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Yards Co., 82 Fed. 839. Co., 82 Fed. 839.

36. Rules and regulations. — Cotting v. 41. Compelling company to admit rail-
Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 79 Fed. road privileges and benefits. — State v.
679. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 41 Fla. 377,

37. Feed and water. — Cotting v. Kansas 27 So. 225.



3535



REGULATION AND CONTROL.



3915-3916



stitution, thereafter to assume entire control, and to abate any erections which
may have been made, and prevent others from being made.'*^

§ 3916. Connecting- Carriers. — Facilities for Interchange of Traffic.

— The requirement of track connections and facilities for the interchange of cars
and traffic at railroad intersections, does not constitute an unconstitutional regu-
lation of commerce.'*^ Where a railroad company chartered by the state, one of
its purposes being to transport intrastate commerce, was ordered by the state rail-
road commission to join in the construction of a connection with an intersecting
railroad, under an act of Indiana, providing that the act authorizing the commis-
sion to order such connections should apply only to the transportation of passen-
gers and property between points within the state, and to switching, delivering,
storing, and handling of such property, the order was not void as a regulation of
interstate commerce, the subject being one on which congress had not expressly
acted. ■^^ A state statute requiring all railroads to switch for a reasonable com-
pensation, and to deliver without discrimination or unreasonable delay any
freight or cars, loaded or empty, destined to any point on their tracks or connect-
ing lines, includes interstate as well as intrastate commerce, and makes exchange
of all kinds of freight mandatory on connecting railroads and is invalid as inter-



42. Navigable v.'aters. — In re Southern
Wisconsin Power Co., 140 Wis. 245, 122
N. W. 801; S. C, 140 Wis. 265, 122 N.
W. 809.

In the absence of congressional legis-
lation on the subject, a state statute, au-
thorizing a dam across a navigable river
wholly within the state, is constitutional;
a direct statute of the United States be-
ing required in order that such erections
may be declared an invalid obstruction
and nuisance. In re Southern Wiscon-
sin Power Co., 140 Wis. 245, 122 N. W.
801; S. C, 140 Wis. 165, 122 N. W. 809.

43. As to connecting carriers. — Gen.
Laws Minn. 1895, c. 91, § 3. Judgment,
Jacobson v. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co., 71
Minn. 519, 74 N. W. 893, 70 Am. St. Rep.
358, 40 L. R. A. 389, affirmed in Wiscon-
sin, etc., R. Co. V. Jacobson, 179 U. S.
287, 45 L. Ed. 194, 21 S. Ct. 115.

Under Pub. Acts 1907, No. 312, § 7,
subd. "b," which provides that, where it
is practicable, the railroad commission
created may require railroads to inter-
change cars, freight, and passenger traf-
fic, and may require track connection
upon such terms as it may determine, and
which, by § 26, provides that any rail-
road being dissatisfied with any order of
the commission fixing any regulations
may within 60 days commence an action
against the commission to vacate such
order as unreasonable, an order regularly
entered by the Commission, requiring
two railroads to connect their tracks at
such point in a certain village as they
should agree upon as most desirable, and
thereafter interchange cars and passen-
ger traffic, does not violate the constitu-
tion of the United States art. 1, § 8, vest-
ing in congress the power to reguhite in-
terstate commerce. Micliigan R. Comm.
T. Micliigan Cent. R. Co., 168 Mich. 230,
132 N. W. 1068.



A state Code provides that: When
any freight that has been shipped, to be
conveyed by two or more common car-
riers to its destination, where, under the
contract of shipment or by law, the re-
sponsibility of each or either shall cease
upon delivery to the next in good order,
has been lost, damaged or destroyed, it
shall be the duty of the initial or any
connecting carrier, upon application by
the shipper, consignee, or their assigns,
within thirty days after application, to
trace said freight and inform said appli-
cant in writing, when, where, how, and
by which carrier said freight was lost,
damaged, or destroyed, and the names of
the parties and their official position, if
any, by whom the truth of the facts set
out in said information can be estab-
lished. If the carrier to which applica-
tion is made shall fail to trace said
freight and give said information in writ-
ing, then said carrier shall be liable for
the value of the freight lost, damaged,
or destroyed, in the same manner and to
the same extent as if said loss, damage,
or destruction occurred on its line. This
provision docs not constitute a regulation
of interstate commerce beyond the power
of the state. Central, etc., R. Co. v. Mur-
phey, 43 S. E. 265, 116 Ga. 863, 60 L. R.
A. 817, reversed in 25 S. Ct. 218, 196 U.
S. 194, 49 L. Ed. 444.

The provision in the constitution of
Kentucky requiring iiUerchange and
switching of cars between connecting
carriers in the transfer and delivery of
freight, is not invalid as an interference
with interstate commerce, its effect on
such commerce being purely incidental
and indirect. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.
Central Stock Yards Co., 97 S. W. 778,
30 Ky. L. Rep. 18.

44. Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 5551; Pitts-
burgh, etc., R. Co. V. Hunt (Ind.), 86 N.
E. 328.



§ 3916 CARRIERS. 3536

fering with interstate commerce, and an order of the state railroad commission
to enforce the provision is invahd."*-^

Delivery to Connecting Carriers. — A state is without power to compel a
railroad company to transfer cars of live stock to a connecting road at a point of
connection within the state, where the shipment was received in another state,
and is, therefore, a subject of interstate commerce."*^

Limiting Liability to Loss on Carrier's Own Line. — Rev. St. Mo. 1889, c.
26, § 944, provides that "whenever any property is received by a common carrier
to be transferred from one place to another, within or without this state, or when
a railroad or other transportation company issues receipts or bills of lading in this
state, the common carrier, railroad or transportation company issuing such bill
of lading shall be liable for any loss, damage or injury to such property, caused
by its negligence or the negligence of any other common carrier, railroad or trans-
portation company to which such property may be delivered, or over whose line
such property may pass." The supreme court of the state construed this statute
as not preventing a carrier engaged in interstate commerce traffic, receiving goods
for shipment, and issuing a through bill of lading therefor, from limiting its lia-
bility, either as to carriage or for negligence, to its own lines, by contract, but
that its purpose was to regulate the form in which such contract should be ex-
pressed, so as to require the carrier to embody the limitation directly, and in un-
ambiguous terms, in the portion of the agreement reciting the contract to trans-
port, and not to import or imply such limitation by way of exception or state-
ments of conditions and qualifications, requiring on the part of the shipper a
critical comparison of clauses of the contract in order to reach a proper under-
standing of its meaning. Held that, as thus construed, the statute was not un-
constitutional, as imposing a burden on interstate commerce, it being within the
power of the state to legislate as to the form of contracts for interstate commerce
carriage.'*'^ A state statute declaring that a common carrier accepting goods for
transportation to a point beyond its own terminus assumes an obligation for their
safe carriage to that point, unless otherwise provided by a written contract signed
by the shipper, merely establishes a rule of evidence, and does not restrict the
right of the carrier to limit his obligation by contract, and hence is not, as ap-
plied to interstate commerce, a regulation thereof so as to be void under the fed-
eral constitution.'*^ A stipulation as to carriage of freight within the state, limit-
ing the liability of a carrier to its own line, has no application to interstate ship-
ments.^^ The statute prohibiting common carriers from limiting their liability by
stipulations in a bill of lading is valid, as applied to contracts for interstate trans-
portation of property. °" A state statute prohibiting common carriers from limit-
ing their common-law liability by contract is not in itself a regulation of inter-
state commerce, when applied to an interstate shipment, which will enable the
carrier to so limit its liability on goods shipped to a point without the state. '^^
A statute providing that, when a railroad company issues bills of lading in Mis-
souri, it shall be liable for any loss, damage, or injury to the property caused by
its negligence or the negligence of any other carrier, when construed as depriving
a carrier of the right to contract for a limitation of its liability beyond its own
line, is not in conflict wdth the constitution of the United States, authorizing Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce. ^^

45. Southern Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 189 affirmed in Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Pat-
Fed. 696. terson Tobacco Co., 18 S. Ct. 335, 169 U.

46. Delivery to connecting carriers. — S. 311, 42 L. Ed. 759.

Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville, 49 Dod^-e v Chica^-o etc R Co., Ill

etc., R. Co., 55 C. C. A. 63, 118 Fed. 113, Minn. 123, "l26 N. W. 627.

63 L. R. A. 213, affirmed in 192 U. S. en r> i * ^ u r'^ „, r.Uc 77

568, 48 L. Ed. 565. 24 S. Ct. 339. ^ \j ^oi^^'^T P ' A.n 4 J '

47. Limiting liability to loss on earn- S. W. 234, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 457.

er's own line.— Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. 51- Pittman v. Pacific Exp. Co., 59 b.

McCann, 19 S. Ct. 755, 174 U. S. 5S0, 43 W. 949, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 595.

L. Ed. 1093. 52. Western Sash, etc., Co. v. Chicago,

48. Judgment, 24 S. E. 261, 92 Va. 670, etc., R. Co., 76 S. W. 998, 177 Mo. 641.



3S37 REGULATION AND CONTROL. § 3916

Liability of Initial Carrier.— A state statute making the initial carrier liable
for loss of goods shipped over its line and connecting lines unless a receipt in
writing is produced from the connecting carrier, is not unconstitutional, as seek-
ing to impose any burden on interstate commerce. ^^

Duty to Trace Freight. — The imposition upon the initial or any connecting
carrier as a condition of availing itself of a vahd contract of exemption from
liability beyond its own line, of the duty of tracing the freight, and informing
the shipper, in writing, when, where, and how, and by which carrier, the freight
was lost, damaged, or destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their
official positions, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out in the informa-
tion can be established, is, when applied to an interstate shipment, a violation of
the commerce clause of the federal constitution.-^-*

Liability as Agent for Other Carrier.— A state statute which makes each

carrier the agent of its connecting carrier from whom it receives freight, and

makes each liable for any freight lost, damaged, or destroyed by the connecting

carrier, is an infringement of the interstate commerce clause of the federal con-
stitution.55

Where Through Rate Is Aggregate of Local Rates.— Where freight is
received to be transported over a carrier's own and a connecting line to a point
beyond a state, and the rate charged is the aggregate of the local rates of the two
lines, and the connecting line had previously adopted and filed with the interstate
commerce commission a tariff under which its proportion of the charge on the
through shipment was collected, and there is a claim that the charge is excessive,
the shipper's redress must be through the interstate commerce commission and
not in a state court.^'^

Platforms and Stations. — A state law requiring all railroads at points of
intersection with other railroads to unite therewith in establishing and maintain-
ing suitable platforms and station houses for the convenience of passengers de-
siring to transfer from one road to the other, and for the transfer of passengers,
baggage, and freight when the same shall be ordered by the Railroad Commission,
etc., aft'ords added facilities for all kinds of commerce over the routes of inter-
secting roads, and the requirement that such railroads shall connect their lines is
not a regulation of interstate commerce.^'^

53. Liability of initial carrier.— Jones- [^g of freight shipped over several roads

I r lln' S% % ^fo" '^'" Railway, 77 so as to take it out of the state for a

"'eV" t?'^' 5^J^- ^- 4 - . part of the route was usual or necessary,

.o c ? Lr .^l^^n fi? ^T^T^'^^-^^^A*' it would be treated as an intrastate ship-

43 b. t.. 265, .116 Ga. 863, 60 L. R. A. ^gnt, so that the agent of the terminal

817, reversed in Central, etc., R. Co. v. carrier was the agent of the initial car-

^"[^ PH Aa ' ^- ^- ^^ ' "^^ f^'" the purpose of receiving a claim

■*-^„V- ^;?- J ^^- ^„ , ^^ for loss filed with it under Act May 13,

Civ Code 1902 vol. 1, §§ 1710, 2176 iqqS (24 St. at Large, p. 1). Harter v.

and Laws 1903, Act No. 1 (24 St. at Charleston, etc., R. Co., 85 S. C. 192, 67

Large, p. 1), requiring a carrier to trace g jr 290.

freight shipped over it or a connecting '.p,' " / . r ,4- ^„ .„„„ r o xu
carrier, and making the carrier liable for ^ ^he Act of May 13, 1903, of South
shipments over it and connecting lines Carolina making each carrier the agent
unless it produces a receipt from a con- °^ '^^ connecting carrier from whom it
necting carrier, and making a bill of lad- [eceives freight, and liable for freight
ing prima facie evidence of liability for lost damaged, or destroyed by such con-
loss or damage to goods in transit, are "^^^":'% ""^Vl^"' '" '"'^^''^' ^^ violation of
not regulations of interstate commerce ,*^e interstate commerce c ause of the
and unconstitutional. Skipper v. Sea- f.^^^''^^ constitution. Winslow Bros. &
board Air Line Railway, 75 S. C. 276, 55 f °; l'' ^^'^"l'^: ^^'^•' ^- ^°- ^^ ^- ^•
S. E. 454, 7 L. R. A., N. S., 388, 9 Am. ^^^' ^° ^^- ^- '"^•
& F.ng. Ann. Cas. 808. 56. Where through rate is aggregate of

55. Liability as agent for other carrier. local rates. — Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. New

—Venning v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 78 S. l'-''^ Milling Co., so Kan. 141, 101 Pac.

C. 42, 58 S. E. 983, 12 L. R. A., N. S., ^011.

^217. 57. Platforms and stations. — Southern

Where it was not shown that tlie rout- Pac. Co. v. Campl)ell, 189 Fed. 690.



§ 3917



CARRIERS.



3538



§ 3917. Particular Articles of Commerce. — Fermented, distilled or other
intoxicating liquors or liquids are subjects of commercial intercourse, exchange,
barter and traffic, between nation and nation, and between state and state, like
any other commodity in which a right of traffic exists, and are so recognized by
the usages of the commercial world, the laws of congress and the decisions of
courts.''^ And congress, under its general power to regulate interstate and for-
eign commerce, may prescribe what article of merchandise shall be admitted and
what excluded; and may, therefore, admit or not, as it shall deem best, the im-
portation of ardent spirits,^^ and where the laws of congress authorize their im-
portation, no state has a right to prohibit it.*"^ By its omission to enact an ex-
press statute on the subject, congress is considered to intend that the regulation
of interstate commerce, in intoxicating liquors as well as other articles of com-
merce, shall be free from the regulation and interference of the different states.^^
Hence, a state law which denies such a right, or substantially interferes with or
hampers the same, is in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the con-
stitution of the United States, and void.*'- Yet, in the exercise of its police



58. Intoxicating liquors — Article of
commerce. — License Cases (U. S.), 5
How. 504, 12 L. Ed. 256; Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. Ed. 205, 8 S.
Ct. 273; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100,
34 L. Ed. 128, 10 S. Ct. 681; Lyng v.
Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 34 L. Ed. 150,
10 S. Ct. 725; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S.
545, 35 E. Ed. 572, 11 S. Ct. 865; Rhodes
V. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 42 L. Ed. 1088, 18
S. Ct. 664; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 700, 8 S.
Ct. 689, 1062; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S.
58, 41 L. Ed. 632, 17 S. Ct. 265; Austin
V. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 45 E. Ed.
224, 21 S. Ct. 132; Vance v. Vandercook
Co., 170 U. S. 438, 42 L- Ed. 1100, 18 S.
Ct. 674; Adams Exp. Co. v. Common-
wealth, 206 U. S. 129, 51 L. Ed. 987, 27
S. Ct. 606.

A state statute prohibiting carriers
from carrying intoxicating liquors into
any county or district therein where the
sale of such liquors is prohibited by law,
as applied to shipments from other states,
is void as an attempted regulation of in-
terstate commerce, and affords no justi-
fication for the refusal of a railroad com-
pany, although a corporation of such
state, to receive and carry such ship-
ments. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cook
Brewing Co., 96 C. C. A. 322, 172 Fed.
117, 40 L. R. A., N. S., 798.

59. Power of congress exclusive. — Li-
cense Cases (U. S.), 5 How. 504, 12 L.
Ed. 256.

The right to send liquors from one
state into another, and the act of sending
the same, is interstate commerce, the reg-
ulation whereof has been committed by
the constitution of the United States to
congress, and, hence, a state law which
denies such a right, or substantially inter-
feres with or hampers the same, is in
conflict with the constitution of the
United States. Vance v. Vandercook Co.,
170 U. S. 438, 42 L. Ed. 1100, 18 S. Ct.
674.
. The interstate and foreign traffic in in-



toxicating liquors is one requiring uni-
lormuy of regulation by national legis-
lation. Walling V. People, 116 U. S. 446,
29 L. Ed. 691, 6 S. Ct. 454.

60. License Cases (U. S.), 5 How. 504,
12 L. Ed. 256.

61. Nonaction of congress. — Bowman
V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465,
31 L. Ed. 700, 8 S. Ct. 689, 1062. See,
also, License Cases (U. S.), 5 How. 504,
12 L. Ed. 256; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.
S. 100, 34 L. Ed. 128, 10 S. Ct. 681; Aus-
tin V. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 45 L.
Ed. 224, 21 S. Ct. 132.

62. State can not regulate. — Vance v.
Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 42 L. Ed.
1100, 18 S. Ct. 674; Adams Exp. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 206 U. S. 129, 51 L. Ed.
987, 27 S. Ct. 606.

A state law is void if it merely regu-
lates the introduction of intoxicating liq-
uors, although it does not amount to a
prohibition thereof. Walling v. People,
116 U. S. 446, 29 L. Ed. 691, 6 S. Ct. 454.

Whenever a law of a state amounts es-
sentially to a regulation of commerce
with foreign nations or among the states,
as it does when it inhibits, directly or
indirectly, the receipt of an imported
commodity or its disposition before it
has ceased to be an article of trade be-
tween one state and another, or another
country and this, it comes in conflict with
a power which, in this particular, has been
exclusively vested in the general govern-
ment, and is therefore void. Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. Ed. 128,
10 S. Ct. 681, followed in Lyng v. Mich-
igan, 135 U. S. 161, 34 L. Ed. 150, 10
S. Ct. 725.

In Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125
U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 700, 8 S. Ct. 689, 1062,
it was held that the statutes of Iowa, for-
bidding common carriers from bringing
intoxicating liquors into the state of Iowa
from another state or territory without
obtaining a certificate required by the
laws of Iowa, was void, as being a reg-
ulation of commerce between the states,



3539



REGULATION AND CONTROIy.



§§ 3917-3918



power, for the protection of the health and morals of its citizens, a state may re-
fuse a market for intoxicating liquors,^^ and may pass such laws in regard
thereto as do not control or interfere with the power possessed by congress to
regulate interstate commerce.'^'* But, as long as a state continues to recognize
intoxicating liquors as lawful articles of consumption and commerce, it is the duty
of the federal courts to afiford such articles of commerce the same protection as
is given to other articles. *^^

§§ 3918-3923. Particular Regulations— § 3918. Charges.— A state

has no power by statute to regulate rates upon traffic between different states.^^
No common carrier doing an interstate business derives its right to charge tolls or
fares for interstate transportation or for services therefor or in connection there-
with from the state, but from the federal government; hence the state has no
power or authority to forfeit such right or franchise, or to oust any such com-
mon carrier from the exercise of any such right. *^'^

Reshipment to Point within State. — Where a shipper shipped goods from
a point without the state to a point within the state, and from that point with-
out unloading or opening the car to another point within the state to which he
originally intended to ship them, the entire shipment is an interstate shipment,
so that he is not entitled to the rate fixed by the state railway commission between



and, therefore, that those laws did not
justify a common carrier in Illinois from
refusing to receive and transport intoxi-
cating liquors consigned to a point within
the state of Iowa. See American Exp.
Co. V. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, 49 L. Ed. 417,
25 S. Ct. 182. See, also, Norfolk, etc.,
R. Co. V. Sims, 191 U. S. 441, 48 L. Ed.
254, 24 S. Ct. 151; O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U. S. 323, 36 L. Ed. 450, 12 S. Ct.
693; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 34
h. Ed. 150, 10 S. Ct. 725; Rhodes v. Iowa,
170 U. S. 412, 42 L. Ed. 1088, 18 S. Ct.
■664; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171
U. S. 1, 43 L. Ed. 49, 18 S. Ct. 767; Scott
%'. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 41 L. Ed. 632,
17 S. Ct. 265; Smith v. St. Louis, etc., R.
Co., 181 U. S. 248, 45 L. Ed. 847, 21 S.
Ct. 603; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
125 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 700, 8 S. Ct. 689,
1062; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois,
177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed. 868, 20 S. Ct.
722.

63. Power of state under police power.
— License Cases (U. S.), 5 How. 504, 12
L. Ed. 256. But see Leisy v. Hardin, 135
V. S. 100, 34 L. Ed. 128, 10 S. Ct. 681.

64, Power of states. — Austin v. Ten-
nessee, 179 U. S. 343, 45 L. Ed. 224, 21
S. Ct. 132; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S.
■623, 31 L. Ed. 205, 8 S. Ct. 273; Thomas
T'. Kansas, 205 U. S. 535, 51 L. Ed. 919,
27 S. Ct. 789; Walling v. People, 116 U.
S. 446, 29 L. Ed. 691, 6 S. Ct. 454; Emert
V. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 39 L. Ed. 430,
15 S. Ct. 367; Bartemeyer v. Iowa (U.
S.), 18 Wall. 129, 21 L. Ed. 929; Beer
Co. V. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L.
Ed. 989; License Cases (U. S.), 5 How.
r)04, 12 L. Ed. 256; Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U. S. 100, 34 L. Ed. 128, 10 S. Ct. 681;
Lyng V. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, .34 L.
Ed. 150, 10 S. Ct. 725; Aml)rnsini v.

4 Car— 28



United States, 187 U. S. 1, 47 L. Ed. 49,
23 S. Ct. 1; Matter of Hefif, 197 U. S.
488, 49 L. Ed. 848, 25 S. Ct. 506; In re
Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. Ed. 572, 11
S. Ct. 865; Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170
U. S. 438, 42 h. Ed. 1100, 18 S. Ct. 674.

65. Recognized as article of commerce
by state. — When a state recognize the
manufacture, sale and use of intoxicating
liquors as lawful, it can not discriminate
against the bringing of such articles in,
and importing them from other states;
such legislation is void as a hindrance to
interstate commerce and an unjust pref-
erence of the products of the enacting
state as against similar products of the
other states. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.
S. 58, 41 L. Ed. 632, 17 S. Ct. 265.

By permitting the manufacture of in-
toxicating liquors for mechanical, medic-
inal, culinary and sacramental purposes,
the law of Iowa does not recognize such
liquors legitimate articles of commerce
for all purposes. Kidd v. Pearson, 128
U. S. 18, 32 L. Ed. 346, 9 S. Ct. 6.

66. Particular regulations. — Sheldon v.
Wabash R. Co., 105 Fed. 785.

67. Crow V. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 176
Mo. 687, 75 S. W. 776, 63 L. R. A. 761;
Attorney General v. St. Louis, etc., R.
Co., 176 Mo. 718, 75 S. W. 888; Attor-
ney General v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 176
Mo. 721, 75 S. W. 888.

Code 1887, § 1215, in so far as it un-
dertakes to fix the rate of charges to be
received within the state by common
carriers engaged in interstate commerce,
violates the federal constitution (article
1, § 8, cl. :5). which gives to congress
power to regulate commerce among the



Online LibraryThomas Johnson MichieA treatise on the law of carriers (Volume 4) → online text (page 83 of 214)