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Whereas, the immense audience assembled this day at Lee Statue
has signalized the veneration and respect in which the people of New
Orleans hold the memory of Robert E. Lee, and the enthusiastic ap-
proval with which they regard the erection of the monument to him;
and, whereas, a postponement of the ceremonies could add nothing
to the tribute already paid thereby :

Be it resolved, That the oration prepared for the occasion be pub-
lished ; that the Mayor being present, the presentation of the monu-
ment to the city of New Orleans by the President of this association,
be forthwith made ; that the directors of the association proceed im-
mediately to the statue, and that the Bishop, J. N. Galleher, here
present, be requested to invoke the blessing of Almighty God upon
the work, and that the ceremonies of the occasion be then considered
as concluded.

Resolved, That the Board of Directors tender their thanks to the
Grand Army of the Republic, the Associations of the Armies of
Northern Virginia and of Tennessee, the militia of the State and all
visiting organizations, as well as to the patriotic women and men of
the South, for their attendance in such enormous numbers, and ex-
press their regret that the storm prevented the completion of the cere-

After the adoption of the foregoing resolution, Hon. Charles E.
Fenner, President of the Association, arose and addressed Mayor
Behan as follows :

Mr. Mayor : As President of the R. E. Lee Monumental Associa-
tion, and in its behalf, I have now the honor of presenting the monu-
ment this day unveiled, through you to the city of New Orleans.

What I have to say touching the illustrious man to whom it is
erected has been uttered in another form.

The immense outpouring of the people of New Orleans which con-
gregated around the statue to-day, defying the elements until all hope
of further proceedings had to be abandoned, testifies to the deep and
enthusiastic veneration with which his memory is revered by the
women and men of the South.

The design of the monument and its construction up to the base
of the statue are the work of our home architect, Mr, John Roy;
while the statue itself is the production of a young American sculptor,

Ceremonies at Unveiling of Statue of General Lee. 101

Mr. A. C. Doyle, of New York, whose growing reputation will surely
be confirmed and extended thereby.

I experience a peculiar pleasure in finding our city represented in
her chief officer by one who was a distinguished soldier under Lee,
and who was at the same time an active member of the Association
and contributed valuable aid in the successful accomplishment of our

Louisiana is entitled to a full share in the glory of Lee. Her sons
illustrated b}^ their valor every field on which his fame was won.

To her chief city we confide this monument, with full assurance
that she will appreciate and preserve it as one of her most precious

Thereupon Mayor Behan arose and responded as follows :

Mr. Chairvia7i a7id Gentlemen of the Lee Monumental Association :

In accepting at your hands, and receiving into the charge of the
city of New Orleans the monument which now completed, so proudly
stands as an enduring tribute to valor, worth and military genius, it
is indeed difficult to sufficiently acknowledge the appreciation and
respect with which our public must regard the affectionate devotion
of those who have contributed to its construction.

This shaft has been erected as a tribute to the greatness and virtue
of one of the purest and noblest men whose names are written in
modern history.

General Lee was not only illustrious as a great commander, but he
was also great in all those attributes which might constitute a bril-
liant exemplar of the highest civilization.

Gentlemen, it needed not this monument to perpetuate the name
and fame of General Lee. His deeds are his monument, and they
will survive and continue in remembrance long after this marble shall
have crumbled into dust ; his great example will outlive the brush of
the painter and the chisel of the sculptor, for great examples are
indeed imperishable:

"They will resist the empire of decay,
When time is o'er and worlds have passed away;
Cold in the dust the perished heart may He,
But that which warmed it once can never die."

After the conclusion of the presentation, the Board of Directors,
in company with Bishop Galleher, proceeded to the statue, and the

102 Southern Historical Society Papers.

Bishop, in the presence of such persons as were present, pronounced
his benediction on the work.

And then, on motion, the meeting adjourned.

By order of the President.

W. I. Hodgson, Secretary.

Company B, Battalion of Washington Artillery, Captain Eugene
May commanding, with a four-gun battery, fired between 3 and 4
o'clock a salute of one hundred guns in honor of the unveiling of the

First Maryland Campaign.


In the Century for June, 18S6, General Longstreet has an article
on the Maryland campaign of 1862, which is remarkable for its ill-
natured allusions to General Jackson, as well as for its partial view of
the campaign and its severe and unfair criticism of General Lee's
strategy. General Longstreet leads us to infer that he prevailed over
Lee's hesitancy to go into Maryland at all by reminding him of his
(Longstreet' s) "experiences in Mexico, where, on several occasions,
we had to live two or three days on green corn." As Jackson's
corps certainly, and Longstreet' s probably, had to live on green corn
for some days before the second battle of Manassas, it was hardly
necessary in General Longstreet to recur to Mexican experiences in
order to overcome the hesitancy of Lee. But however much Lee
yielded to the influence of Longstreet in crossing the Potomac, it
is evident from General Longstreet' s article that Lee unfortunately
refused to be guided by the wisdom of his lieutenant when he had
once entered upon the campaign. General Longstreet thinks that
Lee ought not to have attempted the reduction of Harper's Ferry.
Longstreet is careful to throw all blame for this movement off his
own shoulders, for he tells us that when Lee proposed to him to
undertake it he objected, and urged that " our troops were worn
with marching," &c. He thinks, too, that the fight at South Moun-
tain was a mistake, and that the stand ought to have been made at
Sharpsburg, and not at the Mountain, though he does not frankly
admit that this would have involved the failure of Lee's plans for
the reduction of Harper's F'erry. After South Mountain he criti-
cises the battle of Sharpsburg — thinks it should not have been fought

First Maryland Campaign. 103

— but that the Confederate army ought to have yielded the moral
effects of victory without further struggle by retiring at once to the
south side of the Potomac. After defending General D. H. Hill
from some imaginary assailant for the loss of the captured dispatch,
he adopts, more or less, General Hill's idiosyncrasy in regard to the
value of that dispatch to McClellan and its effect upon the fortunes
of the campaign. He thinks it did McClellan little good, and that it
contributed in no considerable degree to General Lee's failure.
The animus of the article is unfair to the Confederate leader, but
makes up for this by being very complimentary to General Long-
street himself.

If the author looks back with distorted vision upon Lee and his
deeds in this campaign, his bile is evidently deeply stirred when the
vision of Jackson passes before his mind. Speaking of the results of the
campaign, he says : "Jackson was quite satisfied with the campaign,
as the Virginia papers made him the hero of Harper's Ferry, although
the greater danger was with McLaws, and his was the severer and
more important service." Again: "Jackson made a wide, sweeping
march around the Ferry, passing the Potomac at Williamsport, and
moving from there on towards Martinsburg, and turning thence upon
Harper's Ferry to make his attack by Bolivar Heights. McLaws
made a hurried march to reach Maryland Heights before Jackson
could get into position, and succeeded in doing so. With Maryland
Heights in our possession the Federals could not hold their position
there. McLaws put two or three hundred men to each piece of his
artillery, and carried it up the Heights, and was in position before
Jackson came on the Heights opposite. Simultaneously Walker
appeared upon Loudoun Heights, south of the Potomac and east of
the Shenandoah, thus completing the combination against the Fede-
ral garrison." In the description of the battle of Sharpsburg but a
very meagre allusion is made to the tremendous struggle which took
place on Jackson's line, and which was the heaviest attack made by
McClellan during the day ; and only the obscurest mention is made
of the magnificent blow struck by A. P. Hill in the afternoon, which
relieved Longstreet's own line from overwhelming pressure, and sent
Burnside's corps broken and bleeding back to the Antietam.

The purpose and plans of this Maryland campaign are not hard to
understand. Lee had just defeated one-half of the Federal troops in
Virginia, and driven them to the fortifications of Washington. He
could not get at his foe in that position, and to remain idle at Manas-
sas was to give the enemy an opportunity to recover from the blow

104 Southern Historical Society Papers.

he had struck. He, therefore, (after, it would seem, being satisfied
by General Longstreet that his army might live on green corn!)
crossed into Maryland for the purpose of drawing the Federal army
away from Washington in order to defend the North from invasion.
His movement was immediately successful. McClellan, without
waiting to reorganize his disjointed forces, set forth from Washington
towards Frederick city, that he might cover Baltimore as well as the
Federal capital. His movements were necessarily slow, and this
slowness was increased by his cautious temperament and the panic
fears of the National Administration, which, but a few days before,
had looked upon the fall of the capital as certain. McClellan crept
slowly up the Potomac, carrying on his work of reorganization as he
went, stretching his army from the Potomac to the Patapsco, so as
to cover the great cities upon those rivers. His force was large,
from 80,000 to 90,000 effective men, but his army was not in good
condition. One part of it had but recently returned from the unsuc-
cessful Peninsula campaign, another part under Pope had been dread-
fully beaten at Manassas. Gaps had been filled by new troops not
yet inured to service. With his usual tendency to exaggerate the
strength of his foes, McClellan believed that the veteran and vic-
torious army in his front was at least equal in strength to his own.
Add to these considerations the fact that General Halleck, the Fede-
ral commander-in-chief, had not recovered from the nightmare I
induced by Pope's disasters, and seemed possessed of but one idea,
which was, that Lee's object was to draw off the Federal army from
Washington, and then suddenly cross to the Virginia side of the
Potomac and attack that city. Halleck was therefore constantly
warning McClellan against such a movement. Halleck says on the
9th : " We must be very cautious about stripping too much the forts
on the Washington side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off
the mass of our forces, and then attempt to attack from the Virginia
side of the Potomac." On the 12th President Lincoln telegraphs :
" I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williams-
port, and probably the whole Rebel army will be drawn from Mary-
land." On the 13th Halleck says : " Until you know more certainly
the enemy's forces south of the Potomac you are wrong in thus
uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will
send a small column towards Pennsylvania and draw your forces in
that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces
south of the Potomac, and those he might crossover." This was
the very day on which McClellan obtained the lost dispatch. On

First Maryland Campaign. 105

the 14th Halleck says : " I fear you are exposing your left and rear."
And even as late as the i6th he urges the same idea upon McClellan.
Now, if we put together the condition of McClellan's army, his
slowness and caution as a commander, which was so fully evidenced
in the Peninsula campaign, and the apprehension with which the
Federal Administration viewed his increasing distance from Wash-
ington, is it not evident that McClellan's progress must have been
slow, and as he approached the mountains slower still ? In estimating
McClellan's progress. General Lee could not have known fully of
Halleck's fears, and of the constant pulling back exercised upon Mc-
Clellan from Washington, but he knew the sensitiveness of the Fed-
eral Government in regard to that city, he knew McClellan's cautious
character as a commander thoroughly, he knew the disordered con-
dition of his army — indeed, probably underrated the rapidity with
which it was recuperating — and from these data he estimated, fairly
and justly, we believe, the length of time it would take McClellan to
reach the South Mountain.

General Lee expected, of course, when he entered Maryland that
the garrison at Harper's Ferry would leave the place and escape to
the North. Finding that it continued there, he determined, while
watching and waiting for McClellan, to capture this garrison and the
large amount of ordnance and other supplies which had been col-
lected at Harper's Ferry. He proposed to General Longstreet, it
seems, to carry out this plan, but finding his senior lieutenant unable
to appreciate the opportunity, he turned to Jackson, whose vigor and
boldness better suited the enterprise.

On the loth of September the army left Frederick. Jackson, as
General Longstreet states, was to make a sweeping march by way of
Williamsport and Martinsburg, and, driving the Federal troops at
the latter place towards Harper's Ferry, close all the avenues of
escape in the angle between the Shenandoah and the Potomac. At
the same time McLaws, with his own and Anderson's divisions, was
sent into Pleasant Valley, with instructions to take Maryland Heights,
and hedge in the garrison on the north side of the Potomac. J. G.
Walker, with two brigades, was ordered from the mouth of the
Monocacy to cross the Potomac, move towards Harper's Ferry, and,
seizing the Loudoun Heights, to shut up the eastern angle formed
by the Shenandoah and the Potomac. Longstreet was sent to
Hagerstown to look after some supplies and reported movements of
troops from Pennsylvania, while D. H. Hill was left at Boonesboro'
to be ready to support Stuart's cavalry and to guard the mountain-

106 Southern Historical Society Papers.

pass which led to McLaws's rear until Harper's Ferry should fall.
It was not General Lee's original intention to dispute the passage of
South Mountain with McClellan. His design, on the other hand,
was to induce the Federal army, if possible, to cross that range into
the Hagerstown Valley, and when this army had thus gotten fairly out
of the reach of Washington the Confederate commander expected to
give it battle upon his own terms. And, judging from McClellan's
character and movements, Lee believed he would have ample time
for the reduction of Harper's Ferry and the reunion of his divided
arm}' in the neighborhood of Hagerstown before McClellan would be
ready to cross the mountain. Consequently D. H. Hill and Stuart
were expected to delay McClellan's march until the operations at
Harper's Ferry should be completed.

On the 13th of September a copy of General Lee's order, giving
the proposed movements of every division in his army until it should
be reunited after the capture of Harper's Ferry, fell into the hands of
General McClellan at Frederick. The copy so captured was the one
sent from General Lee's headquarters addressed to General D. H.
Hill. How it was lost, and where, are not definitely knov/n. Gen-
eral Hill states that he never received this copy of the order, and
consequently it must have been lost through the carelessness of some
one else, but we believe no means exist of tracing the history of this
accident further. General Longstreet thinks that McClellan might
have gotten through his own agencies all the information the order
gave him ; but such a supposition is at variance with all the facts of
the case. As Halleck's dispatches show, the movement of Confed
erate troops to the south side of the Potomac was interpreted as a
menace to Washington, and served simply to hamper McClellan.
Nor could any agencies, even had they been vastly more efficient
than usual, have revealed to McClellan the position for days to come
of every part of Lee's army as well as the designs of its commander.
McClellan, it is certain, valued the importance of the order infinitely
higher than General Longstreet does. He gave vent to demonstra-
tions of joy when he read it, and at once comprehended the oppor-
tunity presented for striking his adversary a tremendous blow. By
a prompt movement forward he might expect to overwhelm the small
part of Lee's army in his front, and, turning down upon the rear of
McLaws, might raise the siege of Harper's Ferry, and perhaps de-
stroy a portion of the troops engaged in conducting it.

At once orders were issued to every part of the Federal army for
a vigorous forward movement. Stuart found his cavalry pickets

First Maryland CamiJaign, 107

attacked and pressed back with unusual vi_8^or. Everything on the
evening of September 13th gave indications of a change in the
mode of movement of the Federal army. Some one who had' been
a witness of the scene at McClellan's headquarters when the lost
dispatch was brought to him came through the lines and informed
Stuart, who then understood the cause of the Federal activity.
Stuart sent in turn, the information to General Lee at Hagerstown.
Lee received it some time during the night of the 13th, and at once
ordered Longstreet back to Boonesboro' to support Hill. General
Longstreet says that he urged Lee not to make a stand at Boones-
boro', but to bring D. H. Hill back to Sharpsburg. General Long-
street leaves us in doubt as to his opinion of the eifect of this move-
ment on the Harper's Ferry enterprise, but as such a movement
would have uncovered McLaws's rear, there is no doubt that it would
have cost the failure of the plan for the reduction of Harper's Ferry.
General Lee was not prepared to yield so much to his enemy. Nor
is it certain that the line of the Antietam presented any better
opportunity for opposing McClellan than did South Mountain,
where greatly inferior forces could, if well handled, keep back, for a
time at least, the Federal army.

It is not our purpose to discuss the battle of South Mountain,
about which much might be said. General D. H. Hill, aided later in
the day by General Longstreet, was able to hold the mountain
passes at Turner's Gap all day of September 14th. Their com-
mands suffered heavily, however, and such positions were won by
the Federal army as to insure their possession of the mountain next
day. Meantime the Federals had gained possession of Crampton's
Gap, but not until too late to press McLaws on the 14th. Hence
Lee withdrew towards Sharpsburg next morning. While this move-
ment was in progress he learned of the fall of Harper's Ferry, and
ordered the concentration of his whole army behind the Antietam.

Let us turn now to operations about Harper's Ferry. According
to General Lee's captured order McLaws was to possess himself of
Maryland Heights by Friday morning, September r2th; Walker, at
the same time, was, if practicable, to be in possession of Loudoun
Heights; Jackson, by Friday night, September 12th, was expected
to be in possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and "of such
of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg. " Jackson had by far the
longest march to make to reach Harper's Ferry; it amounted to
about fifty miles. He was at Martinsburg, according to orders, on
the night of the 12th, and had driven the Federal troops from that
place towards Harper's Ferry.

108 Southern Historical Society Papers.

About II o'clock on the morning of the 13th the head of his col-
umn came in sight of the enemy drawn up on Bolivar Heights, the
southwestern suburb of Harper's Ferry. Thus Jackson was fully
on time. McLaws, who had not half the distance of Jackson to
march, entered Pleasant Valley on the nth, and on the 12th pro-
ceeded towards Maryland Heights. The way was rough. The
Heights themselves were not strongly guarded — by a small force, I
think, of two regiments. It was about half-past 4 on Saturday even-
ing, the 13th, when General Kershaw succeeded in carrying the
Heights. The Confederate loss in this operation was slight which
shows that the resistance was not very determined. It was difficult
to get artillery upon the mountain from the Pleasant Valley side and
General McLaws had to haul them up by hand, and it was 2 o'clock
P. M.Sunday, 14th, before McLaws's guns were in position to co-op-
erate with Jackson's in the reduction of Harper's Ferry. Thus the
capture of Maryland Heights was accomplished, not on Friday
morning, but some thirty hours later, on Saturday evening, and
when McLaws got possession of the Heights, Jackson had been for
some hours at Bolivar. Walker, who crossed to the Virginia side at
the Point of Rocks, reached the foot of Loudoun Heights by 10
o'clock on the 13th (Saturday), and took possession of them with-
out opposition by 2 P. M. of that day. By 8 o'clock on the morn-
ing of the 14th his artillery was up and ready for action. It thus
appears that McLaws and Walker were each more than a day late in
reaching their positions and about two days late in gelling their artil-
lery into place for effective co-operation in the reduction of the garri-
son. Hence the statement by General Longstreet that McLaws made
a hurried march to reach Maryland Heights before Jackson could get
in position, and succeeded in doing so, gives an entirely erroneous
impression. We have nothing to say in derogation of the brave and
skillful part performed by General McLaws and General Walker in
the reduction of Harper's Ferry — all honor to them for what they
did — but it is evident that if McLaws made a hurried march, Jack-
son must have made one more than twice as much hurried, since in
the same time he marched about fifty miles to McLaws's twenty.
Nor is it true that McLaws reached Maryland Heights before Jack-
son got in position. It was General Lee's intention, evidently, from
his order, that both McLaws and Walker should be in position
before Jackson, as it was likely that the enemy, when alarmed, would
attempt to escape through the avenues to be guarded by their com-
mands, but Jackson, as we have seen, was in front of Bolivar before
either Maryland or Loudoun Heights were occupied.

First Maryland Campaign. 109

After the various commands were in position the intervention of
the rivers between Jackson and his colleagues made it difficult
to communicate with them. The only means of communication
was by signals, and some hours were consumed in learning the con-
dition of affairs and transmitting the orders for attack. General
Walker opened fire from his guns on the afternoon of the 14th.
Jackson then followed suit, and McLaws joined in a little later in the
afternoon. The fire from Walker's guns was effective, as it was a
plunging fire at no great distance. McLaws was too far off to ac-
complish as much, but the moral effect of his shells, plunging from
the mountain tops, was no doubt great. Jackson's troops were the
only ones who could come in contact with the garrison since the Po-
tomac separated the Federals from McLaws, and the Shenandoah
separated them from Walker. Jackson made disposition therefore
to attack the Federal works. General Walker, in his interesting
article in the June Century, says that as late as midday on the 14th
Jackson had no knowledge of the important events transpiring at the
South Mountain passes, and thought the fight going on there was
simply a cavalry affair. He therefore spoke at that time of regularly
summoning the garrison to surrender, and of giving time for the
removal of non-combatants before opening his batteries. Later in
the day Jackson learned from General Lee of the great danger
threatened by McClellan's unexpectedly rapid advance, and was
informed of the urgent necessity for completing the operations at

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