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square miles. That compares fairly enough with the achieve-
ment of Italy or of Germany (before the war) or of Japan
as regards area. But as regards the vital matter, com-




merce, the new colonial empire of the United States sur-
passes those of all rivals excepting only the incomparable
Britain. It may be true, as President Coolidge affirms, that
the United States is not "infatuated with any vision of
empire," but if we have no such vision, we have the reality.
It is time we opened our eyes to that reality.

That is not an accusation. It is merely a description of
fact. It is not meant as an accusation, because imperialism
is not a wholly sinister thing, not wholly an expression of
ruthless greed. It would not be so prevalent if it had no
genuine causes, no humane results, no moral justifications.
To make the matter specific, the imperialist trend of Amer-
ican policy in the tropical part of Latin America since 1898
has been less a matter of deliberate aggression than of un-
considered response to urgent stimuli. That is one danger-
ous element in it. Vacillating and visionless meddling,
without calculation of cumulative and future results, may
be more disturbing than well-planned and systematic ex-
pansion. But to condemn the meddling without appreciat-
ing its causes is as futile as it is unfair.

Liberals and anti-imperialists will do wisely to recognize
frankly that the existence of politically unstable and econom-
ically undeveloped countries between the Rio Grande and
the Canal constitutes a real problem, not easily solved by a
simple formula of non-intervention. To talk as if these
countries were democracies and to discuss with solemn mien
the niceties of their constitutions, is unrealistic, if not a
little ludicrous, whether the talking is done by the State
Department or by the opposition. Secretary Kellogg at
first, last November, seemed to make our Nicaraguan pol-
icy dependent upon the correct rendering of the words
defecto and falta de in the Nicaraguan constitution. It
was imprudent to assume so vulnerable a position. But it
would require rare naivete to believe that the real purpose
of our marines, bluejackets, and cruisers was to instruct the
Nicaraguans in the meaning of one or two Spanish words.

THE Nicaraguan expedition is not an isolated episode to
be debated on its own merits, but rather it is oneof many
symptoms of a condition. Revolutions and coups d'etat have
been common throughout tropical America. Between 1886
and 1915 Haiti had eleven presidents, all styled generals,
four of whom were killed and six deposed by revolution.
Santo Domingo had at least eight upheavals worth record-
ing between the assassination of Heureaux in 1899 and
American intervention in 1916. The Central-American
republics have suffered from the chronic disposition of
"Liberal" and "Conservative" juntas to oust each other by
force. Mexico's harrowing "revolution" is well enough
remembered. To a certain degree, it may be admitted,
American and other foreign financial assistance to revolu-
tions has aggravated this turbulence. But there would not
have been revolutions to finance, or to receive recognition
and support, if it were not for political instability deeply
rooted in undemocratic social and economic conditions.

In itself, this condition would not cause imperialistic
revision of the Monroe Doctrine. But in conjunction with
two other factors it presents problems which it would be
folly to minimize. One factor is economic penetration.
That includes loans to governments, establishment of branch
banks, investments in plantations, mines, oil wells, railways,
lumbering, and sundry other activities of American and

'Imperialism and World Politics, Macmillan, 1926, pp. 414-ff.

European capital. Unquestionably our international prob-
lems would be simpler if capital refrained from such activi-
ties in the Caribbean. But capital will not refrain. Nor
would the withdrawal of all foreign investments be entirely
desirable. The economic development of the Caribbean
would be retarded, and political progress postponed.

THE other factor is the almost universally accepted diplo-
matic doctrine that a government has the duty of protect-
ing its nationals and their property abroad. It is this doctrine,
rather than the inevitable fact of foreign investments, that
should be the focus of attention. Natural though it seems,
the doctrine is no eternal verity. It was formerly less pop-
ular than at present. It is effectively practised today only
when protection is feasible, chiefly in the case of weak and
backward countries. It may conceivably be modified, or
replaced in time by another doctrine, which will secure the
same object with less difficulty.

These factors have caused the United States government,
during the past three decades, to re-interpret the Monroe
Doctrine in the light of contemporary conditions. The
Monroe Doctrine is being imperialized. It was once a
"shield" against European imperialism. Some Europeans
now consider it a screen for American imperialism. Per-
haps a truer metaphor would make the traditional doctrine
an old skin into which the new wine of imperialism has
been poured.

That metaphor may seem irreverent to those who, in
Mrs. Eddy's immortal words, "believe in the Monroe Doc-
trine, in our Constitution, and in the laws of God." To
so many Americans the Monroe Doctrine is a sacred name
for whatever they believe should be our policy toward
Latin America! If the name is given at will to what-
ever policy American statesmen practice toward Latin
America, there is nothing to be gained by discussing it.
If, on the other hand, the Monroe Doctrine means the
doctrine which President Monroe enunciated in 1823, the
problem is easily clarified.

Monroe said, "With the existing colonies or dependencies
of any European power we have not interfered and shall
not interfere." That part of the Monroe Doctrine became
a dead letter when we interfered in 1898 with the Spanish
possessions of Cuba and Porto Rico.

Monroe also declared that the United States would re-
gard as an "unfriendly" act any attempt of a European
power to oppress or control the destiny of any of the in-
dependent Latin-American nations. That warning still
holds good. But it is inadequate. It said nothing about
our acquiring canal rights, leasing naval bases, instituting
financial receiverships, and the like. It said nothing about
customs houses, government bonds, or concessions. These
things are typical features of modern imperialism, as any
one familiar with the story of European imperialism will
recognize at a glance. The Monroe Doctrine was silent
on our sanitary mission in the Caribbean, our mission to
eradicate yellow fever and wage war on germs, for man-
kind in 1823 lived in blissful ignorance of bacteria.

The newer imperialist policies are controversial because,
plausible as may be their justification in other respects,
they are open to three criticisms, i. They are inconsistent
with our professed advocacy of peaceful arbitration or ad-
judication of international disputes. President Coolidge very
recently, and other presidents before him have, proclaimed



our predilection for peaceful justice. Yet in dealing with
Mexico, the Caribbean island-republics, and Central Amer-
ica, the State Depatment has repeatedly called upon the
navy and the marines, rather than on courts or arbitral
commissions. Europe and Latin America perceive this in-
consistency, if we do not. Sometimes it is called hypocrisy.
At a time when the world is attempting to substitute justice
for aggressive military force, the American people would
not, if they were conscious of the issue, desire to have acts
of military aggression entered upon their record. They
would desire the State Department to exhaust every means
of peaceful settlement before using violence, in the future,
to coerce a Haiti. Or a Mexico.

2. Although the new methods may seem, to the State
Department, the most practical and expeditious means for
achieving its ends, they are not "practical" in the long run.
They have already roused a deal of hostility and fear in
Latin America and of suspicion in Europe. These psycho-
logical reactions may ultimately have economic consequences
for our foreign trade, and political consequences for our
security, much more far-reaching than the relatively minor
advantages gained by Caribbean interventions.

3. Too frequently the State Department has used military
intervention in Caribbean countries ,for the profit of private
business interests in a way that inevitably evokes criticism.
For example, it may have appeared in 1915 that American
intervention in Haiti was designed to prevent French inter-
vention, or to prevent Germany from securing a harbor.
But when, some years later, the State Department pub-
lished its documents for 1914 and 1915 in "Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States," it appeared that the Depart-
ment had been singularly solicitous regarding American
financial interests in the Haitian National Railway and the
Haitian National Bank. Once the marines were in control
of Haiti, these financial interests were generously provided
for. Again, in turning over the department's documents for
an earlier year, one finds our diplomatic representative in
Nicaragua urging that naval forces be retained there to
prevent the Liberal majority from overthrowing the Con-
servative government, at least until a loan could be put
through ; that is to say, the Department was using armed
force to maintain an unpopular government which would
agree to a loan floated by American bankers. Now it may
be true, as partisans of dollar diplomacy have held, that
the bankers really handled the loan simply to oblige the
State Department. If so, they deserve credit for their rather
exceptional altruism. But such items do not make a pre-
possessing appearance in the record. There will always
be some readers who will entertain a suspicion that the
bankers were interested in their profits. There will always
be some shrewd historian to point out, as Professor Shepherd
has recently done, that the increase of American inter-
vention in the Caribbean has been paralleled by the in-
crease of American investments there, during the past thirty
years, from "a paltry two or three hundred millions of
dollars to the tidy sum of upwards of three billions."

TWO sets of facts have been put forward, perhaps too
summarily, in the foregoing paragraphs: the facts that
cause the new imperialism, and the facts that cause criticism
of it. Instead of maintaining a watertight partition be-
tween them, why not put the facts together? How can
the aims, in so far as they are legitimate, be secured with-

out the disadvantages and dangers inherent in the present
methods? Common-sense realism asks such questions.

Beginning conservatively, we might at least agree that if
the armed forces of the United States are employed in
defense of American lives and property, or of foreigners (to
prevent foreign intervention), the State Department should
exercise some care while protecting legitimate property to
avoid insisting on undue profits, or recognition of uncertain
property claims, for the benefit of American private busi-
ness interests. The American people have the right to de-
mand that their integrity in such matters shall be scru-
pulously maintained.

PERHAPS we could also agree that armed intervention
should not be used for the purpose of conquest, whether
the conquest is hidden behind subtleties or not. If the marines
are used to coerce weak countries like Haiti and Nicaragua
into signing away their independence, even though the pro-
cess be ingeniously contrived by installing puppet govern-
ments, we cannot disclaim imperialism, and military im-
perialism at that. Fortunately the Senate has more than
once served as a check on efforts of the Department to
carry out veiled protectorate projects. In this matter, the
vigilance of the Senate, backed by public opinion, is a val-
uable safeguard.

To go a step farther, one may ask whether, when armed
intervention seemed necessary, we could not call upon some
international body such as the Pan-American Union (the
League Council might be more appropriate, were we a mem-
ber of the League) to attempt conciliation, endorse the jus-
tice of our cause, and clear us of all suspicion of unjustified
aggression or imperialism. Of course that would mean re-
nouncing our freedom to intervene except on just cause. But
how many Americans wish to intervene unjustly?

If that proposal seems difficult, at any rate there should
be little hesitation about a less drastic suggestion. If, when
the finances of a Haiti or a Nicaragua seem chaotic, we
use force directly or indirectly to establish an American
financial receivership or advisorship, we are accused of im-
perialism. But if we could have such a receivership or
financial advisorship established under international super-
vision, the legitimate interests of bankers and bond-holders
could be safeguarded as well, perhaps even more easily. Had
Jeremiah Smith been imposed on Hungary by the single-
handed action of the United States, he would have been
no more efficient, and much less welcome, than he was
when appointed by an international agency which could
not be suspected of imperialistic designs. Why not try a
similar method in the Caribbean ?

If American liberals could concentrate their efforts on a
program of fairly specific constructive propositions such as
these are intended to typify (and they are intended only
as types, not as items of a definitive program), instead of
throwing their energy into an idealistic but negative de-
nunciation of imperialism, they would have a better prospect
of guiding our Latin-American policy into safe and honor-
able channels. The State Department consists of men who
are trying to meet in "practical" ways the real emergencies
which confront them. If they can be convinced that more
practical policies could be substituted for the new imperial-
ism, they would perhaps experience a sense of relief. After
all, being under fire may be exciting, but it is far from

The Future is Moving East

Center Building, Hebrew University at Jerusalem


Designed by Patrick Gedde

WHEN President Wilson promulgated the
idea of "self-determination of nations,"
eastern Europe knew that he meant IT.
Revolutions followed from the Baltic to the
Red Seas, and America acquired a lasting
importance that cannot be appreciated by
travelers on the Grand Tour of western Europe where
they hear that America is unpopular.

It is not so much that we are rich as that we have en-
tered into the heritage of western Europe that rankles. The
German Empire has been shorn of both territory and pres-
tige. However much of a come-back Germany may make,
it is inconceivable that the Empire or the awe of Germany
should be significant in the old sense. No one can expect
a return of Austria-Hungary. The numbers, wealth and
prestige of France are inevitably leading her to the status
of a second-rate power. Great Britain, still with much
power and tremendous momentum, has well been described
as an Empire Emeritus. Ireland has broken her prestige,
and India, Egypt and the Arabian world will either succeed
in their struggles for independence or will soon secure such
modifications as will merely enable England to save her
face while losing the substance.

We may lend money to the old states, visit them and talk
much about them, but the significant influence of the United
States leaps over the Atlantic and western Europe at a
bound. In western Europe I found envy for America
which took the form of both hate and disparagement. They
see our materialism, and compensate themselves by despising
our culture. They would like our wealth, while they
despise us for having it ; but they ignore our spiritual
achievements. A typical attitude is expressed in the Kreuz

Zeitung by a correspondent warning "inquisitive Germans"
away from the United States. He says: "America has
nothing to offer cultured Europeans. Scratch an Amer-
ican and you are sure to find that he is nothing more than
a piece of machinery."

Eastern Europe would like our wealth, but they also see
our idealism, our democracy, and our experimentation.
They know that we are still learning, and they would like
to share in what we learn rather than imitate the finished
old cultures. In spite of our political ostracism, I am sure
that the United States is furnishing more ideas to Russia
than all the rest of the world combined.

The United States is the country of the present and is
not yet fully ripe, but it may be looked upon as approaching
early autumn. The East of which I speak is in the spring.
We have been so filled with the notion that the direction
of civilization is towards the West that it has somehow
seemed to be inherent in the nature of the universe that no
other direction is conceivable. This, however, is only an
illusion arising out of contemporary conditions. The geo-
graphical limits set by the Pacific Ocean and the vigor
of the Oriental has compelled the western flow of migra-
tion to come to a halt. The picture is like that of a tor-
rent of water which strikes a wall and, leaping up, falls
back upon itself.

A change in relationship and direction of movement does
not mean extermination and differences in culture do not
mean that any are valueless; but psychologically, a genera-
tion or an epoch may be surfeited by one culture and turn
to another, just as no political party can hold office indefi-
nitely and no popular song long remain popular; each is
supplanted by another. In my opinion we are on the eve




of such a change. The song of western efficiency and
Christian dogmatism is becoming unsatisfying even to the

The changes perhaps will not be any more radical than
those in the transitions from Ilium to Athens, Greece to
Rome, Italy to the Holy Roman Empire, or Europe to
America, but since they have hitherto all taken place from
east to west a reversal of direction seems more of a shock,
and the effect of greater portent.

ANOTHER name for Western Civilization is Christen-
dom, though it includes only that part of Christendom
covered by the Roman Catholic-Protestant heritage. The
hundred and fifty million Christians who belong to the
Greek Orthodox Church, which originated from a schism
that preceded the Protestant Reformation by many centuries,
have not been included. The majority of the members of the
Greek Church are Slavs Russians, Serbs and Bulgarians.
In western Europe there has been a very close relation
between the church and the state. This meant that religion
did not serve primarily as a guide to individual conduct
but as a motive for conformity and resignation. The result
was that vigorous minds reacted against it. When I told
a prominent bishop in southern Europe that I had changed
my connection to a state university from a college of re-
ligious origin where he had previously known me, he ex-
pressed regret, saying that the War was the product of the
materialist graduates of the state universities. My own
conclusion is that the peculiar materialism of the state
universities of central Europe was due to state control of
religion. When I told a more liberal archbishop of the

Orthodox Church in a neighboring country this story and
also that I thought that the attitude of the Bolsheviks
towards the church in Russia was the healthiest thing that
could have happened to it, he fully agreed.

Although the heterogeneity and prosperity of America
make comparisons with other countries difficult, neverthe-
less I am convinced that there will be more spiritual
communion between America and eastern Europe and the
new Mohammedan movements than with western Europe.

This will not be due so much to the pioneer activities
of America's organizations, such as the missionaries,
Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., Red Cross, Famine Relief,
Quakers, and Near East Relief, as to the fact that there
was already a confidence and preparedness to understand
these very organizations. This preparedness grew out of
the fact that the peoples had repudiated so much of the old
and that they expected America to be the symbol of what
they hoped to be. Tourists have come back from England,
France, Italy, and somewhat less from Germany, saying
that the people are hostile to Americans. I traveled in fifteen
countries east of these, and never saw the slightest sign of
hostility, but many signs of friendship. The immigrants to
America have contributed much to this attitude. The let-
ters and money which they have sent back have given an
impression very different from that which the newspapers
and tourists give in the West.

I was in a factory school in Moscow. The foreman and
instructor was a most enthusiastic Bolshevik and proud of
what the Soviets had accomplished. But he had worked in
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, for eight years. He said to me
that it would be twenty years before Russia caught up

Courtesy Near East College Association

"The general cultural superiority of Bulgaria is to a considerable degree due to the fact that many of her statesmen have

been graduates of Robert College."



with the United States, and it was clear that no other
comparison counted.

In the days immediately following the War, when the
Y.W.C.A. had money enough to maintain rather wide
work in the new part of Europe, it seemed to me that next
to the Quakers it was the finest representative of America.
It was less institutionalized than the Y.M.C.A. The
Y.M.C.A., however, in Europe has successfully overcome
the limitations which are sometimes attributed to it at
home, and plays a most useful part under most diverse con-
ditions. I saw something of its work in Esthonia, Latvia,
Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Turkey,
Greece, Palestine, and Egypt. In some cases its advisors are
Protestants, in others Roman Catholics, in others Greek
Orthodox, and in Cairo they are Moslems. In a number
of cases the natives feel that the American Y.M.C.A.
secretary is far more successfully the diplomatic repre-
sentative of America than the appointee of the State
Department. Since the Y.M.C.A. is not trying to put over
a theological doctrine, it seems to represent what the people
can only interpret as American idealism, which appears as
elastic, efficient, tolerant, sympathetic and cooperative.

Gratitude for charity seems to be short-lived, so that it
is impossible to estimate the effect of our relief work on the
attitude towards America. A group of teachers whom I
met in Leningrad wanted me to express their thanks for
the food which had been provided for Russian intellectuals
during the famine, but I doubt if the attitude of Russia as
a whole was much affected by the famine relief. The sin-
cerity of the Quakers undoubtedly carried over beyond the
material relief which they gave.

The American missionaries preceded the War and the
revolutions and are now found only in what was once
Turkey, but now Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Palestine,
and Egypt. While some of the old school are left, most of
them represent a type which easily has adapted itself to the
new conditions which are generally both radical and in-
tolerant. In Turkey, where they may not teach Christianity,
they are enthusiastic about trying to make better Moslems.
Their greatest achievements were the establishment of educa-
tional institutions, of which Robert College, the Constanti-
nople Woman's College, and the American University at
Beirut have been the most influential. One is now established
in Cairo, and others under way both in Sophia and Athens.

The dominant form of higher education has been German,
except for occasional French influence. These American
institutions suggest a new note which seems to be pleasing
to the leaders in the countries where they are located. In
fact many of the leaders have been students in these
colleges. The general cultural superiority of Bulgaria over
the other Balkan states is, to a considerable degree, due to
the fact that many of her statesmen have been graduates of
Robert College. The Metropolitan of Sophia, who is the
highest prelate of Bulgaria, a man of unusual breadth and
influence, told me that he had learned much from his asso-
ciation with the members of the faculty of Robert College

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