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Commentaries on the law of negligence in all relations online

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point at issue in conformity with these views, and we see no error in
the record." 19

| § 4943. Engineer in Manufacturing Establishment and his Rre-

i man. — So, it was held in Rhode Island that the engijieer of a manu-

i facturing establishment is not a fellow servant with the fireman, but

is his superior, standing towards him in the relation of vice-princi-
pal. When, therefore, an engineer ordered the fireman to perform
a duty outside of that which he had engaged to do, and extra haz-

the ordinary negligence of the man Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Sander, 19

in charge of the engine: Louisville Ky. L. Rep. 1941; s. c. 44 S. W. Rep.

&c. R. Co. v. Lowe, — Ky. — ; s. c. 644 (no off. rep.).

66 S. W. Rep. 736. " Hon. John F. Dillon, U. S. Cir-

' "cVolz v. Chesapeake &c. R. Co., cult Judge.

95 Ky. 188; s. c. 15 Ky. L. Rep. "Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 WalL

727; s. c. sub nom. Volz v. Cincin- (U. S.) 553; afTg s. c. 2 Dill. (U.

nati &c. R. Co., 24 S. W. Rep. 119; S.) 259.



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ardous, in consequence of which he was injured, it was held that the
company was liable for the damages. 20

§ 4944. Locomotive-Engineer and his Fireman. — So, it was held
in Iowa that the fireman on a locomotive-engine, while engaged in
his duties as such, may properly be found to have been acting under
the immediate control of the engineer; 21 but it should be remem-
bered that there is a statute in Iowa which takes this class of actions
out of the ordinary rules. 22 Under the exceptional rule in Ohio al-
ready indicated, 28 a fireman upon a locomotive, which was sent out
by a superior oflicer under the sole charge of the engineer, without
a conductor or brakeman, to do switching, without experience in
coupling cars, but nevertheless directed by the engineer to make a
coupling, in which act he was injured, had a right of recovery from
the company, the engineer being his superior officer and the vice-
principal of the company. 24 In the absence of statute, a locomotive-
engineer and his fireman are generally regarded as fellow servants. 25
But in some jurisdictions, where the engineer is entrusted with au-
thority or superintendence over his fireman with respect to the per-

»Mann v. Oriental Print-Works,
11 R. I. 152.

"Cooper v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 44
Iowa 134.

" Post, §§ 5294, 5295.

■ Ante, § 4940.

"Pennsylvania Co. v. Hickley, 20
Ohio C. C. 668; s. c. 11 Ohio C. D.
379. See also, Houston &c. R. Co.
v. Stuart (Tex. Civ. App.), 48 S. W.
Rep. 799; s. c. rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom. Houston &c. R.
Co. v. Stewart, 92 Tex. 540; 50 S.
W. Rep. 333.

"Bull v. Mobile &c. Co., 67 Ala.
206; Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Beck-
er, 63 Ark. 477; s. c. 39 S. W. Rep.
358 (under c. statute, where neither
exercises any superintendence or
control over the other) ; Parrish v.
Pensacola &c. R. Co., 28 Fla. 251; s.
c. 9 South. Rep. 696 (engineer, fire-
man, brakeman and shovellers on a
gravel-train engagejd in loading,
hauling, and unloading gravel to re-
pair the road-bed, are fellow servants
engaged in the same common work) ;
Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Swisher, 61 111.
App. 611 (although the engineer oc-
cupies a superior position and has
supervision of the work) ; Illinois
Ac. R. Co. v. Hosier, 45 111. App. 205
(engineer failed to notice a red

light denoting danger, in conse-
quence of which fireman was killed
— no recovery); Mulligan v. Mon-
tana &c. R. Co., 19 Mont 135; s. c.
47 Pac. Rep. 795; Grattis v. Kansas
City &c. R. Co., 153 Mo. 380; s. c.
55 S. W. Rep. 108; 48 L. R. A. 399;
77 Am. St. Rep. 721; Hobbs v. At-
lantic &c. R. Co., 107 N. C. 1; s. c.
9 L. R. A. 838; 45 Am. & Eng. R.
Cas. 592; 12 S. E. Rep. 124; Nash-
ville ftc. R. Co. v. Handman, 13 Lea
(Tenn.) 423 (boiler exploded
through negligence of engineer);
Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Blohn, 73 Tex.
637; s. c. 4 L. R. A. 764; 11 S. W.
Rep. 867; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Comp-
ton, 75 Tex. 667; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep.
667; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Baugh,
149 U. S. 368; s. c. 37 L. ed. 772;
54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 328; 29 Ohio
L. J. 345; 47 Alb. L. J. 465; 48 Alb.
L. J. 5; 13 Sup. Ct Rep. 914; New
Jersey &c. R. Co. v. Young, 1 U. S.
App. 96; s. c. 49 Fed. Rep. 723;
Briegal v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 98
Fed. Rep. 958; s. c. 39 C. C. A. 359
(although the fireman was injured
while engaged in oiling a turntable
under the direction of the engineer,
and in consequence of the negli-
gence of the engineer).


Digitized by


4 Thomp. Neg.] the fellow-servant doctrine.

formance of the duties of the fireman, they are not deemed fellow
servants. 26 The Supreme Court of the United States have held that
a rule of a railroad company to the effect that, where a train or en-
gine is run without a conductor, the engineer shall be regarded as
the conductor, does not change the general rule of law as to the lia-
bility of the company for injuries to an employe caused by the engi-
neer's negligence, so as to make the company liable to a fireman for
the negligence of the engineer. 27

§ 4945. Servant Authorized to Employ and Discharge Other Serv-
ants Acts as Vice-Principal in So Doing. 28 — The master being under
an obligation of taking care to employ fit and competent servants to
the end of promoting the safety of his other servants, 29 this is re-
garded as one of his primary or absolute duties, in the sense that the
servant to whom he entrusts the performance of it acts, in perform-
ing it, as his vice-principal. Accordingly, it is held that if a master
delegates to a superintendent the power to employ and discharge
servants, he thereby makes himself liable for injuries sustained by
a servant, caused by the negligence of such superintendent 80 in se-
lecting an insufficient number of servants for the duty required of
them, 81 or in selecting a servant unfit for the duties required of him, 82
or for an injury through the negligence of the servants employed
by such superintendent while acting under his orders." Within the
meaning of this rule, a yardmaster of a railroad company, charged
with the duty of employing and discharging hands for switching and

* Pennsylvania Co. v. Hickley, 20 management of the business, or the

Ohio C.'C. 668; s. c. 11 Ohio C. D. business is of such a nature that it

379. See also, Houston &c. R. Co. is necessarily committed to agents,

v. Stuart (Tex. Civ. App.), 48 S. as in the case of corporations, the

W. Rep. 799; s. c. rev'd on other principal is liable for the neglects

grounds, sub nom. Houston &c. R. and omissions of duty of the one

Co. v. Stewart, 92 Tex. 540; 50 S. charged with the selection of other

W. Rep. 333. servants, in employing and select-

17 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Baugh, ing such servants, and in the gen-

149 U. S. 368; s. c. 37 L. ed. 772; -29 eral conduct of the business comit-

Ohio L. J. 345; 47 Alb. L. J. 465; 48 ted to his care": Malone v. Hath-

Alb. L. J. 5; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. away, 64 N. Y. 5, per Allen, J.
328; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914. "Stoddard v. St. Louis &c. R. Co.,

» See ante, § 4883. 65 Mo. 514.

*An*e, § 4048. "Walker v. Boiling, 22 Ala. 294;

"Brothers v. Cartter, 52 Mo. 372; Brown v. Gilchrist, 80 Mich. 56; s.

Stoddard v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 65 c. 20 Am. St Rep. 496; 45 N. W.

Mo. 514; Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Lit- Rep. 82; Henry v. Brady, 9 Daly

tie, 19 Kan. 267; Walker v. Boiling, (N. Y.) 142; Nelson v. S. Willey S.

22 Ala. 294; Chapman v. Erie R. S. & Co., 26 Wash. 548; s. c. 67 Pac.

Co., 55 N. Y. 579. "When the mid- Rep. 237.

dleman or superior servant employs " Lydon v. Manion, 3 Mo. App.

and discharges the subalterns, and 601.
the principal withdraws from the


Digitized by LjOOQLC


making up trains, has been held to be the vice-principal of the com-
pany. 84

§ 4946. Servant Vested with Exclusive Supervision, Direction and
Control of the Work or of Any Department thereof is a Vice-Principal,
and Not a Fellow Servant — The doctrine may be collected from many
cases, without attempting to state it in the precise language of any
of them, that a servant who is vested by the master with the general
superintendence and control of the master's work or of any distinct
and separate department of it, 85 with discretionary power in the con-
duct of it, will be deemed a vice-principal of the master, and not a
fellow servant of those working under him, with respect to any duty
growing out of such superintendence, 36 although not necessarily with
respect to any work which he may undertake to perform such as or-
dinarily belongs to a servant. 87 For like seasons, the superintendent

M Stoddard v. St Louis 6c. R. Co.,
65 Mo. 514.

* Nixon v. Selby Smelting &c. Co.,
102 Cal. 458; s. c. 36 P&c. Rep. 803;
Libby v. Scherman, 146 111. 540; s.
c. 34 N. E. Rep. 801; 37 Am. St
Rep. 191; Day harsh v. Hannibal &c.
R. Co., 103 Mo. 570; s. c. 23 Am. St.
Rep. 900; 15 S. W. Rep. 554; New
Omaha &c. Elec. Light Co. v. Bald-
win, 62 Neb. 180; s. c. 87 N. W. Rep.
27; Whalen v. Centenary Church,
62 Mo. 226 (architect and superin-
tendent having general c&arge of
erection of building not a fellow
servant with workmen on building).

M Woodson v. Johnson, 109 Ga.
454; s. c. 34 S. E. Rep. 587 (was not
acting in the capacity of a mere
servant but in that of a superin-
tendent, and as the employer's alter
ego) ; Taylor v. Georgia Marble Co.,
99 Ga. 512; s. c. 27 S. E. Rep. 768;
59 Am. St Rep. 238; Illinois Steel
Co. v. Schymanowski, 162 111. 447;
s. c. 44 N. E. Rep. 876 (control over
a particular class of workmen in
any branch of the business) ; Fraser
v. Schroeder, 163 111. 459; s. c. 45 N.
E. Rep. 288; Chicago Dredging &c.
Co. v. McMahon, 30 111. App. 358;
Ft. Wayne v. Christie, 156 Ind. 172;
s. c. 59 N. E. Rep. 385 (inspector of
water-works deemed a vice-princi-
pal in superintending the digging of
a trench) ; Mitchell v. Robinson, 80
Ind. 281; s. e. 41 Am. Rep. 812;
Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Little, 19 Kan.
267; s. c. 6 Repr. 199; 6 Cent. L. J.
60; Shumway v. Walworth &c. Man.

Co., 98 Mich. 411; s. c. 57 N. W. Rep.
261; Slater v. Chapman, 67 Mich.
523; s. c. 12 West. Rep. 60; 11 Am.
St Rep. 593; 35 N. W. Rep. 106;
Hunn v. Michigan &c. R. Co., 78
Mich. 513; s. c. 44 N. W. Rep. 502;
7 L. R. A. 500; 41 Am. & Eng. R.
Cas. 452; Cox v. Syenite Granite
Co., 39 Mo. App. 424; Herriman v.
Chicago &c. R. Co., 27 Mo. App. 435;
Gormly v. Vulcan Iron- Works, 61
Mo. 492 (though the superintendent
is engaged at the same work with
the injured servant); Brothers v.
Cartter, 52 Mo. 372; Devany v. Vul-
can Iron-Works, 4 Mo. App. 236
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 27
Neb. 673; s. c. 43 N. W. Rep. 415;
41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 463; Kim-
mer v. Weber, 151 N. Y. 417; s. c.
56 Am. St Rep. 630; aff'g s. c. 81
Hun (N. Y.) 599; 63 N. Y. St Rep.
291; 30 N. Y. Supp. 1103 (where he
gave all the orders to the men, even
in the presence of the employer,
who left the whole conduct of the
work to him) ; Spelman v. Fisher
Iron Co., 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 151
Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5;
authorities cited in Lewis v. Seifert,
116 Pa. St 628; s. c. 11 Atl. Rep.
514; 20 W. N. C. (Pa.) 145; 2 Am.
St Rep. 631; Mullan v. Philadelphia
&c. S. S. Co., 78 Pa. St 25; Mul-
cairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24; s.'
c. 29 N. W. Rep. 565 (employed by
city to superintend the construction
of a cistern) ; Coulson v. Leonard,
77 Fed. Rep. 538.
"Riley v. O'Brien, 53 Hun (N. Y.)


Digitized by


4 Thomp. Neg.] the fellow-servant dqctrine.

of a railway company who has been clothed by the board of directors
with power to act as the immediate representative of the company —
its corporate executive officer, entrusted with the power of the board
of directors, so far as regards the control and management of its
trains and the arrangements connected therewith — is the alter ego of
the company, and not a fellow servant with its ordinary employes. 88
The captain of a ship is in a very large sense the representative of
the owner. He can hypothecate the ship. He is not treated as an
ordinary agent, but as a special owner of the ship. He unites in him-
self the double powers of an absolute and temporary owner, or char-
terer. The law treats him as being a special proprietor, and in charge
of the ship. He has the authority to bind the owners for repairs and
necessaries ; and he can settle claims for demurrage. This being so,
if he is guilty of an act of negligence by which one of the crew is
killed or injured, the owner is liable in damages. 89 It is to be kept
in mind that the question cannot be made to depend upon the mere
name by which the superior servant is known, whether foreman or
superintendent. For example, it has been held that a superintend-
ent, employed by a city to superintend the digging of a trench, and
one employed as a laborer to dig the trench by the same master, are
prima facie fellow servants. 40

147; s. c. 24 N. Y. St Rep. 720; 6
N. Y. Supp. 129; Kolb v. Carrington,
75 111. App. 159 (if the proximate
cause of the injury which the serv-
ant received was an act of superin-
tendence or control on the part of
the foreman, the master will be
none the less liable because the
foreman co-operated with the serv-
ant in doing the work) ; Barnicle
v. Conner, 110 Iowa 238; s. c. 81 N.
W. Rep. 452 (holding that as to the
particular act, the moving of a
heavy column, the foreman was a
fellow servant); Consolidated Kan-
sas City Smelting &c. Co. v. Pe-
terson, 8 Kan. App. 316; s. c. 55
Pac. Rep. 673 (holding that where
the foreman, after negligently
throwing a switch, was also assist-
ing in the mere manual service of
pushing a ca N r, it did not make the
act of throwing the switch any the
less that of the principal) ; Lindvall
v. Woods, 44 Fed. Rep. 855.

"Washburn v. Nashville &c. R.
Co., 3 Head (Tenn.) 638; s. c. 75
Am. Dec. 784.

w Ramsay v. Quinn, 8 Ir. R. C. L.
322; s. c. 1 Cent. L. J. 478.


"Flynn v. Salem, 134 Mass. 361.
Thus, it has been held that a super-
intendent in charge of the work of
removing a telephone-pole is a fellow
servant of one of the workmen, in
directing such workman and others
to let go their hold on the pole be-
fore it can be done safely, and no
recovery can be had from the em-
ployer for an injury resulting there-
from, — the reason being that with
respect to the work In which he is
engaged at the time of the accident
he is a fellow workman of the per-
son injured: Morgridge v. Provi-
dence Teleph. Co., 20 R. I. 386; s. c.
39 Atl. Rep. 328; 78 Am. St. Rep.
879. So, it has been held that the
negligence of the superintendent
and manager of a quarry, having
power to hire and discharge em-
ployes, in directing workman with
whom he is engaged in blasting to
put powder in a hole, without wait-
ing a sufficient time for the hole to
cool after giant powder has been
exploded therein for the purpose of
drying it, — is that of a fellow serv-
ant, and not of a vice-principal:
Mast v. Kern, 34 Or. 247; s. c. 75

Digitized by



§4947. Illustrations of this Doctrine. — Thus, the general agent
in charge of the track-laying, — which is a distinct department in the
construction of a railroad, — having five gangs of men under him,
each subject to its particular foreman, whom he has authority to hire
and discharge, and having supreme control of his department in the
absence of the general superintendent, — acts as a vice-principal in di-
recting the foremen how the spiking of the track shall be done, and
the company is liable for an injury to one of the men resulting from
his negligence in thus directing the work. 41 So does, generally, an
experienced bridge-builder, to whom the proprietor has given the full
control of the construction of a trestle, as its superintendent and rep-
resentative, with respect to his conduct in superintending and direct-
ing the piling of certain timbers, though he also assists the men in
the work, — the conclusion being that he is not a fellow servant of a
laborer engaged in the work, who is injured by the timber falling
upon him. 42 So does a foreman having general control, with power
to employ and discharge workmen, in ordering a workman to go upon
an elevator, and operating it himself, whereby the workman is injured,
since the injury arises from an act of superintendence or from the ex-
ercise of authority. 48 And so, where the plaintiff was employed by the
superintendent, and told to report to a foreman, and the plaintiff was

Amr St Rep. 580; 5 Am. Neg. Rep.
88; 54 Pac. Rep. 950. So, the negli-
gence of a superintendent in charge
of certain work of construction in
giving erroneous information to a
workman as to whether the way be-
low was clear so that he could safe-
ly throw down blocks, whereby an-
other workman was injured, was
not chargeable to the master but
was deemed the negligence of a fel-
low servant: Donnelly v. San Fran-
cisco Bridge Co., 117 Cal. 417; s. c.
49 Pac. Rep. 559. If there are two
servants working together, and one
of them, through negligence, injures
the other, the fact that the one in-
flicting the injury is the superin-
tendent of other servants does not
exclude the conclusion that they
may be fellow servants with respect
to the act done out of which the in-
jury proceeded, even under a statute
providing that a superior is not a
fellow servant of his subordinate:
Texas Ac. R. Co. v. Tatman, 10 Tex.
Civ. App. 434; s. c. 31 S. W. £ep.
333. There is a holding to the ef-
fect that the master will not be re-
lieved from liability for the negli-

gence of his foreman, by reason of
the fact that, at the time of the in-
jury, the foreman was engaged in
working as a laborer with the in-
jured person: Hutson v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co., 50 Mo. App. 300. But
this seems to be opposed to the gen-
eral doctrine. But the liability of
the master for the negligence of his
superintendent in performing an act
of superintendence, — that is to say,
in directing the work, — is not af-
fected by the fact that the superin-
tendent afterwards assists in its per-
formance: Malcolm V. Fuller, 152
Mass. 160; s. c. 25 N. E. Rep. 83.

41 Colorado &c. R. Co. v. Naylon,
17 Colo. 501; s. c. 30 Pac. Rep. 249;
31 Am. St. Rep. 335.

"Brennan v. Berlin Iron Bridge
Co., 74 Conn. 382; s. c. 50 Atl. Rep.

"Swift v. Bleise, 63 Neb. 739; s.
c. 89 N. W. Rep. 310. The Court
stated that if the injury had arisen
from the foreman merely assisting
in the work, apart from any exer-
cise of any authority by him, the
fellow-servant rule would apply,
and the master would not be liable.


Digitized by


4 Thomp. Neg.] the fellow-servant doctrine.

not instructed in his duties, or warned of danger by the superintend-
ent, and the plaintiff and others were called by the foreman to as-
sist him in starting an elevating-belt on certain machinery managed by
him, the foreman was a vice-principal, and not a fellow servant of
the plaintiff, and the duty to instruct the plaintiff devolved upon
him. 44 Where, by special order of the superintendent, which was
unreasonable, a train was allowed to stand on the track, and through
the negligence of a flagman was run into, to the injury of the plain-
tiff, it was held, that the fact that the flagman, as a fellow servant,
contributed to the injury, was no defense, 45 — the superintendent be-
ing the representative of the company, and the principle being that,
where the combined negligence of the master and a fellow servant re-
sults in an injury, the master is liable. 46

§4948. Application of this Doctrine in Case of Corporations. —

The doctrine of the preceding sections applies with even greater force
to corporations ; for, as these bodies ban, from their nature, act only
through agents, then, unless the executive agent of a corporation is
deemed, for the purposes of this rule, the corporation itself, it will
result that an immunity will be extended to men when prosecuting
their business in powerful combinations, through the forms of a cor-
porate organization, which is denied to men who prosecute their busi-
ness in person. Such a result is certainly against public policy, and
will not knowingly be sanctioned by the courts. Many American
courts accordingly hold that the officer of a corporation who has
charge of its business must for all practical purposes be regarded as
the corporation itself ; 47 and in the view of some of the courts there is a

"Waxahachie Oil Co. v. Mc- in their employer's factory, were
Lain, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 334; s. c. not fellow servants, unless their re-
66 S. W. Rep. 226. Circumstances lations were snch that the subordi-
under which the testimony of the nate could "exercise an influence"
defendant's foreman, that he had upon the superintendent "promotive
general charge of, and the right to of proper caution"; so that, unless
employ and discharge all employes, such con-association were shown,
was deemed sufficient to support a the subordinate could recover of the
finding that he was authorized to employer for injuries caused by the
bind the defendant by his promise negligence of the superintendent:
to furnish lights at the place where Hobbold v. Chicago Sugar Ref. Co.,
an accident took place: Hillje v. 44 111. App. 418.
Hettich (Tex. Civ. App.), 65 S. W. "Ante, § 4856, et seq.
Rep. 491 (no off. rep.); s. c. rev'd * 7 See cases in the preceding see-
on other grounds, sub nom. Hil je v. tions, and also Cumberland Ac. R.
Hettich, 95 Tex. 321; 67 S. W. Rep. Co. v. State, 44 Md. 283; Cumber-
90. land &c. R. Co. v. State, 45 Md. 229;

45 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Hender- Frazier v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 38
son, 37 Ohio St. 549. There is a Pa. St. 104; Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gil-
decision to the effect that a super- son, 63 Pa. St. 146; Patterson v.
intendent and a subordinate work- Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 76 Pa. St
man engaged in putting out a fire 389; Brickner v. New York ftc. R.


Digitized by LjOOQLC


distinction in this regard between a corporation and a natural person.
This distinction is, however, denied in England. 48 "That," said
Blackburn, J., "cannot make any difference. In Morgan v. Vale of
Neath Railway Company** the defendants were a corporation, and
nobody thought of suggesting any distinction on that ground." 60 It
was accordingly held that a certified manager of a coal mine, ap-
pointed under a statute, was a fellow servant with a person working
in the mine. His relation to the other workmen in the mine was
just the same as it would have been if the statute had not been

Co., 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 506; 8. c. aff'd,
49 N. Y. 672. "A corporation," said
Potter, J., in this case, "cannot act
personally. It requires some person
to superintend structures, to pur-
chase and control the running of
cars, to employ and discharge men,
and provide all needful appliances.
This can only be done by agents.
When the directors themselves per-
sonally act as such agents, they are
the representatives of the corpora-
tion. They are then the executive
head, or master. Their acts are the
acts of the corporation. When these
directors appoint some person other
than themselves to superintend and
perform all these executive duties
for them, then such appointees,
equally with themselves, represent
the corporation, as master, in all
those respects. And though in the
performance of these executive du-
ties he may be, and is, a servant of
the corporation, he is not in those
respects a coservant, a colaborer, a
coemployg, in the common accepta-
tion of those terms, any more than
is a director, who exercises the same
authority. Though such superin-
tendent may also labor like other co-
laborers, and he may be in that re-
spect a colaborer, and his negli-
gence as such colaborer, when act-
ing only as a laborer, may be
likened to that of any other; yet
when, by appointment of the mas-
ter, he exercises the executive du-
ties of master, as in the employment
of servants, in the selection or adop-
tion of the machinery, apparatus,
tools, structures, appliances, and
means suitable and proper for the
use of other and subordinate serv-
ants, then his acts are executive
acts, — are the acts of a master; and
then the corporation are responsi-

Online LibrarySeymour Dwight ThompsonCommentaries on the law of negligence in all relations → online text (page 133 of 165)