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passed on the 17th of February, 1793, so
far as the state law is brought to bear
upon a vessel which had taken out a li-
cense, and was duly enrolled under the
act of congress for carrying on the coast-
ing trade, and plied between New Or-
leans and the cities of Montgomery and
Wetumpka, in Alabama. Sinnot v. Dav-
enport (U. S.), 22 How. 227, 16 L. Ed.
243; Foster v. Davenport (U. S.), 22
How. 244, 16 L. Ed. 248: Smith v. Ala-
bama. 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508. 8 S.
Ct. 564; Moran v. New Orleans. 112 U.
S. 69, 28 L. Ed. 653, 5 S. Ct. 38.



3479 REGULATION AND CONTROL. § 3865

control of the improvements or compels their removal. This parallel line of de-
cisions runs back to the early history of the federal supreme court.^^ fhe cases
where a tax or toll upon vessels is allowed to meet the expenses incurred in im-
proving the navigation of waters traversed by them, as by the removal of rocks,
the construction of dams and locks to increase the depth of water and thus
extend the line of navigation, or the construction of canals around falls, is con-
sidered merely as compensation for the additional facilities thus provided in the
navigation of the waters.'"' Upon similar grounds, what are termed harbor dues
or port charges, exacted by the state from vessels in its harbors, or from their
owners, for other than sanitary purposes, are sustained. ^^ Thus, the state may
impose a tax upon vessels sufficient to meet the expenses attendant upon the exe-
cution of proper regulations prescribed for the government of vessels in order to
protect the safety, convenient use and enjoyment of property, and charges in-
curred in enforcing such regulations may properly be considered as compensation
for the facilities thus furnished to the vessels. Should such regulations interfere
with the exercise of the commercial power of congress, they may at any time be
superseded by its action.^s The exaction of tolls for passage through locks is as
compensation for the use of artificial facilities constructed, not as an impost upon
the navigation of the stream. ^^

Effect of License to Prosecute Coasting Trade.— A license to prosecute
the coasting trade is a warrant to traverse the waters washing or bounding the
coasts of the United States, and conveys no privilege to use, free of tolls, or of
any condition whatsoever, the canals constructed by a state, or the watercourses
partaking of the character of canals exclusively with the interior of a state, and
made practicable for navigation by the funds of the state, or by privileges she
may have conferred for the accomplishment of the same end.^*'

Statute Forbidding Persuading Seamen to Desert.— A state statute for-
bidding any person to persuade a seaman to desert a vessel within waters under
the jurisdiction of the state, is a valid exercise of police power, and is not in con-
flict with the constitution of the United States, granting congress power to regu-
late foreign and interstate commerce, since a state act regulating commerce is not
void unless contravening an existing act of congress or the policy of the govern-
ment. ''i

Tonnage Duties. — A city ordinance exacting from boats wharfage for each
time of coming within the city harbor and landing at any public wharf, to be esti-
mated upon the tonnage of the boats, and exempting boats from such wharfage
when they land on portions of the wharf where no money has been expended by
the city to facilitate the landing of vessels, does not exact a duty on tonnage
within the United States constitution, prohibiting a state from laying any duty on
tonnage without the consent of congress, but provides merely for wharfage.'-^-

85. Compensation for additional facili- 88. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl-
ties.— Lindsay, etc., Co. v. Mullen, 176 U. vania, 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. Ed. 158, 5 S.
S. 126, 44 L. Ed. 400, 20 S. Ct. 325; Har- Ct. 826.

man v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 396, 37 L. Ed. 89. Toll for passage through locks.—

216, 13 S. Ct. 306; Huse v. Glover, 119 Huse v. Glover, 119 U. vS. 543, 30 L. Ed.

U. S. 543, 30 L. Ed. 487, 7 S. Ct. 313. 437, 7 vS. Ct. 313; Monongahela Nav. Co.

86. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl- ^,. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L-
vania, 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. Ed. 158, 5 S. Ed. 463, 13 vS. Ct. 622.

Ct. 826; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 30 g^ Effect of license to prosecute coast-

L. Ed. 487, 7 S. Ct. 313; Sands v. Mams- ■ trade.— Veazie v. Moor (U. S.), 14
tee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288, 31 L. ^f^^^, ,^,;^ -,4 j^ p,] 545

St, W' ,\f ■ S'-i'X^^'uT: Zl\m: ." ei.' S.a.u.e forbidding persuading sea-

c r<r QoV ^ ^- ^ j^gj^ ^Q desert.— Hill s Ann. Laws, ?; 1952,

^-8?. Gloucester Ferrv Co. .. Pennsyl- Young .. Frazier, 36 Ore. 247, 59 Pac.

vania. 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. Ed. 158, 5 S. '07. ^ , . -n t

Ct 826; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. 92. Tonnage duties.— St. Louis t; Lagle

Co.. 123 U. S. 288, 31 L. Ed. 149, 8 S. Ct. Packet Co., 214 Mo. 638, 114 S. W. 2L
113.



§§ 3865-3866 carriers. 3480



Lien for Maritime Tort. — The creation and enforcement of a lien for a
nonmaritime tort against a foreign vessel engaged in interstate commerce, under
a state statute which embraces all vessels, whether domestic or foreign, and
whether engaged in intrastate or interstate commerce, does not offend against
the commerce clause of the federal constitution. "^

Sunday Laws. — The court has jurisdiction of an offense consisting of a vio-
lation of the Sunday law by a steamboat while engaged in carrying passengers
from one Indiana town to another, though the voyage begins and ends at a city
in Kentucky.'-"

§§ 3866-3879. Railroads— § 3866. In General.— Railroad companies en-
gaged in the transportation of passengers and freight among the states and be-
tween the United States and foreign countries are instruments of interstate and
foreign commerce, and their business is such commerce itself. Such transporta-
tion is a branch of interstate and foreign commerce, national in its character and
exclusively within the regulating power of congress. It can not, therefore, be
iegulated in any manner by the several states. Every obstacle to interstate rail-
road transportation, or burden laid upon it by state authority, amounts to a regu-
lation of it and is an invasion of the exclusive power of congress. ^^ Any law
which in its direct result regulates the interstate transportation of a single in-
dividual carrier, or company of carriers, violates the commerce clause and it is
no answer to say the commodity can still be transported by another carrier or by
water instead of rail, so long as the direct effect of the state legislation is to regu-
late the transportation of the commodity by a particular means, by rail instead
of by water, or by a particular individual or company. '-'•^ Railways being instru-
ments of interstate commerce, the states may not burden them by forbidding the
introduction into the state of articles of commerce generally recognized as law-
ful, or by prohibiting their sale after introduction.''''^ But the fact that a rail-
road corporation is engaged in interstate commerce does not exempt it from con-
trol by the state in respect to all business done therein not directly connected with
traffic between the states. ^'^

Reasonableness of Regulation. — After all local conditions have been ad-
equately met, railways have the legal right to adopt special provisions for through
traffic, and state legislative interference therewith is unreasonable and an infringe-
ment upon that provision of the constitution which requires that commerce be-
tween the states shall be free and unobstructed.'"^

Under Police Power. — State laws passed in the exercise of the police power,
are valid in the absence of congressional legislation on the same subject, though
they incidentally and indirectly aff'ect the interstate operations of railroads, pro-
vided they do not constitute regulations within the meaning of the constitution. ^

93. Lien for maritime tort.— Martin v. 96. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Euba.-.k,
West, 222 U. S. 191, 32 S. Ct. 42, 30 L. 184 U. S. 27, 46 L. Ed. 416, 22 S. Ct. 277.
R. A., N. S., 592, affirming judgment 51 97. Forbidding introduction of articles
Wash. 85, 97 Pac. 1102, 21 L. R. A., N. from other states.— Houston, etc., R. Co.
S., 324. V. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 50 L. Ed. 772, k!G

94. Sunday laws.— Dugan v. State, 25 N. S. Ct. 491.

E. 171, 125 Ind. 130, 9 L. R. A. 321; Dor- 98. McGuire v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,

sey V. State, 25 N. E. 350. 125 Ind. 600. 108 N. W. 902, 131 Iowa 340, 33 L. R.

95. Railroads. — Railroad Co. v. Husen, A., N. S., 706.

95 U. S. 465, 24 L. Ed. 527; Case of the 99. Provisions for through traffic-
State Freight Tax (U. S.), 15 Wall. 232. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U.
21 L. Ed. 146; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. II- S. 514, 44 L. Ed. 868, . 20 S. Ct. 722;
linois, 118 U. S. 557, 30 L. Ed. 244, 7 S. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U.
Ct. 4; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., S. 321, 50 L. Ed. 772, 26 S. Ct. 491.
125 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 700, 8 S. Ct. 689. 1. Under police power.- Smith v. Ala-
1062; Philadelphia, etc.. Steamship Co. v. bama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508, 8 S.
Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. Ed. Ct. 564; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Ala-
1200, 7 S. Ct. 1118; Railroad Comm. bama, 128 U. S. 96, 32 L. Ed. 352, 9 S.
Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. Ed. 636, 6 S. Ct. 28; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Solan, 169
Ct. 334, 1191. U. S. 133, 42 L. Ed. 688, 18 S. Ct. 289;



3481



REGULATION AND CONTROL.



§ 3866



A proper police regulation does not conflict with any federal or state restrictions
on the legislative power, and is valid, though the road sought to be regulated is
only partly within the state.- Thus, a state makes all needful regulations of a
police character for the government of interstate railroad companies while opera-
ing within its jurisdiction, in order to insure the safety, good order, convenience
and comfort of the passengers and of the public. All such regulations are strictly
within the police power of the state. They are not in themselves regulations of
interstate commerce, although to some extent they control the conduct and liabil-
ity of those engaged in such commerce. It is only wdien such laws operate as reg-
ulations of commerce in the circumstances of their application, and conflict with
the expressed or presumed will of congress exerted upon the same subject, that
they can be required to give way to the supreme authority of the constitution.?



Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.
S. 285, 43 L. Ed. 702, 19 S. Ct. 465; Penn-
sylvania R. Co. V. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477,
48 L. Ed. 268, 24 S. Ct. 132; Hennington
V. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 41 L. Ed. 166,
16 S. Ct. 1086; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v.
Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 42 L. Ed. 878, 18
S. Ct. 488; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.
S. 47, 35 L. Ed. 649, 11 S. Ct. 851; Rail-
road Comm. Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 29 L.
Ed. 636, 6 S. Ct. 334, 1191; Erb v. Mo-
rasch, 177 U. S. 584, 44 L. Ed. 897, 20
S. Ct. 819; Railroad Co. v. Richmond,
96 U. S. 521, 24 L. Ed.- 734; Cleveland,
etc., R. Co. V. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44
L. Ed. 868, 20 S. Ct. 722; New York, etc.,
R. Co. V. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41
L. Ed. 853, 17 S. Ct. 418; McNeill v.
Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 50 L. Ed.
1142, 26 S. Ct. 722.

"In Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 161 U. S. 677, 40 L. Ed. 849, 16
S. Ct. 714, the court said: 'It has never
been supposed that the dominant power
of congress over interstate cortimerce
took from the states the power of leg-
islation with respect to the instruments
of such commerce, so far as the legisla-
tion was within its ordinary police pow-
ers.' But that case distinctly recognized
that there was a division of power be-
tween congress and the states in respect
to interstate railways, and that congress
had the superior right to control that
commerce and forbid interference there-
with, while to the states remained the
power to create and to regulate the in-
struments of such commerce, so far as
necessary to the conservation of the pub-
lic interests." Northern Securities Co.
V. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 348, 48
L. Ed. 679, 24 S. Ct. 436.

"That states may not burden instru-
ments of interstate commerce, whether
railways or telegraphs, * * * by for-
bidding the introduction into the state of
articles of commerce generally recog-
nized as lawful, or by prohilMting their
sale after introduction, has been so fre-
ciuently settled that a citation of author-
ities is unnecessary. Upon the other
hand, the validity of local laws designed
to protect passengers or employees, or



persons crossing the railroad tracks, as
well as other regulations intended for the
public good, are generally recognized.
An analysis of all the prior important
cases upon this point will be found in the
opinion of the court in Cleveland, etc.,
R. Co. V. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L.
Ed. 868, 20 S. Ct. 722." Houston, etc.,
R. Co. V. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 50 L.
Ed. 772, 26 S. Ct. 491.

The state's police power may be exer-
cised to insure a faithful and prompt per-
formance of duty within the state by
railroads or other common carriers en-
gaged in interstate commerce, especially
with reference to the safety of persons
and property. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.
V. State,- 172 Ind. 147, 87 N. E. 1034.

2. People V. New York, etc., R. Co., 8
N. Y. S. 672, 55 Hun 409, 608. Affirm-
ing judgment, 5 N. Y. S. 945, judgment
affirmed in 123 N. Y. 635, 25 N. E. 953.

3. Regulations to secure safety of pas-
sengers and public. — Smith %'. Alabama,
124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508, 8 S. Ct. 564;
Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 128
U. S. 96, 32 L. Ed. 352, 9 S. Ct. 28; Chi-
cago, etc., R. Co. V. Solan, 169 U. S.
133, 42 L. Ed. 688, 18 S. Ct. 289; Hen-
nington V. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 41 L.
Ed. 166, 16 S. Ct. 1086; New York, etc.,
R. Co. V. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41
L. Ed. 853, 17 S. Ct. 418; Gladson v.
Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 430, 41 L. Ed.
1064, 17 S. Ct. 627; Railroad Comm.
Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. Ed. 636, 6 S.
Ct. 334, 1191; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co.
V. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 43 L. Ed. 702,

19 S. Ct. 465; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v.
Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed. 868,

20 S. Ct. 722; Plumley v. Massachusetts,
155 U. S. 461, 39 L. Ed. 223, 15 S. Ct.
154.

An enumeration of the instances in
which the federal supreme court has sus-
tained the validity of local laws intended
to promote the safety and comfort of
passengers, employees, persons crossing
railroad tracks and adjacent property
owners, is given in the opinion by Mr.
Justice Brown, in Cleveland, etc., R. Co.
7'. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed. 868,
20 S. Ct. 722. See, also, Pennsylvania



§ 3866



CARRIERS.



3482



In conferring upon congress the regulation of commerce, it was never intended tO'
cut the states off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life and
safety of their citizens, though the legislation miglit indirectly aft'ect the com-
merce of the country. Legislation, in a variety of ways, may affect commerce
and persons engaged in it without constituting a regukition of it within the mean-
ing of the constitution.-* While the state can make reasonable police regulations
affecting the operation of railroads within the state, and which are also engaged
in interstate commerce, the regulation should only tend to the efficient discharge
of the duties of the railroads to their patrons within the state, and to the safe-
guarding of persons and property therein, and should impose no considerable
burden on the interstate commerce.-'' When a law regulating carriers, passed by
a state under its police power incidentally affecting interstate commerce, conflicts
with an act of congress on the same subject matter, or the power granted to con-
gress has been exercised by that body, the act of the state legislature must yield
and be sufjerseded by the federal act.'"

Regulation of Local Matters. — A state may, in the absence of congressional
prohibition, enact laws on matters, local in their nature, which tend to enforce the
proper performance by interstate carriers of duties arising in the state which fa-
cilitate traffic, although such laws may incidentally affect interstate commerce.'''

Railroad Entirely within State. — The construction and operation of a rail-
road wholly within a state is subject to the laws of such state, though it is so con-
nected as to form practically a through line of railroad from a point in the state
to a point outside of the state. ^



R. Co. V. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L.
Ed. 268, 24 S. Ct. 132.

"It may prescribe the location and the
plan of construction of the road, the rate
of speed at which the trains shall run,
and the places at which they shall stop,
and may make any other reasonable reg-
ulations for their management, in order
to secure the objects of the incorpora-
tion, and the safety, good order, conven-
ience and comfort of the passengers and
of the public. All such regulations are
strictly within the police power of the
state. They are not in themselves reg-
ulations of interstate commerce." Glad-
son V. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 41 L.
Ed. 1064, 17 S. Ct. 627, citing Railroad
Comm. Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. Ed.
636, 6 S. Ct. 334, 1191.

4. Commerce incidentally affected.—
Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U. S. 99, 23 L.
Ed. 819; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S.
465, 31 L. Ed. 508, 8 S. Ct. 564; Pitts-
burgh, etc.. Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156
U. S. 590, 39 L. Ed. 544, 15 S. Ct. 459;
Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189, 48
L. Ed. 401, 24 S. Ct. 234; Hennington
V. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 41 L. Ed. 166,
16 S. Ct. 1086.

"In other words, if the law of the par-
ticular state does not govern that rela-
tion, and prescribe the rights and duties
which it implies, then there is and can
be no law that does until congress ex-
pressly supplies it, or is held by impli-
cation to have supplied it, in cases within
its jurisdiction over foreign and inter-
state commerce. The failure of congress
to legislate can be construed only as an
intention not to disturb what already ex-



ists, and is the mode by which it adopts,
for cases within the scope of its powers,
the rule of the state law, which, until
displaced, covers the subject." Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508,
8 S. Ct. 564.

"In Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Haber,
169 U. S. 613, 42 L. Ed. 878, 18 S. Ct.
488, after reviewing previous cases in this
court, Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the
opinion of the court, says: 'These cases
all proceed upon the ground that the reg-
ulation of the enjoyment of the relative
rights, and the performance of the du-
ties, of all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of a state, belong primarily to such
state under its reserved power to pro-
vide for the safety of all persons and
property within its limits; and that even
if the subject of such regulations be one
that may be taken under the exclusive
control of congress, and be reached by
national legislation, any action taken by
the state upon that subject that does not
directly interfere with rights secured by
the constitution of the United States or
by some valid act of congress, must lie
respected until congress intervenes.' "
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.
S. 477, 48 L. Ed. 268, 24 S. Ct. 132.

5. Patterson v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
77 Kan. 236, 94 Pac. 138, 15 L. R. A., N.
S., 733.

e. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. State, 26
Okla. 62, 107 Pac. 929, 30 L. R. A., N.
S.. 137.

7. Local matters. — St. Louis, etc., R.
Co. V. State, 26 Okla. 62, 107 Pac. 929,
30 L. R. A., N. S., 137.

8. Railroad entirely within state. — Wa-



3483 REGULATION AND CONTROL. §§ 3866-3867

Engaged in Interstate and Intrastate Traffic. — That a railroad company
is engaged in interstate commerce does not deprive it of the right also to engage
in intrastate traffic, or relieve it of its obligation to obey the law of the state while
so engaged.^

Where Commerce Remotely Affected. — A statute regulating operation of
trains within a state is not invalid as an interference with interstate commerce if
its effect on such commerce is indirect or remotej*^

§ 3867. Location and Plan of Construction of Railroad. — A state may
prescribe the location and the plan of construction of the road.^i The width of
the gauge, the character of the grades, the mode of crossing streams by culverts
and bridges, the kind of cuts and tunnels, the mode of crossing other highw^ays,
are matters which may be regulated by the state. ^ 2 ji^\\ g^^-h regulations are
strictly within the police power of the state. They are not in themselves regula-
tions of interstate commerce; and it is only when they operate as such in the
circumstances of their application, and conflict with the expressed or presumed
will of congress exerted on the same subject, that they can be required to give
way to the paramount authority of the constitution of the United States. ^^

Blocks, Switches, etc. — Since congress has not required railroads engaged
in interstate commerce to fill or block switches, frogs, and guard rails on their
roads. Act Mo. Feb. 28, 1907, requiring railroads so to do, does not conflict with
Act Cong. April 22, 1908, commonly known as the Employer's Liability Act,,
whereby congress assumed jurisdiction over injuries to employees engaged in
interstate commerce.^-* A statute requiring that a railroad shall, in certain cases^
put in side tracks to private industrial concerns, is not an interference with
interstate commerce although such a road may run through several states, and
may carry freight over this side track to other states. i-"*

Erection of Station. — A state law requiring a railroad to erect a depot at
a particular station is an exercise of the police power, and is not a regulation of
interstate commerce, in violation of the constitution of the United States. ^^

Building Spur Track. — An order of a state railroad commission, requiring
a railroad to lay a spur track at a certain point on the ground of public necessity,
was not a regulation of or interference with interstate commerce, but a proper
exercise of the police power of the state. ^"

Automatic Bell Ringers. — A statute requiring railroad locomotives to have
automatic bell ringers could not have extraterritorial effect by applying to rOads
without the state. ^^

bash R. Co. v. West Side Belt R. Co., Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508,

197 Fed. 442. 8 S. Ct. 564.

Under Laws 1899, c. 4700, providing 12. Character of guage, grades, etc.—

for the organization and powers of the Smith r. Alaliama. 124 L. S. 465, 31 L.

board of railroad commissioners, a rail- Ed. 508, 8 S. Ct. 564.

road operated from a point in Florida to 13. Gladson v. Mmnesota, 166 U. S.

a point in another state is, in so far as ■*27, 41 L. Ed. 1064, 17 S. Ct. 627; Smith

the road is located in Florida, and in so ^'- Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508,

far as its business is confined to traffic ^ ^- Ct. 564. _ .

in Florida, subject to the regulation, con- I*- Blocks, switches, etc.— St. Louis,

trol, and supervision of the railroad com- etc., R. Co. 7: McXamare, 91 Ark. 515.

missioners. State v. Jacksonville Ter- ^22 S. W. 102. ^ , t^

minal Co., 27 So. 225, 41 Fla 377. 15- Corporation Comm. v. Southern R.

QTT A ■ ■ .. ^4. A • .. ..4. Co., 153 N. C. 559, 69 S. E. 621.

9. Engaged m interstate and intrastate .'„ c^^^,.- „ ^r A^t.- c«. t ^ ;o „*^

♦r-ofc CI I r\ ■ I T) /^ 16. Erection oi station. — St. Louis, etc.,

trartic. — Sholioiiey v. Quincv, etc., R. Co., r> n c, .. n- a t <~o -n < o \%t

223 Mo. 649, 122 S. W. l'025. ,^;, C°- ^- ^''''^''' ^^ ^'^- '^'^^ ^^^ ^- ^■

10. Where commerce remotely affected. 17. Building spur track.— St Louis.
—Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. State, 172 etc., R. Co. 7'. State, 99 Ark. 1, 136 S.
Ind. 147, 87 N. E. 1034. \Y ,);{«.

11. Location and plan of construction. 18. Automatic bell ringers. — State v.
—Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, Louisville, etc., R. Co., 177 Ind. 553, 96-
41 L. Ed. 1064, 17 S. Ct. 627; Smith v. N. E. 340.



§§ 3868-3870



CARRIERS.



3484



§ 3868. Purchase of or Consolidation with Competing Lines. — It is

competent for a state, in the exercise of its police power, to forbid the purchase
or consoHdation of parallel and competing lines of railroad, and the application
of this power with respect to interstate railroads is not an interference with the
power of congress over interstate commerce.^'*

§ 3869. Requiring Recordation of Lease. — A statute of a state requir-



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