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4 Thomp. Neg.] duties and liabilities op the master.

tures along its line reasonably safe," is erroneous. Its duty is to use
such care as a person of ordinary prudence would use, under like cir-

dinary care an<J prudence would
have exercised under like circum-
stances); Galveston &c. R. Co. v.
Garrett, 73 Tex. 262; s. c. 13 S. W.
Rep. 62 ; Trinity County Lumber Co.
v. Denham, 85 Tex. 56; s. c. 19 S. W.
Rep. 1012; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Wells,
91 Tex. 685; s. c. 17 S. W. Rep. 511;
rev'g on rehearing, 16 S. W. Rep.
1025; Galveston Ac. R. Co. v. Gorm-
ley, 91 Tex. 393; s. c. 9 Am. & Eng.
R. Cas. (N. $.) 468; 43 S. W. Rep.
877; rev'g s. c. (Tex. Civ. App.) f 42 S.
W. Rep. 314 (no off. rep.) ; Texas Ac.
R. Co. v. Taylor (Tex. Civ. App.), 44
S. W. Rep. 892 (no oft. rep.) (that
degree of care which an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under
similar circumstances) ; Missouri
Ac. R. Co. v. Hauer (Tex. Civ. App.)»
43 S. W. Rep. 1078 (no off. rep.);
Sincere v. Union Compress &c. Co.
(Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. Rep. 326
(no off. rep.) (not liable for failing
to observe a customary precaution
taken by those engaged in the sqme
business to protect employe's from
injury, unless ordinary care and pru-
dence require that such precaution
be observed) ; Galveston &c. R. Co.
v. Gormley (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S.
W. Rep. 1051 (no off. rep.); Bertha
Zinc Co. v, Martin 93 Va. 791; s. c.
2 Va. L. Reg. 833; 22 S. E. Rep. 869;
Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Lash
(Va.), 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.)
569; s. c. 24 S. E. Rep. 385 (no off.
rep.); Southwest Imp. Co. v. An-
drew, 86 Va. 270; s. c. 13 Va. L. J.
634; 17 Wash. L. Rep. 599; 6 Rail, &
Corp. L. J. 252; 9 S. E. Rep. 1015;
Hoffman v. Dickinson, 31 W. Va.
142; s. c. 6 S. E. Rep. 53 (master
not obliged to take more care of his
servant than he would be expected,
as a prudent man,' to take of him-
self) ; Knight v. Cooper, 36 W. Va.
232; s. c. 14 S. E. Rep. 999; Oliver
v. Ohio River R. Co., 42 W. Va. 703;
s. c. 26 S. E. Rep. 444; Promer v.
Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 90 Wis. 215;
s. c. 63 N. W. Rep 90 (duty to exer-
cise such care and adopt such pre-
cautions as will protect the servant
from avoidable danger) ; Reilly v.
Campbell, 8 C. C. A. 438; s. c. 59
Fed. Rep. 990 ; Nelson v. Allen Paper
Car Wheel Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 840;
Mason &c. R. Co. v. Yockey, 43 C. C.


A. 228; s. c. 103 Fed. Rep. 265; The
France, 59 Fed. Rep. 479; s. c. 8 C.
C. A. 185; Erskine v. Chino Valley
Beet-Sugar Co., 71 Fed. Rep. 270
(must exercise ordinary care in fur-
nishing sufficient and safe materials,
machinery, and other means for per-
formance of the service, and must
keep them in repair and order, and
make inspections, tests, and exam-
inations at the proper intervals);
Garnett v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 98
Fed. Rep. 192 (relation of master
and servant is not analogous to that
of guardian and ward) ; Hough v.
Texas &c. R. Co., 100 U. S. 213; Ar-
mour v. Hahn, 111 U. S. 313; Choc-
taw &c. R. Co. v. Holloway, 114
Fed. Rep. 458; s. c. 52 C. C. A. 260;
Goheen v. Texas &c. R. Co., 3 Cent.
L. J 382; s. c. sub nom. Gohen v.
Texas &c. R. Co., 10 Fed. Cas. 537;
1 Tex. L. 'J. 97; Myers v. Sault
St. Marie Pulp &c. Co., 3 Ont L.
Rep. 600 (employer bound by the
common law to take all reasonable
precautions for the safety of his
workmen). In Nashville ftc. R. Co.
v. Jones, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 27, the
action was for the death of a rail-
way fireman killed by the explosion
of the boiler of the locomotive. The
case was put to the jury on in-
structions which measure the duty
of the company by the standard of
ordinary or reasonable care; but the
court, for the most part, in its opin-
ion, cites carrier cases, without no-
ticing that the courts generally im- '
pose a higher degree of care upon
carriers toward their passengers
than upon masters toward their
servants. In Allerton Packing Co.
v. Egan, 86 111. 253, it was ruled
that a master cannot be held liable
for an injury to one of his employes
from the use of the machinery
which he has provided, if he has
used a high degree of care in its
manufacture and selection. Whether
ordinary prudence and care would
excuse the master, the court did not
deem it necessary to decide. As t?
the degree of care to be taken of a
hired slave, see Heathcock v. Pen-
nington, 11 Ired. (N. C.) 640. "To
provide a safe place where the serv-
ant can work, would seem to be one
of the most obvious duties of the em-

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[2d Ed.

cumstances, to ftirnish structures and appliances which are reasonably
safe, and to use such care to maintain them in that condition. 8

§ 3768. Rule of Reasonable Care Applied to the Safety of Ha*
chinery, Appliances, etc. — "Reasonably Safe for the Purpose Intend-
ed." — It will not escape attention that this rule of reasonable care is
generally formulated, in defining the obligation of the master to fur-
nish his servants with safe machinery, tools, and appliances with
which to work, by saying that he is not bound to /urnish the safest
and best appliances known or in use, yet he is bound to furnish such
as are reasonably safe for the purposes intended. 4

§ 3769. Rule of Ordinary Care Applied to the Safety of Machinery,
etc. — Not Negligence to Act in Accordance with Ordinary Usage. — It
must not escape attention that many of the courts, in defining the
liability of the master with respect to the safety of the machinery,
tools and appliances which he places in the hands of his servants, re-
duce the measure of his duty to the level of the care employed by em-
ployers generally in the same business or situation, by saying that he

ployer. A master Is bound to exer-
cise proper care in the materials and
machinery given to a servant to
work upon, or with, and if this duty
is neglected, he is liable for inju-
ries": Whalen v. Centenary Church,
62 Mo. 327, per Napton, J. In the
application of this doctrine, it has
been held 'that the mere fact that
an injury to a railroad engineer
would not have occurred if a sema-
phore had been put up in a different
place, does not render the railroad
company liable for the injury,
where the semaphore had been
placed by men of experience in rail-
roading, had always before proved
sufficient, and would have done so at
the time of the accident but for the
unaccountable failure of the air-
brakes to work: Whalen v. Michi-
gan &c. R. Co., 114 Mich. 512; s. c.
4 Det Leg. N. 653; 72 N. W. Rep.

•Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Gormley,
91 Tex. 393; s. c. 27 S. W. Rep.
1051; Nolan v. Montana &c. R. Co.,
25 Mont. 107; s. c. 63 Pac. Rep. 926
(accident due to insufficiency of
means used by fellow servants).

* Substantially to this effect see
the following cases: Arizona Lum-
ber &c. Co. v. Mooney (Ariz.), 42
Pac. Rep. 952 (no off. rep.); Chi-

cago Ac. R. Co. v. Finnan, 84 111.
App. 383; Meyer v. Meyer, 86 111.
App. 417 (master bound to furnish
appliances reasonably safe for a per-
son in the exercise of ordinary care
for his own safety) ; Bender v. St.
Louis &c. R. Co., 137 Mo. 240; s. c.
37 S. W. Rep. 132 (not bound to
adopt any particular kind of ma-
chinery, but he is bound to procure
that which is reasonably safe for
the work designed, whatever kind
he adopts) ; Lincoln St. R. Co. v.
Cox, 48 Neb. 807; s. c. 4 Am. & Eng.
R. Cas. (N. S) 273; 67 N. W. Rep.
740 (master bound to use only such
care as the circumstances reasona-
bly demand, to see that appliances
furnished to the servants are rea-
sonably safe for use, and that they
are afterwards maintained in such
reasonably safe condition) ; Spencer
v. Worthington, 60 N. Y. Supp. 873;
s. c. 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 496; Fritz
v. Salt Lake &c. Co., 18 Utah 493;
s. c. 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 727; 56 Pac.
Rep. 90; Mulligan v. Montana &c.
R. Co., 19 Mont. 135; s. c. 47 Pac.
Rep. 795 (and is not responsible, if
the same were good of their kind
and in good repair, although other
machinery or appliances of different
construction would have been
safer) ; post, § 3989, et seq.


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4 Thomp. Neg.] duties and liabilities of the master.

can only be required to provide such machinery as is in common,
ordinary use in the trade or business wherein he is engaged. 5 The
rule as to the measure of the employer's duty is also stated by say-
ing that if, by the use of ordinary care in testing the strength
of machinery placed in the hands of an employ^ with which to labor,
its weakness and dangerous character for the work to be done could
have been ascertained, the employer will be chargeable with notice of
any defect in thp machinery, and liable for any injury resulting to
such employ^ from such defect. 6 The master's negligence depends
not only upon the dangerous character of the machine and his knowl-
edge of it, but it must also appear that, with such knowledge, the mas-
ter neglected to do what a person of ordinary care could and would
have done under such circumstances. 7 This ordinary care is deemed
to be reasonable care for the reason that it is ordinary care. Thus,
the test of negligence is said to be the ordinary usage of the business ;
and whatever is according to the general, usual, and ordinary course
adopted by those in the same business is reasonably safe within the
meaning of the law. 8 Upon this subject it has-been said: "What is.
ordinary care cannot be determined abstractly. It has relation to
and must be measured by the work or thing done and the instrumental-
ities used, and their capacity for evil as well as good. What would be
ordinary care in one case may be gross negligence in another. We
look to the work, its difficulties, dangers and responsibilities, and then
say, What would and should a reasonable and prudent man do in such
an exigency? The word 'ordinary' has a popular sense, which would
greatly relax the rigor of the rule. The law means by 'ordinary care'
the care reasonable and prudent men use under like circumstances/' 9

'Post §§ 3991, 3993; Fick v. Jack- Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray
son, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 378; s. c. 39 (Mass.) 274, 280, per Thomas J.
W. N. C. (Pa.) 534; Chicago &c. R. This, variously stated, is the doc-
Co. v. DuBois, 56 111. App. 181 (not trine of nearly all the cases: Camp
negligent when machinery is as safe Point Man. Co. v. Ballou, 71 111.
as ordinary care, prudence, and skill 417; Chicago &c. R. 'Co. v. Sweet,
can make it). 45 111. App. 197; St. Louis &c.

•Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Stillphant, 70 R. Co. v. Vairius, 56 Ind. 611;

Tex. 623; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 673. Cooper v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 44 Ind.

Substantially to the same effect, see 134; Seaver v. Boston &c. R. Co., 14

O'Neil v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 3 Mc- Gray (Mass.) 467; Daubert v.

Crary (U. S.) 423; Palmer v. Den- Pickel, 4 Mo. App. 590; Connolly v.

ver &c. R. Co., 3 McCrary (U. S.) . Poillon, 41 Barb. (N. T.) 366; s. c.

635; Boardman v. Brown, 44 Hun aff'd, 41 N. Y. 619; Nashville &c. R.

(N. Y.) 336. Co. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 27;

7 Findlay Brew. Co. v. Bauer, 50 International &c. R. Co. v. Doyle,

Ohio St. 560; s. c. 30 Ohio L. J. 298; 49 Tex. 190; s. c. 5 Rep. 631; Jones

48 Alb. L. J. 477; 35 N. E. Rep. 55.* v. Yeager, 2 Dill. (U. S.) 64.

8 Fick v. Jackson, 3 Pa. Super. Ct.
378; s. c. 39 W. N. C. (Pa.) 534.


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§ 3770. Explanations of this Doctrine. — In this and other relations,
except that of carriers of passengers, the judges, in describing the
4 care which the law requires of one person to avoid injury to another,
use the words "ordinary or reasonable care" in conjunction, ha though
ordinary care means the same thing as reasonable care. It is quite ap-
parent that ordinary care, — that is to say, the care which men ordina-
rily take under particular circumstances, — may be a much lower stand-
ard of care than reasonable care, — that is to say, the care which men
ought to take under the same circumstances. The standard of ordinary
care is the care which men ordinarily apply under similar circum-
stances, — that is to say, the general custom' of the business. Applied to
the case where a workman is injured by machinery furnished him by his
master, the rule of ordinary care directs the jury to consider, not
whether the machinery was dangerous, but whether it was of the kind
ordinarily used for similar work. 10 Under this rule even tlje customary
care of corporations becomes the standard where a corporation is the
employer of the injured servant. 11 Thus individual and even incorpo-
rated employers are allowed by their general custom or habit of acting,
or by their general neglect and inattention to their social duty, to make
a rule of law for their own exoneration. As applied to the subject
of unsafe railway car-couplings, the "ordinary care" of the railway
companies was habitually and criminally negligent, they making no
adequate exertions to protect the lives or limbs of their employes,
and thousands were annually killed and maimed by this "ordinary
care," and the judges did nothing, or next to nothing, to arrest "that
stream of slaughter ere it sank." But it became necessary for the
legislatures, State and National, to interpose and to establish a rule
of "reasonable care" in the place of the rule of ordinary care pre-
scribed by the railroad companies and judges. 12 But, even without
compulsion from the legislatures, the judges are, of their own accord,
breaking loose from this standard of ordinary care where it results
in the condoning of negligence and in the doing of injustice. The
standard is not the ordinary care of men or of corporations under like
circumstances unless that care is also reasonable care. Applied to the
subject of machinery and appliances furnished by the employer to

10 Washington Asphalt Block &c. so far as such practice was not ob-
Co. v. Mackey, 15 App. (D. C.) 410. viously insufficient: Baxter v. Chi-

11 Thus, it has been reasoned that cago &c. R. Co., 104 Wis. 307; s. c.
the test of whether defendant rail- 80 N. W. Rep. 644.

way company was guilty of a want " Allusion is here especially made

of ordinary care in caring for its to the Act of Congress requiring all

locomotive-boilers was whether its Interstate railway companies to

conduct came up to the customary adopt, within a stated period after

care exercised by corporations gen- the passage of the act, railway car-

eratly in the same line of business, couplings of a prescribed character.


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4 Thomp. Neg.] duties and liabilities of the master.

his employ^ the meaning is that the employer does not perform his
duty to an employ^ by furnishing appliances or machinery such as
are ordinarily used by persons in the same line of business, unless they
are reasonably safe and sound or he has used due care to have them
reasonably safe and sound. 18 But there can be no valid objec-
tion to the use of the words "ordinary" or "ordinary care" in defin-
ing the care which ought to be exercised under given circumstances,
where the definition is so framed as to make ordinary care in point
of fact reasonable care, — as in the following definition: "Ordinary
care simply implies and includes the exercise of such reasonable dili-
gence, care, skill, watchfulness, and forethought as, under all the cir-
cumstances of the particular service, a careful, prudent man or officer
of a corporation would exercise under the same or similar circum-
stances. And by the term 'same circumstances' is meant to include
all the circumstances of time, place, and attendant conditions." 14 The
standard is not what men ordinarily do under like circumstances, but
what reasonably prudent and careful men, having due regard for their
social obligations, — that is to say, for the rights and safety of others, —
do under like circumstances. 15

§ 3771. Further Explanations. — A slight inconvenience or expense
is no excuse to the master for failing to furnish safe machinery or
appliances for the use of servants. 16 Even where the element of skill
or art comes in, as against a workman without special skill, the master
is not bound to exercise exhaustive care or the highest degree of dili-*
gence. 17 The test of liability is therefore said to be, not whether the
master omitted to do something which he could have done, and which
would have prevented the injury, but whether he did anything which,

"Sawyer v. J. M. Arnold Shoe Co., of ordinary negligence: English ▼.

90 Me. 369; s. c. 38 Atl. Rep. 333. Galveston &c. R. Co., 22 Tex. Civ.

"Dowey v. Gemini Min. Co., 24 App. 3; s. c. 23 S. W. Rep. 57. It is

Utah 431; s. c. 68 Pac. Rep. 414. believed that the decision is refined

An instruction, in an action of this and untenable. It should seem that

kind, that negligence on the part of the law ought to demand on the part

the defendant is the want of such of a master prosecuting a dangerous

care and prudence as persons skilled business, such as the operation of a

in that business observe under sim- railway, the care of persons skilled

liar circumstances, and that want of in the business, and not the "ordi-

care on the part of plaintiff is the nary care and prudence under all

absence of such care as ordinary per- circumstances of the case," — e. g. t

sons, skilled in the business the mas- that of a farmer, a mule-driver or a

ter was engaged in, ordinarily ob* ditch-digger,

serve under similar circumstances, ,8 Vol. I, §§ 1, 2.

was held erroneous, on the ground "Trainor v. Philadelphia Ac. R.

that the conduct of a man of or- Co., 137 Pa. St. 148.

dinary prudence under all circum- "Whart. on Neg., §§ 212, 213;

stances of the case is the standard Nolan v. Shickle, 3 Mo. App. 300,

by which the law tests the question 307.


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[2d Ed.

under the circumstances, in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence,
he ought not to have done, or omitted any precaution which a prudent
and careful man would have taken. 18

§ 3772. This Care Varies According to the Danger to be Avoided. —

As in other situations, 19 this ordinary or reasonable care, by whatever
term it is designated, varies according to the danger to be avoided. 20
For example, the care required of the master, under this rule, in re-
spect to machinery and appliances, is much less where the service re-
quired to be performed is on the surface of the earth, in open day, and
its character and appliances are simple, than when the machinery used
is dangerous and complicated, or the work is performed in a place or
at a time when the surrounding dangers are not so obvious. 81

"CummingB v. Collins, 61 Mo. 520.
Contra, Lalor v. Chicago ftc. R. Co.,
52 111. 401. Tested by this rule, it
has been held, with obvious pro-
priety, that a declaration in an ac-
tion by a railway engineer for inju-
ries sustained in consequence of his
engine running off the track, which
merely alleges that the engine "ran
off the track in spite of the reason-
able care and diligence of the plain-
tiff, and which running off was in
consequence of the imperfection and
insufficient connection of the track
where the said track crossed other
tracks, the defendants being bound
to keep said track in good running
condition," is bad on demurrer, be-
cause it fails to allege negligence on
the part of the defendant, and as-
serts an absolute duty to keep the
track in. good repair: Gartland v.
Toledo Ac. R. Co., 67 111. 498; Chi-
cago ftc. R. Co. v. Harney, 28 Ind.
28; Ohio ftc. R. Co. v. Hammersley,
28 Ind. 871. See also, King v. Bos-
ton ftc. R. Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 112;
Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill (N. Y.)
592; Murphy v. Smith, 19 C. B. (N.
S.) 360; s. c. 12 L. T. (N. S.) 605;
Nashville ftc. R. Co. v. Elliott, 1
Coldw. (Tenn.) 611. And, in gen-
eral, an instruction which assumes
a universal rule that it is always the
duty of an employer to furnish suit-
able appliances, is ground for re-
versing a judgment: Robinson v.
George F. Blake Man. Co., 143 Mass'

"Vol. I, §§ 25, 26.

"Boyd v. Blumenthal, 3 Pen.

(Del.) 564; s. c. 62 Atl. Rep. 330
(the care required being in propor-
tion to the dangerous character of
the employment) ; Huhn v. Missouri
ftc. R. Co., 92 Mo. App. 440; s. c. 10
West Rep. 405; 4 S. W. Rep. 937'
(as the danger increases, the care
should be increased); Harroun v.
Brush Electric Light Co., 12 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 126; s. c. 42 N. Y.
Supp. 716; appeal dismissed, 152 N.
Y. 212; s. c. 46 N. E. Rep. 291 (must
be proportioned to what may prop-
erly be expected of him under the
circumstances, and increase in a
corresponding ratio with the danger
and hazard necessarily connected
with the use of the appliances) ;
Galveston ftc. R. Co. v. Gormley, 91
Tex. 393; s. c. 9 Am. ft Eng. R/Cas.
(N. S.) 468; 43 S. W. Rep. 877;
rev/g s. c. (Tex. Civ. App.) 42 S. W.
Rep. 314 (no off. rep.) (refinement
that the degree of care does not vary
with the increase or diminution of
the danger, but that the quantum
of diligence to be used differs under
different circumstances) ; Trihay v.
Brooklyn Lead Min. Co., 4 Utah 468;
s. c. 11 Pac. Rep. 612; Gowen v.
Harley, 56 Fed. Rep. 973; s. c. 56
Am. ft Eng. R. Cas. 238; 6 C. C. A.
190; Texas ftc. R. Co. v. Barrett,
67 Fed. Rep. 214; s. c. 14 C. C. A.
373 (a care and skill in proportion
to the consequences liable to follow-
from the want of such care and

* Gowen v. Harley, 56 Fed. Rep.
973; s. c. 56 Am. ft Eng. R. Cas. 238;
6 C. C. A. 190.


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4 Thomp. Neg.] duties and liabilities op the master.

§ 3773. Master Hot Bound to Exercise a High and Exhaustive De-
gree of Care. — Thte definition of the degree of care which a master is
bound to exercise to the end of promoting the safety of his servants,
as reasonable or ordinary care, 22 necessarily excludes the conclusion
that he is liable for failing to exercise a high and exhaustive degree
of care, as a carrier of passengers. 28

§ 3774. Not Liable for Accidents Not Reasonably to be Antici-
pated. — In applying this doctrine of reasonable care it is well held
that a master is not liable for injuries to his servant resulting from an
accident of such a character that reasonable men, proceeding with
reasonable caution, would not ordinarily have foreseen and anticipated
it, 24 — such as an injury happening under very exceptional circum-
stances, although the proper precautionary measures, if taken, would
have prevented it. 25 It is not at all necessary to the liability of the
master that the particular injury which did happen could not have
been foreseen ; it is enough that the machine was negligently allowed
, to become defective and out of order, so that mischief was likely to
happen to the servant from its ordinary use. 26

"Ante, §§ 3767/3772.

■ Wabash R. Co. v. Farrell, 79 111.
App. 508; s. c. 31 Chic. Leg. N. 199;
Hart &c. Man. Co. v. Tima, 85 111.
App. 310 (the law does not require
him to go out and find a machine as
safe as can be procured) ; Allerton
Packing Co. v. Egan, 86 111. 253 (the
conclusion is quite easy that where
an employer has exercised a very
high degree of care both in the se-
lection of the materials and in the
construction of the machinery, he
will not be liable for an injury to
his servant resulting from a defect
therein); Jungnitsch v. Michigan
&c. Iron Co., 105 Mich. 270; s. c. 63
N. W. Rep. 296; 2 Det. Leg. N. 107
(duty of reasonable care does not
extend to such care as will reduce
the liability of accident to the mini-
mum) ; Stiller v. Bohn Man. Co., 80
Minn.l-; s. c. 82 N. W. Rep. 981 ; Kent
v. Yazoo &c. R. Co., 77 Miss. 494;
s. c. 27 South. Rep. 620; National
Malleable Castings Co. v. Luscomb,
19 Ohio C. C. 673; Texas &c. R. Co.
v. Bingle, 91 Tex. 287; afTg s. c. 16
Tex. Civ. App. 653 ; 9 Tex. Civ. App.
322; 29 S. W. Rep. 674 (master's
duty is to use such care as persons
of ordinary prudence would employ
in such matters, to see that the ma-
chinery and appliances are reason-


ably safe; but he is not required to
do everything that can reasonably
be done for the safety of his em-
ployes) ; Norfolk &c. R. Co. v. Phil-
lips, 100 Va. 362; s. c. 41 S. E. Rep.
726; Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. McClin-
tock, 91 Fed. Rep. 223; s. c. 33 C. C.
A. 466; 63 U. S. App. 550.

14 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Duffy,
35 Ark. 602 (section-man lost eye by
bursting of iron maul with which
he was driving spikes) ; Sjogren v.

Online LibrarySeymour Dwight ThompsonCommentaries on the law of negligence in all relations → online text (page 13 of 165)