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U. S. 328, 52 L. Ed. 230, 28 S. Ct. 121.

The extent of the right to control
through interstate transportation of pas-
sengers by state legislation, or under or-
ders of a commission authorized by the
state, has been recently before the fed-
eral supreme court. Mississippi R.
Comm. V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 203 U.
S. 335, 51 L. Ed. 209, 27 S. Ct. 90; At-
lantic, etc., R. Co. V. Wharton, 207 U.
S. 328, 52 L. Ed. 230, 28 S. Ct. 121.

The principle to be deduced from these
cases is, that where a railroad company
has already provided ample facilities for
the adequate accommodation of the trav-
eling public, such as may be proper and
reasonable at any given point, and oper-
ates interstate commerce trains, carrying
passengers, through the same places, at
which such interstate trains do not stop,
a state regulation which requires the
stopping of such interstate trains, in ad-
dition to ample facilities already pro-
vided, to the detriment and hinderance
of interstate traffic, is an unlawful regu-
lation and burden upon interstate com-
merce. Herndon v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
218 U. S. 135, 54 L. Ed. 970, 30 S. Ct.
633.

An order made under state authority,
requiring a railroad company to stop on
signal two of its through fast mail trains
running between Jersey City, New Jer-
sey, and Tampa, Florida, at a small town
in South Carolina which is also the junc-
tion point -v'ith a small branch road, is
void as a direct regulation of interstate
commerce, where, in addition to several



local trains daily, the residents of such
towns are furnished daily one slower
through train each way. Judgment, Rail-
road Comm'rs v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co.,
54 S. E. 224, 74 S. C. 80, reversed in At-
lantic, etc., R. Co. V. Wharton, 207 U.
S. 328, 52 L. Ed. 230, 28 S. Ct. 121.

The requirement that passenger trains
shall stop at all junction points of other
roads, which is made by Act Mo. March
19, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 185), amending
Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 1075 (Ann. St. 1906,
p. 923), amounts to an unnecessary and
unlawful burden upon interstate com-
merce if such requirement is construed
to necessitate the stoppage of through
interstate trains for the transfer of pas-
sengers from one road to another, when
ample facilities for the traveling public
are already provided, and severe detri-
ment and hindrance to interstate traffic
will result. Herndon v. Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 218 U. S. 135, 54 L. Ed. 970, 30 S.
Ct. 633; Roach v. Atchison, etc., R. Co.,
218 U. S. 159, 54 L. Ed. 978, 30 S. Ct.
639. Affirming decree Chicago, etc., R.
Co V. Swanger, 157 Fed. 783.

This statute. Act Mo. March 19, 1907
(Laws 1907, p. 185), amending Rev. St.
Mo. 1899, § 1075 (Am. St. 1906, p. 923),
is not of that class passed in the exer-
cise of the police power of the state for
the promotion of the public safety, and
requiring the stoppage of trains by one
railroad before crossing the tracks of
another railroad; this statute, as its sec-
ond section shows, was passed for the
purpose of providing greater facilities of
travel, and not for the protection of life
and limb. Herndon v. Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 218 U. S. 135, 54 L. Ed. 970, 30 S.
Ct. 633.

46. Requiring intrastate trains to stop
at county seats. — The statute of Minne-
sota of March 31, 1893, c. 60, Laws of
1893, p. 173, was held to be a valid po-
lice regulation and not an interference
with interstate commerce. Gladson p.
Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 41 L. Ed. 1064,
17 S. Ct. 627, cited in Cleveland, etc., R.
Co. V. Illinois. 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed.
868. 20 S. Ct. 722, distinguished from Illi-
nois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S.
142, 41 L. Ed. 107, 16 S. Ct. 1096, in that
the statute in that case required a fast
train, carrying interstate passengers and
the United States mail, over an inter-
state highway established under author-
ity of congress, to turn aside from the
direct interstate route in order to stop



3515



REGULATION AND CONTROL.



§ 3892



passenger trains including interstate trains as well as trains running wholly within
the state, to stop a sufficient length of time at the stations of county seats to
receive and let off passengers with safety, when applied to a through train used
exclusively for interstate traffic, is an unreasonable regulation, and a direct bur-
den upon interstate commerce, the railroad company furnishing other passenger
trains, sufficient in number to accommodate all the local and through business
along the line of the road, all of which stopped at county seats.^'^ A fortiorari,.



at a county seat, the present question
not having been presented or decided in
that case. See, also, Mississippi R.
Comm. V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 203 U.
S. 335, 51 L. Ed. 209, 27 S. Ct. 90.

47. Requiring interstate trains to stop
at county seats. — -The statute of Illinois
passed March 31. 1874, § 26, Rev. Stat.
1889, ch. 114, § 88, was held void as an
unreasonable and direct burden upon in-
terstate commerce, when applied to a
through train engaged exclusively in in-
terstate traffic. Cleveland, etc., R. Co.
V. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed. 868,
20 S. Ct. 722, distinguished from the case
of Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, 173
U. S. 285, 43 L. Ed. 702, 19 S. Ct. 465,
in the fact that the Ohio statute required
only that three regular passenger trains
should stop at every station containing
three thousand inhabitants, leaving the
company at liberty to run as many
through passenger trains exceeding three
per day as it chose, without restriction
as to stoppage at particular stations. In
other words, it left open the loop hole
which the statute of Illinois effectually
closed. See, also, Mississippi R. Comm.
V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335, 51
L. Ed. 209, 27 S. Ct. 90; Houston, etc.,
R. Co. V. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 50 L.
Ed. 772, 26 S. Ct. 491.

The statute in effect required every
passenger train, regardless of the num-
ber of such trains passing each way daily
and of the character of the traffic car-
ried by them, to stop at every county
seat through which such trains might
pass by day or night, and regardless also
of the fact whether another train desig-
nated especially for local traffic stopped
at the same station within a few minutes
before or after the arrival of the train
in question. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v.
Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed. 868. 20
S. Ct. 722, citing Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
Illinois. 163 U. S. 142, 41 L. Ed. 107,
16 S. Ct. 1096.

While the statute in question is oper-
ative only in the state of Illinois, it is
obnoxious to the criticism made of the
Louisiana statute in Hall v. DeCuir, 95
U. S. 485. 24 L. Ed. 547, that "while it
purports only to control the carrier when
engaged within the state, it must neces-
sarily influence his conduct, to some ex-
tent, in the management of his business
throughout his entire voyage. * * *
If each state was at liberty to regulate
the conduct of carriers while within its
jurisdiction, the confusion likely to fol-



low could not but be productive of great
inconvenience and unnecessary hardship.
Each state could provide for its own
passengers and regulate the transporta-
tion of its own freight regardless of the
interests of others." Cleveland, etc., R.
Co. V. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed.
868, 20 S. Ct. 722.

A state railroad commission, in the ab-
sence of congressional legislation, has
the power, under a state statute, to com-
pel a railroad company to stop its inter-
state trains where it has failed to furnish
adequate accommodation to a particular
locality; but where such accommodation
had been furnished by the company, it
was held that the railroad commission
had no such right, and an attempt to
assume such power would be a violation
of the commerce clause of the constitu-
tion. Mississippi R. Comm. v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335, 51 L. Ed.
209, 27 S. Ct. 90.

St. 1911, § 1801, providing for the stop-
ping of passenger trains at stations, held
applicable to interstate passenger trains
as well as to domestic trains. Chicago,
etc., R. Co. V. Railroad Comm., 152 Wis.
654, 140 N. W. 296.

It is only after a carrier has provided
adequate domestic and interstate local
service that it may inaugurate special
through or interstate service which sliall
be free from state regulation as inter-
fering with interstate commerce. Chi-
cago, etc., R. Co. V. Railroad Comm., 152
Wis. 654, 140 N. W. 296.

A state through which the line of an
interstate railroad is operated may de-
mand reasonably adequate interstate as
well as domestic service. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. V. Railroad Comm., 152 Wis. 654,
140 N. W. 296.

That a state regulation requiring addi-
tional domestic service from an interstate
railroad may indirectly or in a slight de-
gree affect or interfere with interstate
commerce does not render the regula-
tion void if that is not its purpose, and
it has another legitimate object. Chi-
cago, etc., R. Co. V. Railroad Comm., 152
Wis. 654, 140 N. W. 296.

St. 1911, § 1801, requiring at least two
passenger trains daily eacli way to be
stopped at stations having 200 or more
inhabitants, if four trains daily each way
arc run, was neither illegal as to an in-
terstate railroad, as interfering with in-
terstate commerce nor unreasonable.
Chicago, etc.. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm.,
I5;3 Wis. 654, 140 N. W. 296.



§§ 3892-3893 carriers. 3516

such statute so far as it requires a fast mail train, carrying interstate passengers
and the United States mail, over an interstate highway established by authority
of congress, to delay the transportation of such passengers and mails, by turn-
ing aside from the direct interstate route, and running to a station of a county
seat three and a half miles away from a point on that route, and back again to
the same point, and thus traveling seven miles which form no part of its course,
before proceeding on its way, and to do this for the purpose of discharging and
receiving passengers at that station, for the interstate travel to and from which
the railroad company furnishes others and ample accommodation, is an uncon-
stitutional hindrance and obstruction of interstate commerce, and of the passage
of the mails of the United States."*^

Mail Train. — Interstate commerce is unconstitutionally interfered with by an
order of the Mississippi railroad commission, made in the exercise of its discre-
tionary authority, recjuiring a railway company to stop its interstate mail trains
at a specified county seat, where proper and adequate railway passenger facilities
are otherwise afforded that station.'*''

Where Accommodation Furnished by Other Trains. — An order made
under state authority, requiring a railroad company to stop on signal two of its
through fast mail trains running between Jersey City, New Jersey, and Tampa,
Florida, at a small town in South Carolina which is also the junction point with
a small branch road, is void as a direct regulation of interstate commerce, where,
in addition to several local trains daily, the residents of such town are furnished
daily one slower through train each way.^*^ A statute of a state requiring the
stoppage at a given station of a train engaged in interstate commerce is void,
where it appears from the undisputed evidence that there are eight daily trains
carrying passengers on defendant's road which stop at such town, and are such
as to afford adequate and reasonable facilities for the accommodation of travel to
and from that place.'' ^

§ 3893. Regulating Duty to Accept Goods. — A state law, providing a
penalty for refusal to accept freight for shipment, is not invalid as applying to
interstate traffic, the gist of the offense being the carrier's refusal to receive the
goods for shipment, which is an act done wholly within the state, and no part
of the act of transportation.^- The act of congress, requiring the publication by

48. Requiring trains to turn aside from state, or to transcontinental trains, dis-
interstate route and run to county seats. tinguislied from Cleveland, etc., R. Co.
— The line of railroad owning and oper- v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514. 44 L. Ed. 868,
ating the train in question, having been 20 S. Ct. 722, in that case the question
established by congress as a national was not presented whether the statute
highway for the accommodation of inter- was constitutional so far as it required
state commerce and of the mails of the the train in question to stop at county
United States, and as such having been seats without deviating from its inter-
recognized and promoted by the state of state course. See, also, Mississippi R.
Illinois, it was held that the statute of Comm. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 203 U.
Illinois, Rev. Stat. 1889, ch. 114, § 88, in S. 335, 51 L. Ed. 209. 27 S. Ct. 90; Hous-
the particulars set out in the text, was ton, etc., R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321,
unconstitutional and void as an hindrance 50 L. Ed. 772, 26 S. Ct. 491.
and obstruction of interstate commerce, 49. Mail train. — Judgment, Illinois
and of the passage of the mails of the Cent. R. Co. v. Mississippi R. Comm.,
United States. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. 70 C. C. A. 617, 138 Fed. 327, affirmed
Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, 41 L. Ed. 107, 16 in 203 U. S. 335, 51 L. Ed. 209, 27 S.
S. Ct. 1096, distinguished from Gladson Ct. 90.

V. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 41 L. Ed. 50. Where accommodations furnished

1064, 17 S. Ct. 627, in that the train in by other trains.— Judgment, Railroad

question in that case ran wholly within Comm'rs v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 74 S.

the state, and could have stopped at the C. 80, 54 S. E. 224, reversed in Atlantic,

county seat in question without deviating etc., R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328,

from its course, and also the statute of 52 L. Ed. 230, 28 S. Ct. 121.

Minnesota expressly provided that the 51. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. State, 85

act should not apply to through railroad Ark. 284, 107 S. W. 989.

trains entering the state from any other 52. Duty to accept goods. — Reid v.



3517



REGULATION AND CONTROL.



i§ 3893-3894



carriers of freight rates for interstate shipments, and the orders of the interstate
commerce commission thereunder, do not constitute such action by the federal
government as to prevent proper and reasonable state regulations imposing pen-
alties upon interstate carriers for failure to receive shipments or transport
promptly. ^^

§ 3894. Regulating Time, Place and Manner of Delivery. — A state, in
the exercise of its police power, may confer on an administrative agency power to
make reasonable regulations concerning the place, manner, and time of delivery
of merchandise moving in interstate commerce.^'* A state railroad commission's
order intended to enforce a state statute, requiring intracity transportation of
carload freight between junction, intersection, and transfer points, and delivery
sidings, could not necessarily and immediately affect interstate commerce as a
matter of law, and was therefore not objectionable as a violation of the commerce
clause of the federal constitution, in that its enforcement would result in congest-
ing the carrier's terminal facilities to the detriment of interstate commerce. ^^
A state may, in the exercise of its police authority, confer upon an administrative
agency the power to make many reasonable regulations concerning the place,
manner and time of delivery of merchandise moving in the channels of interstate
commerce, but any regulation of such subject made by a state or under its au-
thority, which directly burdens interstate commerce, is a regulation of such com-
merce and repugnant to the constitution of the United States. ^*^ Accordingly an
order of a state corporation commission requiring a railroad company engaged in
interstate commerce to deliver cars containing interstate shipments beyond its
right of way and to a private siding, was held to impose a direct burden upon
interstate amounting to a regulation of it and therefore void.^'''



Southern R. Co., 149 N. C. 423, 63 S. E.
112.

Revisal 1905, § 2631, imposing a pen-
alty on carriers for refusal to accept
shipments of freight, is not invalid as ap-
plying to interstate commerce, as the
penalt}^ is incurred by the violation of a
common-law duty to accept freight
whenever tendered, which is an act done
entirely within the state and no part of
the act of transportation. Burlington
Lumber Co. v. Southern R. Co., 152 N.
C. 70, 67 S. E. 167.

Revisal 1905, § 2631, imposing a pen-
alty upon railroad companies for refus-
ing to accept freight for shipment, is not
unconstitutional when applied to an in-
terstate shipment; not being an interfer-
ence with or burden upon interstate com-
merce. Reid V. Southern R. Co., 153 N.
C. 490, 69 S. E. 618.

Revisal 1905, § 2631, imposing a pen-
alty for a carrier's refusal to receive
freight for shipment, as applied to an in-
trastate shipment, and in al)sence of spe-
cific action by congress or the interstate
commerce, though it may indirectly af-
fect interstate commerce. Garrison v.
Southern R. Co., 150 N. C. 575, 64 S. E.
578.

That Revisal 1905, § 2631, may in cer-
tain cases affect interstate shipments,
does not invalidate it, but merely gives
an additional excuse to the carrier for
nonperformance. Garrison v. Southern
R. Co., 150 N. C. 575, 64 S. E. 578.

Revisal 1905, § 2631, penalizing any



carrier $50 for each day it refuses to re-
ceive freight for shipment, is not invalid
as a burden on interstate commerce, the
statute permitting excuses in proper
cases for failure to comply therewith, and
the federal government not having acted
directly on the subject. Reid v. Southern
R. Co., 150 N. C. 753, 64 S. E. 874, 17
Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 247.

53. Reid v. Southern R. Co., 150 N. C.
753, 64 S. E. 874, 17 Am. & Eng. Ann.
Cas. 247.

54. Time, place and manner of deliv-
ery. — North Carolina Corp. Comm. v.
Southern R. Co., 151 N. C. 447, 66 S. E.
427.

A state, under its police power, may
make reasonable regulations as to the
place, manner, and delivery of merchan-
dise moving in the channels of interstate
commerce, but must not make such reg-
ulations as will interfere with such com-
merce. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. State,
26 Okla. 62, 107 Pac. 929, 30 L. R. A.,
N. S., 137.

55. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Michigan
R. Comm., 198 Fed. 1009.

56. McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202
U. S. 543, 50 L. Ed. 1142, 26 S. Ct. 722.
See, also, Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Mayes,
201 U. S. 321, 50 L. Ed. 772, 26 S. Ct.
491; American Steel, etc., Co. v. Speed,
192 U. S. 500, 48 L. Ed. 538, 24 S. Ct.
365.

57. Requiring delivery of cars beyond
right of way. — McNeill v. vSoulhorn R.
Co., 202 U. S. 543, 50 L. Ed. 1142, 26



§§ 3894-3896 carriers. 3518

Placing Car on Particular Track. — Where car loads of coal are shipped
from one state into another, an order of a state corporation commission directing
the railroad company to place the cars on a certain track for unloading, as re-
cjuested by the consignee, is void as an interference with interstate commerce. ^^

Delivery on Private Siding. — An order of a state corporation commission
compelling a railway company engaged in interstate commerce to deliver cars
containing interstate shipments beyond its right of way to a private siding is an
unlawful interference with interstate commerce, whether viewed as an assertion
by the commission of its general powers over carriers, or of its power to make
the order in a particular case in favor of a given person or corporation.^*'

Refusal to Deliver on Payment of Charges. — A statute imposing a penalty
on a railroad company for a refusal to deliver freight to the owner or consignee
on payment or tender of the freight charges due, as shown by the bill of lading, is
in conflict with the Act of February 4, 1887, regulating commerce, and, as to
interstate commerce, and, as to interstate shipments of freight, can not be en-
forced.*^ •^'

Reshipment. — Where, after the arrival of stock in the carrier's "break-up"
yards at the point of destination, the shipper demanded that the stock be deliv-
ered in the car to a connecting carrier, with whose road the initial carrier had
physical connection, for shipment to another point within the state, such reship-
ment did not constitute interstate commerce, though the original shipment was
from a point within the state. ""'^

Penalty for Failure to Deliver Freight. — A statute providing against rail-
roads for each day freight is held after payment or tender of freight charges, or
holding freight for collection of excess of freight thereon, is in conflict with
Act Cong. Feb. 4, 1887, regulating interstate commerce, and as to interstate
shipments of freight is void.*^^

§ 3895. Care of Live Stock. — A statute providing, inter alia, that "no
railroad company, in the carrying or transportation of animals, shall overload its
cars," when applied to shipments made from a point within to a point without
the state, is not unconstitutional, as violative of the provision in the constitution
of the United States (article 1, § 8) granting congress power to regulate inter-
state commerce. ^^

§ 3896. Routing Goods. — A state law providing that a common carrier
shall pay a penalty of $500 for shipping freight by a route other than that desig-
nated by the shipper, is unconstitutional when applied to goods shipped from a
foreign state, as in violation of the interstate commerce section of the federal
constitution.^* The rule of the railroad commission of the state of Arkansas,
which provides that, "in case of failure on the part of the shipper to give routing
instructions, it shall be the duty of the railroad receiving the shipment to forward
it via such route as will make the lowest rate," as applied to interstate shipments,
is unconstitutional as an interference with interstate commerce.^ ^

S. Ct. 722, construing order and decision charges. — Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Pe-

of the corporation commission of North ters, 40 S. W. 429, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 515.

Carolina, and the statutes of that state 61. Reshipment. — Louisville, etc., R.

upon which the same was based. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 97 S.

58. Placing car on particular track. — W. 778, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 18.

Southern R. Co. v. Greensboro, etc.. Coal 62, Penalty for failure to deliver

Co., 134 Fed. 82, modified and affirmed freight.— Trinity, etc., R. Co. v. Geppert

m McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 26 S. Ct. (fex Civ App ) 135 S W 164.



722, 202 U. S. 543, 50 L. Ed. 1142.



63. Care for live stock. — Crawford v.



59. Delivery on private siding. — De- e <-t -on e/' o r> ioc o^ o t? on
.,..«„ c.^. ,*.!,.. „ -D n^ n u 1. bouthern R. Co., 56 S. C. 136, 34 b. h,. 80.
cree. Southern R. Co. v. Greensboro, etc., . ^

Coal Co., 134 Fed. 82, modified and af- 64- Routing goods.— Lowe v. Seaboard,

firmed in McNeill v. Southern R. Co., etc., Railway, 63 S. C. 248, 41 S. E. 297,

26 S. Ct. 722, 202 U. S. 543, 50 L. Ed. 90 Am. St. Rep. 678.

1142. 65. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Allen, 181

60. Refusal to deliver on payment of Fed. 710.



3519 REGULATION AND CONTROL. §§ 3897-3900

§ 3897. Cartage and Drayage. — One conveying liquor shipped in inter-
state commerce from the railroad depot to the home of the consignee held en-
gaged in interstate commerce and not subject to state law prohibiting the con-
veying of intoxicating liquor.*'"

§ 3898. Compelling Railroad to Elevate Bridge. — A requirement com-
pelling railroad companies to elevate bridges over the Kansas river does not, by
reason of the consequent expense and difficulty, violate the commerce clause of
the federal constitution. ^"^

§ 3899. Collection of Purchase Price for Consignor. — A state statute
which makes it a criminal offense for any railroad company, express company
or other common carrier or any other person, in connection with transportation
of intoxicating liquors in interstate commerce, to collect the purchase price or
any part thereof before, on, or after delivery from the consignee, or in any
manner act as the agent of the buyer or seller of any such liquor for the purpose
of buying or selling or completing the sale thereof, applies to a bank to which a
draft for the purchase price of a shipment of liquor is sent by the seller in an-
other state, with a bill of lading for such liquor attached, and which collects
the draft from the consignee, and delivers the bill of lading to him upon which
he obtains the liquor from a carrier.*''^

§ 3900. Regulations with Respect to Limitation of Liability of Car-



Online LibraryThomas Johnson MichieA treatise on the law of carriers (Volume 4) → online text (page 79 of 214)