Thomas A. Smith.

Twelfth Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics and Information of Maryland. 1903. Thomas A. Smith, Chief. (Volume 1904) online

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said Chief Justice Shaw in Cofnmonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cusli. 84,
"however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of othe^rs having an equal right
to the enjoyment of their property nor injurious to the rights of the
community. Rights of property, like all other social and conven-


tional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their en-
joyuiont as will prevent them from being injurious, and to such rea-
sonable restraints and regulations established by law as tlie Legisla-
ture under the governing and controlling power vested in tlietu Ijy the
Constitution may think necessary and expedient." This power, said
the Supreme Court in Holden vs. Hardy, i6g (J. S. j66, legitimately
exercised can neither be limited by contract nor bartered away by
legislation; or, as said by the same court in Stone vs. Miss., loi U. S.
816, no Legislature can bargain away the public health or the public
morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their ser-
vants. Government is organized with the view of their preservation
and cannot divest itself of the power to provide for them. And so
again in N. O. Gas Light Co. vs. La. Light Co., J15 U. S. 6^0, it was
said the constitutional prohibition upon vState laws impairing the obli-
gation of contracts does not restrict the power of the vState to protect
the public health and public morals nor the public safety as the one
or the other may be involved in the execution of such contract. The
exercise of the police power being for the promotion of the public good
is superior to all considerations of private right or interest, and by
virtue of it the State may lawhilly iiripose upon the exercise of private
rights such burdens and restraints as may be necessary and proper to
secure the general health and safety. P. & IV. on Public Health
and Safety, Sec. 12. The holder of property is bound to know that
through agencies other than his own his property may become an
occasion of injury to the public and that in such event it is subject to
reasonable regulation in the interest of the public. "Any other doc-
trine would strike at the root of all police regulations." Id. In the case
of the State vs. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 56^, this Court had occasion to go into
an examination of the police powei of the State in reference to regu-
lations respecting dairies, and we need not repeat what was there so
recently said with reference to the extent of the police power of the
Commonwealth. That the power is broad, comprehensive and far
reaching will not be questioned or gainsaid. In the very nature of the
case it must be so. It is, as said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in the
License Cases, 5 How. j8j, "the power of sovereignty, the power to
govern men and things within the limits of its dominion." It is a
power that necessarily belongs to the legislative department of the
State government. It is for that co-ordinate branch to determine
whether particular things or acts are or are not dangerous to the pub-
lic health, the public safety, and the public morals, and when that
branch of the government has spoken the subject must be considered
as closed, unless the Judicial Department has a revisory jurisdiction;
and that brings us to the question whether the Courts have such a
jurisdiction, and if they have what are its legitimate limits?

This inquiry presents the pivotal point of the case. It may be said
in the language of the Supreme Court in JMugler vs. Kansas, 12^ U. S.


6^j, "if a statiite purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals or the public safety, has no real or sub-
stantial relation to those objects or is a palpable invasiou of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the Court to so ad-
judge and thereby give effect to the Constitution." Running through
all the. cases, both Federal and State, is the doctrine that if the
measure designed for, or purporting to concern, the protection or
preservation of the public health, morals or safety, is one which has a
real and substantival relation to the police potver; then no matter how
unreasonable nor how unwise the measure it may be, it is not for
the judicial tribunals to avoid or vacate it upon those grounds. Numer-
ous illustrations of this principle are furnished in reported cases.
"For it must now be considered, as an established principle of law in
this country, that there are no limits whatever to the legislative
powers of the States, except such as are prescribed iu their own Con-
stitutions or in that of the United States; consequently, that the
Courts, in the performance of their duty to confine the legislative de-
partment within the constitutional limits of its power, cannot nullify
and avoid a law, simply because it conflicts with the judicial notions
of natural rights or morality or abstract jtistice."

Parker df IVorth Pub., H. & Saf., Sec. 8 and cases cited in note 2-
We may also refer to Dean vs. Baltimore, 80 Md. ijj, where au
ordinance provided that if milk failed, when inspected by one of the
local milk inspectors, to be of a certain quality it should be sum-
marily seized and forfeited; and this Court held that the ordinance was
a legitimate exercise of the police power, though it involved the de-
struction of property without judicial procedure. In Iloldeit vs. Hardy,
supra, a statute of the State of Utah limiting hours of labor in mines
was held valid as an exercise of the police power. In Railroad Co.
vs. Paul, IJ3 U. S. 404, a statute requiring immediate payment of
wages to discharged employees was held to be valid. In Detroit Rail-
way vs. Osborne, i8g U. S. j8j, it was held that restrictions placed
upon electrical cars and not upon other vehicles used on the public
streets was a legitimate exercise of the police power. A striking illus-
tration of what may be done, and validly done, under the police
power is furnished in the case of the Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., gj
U. S. 25. The Boston Beer Company was incorporated by the Legis-
lature of Massachusetts in 1828 for the purpose of manufactur-
ing malt liquors in all their varieties. In 1869 the Prohibitory
Iviquor Law of Massachusetts was passed. Under the last
named Act a citation was issued requiring the Boston Beer
Company to appear in the Municipal Court of Boston
and show cause why the liquors in its possession should not be for-
feited. The Beer Company appeared, and the trial resulted in a judg-
ment of forfeiture. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court, where
judgment was again rendered for the Commonwealth, whereupon the


record was transinitled to the Sui)reiiie Judicial Court of the State,
which afFirnied the action of tlie vSuperior Court and remanded the case
to the latter Court, where final judgment was entered declaring the
liquors forfeited. To that judgment a writ of error was prosecuted,
and the proceedings thus reached the vSupreme Court of the United
States. In the last named ti'ibunal the judgment of the State Court
was affirmed. In the course of the opinion reported in gj U. S. it was
said: "The plaintiff in error was incorporated 'for the purpose of
manufacturing malt liquors in all their varieties,' it is true, and the
right to manufacture, undoubtedly, as the plaintiff's counsel contends,
included the incidental right to dispose of the liquors manufactured.
But, although this right or capacity was thus granted in the most un-
qualified form, it cannot be construed as conferring any greater or
more sacred right than any citizen had to manufacture malt liquor;
nor as exempting the Corporation from any control therein to which a
citizen would be subject, if the interests of the community should
require it. If the public safety or the public morals require the dis-
continuance of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of the Legislature
cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any inci-
dental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer.
All rights are held subject to the police power of the vState." Follow-
ing the same current of decision is the case of Kidd vs. Pearson, 128
U. S. I. It was there said in dealing with a law of Iowa whicli au-
thorized the abating as a nuisance of a distillery used for the unlawful
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors that "a State has the
right to prohibit or restrict the manufacture of intoxicating liquors
within her limits; to prohibit all sale and traffic in them in said State;
to inflict penalties for such manufacture and sale, and to provide regu-
lations for the abatement as a common nuisance of the properly used
for such forbidden purposes, and that such legislation by a State is a
clear exercise of her undisputed police power, which does not abridge
the liberties or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor de-
pjive any person of property without due process of laW; nor in any
way contravene any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United S+ates." See also Austin vs. Tenn., ijg U.
S., jV3. where a statute prohibiting the sale of cigarettes after they
had been taken from the original packages wis upheld as within the
police power. See also Vol. 9, loose's Notes to United States Re-
ports, 5^4-525-

There is a class of cases which must be distinguished from those
which hold that the unreasonableness of a police regulation adopted
by the Legislature furnished no ground for the Courts to strike it
down. The distinction is plain and simple. The Legislature being
the sole depository of the law-making power, it is not for Courts of
justice to say that a given enactment passed in virtue of the police
power, and having a direct relation to it, is void for unreasonableness.


because if Courts undertook to exercise such an authority they would
in effect exert a veto on legislation. But whenever power has been
delegated by the Legislature to a municipal corporation to adopt
and promulgate ordinances for the protection of the public health,
niorals or safety, the reasonableness of the measures enacted by
the municipality is a feature to which the Courts look to see
whether the measure is within the power granted, and they
do this upon the assumption that the Legislature did not intend
to empower the municipality to enact unreasonable or oppressive
ordinances. Thus in Radecke's case, 49 Md. 22g, where an ordinance
of Baltimore city, which permitted the Mayor to revoke any license
previously granted to erect a steam engine, was under review,
this Court said, after alluding to quite a number of cases: "While we
may not be willing to adopt and follow many of these cases, and while
we hold that this power of control by the courts is one to be most
cautiously exercised, we are yet of opinion there may be a case in
which an ordinance passed under grants of power like those we have
cited is so clearly unreasonable, so arbitrary, oppressive or partial, as
to raise the presumption that the Legislature never intended to confer
the power to pass it, and to justify the courts in interfering and set-
ting it aside as a plain abuse of authority. In applying the doctrine
of judicial control to this extent, we contravene no decisions in our
own State and impose no unnecessary restraints upon the action of
municipal bodies." The ordinance was set aside as a plain abuse of the
authority delegated by the Legislature tp the municipality. But
when dealing with an Act of Assembly on this subject we have no
such situation to confront us. If the Act has a real and substantial
relation to the police power no inquiry as to its unreasonableness can
arise, because it is the judgment of the law-makers and not of the
courts which must control; and if in the judgment of the former the
thing be reasonable, all inquiry on that ground by the latter is fore-

Tested by the principles hereinbefore announced we find nothing in
the Act of 1902 which indicates that its design, its purpose or its
details have not a real and substantial relation to the police power.
It may be conceded that some of these provisions, if harshly admin-
istered, may be or become oppresive, but it by no means follows that
the law itself is, therefore, not a legitimate exercise of the police power.
It is not to be assumed that the public functionary will act in an
oppressive or unlawful manner. Discretion must be reposed some-
where. If an official should transcend the legitimate limits of the
authority with which the statute clothes him, the injured party is not
without redress. Laws are to be upheld rather than stricken down.
Every intendment must be made by the courts in favor of the consti-
tutionality of a statute. County Commissioners vs. Meking, 50 Md.
jp; Cooley, Con. Lhn. 216. It is a cardinal rule that where one con-


«truction of the statute would make it valid and another would make
it unconstitutional, courts will follow the former rather than the latter
interpretation, for the reason that it will not be presumed the I/Cgis'
lature intended to pass an invalid act. Tettnnick vs. Ozvings, 70 Md.
251; Gordon vs. M. & C. C, s Gill 241.

Taking now in detail the five counts of the indictment, it is clear,
we think, that the first count contains an allegation that the appellee
was violating the health regulation prescribed by the statute. It
alleges that he was using a certain tenement and dwelling-house for
the manufacture of coats, vests and other garments by other than
immediate members of his family. We suppose that it is a matter of
which a court may take judicial notice that the manufacture of wear-
ing apparel in improperly ventilated, unsanitary and overcrowded
apartments will likely promote the spread of, if it does not engender,
disease, and it is obviously within the police power of the State to
regulate the number of persons who may be employed in any tene-
ment or other establishment where this manufacturing is carried on,
so that the public health may be conserved. What has just been said
is equally applicable to the second count and we need not further dis-
cuss it. The third count has relation to a provision of the Code exist-
ing prior to the adoption of the Act of 1902. By Section 149C of
Article 27 of the Code, of which the Act of 1902 is an amendment, it
was required that at least four hundred cubic feet of clear space should
be allowed in each room for each occupant in manufacturing estab-
lishments, and the Act of 1902 required that a permit should be secured
from the Chief of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics, setting forth
the number of persons allowed to be employed in each room. The
number thus employed was, of course, regulated by the amount of air
surface to which under Sec. 149C employes were entitled. The failure
to procure such a permit is the charge alleged in the third count. It
certainly requires no discussion to show that such a regulation is
strictly and essentially a health regulation. The overcrowding of
factories and the inhalation of impure air, where there is not sufficient
surface afforded to each employee, are obviously calculated to produce
or foster disease, and the manufacture of articles of wearing apparel
in overcrowded rooms or apartments, under these conditions, is un-
questionably liable to spread contamination. The fourth count of the
indictment need not to be further considered. What has been said in
reference to the third is sufficient to support the fourth. The fifth
count charges that the appellee did not keep a written register of the
names and addresses of all persons to whom work was given to be
made. If it is important, as we have said it was, that these over-
crowded and unhealthy and unsanitary tenement houses should be
subject to the inspection and control of some designated health officer,
it goes without saying that the provision would be of little avail if the
proprietor could give out the work to others without keeping a register


of their uames and addresses, because the he?lth officer without the
aid of such register would be unable to trace the localities where the
■work was being done. The whole scheme of the Act appears to us to
be in furtherance of the protection and preservation of the public
health, and whatever criticism may be made upon the method of its
enforcement, no convicting reason has been suggested to show that
its terms have not a real and substantial relation to the subject of the
police power of the State.

The statute invades no private right of property, and does
not confer upon any official either arbitrary or unrestricted
power. It certainly does not in terms expressly do either.
It has no relation to homes ^vhere manufacturing of the enumerated
articles is not carried on. The whole tenor of the enact-
ment distinctly indicates that its provisions are aimed at and
are intended to apply to tenements and other buildings where
the garments specified are manufactured for sale, and that it has no
relation to homes or places where apparel not manufactured for sale
may be made. Nor does the statute clothe the officers its provisions
alluded to with arbitrary power. As well might it -be said that a police-
officer who is authorized to summarily seize property which could only
be put to an illegal or criminal use, acted arbitrarily in making such a
seizure before a judicial adjudication condemned the thing seized.
This Court has emphatically said in Police Coins, vs. Wagtier, gj Md.
79A, "that the State has power to pass such laws as are necessary to
protect the health, moral or peace of society; at^d where the summary
seizure, or even the destruction, of the offending thing is necessary
for the public safet}^ may authorize that to be done, and such laws
are not incompatible with those constitutional limitations which de-
clare that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law." In the case just cited the alleged arbitrary seizure of
a slot-machine by the police authorities of Baltimore city was upheld
as being within the legitimate exercise of the police power of the
State. In the earlier case of Ford vs. the State, S^ Md. 465, the
traverser was indicted under the Act of 1894, Ch. 310, for having in his
possession lists or slips of lottery or policy drawings. That was a
thing which the statute prohibited, even though the accused party did
not know what the lists or slips were or that they were prohibited
articles. The statute was upheld as a legitimate exercise of the police
power in the face of the contention that its provisions arbitrarily
created an indictable offence where there was not only a total absence
of criminal intent, but a complete ignorance on the part of the
traverser as to what the lists or slips were.

An officer, who, under pretext of executing the sweat-shop statute ^
would assume to exert an arbitrary or unwarrantable power, would
be answerable for his misconduct, just as would be any other tres-


passer. Riglitly interpreted we fuul no imperfections in the statute
assailed in this case.

Entertaining the views we have expressed we must reverse the
judgment appealed from and award a new trial.

judgment reversed ivith costs and new trial awarded.
Filed February ig, 1904.

State of Maryi^and, Sct:

I, Thomas Parran, Clerk of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, do
hereby certify that the foregoing is truly taken from the Record of
Proceedings of the said Court of Appeals.

In testimony whereof, I« have hereunto set my
hand as Clerk, and affixed the seal of the said Court
of Appeals, this 24th day of February, A.D. 1904.

Thomas Barran,
Clerk Court of Appeals of Maryland.



Accept Reduction of Wages, Boilermakers and Iron Ship-
builders 55

Agriculture 157-160

Acreage, Production and Value of Principal Products

in Maryland for 1903 161

Cost of Production on Farm 159-162

Prices of Wheat, Corn, Oats and Rye 162

Arbitration lo

Bill Proposed 11-12


Bread — Production and Distribution 133

Character of Concerns 135-137

Character, Number and Pieces of 147-149

Distribution of 151-155

Prices of 143-146

Quantity of Flour Used, Wages, &c 139-141

Bricklayers Get Increase of Wages 56


Children in Mercantile Establishments — Employment of 102-103

Consumers' League 113

Convention of the Association of Officials of Bureaus of

Labor Statistics 299-301

Cost of Living 13-15


Demands of Baltimore & Ohio Trainmen. 58


Financial Statement 313

Free Employment Bureau — First Annual Report of 95-101

Applications — Table of loo-ioi

Nationality of Applicants....*. 98

328 INDEX.


Immigrants — Arriving in Baltimore 274-275

By Months 275

By Ages 275

important Events that Occurred in Maryland 300-301

Incorporations — New — in Maryland for 1903 277

In all Counties 278

Allegany 279

Anne Arundel 280

Baltimore 281

Caroline 282

Carroll 282

Cecil 282

Dorchester 283

Frederick 283

Garrett 283

Harford '. 284

Kent 284

Montgomery 284

Prince George's 285

Queen Anne's 285

St. Mary's 285

Somerset 285

Talbot 286

Washington 286

Wicomico 286

Worcester 286

In Baltimore City 287-290

Increases and Decreases of Capital Stock in Balti-
more City 291

Without Capital Stock in Baltimore City 293-296

Recapitulation 297


I/abor Lavps -Recent 303-311

Chapter 269 — Compulsory School Attendance 303-307

Chapter 566 — Regulating Employment of Children 307-308

Article 27 — Regulating Factories 308-309

Chapter loi — Regulating Factories and Workshops —

Sweatshops 310-311

Labor Organizations— Maryland 60-64

Laborers Demand Higher Wages 56

Legislation — New 16



Markets, Retail Prices in 15

Marine P'iremen — P^fforts of.... 57

Marine Engineers— Increase of Wages of 52-55

Maryland and Its Counties 164-168

The Counties 169

Allegany 170-174

Anne Arundel 174-176

Baltimore 177-182

Calvfert 182-184

Caroline 184-191

Carroll , 191-199

Charles 199-201

Cecil 201-206

Dorchester 206-211

Frederick , 211-219

Garrett 219-223

Harford 223-228

Howard 228-231

Kent „ 231-235

Montgomery 235-241

Prince George's 241-243

Queen Anne's 243-245

Somerset 245-249

St. Mary's 249-251

Talbot 251-254

Washington 254-259

Wicomico 259-268

Worcester 268-272

Miners — Increase of Wages of 58


Prices — Retail— in Markets of Baltimore 15


Strikes and Lockouts 26-58

At the Crown Cork and Seal Works 56

At Curtis Bay 44

Of Bakers 39-40

Boilermakers 28

Bricklayers 37

Canal Boatmen 51

Carpenters 29-35

Carriage iand Wagon Builders : 38-39

Cloakmakers 28

Cloth Hat and Cap Makers 29-51

330 INDEX.

Strikes and Lockouts — Contimied. PAGE.

Ironworkers 51

Laundry-Workers 28

Machinists 42-43

Marble- Workers 45-50

Meat Packers 51

Milk Drivers 29

Molders 36

On State House at Annapolis 57

Organ Builders 50

Printers 35

Shoe Workers , 43

Skirtmakers 41-42-45

Steam Fitters and Helpers 35-36

Structural Ironworkers 38

Tailors 28

Warehousemen 44

Sweatshop and Factory Inspection 65-94

Articles Made in 70

Character of Buildings Used as 69

Children Employed in, Who Cannot Read or Write 74

Under 16 Years of Age 73

Under 12 Years of Age 73

Condition of Workrooms Used as 75

Details Tables of Inspection 77

Floors on Which Workrooms Are Located... 72

Fuel Used in 76

Hours of Labor in 75

Location of Buildings 70

Location of Workrooms ,., 71

Number of Persons Employed in 73

Permits to Work Issued 68

Persons Not of Family Employed in 74

Rooms Used as, with Less than 400 Cubic Feet of

Space for Each Person 72

Test Cases in Court of Appeals 79-94

Decision of 315-325


Telegraphers Want Increase of Wages 58


Wages, The Trend of, in Recent Years 16-25

In the United States 17-18

California 19

INDEX. 331

"Wages — Continued. page.

Connecticut 20

Illinois 20

Iowa 20

Maryland 21

Massachusetts 22

New York 23-24

Pennsylvania 24

Rhode Island 24

Wisconsin 25

"Women and Children — Employment of 104-132

In Boys' and Children's Wear 126-127

Cigars, Cigarettes and Tobacco 132

Coat Pad Industry 115-122

Corset Making 124

Ladies' Skirts 123-124

Ladies' Waists 125

Ladies' Wrappers 123

Night and Dress Shirts 128-130

Online LibraryThomas A. SmithTwelfth Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics and Information of Maryland. 1903. Thomas A. Smith, Chief. (Volume 1904) → online text (page 29 of 30)