I shall return later;
and (2) Haugwitz's letter to Schulenburg of September 30, in which
he reports what he has learned of the new Austrian propositions.
The sum of what he says is that the Court of Vienna now demands
a 'supplement' in Alsace and Lorraine as far as the Moselle; he men-
tions none of the other provisions of the 'protocol'; he does not hint
for a moment that he has already reached a provisional agreement
with Spielmann, that a written plan has been presented to him, that
he has made any definite proposals as to the Prussian acquisitions. 1
Spielmann, on his side, says in a letter to Cobenzl of September 27:
"Mit dem H. Graf en v. Haugwitz habe ich liber mein aufhabendes
Geschaft ausftihrlich und umstandlich conferiret"; 2 and October 15 3
that the King seemed inclined to grant Austria "die Zutheilung ander-
weitiger reichlicher Surrogate fur die Markgrafthtimer, woriiber ich
bereits seit Frankfurt den Grafen von Haugwitz vorlaufig bestens
zu sondiren und zu stimmen gesucht hatte." — I will readily admit
that much of the plan contained in the 'protocol' had been already
discussed on the journey from Frankfort; but I do not see any signs
whatever that the two ministers had advanced so far that Spielmann
could embody their agreement in a written plan, and especially in
one like this; and there are many reasons that render it highly im-
probable that such was the case.

In the first place, consider the initial article about the continua-
tion of the war. Heidrich says, indeed, that at the time of Spiel-
mann's departure from Vienna the Austrians had already grown
familiar with the idea that it would take a second campaign to get
the terms of peace that they wanted; that they already planned to
draw England, Russia, and other Powers into the contest; and that
they were inclined to go in for a war of conquest in the grand style.
As proof of this he offers only a by no means significant citation from
the Politisches Journal, pp. 1005 f. When one turns to the Austrian
records themselves, one gains quite a different impression: one finds
that the great desire at Vienna was to make peace as soon as possi-

1 B. A., R. XI, Frankreich, 89 K.

2 V. A., Mission in das preussische Hauplquartier de 1792.

3 Vivenot, ii, p. 273.



APPENDIX XV 543

ble. As there is absolutely no reason to suppose that the temper of
his Court had changed in the week following Spielmann's departure,
one may take, for example, Cobenzl's instructions to the Referendary
of September 20, 1 which contain the clearest utterances on this sub-
ject. The Vice-Chancellor writes that since nothing lies nearer the
Emperor's heart than the speedy termination of the war, this must
be one of the objects of Spielmann's special care. He considers fur-
ther the possibility that the capture of Paris might not end the affair;
suggests an armistice and a negotiation for peace during the winter;
shows the greatest desire to avoid a ' long, ruinous war" at any hon-
orable price. I cannot find here any sign that the Imperial Court
had already resolved on a new campaign, on building up a great
coalition, or on a grand war of conquest. — Then one should notice
the development of Spielmann's ideas on the subject. On September
30 he writes that their main aim must be to get out of this " costly
game" (the war) as soon as possible; and hence they ought to offer
the French "a very cheap bargain," insisting chiefly that the King of
France should be restored to at least a "quasi-freedom." 2 How rec-
oncile this with the great war of conquest, for which, according to
Heidrich, Spielmann had just come to an agreement with Haugwitz?
Then, on October 4 3 the Referendary has learned of the retreat of
the allied armies, and begins to fear "die leider nur zu wahrschein-
liche Unvermeidlichkeit einer zweiten Campagne." Finally, on
October 15 he has become convinced of the necessity of continuing
the war, and exposes at length the reasons that have led him to con-
tinue his negotiations in spite of tJiat fact. In one place in this report
he writes: "Meiner Betrachtung, dass die bisherigen supposita durch
den unerwarteten Ausgang der Campagne nicht wenig geandert
wtirden, setzt derselbe [Haugwitz] die Ueberzeugung seines Herrn
von der absoluten Nothwendigkeit einer zweiten Campagne . . . ent-
gegen." 4 These words are absolute nonsense on the supposition
that the two ministers had long been agreed on a plan, the first
article of which provided for a second campaign. Unless Spielmann's
reports are to be considered a mass of duplicity, one cannot suppose
that he had consented to such an article in September — at a time
when the allied armies were supposed to be fast approaching Paris.
And as for Haugwitz, who in May and again in July had opposed

1 Vivenot, ii, pp. 211-221.

2 V. A., Mission in das prcussische Hauptquartier.

s Vivenot, ii, pp. 248 f. 4 Vivenot, ii, p. 274.



544 APPENDIX XV

the war altogether, how can one believe that in September — with-
out any necessity or a shadow of authorization, as far as we can see
— he had agreed to a second campaign merely in order to conquer
Alsace and Lorraine for Austria?

There is another equally valid reason why this 'protocol' cannot
be referred to September. The Emperor had on September 9 ap-
proved the ideas of the Conference ministers, who opposed staining
the honor of their Court by any active participation in the dismem-
berment of Poland. Is one to suppose that immediately afterwards
Spielmann proposed to Haugwitz the plan for an Austrian occupa-
tion of Polish territory — an occupation which might be turned
into permanent possession, in case acquisitions failed to be secured
elsewhere? On this point, Spielmann speaks quite definitely in his
report of November 6. He relates telling Haugwitz (about October
27) that he had had, when he left Vienna, no instructions relative to
an Austrian acquisition in Poland; and that it was therefore only in
view of the changed circumstances and as his private idea that he had
suggested this expedient after his return from Verdun (i.e., after
October 12). This seems to me conclusive against Heidrich's theory.

From the dozen similar' considerations that might be advanced
here, I shall mention but two more. If in September Haugwitz had
reached an agreement with Spielmann that could be put into precise
written form, why did the King send him back from Consenvoye to
receive the Austrian's definite propositions? Or again, how could
Haugwitz in September have indicated to Spielmann the exact line
of demarcation that his Court desired in Poland? As far as we know,
he had received no instructions on that point; his proposals of August
had apparently been passed over without an answer; it was only at
Consenvoye that the King had drawn on the map the line he meant
to claim.

If these reasons seem decisive against placing the 'protocol' in
September, it is not hard to show that that document fits in very
well with the circumstances of mid-October. In the first place, the
passage at the beginning of Spielmann's report of November 6 can
be rightly understood, I think, only if one places the emphasis on the
word spatern: i.e., the plan was drawn up before the later disasters
set in. For Spielmann proceeds immediately to tell what disasters
he is referring to: the retreat from Verdun, which turned into a rout,
the total evacuation of French soil, the highly suspicious conduct of
the Prussians, the appearance that they were trying to get out of the



APPENDIX XV 545

war and abandon Austria, etc., etc. Now these suspicions appear
only in the report of November 6; and they had much to do with
inducing Spielmann to change his tactics with the Prussians. In his
last preceding report (October 15) he still shows himself convinced
of the Prussian loyalty. The change evidently occurred after that.
At the end of this report of the 15th, he states that he has decided to
go on with the negotiation, and that the plan which he means to
proceed by — under reservation of the Emperor's approval — will
be sent in later. Then at the very beginning of the next dispatch
(November 6), he submits this plan (the 'protocol'), which he has
agreed upon with Haugwitz — under reservation of the Emperor's
approval — "before the later disasters set in." It is obvious, I
think, that October 15 must be taken as the terminus post quern.

The terminus ante quern can also be determined with fair precision.
On October 19 Haugwitz writes to Schulenburg that Spielmann has
presented him with a memoire analogous to the principles reported
in his letter of September 30. 1 Perhaps the term memoire does not fit
very well the document we have been considering; but the word
memoire is used rather loosely in the language of this period, and
Haugwitz may have chosen it as less suggestive of anything approach-
ing a definite agreement. For several reasons I am convinced that
this memoire was really the 'protocol' printed in Vivenot. In the
first place, it is not easy to suppose that if Spielmann had presented
another document to Haugwitz, he would not have sent it home, or
even have mentioned it in his report of November 6. Furthermore,
Haugwitz writing to Schulenburg on October 19, immediately after
speaking of the memoire, declared that the Court of Vienna seemed
more inclined to the continuation of the war (which would appear to
be a reference to Article I of Spielmann's plan); and on October 27
he added that the memoire contained the familiar proposition about
Alsace-Lorraine as far as the Moselle, the demand for the King's
mediation at Zweibriicken, the concession of the line Czestochowa-
Rawa-Soldau to Prussia, and a provision about an Austrian oc-
cupation, and possibly an Austrian acquisition, in Poland. 1 In
short, the memoire described by Haugwitz seems to have contained
all the important articles of the 'plan' sent in by Spielmann. More-
over, Haugwitz wrote that he had expressly rejected the proposition
about the Austrian occupation in Poland, and Spielmann also re-
ported that this was the only article of his 'plan' to which Haug-

1 B. A., R. XI, Frankrekh, 89 K.



546 APPENDIX XVI

witz refused to agree. From all this, it seems evident that the memoire
and the 'plan' were one and the same document. The so-called 'pro-
tocol' printed in Vivenot represents, then, not an agreement reached
after the Note of Merle, nor one dating from late September, but
rather the draft of a convention submitted by Spielmann to Haug-
witz between the 15th and the 19th of October.



APPENDIX XVI

Documents Illustrating Haugwitz's Final Negotiation



Online LibraryRobert Howard LordThe second partition of Poland; a study in diplomatic history → online text (page 54 of 59)