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cattle could have "proper food, water, gj-ig R. Co. v. United States, 200 Fed. 406.
space, and opportunity for rest" (Rev. St. gg -y^hei-e stock in charge of owner.—
U. S., § 4388), so as to relieve the earner United States v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 184
from the duty of unloadmg them at stated -p^^ gg^

intervals for rest, water, and feeding. ' „.. i j c.^^ ^t^^i, ;ii^ ^f,-

Chesapeake, etc.. R. Co. v. American ^ ^^A Stockyards on fire.-Nashv lie etc.,

Exch. Bank. 92 Va. 495, 23 S. E. 935, 44 R- Co. v. Heggie, 86 Ga. 210, 12 S. E.

L R A 449 ^^^' ^^ ^'"' P'

'86.' United States v. Erie R. Co., 191 91. Condition of stock when accepted.—

■ Fed. 941. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Stnblmg (Tex. Civ.

87. Where stock not watered.— United App.), 34 S. W. 1002.



3629 INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT. §§ 4013-4014

§ 4013. Damages. — A railroad company, engaged in the transportation of
horses from one state to another, which keeps them confined in a car for more
than twenty-eight consecutive hours, without unloading them for rest, water, or
food, is guilty of negligence per se, and is liable, not only for the penalty pro-
vided in said section but also for any damage or injury that may be thereby sus-
tained by the owner of the stock. ^-

§ 4014. Proceedings. — Nature of Proceeding. — Although the action to
enforce the penalty is civil in form,''^ the statute is a criminal one.'-'-*

Pleading. — Technical objections to the declaration are without merit after
verdict.-'"' The plaintifi:' need not allege or prove the nonexistence of ''accidental
or unavoidable causes," which are matters of defense. A description of the de-
fendant as "lessee" of the road, and otherwise following the language of the stat-
ute, is sufficient after verdict, although it does not expressly allege that defendant
was at the time operating the road.***^ A carriers confinement of a train load of
cattle for a longer period than permitted by the act without unloading is a single
ofifense, within the meaning of the act ; and hence, in an action therefor, separate
counts in the complaint of declaration for each car, intended to multiply the pen-
alty by the number of cars, are not permissible.''"

Province of Court and Jury. — In an action for the violation of the act, it is
the province of the court to fix the amount of recovery, and that of the jury to
determine the question of violation. ^^ The question of the legality of written re-
quests for an extension of time of confinement of cattle, is a question of law for
the court. '^"

Instructions. — \Miere, notwithstanding the jury found in defendant's favor
on the recitals and conditions in a requested charge, they could also conclude un-
der the evidence that defendant "knowingly" and "willfully" failed to comply
with the food and rest law, an instruction charging that if such conditions were
found the jury should find for defendant was properly refused. ^

Presumptions and Burden of Proof. — A proceeding under the statute to
enforce the penalty, although the action is civil in form, the defendant is pre-
sumed innocent until every essential element of the offense is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. ^ In an action under such statute against a railroad company
to recover the penalty imposed thereby for "knowingly and willfully" failing to

92. Damages.— Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. 96. Xew York, etc., R. Co. v. United
Heggie, 86 Ga. 210, 12 S. E. 363, 22 Am. States, 165 Fed. 833, 91 C. C. A. 519.

St. Rep. 453; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 97, United States v. St. Louis, etc., R.

Slattery, 76 Neb. 721, 107 N. W. 1045, 124 q^^ 107 Fed. 870.

^^\ ^^V ^^P" ^^r' •, 98. Province of court and jury.— Atchi-

The failure of a railway company on ^^^^ ^ ^^ ^, ^^j^^^ g^^^^^^ -^01 ^

an interstate shipment of stock, to unload p \ ^^q ^^g p^^ ^2
it for rest, water, and feed, after being 'i,^\,-, 'action by the United States
confined in cars for twenty-eight consecu- ^ i^gt a carrier for violation of the
tive hours, as required by Rev. St U. S., twenty-eight hour law, whether the ani-
§ 4.386, constitutes actionable negligence ^^^^j^ ^^^^ knowingly and willfully con-
at the suit of the owner injured thereby; ^^^^^ beyond the time limit, and whether
nor does the fact that a penalty is im- ^j^j^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^ accident, in that the car-
posed for breach of such duty prevent an j.j^j. ^^g justified in believing that the
action for negligence, such penalty not be- ^^retaker would unload the stock, held
ing given to the injured party in satis- ^^^ ^^^ ■ Oregon-Washington R.,
faction of the injury Burns y. Chicago, ^^ ^ United States, 205 Fed. 337,
etc., R. Co., 80 N. W. 927, 104 Wis. 646. i23 C C A 471

93. Proceedings. — United States v. " \..' ' . ' t^ ^ tt •.. 1

Louisville, etc., R. Co., ]57 Fed. 979; New ,, ^' Missouri etc., R. Co. r Umted

York, etc.. R. Co. v. United States, 165 ^"'tates, 101 C. C. A. 143, 1<8 Fed. 15.

Fed. 833, 91 C. C. A. 519. 1. Instructions. — Houston, etc., R. Co.

94. United States v. Louisville, etc., R. v. United States, 94 C. C. A. 307, 168 Fed.
Cf)., ir,7 i'\fl. 979. 895.

95. Pleading.— Now York, etc., R. Co. 2. Presumptions and burden of proof.
V. United Stales, 165 h'ed. 833. 91 C. C. —United States 7'. Louisville, etc., R. Co.,
A. 519. 157 Fed. 979.



§§ 4014-401;



CARRIERS.



3630



comply with its provisions, based on the failure of defendant to unload a car load
of cattle until nearly six hours after their receipt from a connecting road, by
which they had been loaded twenty-four hours previously, the government is not
entitled to recover on proof merely of such facts ; there being no evidence that
they were not unloaded and fed during such time, or that defendant had knowl-
edge of the time when they were loaded.^

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence. — In an action by the United States
against a railroad company to recover the penalty imposed by the Act for know-
ingly and willfully failing to comply with its provisions requiring the unloading
of live stock for rest, water, and feeding, the government is required to establish
its case only by a preponderance of the evidence.-* The greater weight of evi-
dence is sufficient, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is unnecessary.^

§ 4015. Icing Perishable Goods. — \\'hatever transportation service or fa-
cility the law requires the carrier to supply they have the right to furnish. They
can therefore use their own cars, and can not be compelled to accept those ten-
dered by the shipper on condition that a lower freight rate be charged. So, too,
they can furnish all the ice needed in refrigeration, for this is not only a duty and
a right, under the Hepburn Act, but an economic necessity due to the fact that
the carriers can not be expected to prepare to meet the demand, and then let the
use of their plants depend upon haphazard calls, under which refrigeration can
be demanded by all shippers at one time and by only a few at another. But of
course this does not mean that, because the carriers have ice on hand, they can
compel the shipper to have his fruit refrigerated, when, on account of the state of
the weather or for other cause, he prefers to have it forwarded under ventilation
only.^ Carriers of citrus fruits from California to eastern points may be com-
pelled by the interstate commerce commission to permit the consignors to ice the
car bunkers at their warehouses, until the carriers shall offer to furnish ice at the



3. United States v. Louisville, etc., R.
Co., 157 Fed. 979.

4. Weight and sufficiency of evidence.
— United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 157
Fed. 459.

5. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. United
States, 101 C. C. A. 140, 178 Fed. 12;
Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. United States,
101 C. C. A. 14!!, 178 Fed. 15.

6. Icing perishable goods. — Atchison,
etc., R. Co. V. United States, 232 U. S.
199, 34 S. Ct. 291.

"The icing may have been so related to
refrigeration as to authorize the carriers
to render that service. But manifestly
they could not be expected to build re-
frigerating plants near each warehouse;
and, the carrier not being in a position
to do such icing, the consignor had the
same right to provide the necessary sup-
ply that he would have had to ice a ship-
ment of fish, to furnish and place stand-
ards to secure lumber on an open car. or
to fasten to the floor articles which other-
wise might be damaged by the jerks and
jolts of a moving train. In the absence,
therefore, of the carriers' oflfer, under a
filed tariff, to furnish ice at the time and
place needed in pre-cooled shipments, or
to substitute a service of equal value at
practically the same cost, they had no
right to prevent the consignor from filling
the bunkers so as to fit the freight for
proper transportation." Atchison, etc.,



R. Co. V. United States, 232 U. S. 199,
34 S. Ct. 291.

"When ice is actually needed and is ac-
tually used, the question arises as to
whether icing is a part of preparation
which can be done by the shipper; or a
part of refrigeration (transportation)
which, by statute the carrier has Ithe ex-
clusive right to furnish. To this question
no answer can be given that will apply
in all cases. For in the shipment of fruit,
as in that of other articles, it is impossi-
ble to lay down a rule which definitely
fixes what loading includes and by whom
it must be done. Nor is there any con-
sistent practice on this subject, since
from reported cases it appears that the
claims of the parties are based rather on
interest than on some definite principle.
Sometimes the shipper, as here, insists on
the right to load and provide necessary
appliances. At other times he demands
that such service and appliances be fur-
nished by the railroad company. Con-
versely the carriers sometimes claim, as
here, the right to furnish service and
facilities, while in other cases insisting
that one or both must be supplied by the
consignor. National Lumber Dealers As-
sociation T. Atlantic Coast Line, 14 I.
C. C. 154; Schultz v. Southern Pacific. 18
I. C. C. 234; In re Allowance for Lining
and Heating Cars. 26 I. C. C. 681; 25
I. C. C. 497." Atchison, etc., R. Co. v.
United States. 232 U. S. 199, 34 S. Ct. 291.



3631



INTERSTATE) COMMERCE ACT.



;§ 4015-4016



time and place needed at practically the same cost."

§§ 4016-4049. Prohibitions upon Carriers— §§ 4016-4044. Dis-
crimination and Preferences — § 4016. In General. — Statutory Pro-
vision. — The interstate commerce act provides that it shall be unlawful for any
common carrier subject to the provisions of the act to make or give any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm,
corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect
whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation or lo-
cality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable preju-
dice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."^

The purpose of this act is to place all shippers on an absolute ecjuality,^
to require equal treatment of all shippers and to prohibit unjust discrimination in
favor of any of them.^" The sections in question were intended to prevent dis-
crimination in all branches of freight traffic. ^^

Declaratory of Common Law. — The provision of the act which relates to
undue preference is declaratory of the common law.^-

Construction. — Although the English traffic acts do not appear to be as com-
prehensive as our own, and may justify contracts which with us would be obnox-
ious to the long and short haul clause of the act, or would be open to the charge
of unjust discrimination, yet so far as relates to the question of "undue prefer-
ences," it may be presumed that congress, adopting the language of the English
Act, had in mind the construction given to their words by the English courts, and
intended to incorporate them into the statute. ^^



7. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. United
States, 232 U. S. 199. 34 S. Ct. 291.

8. Discriminating and preferences. — In-
terstate Commerce Comm. v. Baltimore,
etc.. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 699,
12 S. Ct. 844; Interstate Commerce Comm.
V. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. Ed. 1047,
12 S. Ct. 1125; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. In-
terstate Commerce Comm., 162 U. S. 197,
40 L. Ed. 940, 16 S. Ct. 666; Parsons v.
Chicago, etc., R. Co., 167 U. S. 447, 42
L. Ed. 231, 17 S. Ct. 887; Interstate Com-
merce Comm. V. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co.,
167 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 243, 17 S. Ct. 896;
Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Florida Fruit
Exch., 167 U. S. 512, 42 L. Ed. 257, 17
S. Ct. 998; Interstate Commerce Comm.
V. Alabama Mid. R. Co., 168 U. S. 144, 42
L. Ed. 414, 18 S. Ct. 45; Central Stock-
yards Co. V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 192
U. S. 568, 48 L. Ed. 565, 24 S. Ct. 339;
Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co., 204 U. S. 426, 51 L. Ed. 553, 27 S.
Ct. 350, 9 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1075.

A common carrier engaged in inter-
state commerce can not grant special
favors to anyl)ody. Johnson v. New York,
etc., Railroad (Me.), 88 Atl. 988.

9. United States v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co.,
74 C. C. A. 466, 143 Fed. 266.

10. United States v. Union Stockyard,
etc., Co., 226 U. S. 286, 33 S. Ct. 83, citing
New York, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm., 200 U. S. 361, 50 L.
Ed. 515, 26 S. Ct. 272; Armour Packing
Co. V. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 52 L.
Ed. 681, 28 S. Ct. 428; Louisville, etc., R.
Co. V. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 55 L. Ed.
297, 31 S. Ct. 265. 34 L. R. A., N. S., 671;



Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S.
155, 56 L. Ed. 1033, 32 S. Ct. 648, Ann.
Cas. 1914A, 501.

11. Pitcairn Coal Co. v. Baltimore, etc.,
R. Co., 165 Fed. 113.

12. Declaratory of common law. — Pit-
cairn Coal Co. v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co.,
165 Fed. 113.

13. Construction. — Interstate Commerce
Comm. 7'. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 145 U.
S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 699, 12 S. Ct. 844. See,
also, McDonald v. Hovey. 110 U. S. 619,
28 L. Ed. 269, 4 S. Ct. 142; Texas, etc.,
R. Co. V. Interstate Commerce Comm.,
162 U. S. 197, 40 L. Ed. 940, 16 S. Ct.
666.

The provisions of § 3 of the Act Feb.

4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 380 [U. S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 3155] have their near protype
in § 2 of the English Railway Traffic Act
of 1854, and the courts of this country
have adopted the English interpretation
of that section. Northwestern Ware-
house Co. V. Oregon R., etc., Co., 159 Fed.
975, citing Interstate Commerce Comm.
V. Baltimore, etc.. R. Co., 43 Fed. 37; S.
C, 145 U. S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 699. 12 S.
Ct. 844.

It was modeled upon § 2 of the Eng-
lish Act of July 10, 1854, and § 11 of the
Act of July 21, 1873. Texas, etc., R. Co.
V. Interstate Commerce Comm., 162 U.

5. 197, 40 L. Ed. 940, 16 S. Ct. 666.
Under the express provisions of In-
terstate Commerce Act, Act Veh. 4, 1887,
c. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 380 [U. S. Comp. St.
1901. p. 3155], a common carrier is re-
quired not to make or give any unckie or
unreasonal)le preference or advantage to



§§ 4016-4017



CARRIERS.



3632



Necessity for Advantage to Carrier or Other Shipper. — By the provision
of the act prohibiting discrimination in raih'oad rates by the giving of nnreason-
able preference to any person or locality, all discriminations are not forbidden,
but only discrimination against some person, locality, or corporation, made for
the advantage of the carrier, or by receiving greater or less compensation from
one class of persons than from another for similar services ; ^^ and hence a con-
tract by a railroad to maintain rates from a factory not exceeding, to competitive
points, the rates from two other places, is not, on its face, void for discrimina-
tion. i^"*

§ 4017. Undue and Unreasonable. — The Interstate Commerce Act does
not prohibit the giving of all preferences and advantages, but prohibits only those
that are undue and unreasonable. ^"^ And the mere circumstance that there is, in
a given case, a preference or advantage, does not of itself show that such prefer-
ence or advantage is undue or unreasonable within the meaning of the act.^'''
The discrimination must be unjust between shippers, persons, localities, or cor-
porations, by granting undue preference to one, or subjecting another to unrea-
sonable disadvantage.^^ That a carrier, to injure or harass the business of a con-
'^ignee, subjects it to a prejudice or disadvantage which is neither undue nor
unreasonable, does not change the nature of the prejudice or create any cause of ac-
tion there for. 1''

The use of the word "discrimination" in the amendatory acts of February
19, 1903, and June 29, 1906, without the qualifying words "unjust," "undue,"' or
"unreasonable," used in the original act of February 4, 1887, is not intended to
broaden the provisions of the earlier act in that respect; the word "discrimina-
tion" itself, as so applied, implies an unjust or unfair distinction. 2"



any particular firm, person, or corpora-
tion, or locality, or to any particular de-
scription of traffic, or subject any par-
ticular firm, corporation, or locality, or
any particular description of traffic, nor
to any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatso-
ever, but this duty only applies where the
circumstances or conditions are substan-
tially similar. Northwestern Warehouse
Co. V. Oregon R., etc., Co., 159 Fed. 975.

14. Necessity for advantage to carrier
or other shipper. — Laurel Cotton Mills v.
Gulf, etc., R. Co.. 84 Miss. 339, 37 So.
134, 66 L. R. A. 453.

15. Laurel Cotton Mills v. Gulf, etc., R.
Co., 37 So. 134, 84 Miss. 339, 66 L. R.
A. 453.

16. Undue and unreasonable. — Union
Pac. R. Co. V. L'pdike Grain Co.. 101 C.
C. A. 583, 178 Fed. 223; Cincinnati, etc.,
R. Co. V. Interstate Commerce Comm.,
162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 S. Ct.
700, 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 223;
Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Balti-
more, etc., R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 36 L.
Ed. 699, 12 S. Ct. 844; Laurel Cotton
Mills V. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 84 Miss. 339,
37 So. 134, 66 L. R. A. 453.

Interstate Commerce Act, Feb. 4, 1887,
c. 104, § 3. 24 Stat. 380 [U. S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 3155], authorizes a preference, ad-
vantage, or discrimination between per-
sons, localities, or traffics, provided such
preference, advantage, or discrimination



be not undue and unreasonable. Inter-
state Commerce Comm. v. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co.. 141 Fed. 1003, affirmed in 28 S.
Ct. 493, 209 U. S. 108, 52 L. Ed. 705.

17. Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Kutter, 77
C. C. A. 315, 147 Fed. 51, citing Texas,
etc., R. Co. V. Interstate Commerce
Comm., 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. Ed. 940, 16
S. Ct. 666.

18. Laurel Cotton Mills v. Gulf, etc., R.
Co., 84 Miss. 339, 37 So. 134, 66 L. R.
A. 453.

19. Gamble-Robinson Comm. Co. v. Chi-
cago, etc.. R. Co., 168 Fed. 161.

The Interstate Commerce Act (Act
Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104. 24 Stat. 379 [U. S.
Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154]) held not to pro-
hibit the giving of all preference and ad-
vantages, or the production of all preju-
dices and disadvantages, but only those
that are undue and unreasonable. Gam-
lile-Robinson Comm. Co. v. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co., 168 Fed. 161.

20. The use of the word "discrimination"
in § 1 of the Elkins Act (Act Feb. 19,
1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847 [U. S. Comp. St.
Supp. 1907, p. 880]), as amended by Hep-
burn Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 2. 34
Stat. 586 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p.
897), without the qualifying words "un-
iust," etc., used in the original Act Feb.
4, 1887, c. 104, §§ 2, 3, 24 Stat. 379, 380
(U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3155), was not
intended to broaden the provisions of the
earlier act. L^nited States v. Wells, Fargo-
Kxp. Co., 161 Fed. 606.



3633 INTERSTATE C0MMI:RCE ACT. §§ 4017-4018

All special contracts or traffic arrangements between carrier and shipper are
not forbidden or condemned, but only such as operate unfairly, and evidence un-
due favoritism toward one, or deprive another of his just rights.^i

What Constitutes Undue Preference. — That portion of the Interstate
Commerce Act which relates to undue preference is declaratory of the common
law, and, when considered in connection therewith, any undue preference which
is based upon the theory that the preference is made with a view of promoting
the interests either of a shipper or a carrier, without due regard to the interests
of shippers who are similarly situated, must be considered violative of such sec-
tions>'-

Question of Fact. — What is an undue or unreasonable preference or ad-
vantage given by a carrier of goods to a shipper within the inhibition of the inter-
state commerce act is a question of fact.^s As the third section of the act, which
forbids the making or giving any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
to any particular person or locality, does not define what, under that section, shall
constitute a preference or advantage to be undue or unreasonable, it can not be
doubted that whether, in particular instances, there has been an undue or unrea-
sonable prejudice or preference, is a question of fact depending on the matters
proved in each case.^^

Evidence of Preference Alone. — The mere circumstance that there is, in a
given case, a preference or an advantage does not of itself shovv that such pref-
erence or advantage is undue or unreasonable within the meaning of the act.-^

Real Advantage to One Shipper.— Though under the Act of June 29, 1906,
trifling differentiations may not be a forbidden discrimination, if the_ court can
say that the distinction gives one shipper a real advantage over others, it is a for-
bidden discrimination.''^

§ 4018. Similar Service and Circumstances. — To come within the in-
hibition of the act the positions of the respective persons or classes between whom
differences in charges are made, must be compared with each other, and there
must be found to exist substantial identity of situation and service, accompanied
by irregularity and partiality resulting in undue advantage to one, or undue dis-
advantage to the other.-' As between commodities and localities, special distinc-
tions may be made where there is some basis therefore in reason and in fact ;_ dis-
tinctions found, for example, in the character of the freight, the risk of injury,
the increased difficulty of handling, and the increased damages which the carrier
would be called upon to pay in case of loss or injury in one case as compared with
another.-^ But a rule or classification, although couched in terms similarly fair
on their face, can not be sustained where the practical effect thereof is to work
an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination or preference as between persons,

21. Laurel Cotton Mills v. Gulf, etc., R. 25. Evidence of preference alone.—
Co., 84 Miss. 339, 37 So. 134, G6 L. R. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Com-
A. 4.53. merce Comm., 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. Ed.

22. What constitutes undue preference. 940, 16 S. Ct. 666.

— Pitcairn Coal Co. v. Baltimore, etc., R. 26. Real advantage to one shipper. —

Co.. ir.,'-, Fed. 113. Hocking Valley R. Co. v. United States,

23. Question of fact. — State v. Adams 210 Fed. 735.

Exp. Co., 171 Ind. 138, S.-) N. E 337. 19 g^^ Similar service and circumstances.—

L. R. A., N. S., 93, rehearmg denied m Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Kuttcr, 147 Fed.

85 N. E. 966. 5-,^ 77 Q Q A. 315; Interstate Commerce

24. IiUorstate Commerce Comm. v. Ala- - q^„^^^ ^ Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 145 U.
iKima Mid. R. Co., 168 U. _ S. 144, 42 U. g 353 3,; j^ y^^i (599^ 13 g q^ 844. North-
Ed. 414 18 S. Ct. 45; Cincinnati, etc., R. .western Warehouse Co. t^. Oregon R.,
Co. V. Interstate Commerce Comm., 162 . /^ -.r,, pi 07^

U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 S. Ct. 700, 4 "^^^ ^°;' ^-"f ' ^^^^ ''''■ ^ p..

Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S.. 223; Texas, ^' ^"terstate Commerce Comm^ r. Chi-

etc. R. Co. V. Interstate Commerce S^P' /,^^- ^^e S?" .no '

CoPim.. 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. Ed. 940, 16 Rfl- ^05, 28 vS. Ct. 493.
S. Ct. 666.



§ 4018 CARRIERS. 3634

places, or commodities. ^^ To carry two barrels of sugar for one person on a
given date, and to carry one barrel of sugar for another person, between the same
points over the same route, two days later, are contemporaneous, and Hke services
within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act."^'*

Similar Rates Charged.— The fact that a railroad company, in its schedule
of freight rates, groups together two cities on its hue, some distance apart, and
charges the same rate for carriage to both, is not to be treated as a conckisive ad-
mission that the service is performed under substantially similar circumstances



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