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"The Catholics were treating with the Protestants and
endeavouring to unite with them, in order to continue
a war, which at first had been wholly undertaken in
defence of [the Protestant] religion. The Swedes
caballed with the Emperor against France their ally :
France hearkened to the Duke of Bavaria, in order to
hinder the Swedes from carrying their conquests too
far in Germany : Spain supported the Elector of Bran-
denburg, the head of the Calvinist league : and the
Dutch sought the friendship of the Spaniards, their old
enemies."

Respecting this "confusion of views," as Ramsay
presently calls them, all we have to bear in mind for
the moment is that Mazarin was listening to the over-
tures of Bavaria, and that, althoucrh he wished to cfive
the Imperialists what Wellington used to call "a
damned good drubbing," he feared that, if the House
of Austria were to be completely crushed. Protestant-
ism might reign throughout the whole of Central
Europe ; and a preponderance of Protestantism would
have interfered with his own political designs. These
double motives of the cardinal proved vexatious to
Turenne on more than one occasion.

In the beginning of April, 1646, Turenne returned
to his army, which he removed from Treves to near
Mayence. When there, he sent to inform the com-

^ Vol. ii., p. 120.

7*



100 MARSHAL TURENNE [1646

mander-in-chiefof the Swedish army, General Wrangel/
that he intended to cross the Rhine, by a bridge of
boats, at Bacharach, and join his own to the Swedish
army in Hesse-Nassau. To his great annoyance, just
as he was starting to put this design into execution, he
received an order from Mazarin to give up all idea of
it, because the Duke of Bavaria had promised not to
join his army to that of the Emperor,^ on condition
that the French army did not join that of Sweden, or
cross the Rhine. Instead of crossing the Rhine,
Tureime was commanded to turn to the West, to leave
Germany and to besiege Luxemburg.

Turenne felt certain that the Duke of Bavaria was
hoodwinking Mazarin, and that to besiege Luxemburg
would be a fatal mistake at such a moment; therefore
he obeyed the order not to cross the Rhine, but he
made excuses for remaining in Germany instead of
proceeding to Luxemburg.

While Mazarin was fulfilling his share of the bargain,
it was far otherwise with the Duke of Bavaria, and
while the French and Swedish armies were still wide
apart, that perfidious Duke had joined his forces to
those of the Emperor. In the face of this direct breach
of contract what was Turenne to do? He was not
long in deciding. Without waiting for orders from

1 Wrangel had just taken the place of General Torstenson,
who had been obliged to relinquish his command owing to a very
severe attack of gout.

2 The Emperor at that time was Ferdinand III., who had mar-
ried the Infanta of Spain, to whom Charles I. of England had paid
court in 1623.



1646 Mt. 35] A LONG MARCH loi

Mazarin, he started at once to join his army to that
of Sweden ; and, as a flood had destroyed his bridge
of boats at Bacharach, and he learned that no bridge
across the Rhine nearer than Wesel was open to him,
he determined to make the long march of 1 50 miles to
that place, which is within 100 miles of the mouth of
the Rhine. When he reached VVesel he had consider-
able trouble in obtaining leave from the Dutch to cross
the river. Having at last obtained that permission and
transferred his troops to the right bank of the Rhine,
he made a second lengthy march, in a south-easterly
direction, to join his army to that of Wrangel, near
Friedburg, a fortified town in Hesse-Darmstadt, of which
the walls and a fine, tall, round tower are still standino-
about a dozen miles to the north of Frankfurt. Alto-
gether, Turenne's march from Treves, by Wesel, to
Friedburg, was about 320 miles, and it was made in
very little more than a month.

The combined Imperial and Bavarian armies had
already approached the Swedish army ; but, although
greatly outnumbering it, they dared not do more than
encompass it, because Wrangel's position was very
strong and admirably entrenched. On the arrival of
Turenne, they withdrew to a considerable distance.
The French and Swedish allies numbered 10,000
horse, 6,000 or 7,000 foot, and 60 guns ; the Imperial
and the Bavarian allies numbered 14,000 horse, 10,000
toot and rather more than 50 guns.

We are now at the beginning of a long campaign
which will require a chapter to itself



CHAPTER IX.

The campaign of the united forces of Turenne and
Wrangel (August, 1646) consisted of a series of
strategical marches rather than of battles.

Turenne and Wrangel got on well together ; but not
so the two great generals opposed to them. When the
rival armies were within easy reach of each other, the
Bavarian general urged an immediate attack upon the
French and Swedish allies, on the ground that the
Bavarian and Imperialist armies outnumbered those of
France and Sweden in the proportion of nearly, if not
quite, three to two. The Archduke Leopold, on the
contrary, was busily engaged in entrenching his posi-
tion, his favourite occupation when on a campaign,
and he refused to move until he had finished his
works; in fact, we are told by Ramsay that, "so far
from offering battle, he employed himself day and
night in making deeper the entrenchments of his
camp, in which he was almost buried already".

Wrangel and Turenne had now a difficult and an
intricate position to consider. It was almost the middle
of August. If they fell back towards the Rhine they
would find themselves in a country already laid waste



1646 ^T. 35] PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 103

by wars. On the other hand, if they assumed the
offensive they would be fighting at a serious disad-
vantage in numbers. Finally they decided to take
advantage of the enemy's delay, to leave them behind,
buried in their own trenches, and to make a bold dash
for the very heart of Bavaria.

The difference between wintering in a devastated
and in an undevastated country was greater in those
days than we, who live in times of rapid transport of
supplies, can readily imagine. Nor did this difference
only affect a general and his plans in respect to his
army at the moment; for "such a difference," says
Turenne, "proves a great advantage in the next cam-
paign, because new soldiers will readily come to serve
in armies that are in plentiful countries".

The rivers of the country through which they in-
tended to pass were very favourable to their projects.
Roads in those times usually followed water-courses,
and certain tributaries of the Rhine on the one hand,
and of the Danube on the other, flowed through
the valleys leading by the shortest route to Munich,
the capital of the Duke of Bavaria's kingdom, a city
nearly 200 miles to the south-east of Friedburg. If
the allies could but make good their way along this
route and garrison the fortresses which they would
have to capture and leave in their rear, the Bavarian
and Imperialist armies would have to go a long way
round to get at them.

The plan of Turenne and Wrangel was to leave
Friedburg and reach the river Main by one of its



I04



MARSHAL TURENNE [1646



tributaries, not very far from Frankfurt, then to go up
the valley of the Main to where the river Tauber runs
into it, and after that to go up the valley of the Tauber
almost to the top of the watershed, which is there not
a very high one. They proposed next to cross over
the watershed and to go down one of the tributaries of
the Danube, until they reached that river ; to go up
the Danube to where the Lech flows into it ; then to
go up the Lech and seize its fortresses, and finally to
strike across the country to Munich. It was a very
bold venture ; but circumstances assisted the strategic
skill of the French and the Swedish generals.

To begin with, the Archduke could not be per-
suaded by the Bavarian general to start at once so as
to intercept Turenne and Wrangel. He was much
too busy digging ! The French and Swedish armies
started at two o'clock in the morning and had actually
to pass within sight of the enemy ; but, says Turenne,
his foes "seemed to be irresolute, and only put them-
selves under arms. De Wert, however, had been
sent on to defend a pass, but apparently without
sufficient strength ; " for, brave as he was, he retired
"towards the main body of the enemy's army".
Turenne and Wrangel marched twenty-seven miles
that day. The hesitation and seeming want of courage
on the part of the Archduke Leopold is almost inex-
plicable.

The chief difficulties that Turenne and Wrangel
had to face were the fortresses lying on their route ;
for, unless they could be taken, success would be next



1646 yET. 35] SURRENDERS 105

to impossible. The inhabitants of the country through
which they passed knew that the large united armies of
Bavaria and the Empire were in the north-west, with
the object of defending their own nations, and of
crushing^ the French and the Swedes ; when, there-
fore, the Swedes and the French, very obviously un-
crushed, appeared in view, they not unnaturally inferred
that the Imperial and Bavarian armies must have
been conquered in a great battle and, acting upon
this inference, they fled in all directions.

Of course the suspicion of the defeat of the armies
of the Empire and Bavaria was rapidly developed
by rumour from suspicion into fact ; and the report
being carried from one garrison to another, they, in
most cases, either surrendered at once or made only
a feeble and brief resistance.

When the Duke of Bavaria, at Munich, heard
what had happened, he was terribly frightened and
furiously angry. He ordered all his valuables to be
packed up immediately and removed to a distance ;
and he sent to reproach the Archduke Leopold for
allowing the enemy to pass him, practically unopposed
and entirely unpursued, into the richest plains of
Bavaria. Forgetting his own perfidy to France, he
assumed an air of virtuous indignation at what he
regarded as the perfidy of the Archduke, who had
rewarded him for breaking his word to Mazarin and
joining his army to that of the Empire, by permitting
the troops of the outraged Mazarin to punish him for
his breach of faith by plundering his dominions.



io6 MARSHAL TURENNE [1646

In respect to this question of plunder, the reader
ought to impress upon his memory that the fact that,
if Ramsay is to be believed, "the booty might have
been inestimable," and that "the Viscount might have
demanded for himself alone, 100,000 crowns per month,
without doing anything contrary to the usages of war :
but with an unparalleled disinterestedness, he only took
out of the enemy's magazines what was sufficient to
subsist his army". It will be important to remember
this when, farther on, we meet with accusations against
Turenne of inflicting cruel devastation, as a punishment
for some infamous ill-treatment of his own soldiers.

The allies successfully carried out their programme
described above, so far as it included reaching the
Danube, where the Lech flows into it. Near that
point stands Rain, now an insignificant town, but then
one of the important fortresses of Bavaria. This place
was besieged by Wrangel, while Turenne sent the
Marquis de Beauvau with 500 horse to demand the
surrender of Augsburg, another fortress twenty miles
due south of Rain and also on the Lech. There being
scarcely any garrison in Augsburg, the Marquis de
Beauvau was immediately admitted, without his men,
and the citizens began to make terms with him for the
surrender. Augsburg stood on a high and commanding-
position at the junction of the rivers Lech and Wertach.
Besides being an important fortress, it was the chief
point of commerce between Northern Europe and the
Levant. In its trade and in its merch^mt nobility it
was almost a rival to Venice About the time when



1646 JET. 35] AUGSBURG 107

Turenne was approaching- it. one Augsburg family,
originally descended from a weaver, numbered no less
than forty-seven counts and countesses of the Empire
among its five branches.

Now Wrangel was particularly anxious that the
French should not take exclusive possession of Augs-
burg, partly on the ground that it had once been
captured by the great Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden,
and partly on account of its importance ; therefore he
sent to Turenne, who had started for Augsburg, urging
him to return at once to his assistance at Rain, as he
was in urgent need of support. On receiving this
messagfe, Turenne recalled De Beauvau from Augrs-
burg and hurried to support Wrangel in the siege of
Rain, which capitulated in a few days.

Meanwhile the Bavarian General Royer had come
from Meiningen, a fortress forty miles to the south-
west near the frontier of Wiirtemberg, and had
strengthened the garrison of Augsburg by from 1,200
to 1,500 men. News of this reached Turenne, who,
from Wrangel 's frequent mention of the former capture
of Augsburg by Gustavus Adolphus, had by this time
perceived his object and recognised his own mistake
in retiring from Augsburg at Wrangel's request, a
mistake for which he is severely criticised by Napoleon.

After the capture of Rain, both Turenne and
Wrangel hurried to Augsburg, in order to besiege it
and cut their trenches before the arrival of the united
Imperial and Bavarian armies, which they expected to
appear in about a week. It was well that they were



io8 MARSHAL TURENNE [1646

prepared against an attack from these armies in their
rear ; for the Duke of Bavaria had told the Archduke
that unless he raised the siege of Augsburg, he himself
would forsake the Imperial alliance and join his army
to those of France and Sweden; and, with this fear
before his eyes, the Archduke was bestirring himself.

In due course the Bavarian and Imperial armies,
which had come from Friedburg by Bamberg and
Nuremberg, a route much to the east of the short cut
taken by the French and Swedes, appeared before
Au^sburo^. As we have seen, their armies had been
half as large again as those of the French and the
Swedes, even at Friedburg. Since then they had been
reinforced en 7^oute, while the French and the Swedes
had been obliged to leave some of their troops behind
them, for the purpose of garrisoning the fortresses which
protected their rear on their march. For all his numerical
strength, the Archduke's ardour began to cool, now that
he was getting so near his enemy. Prudence having
by this time taken the place of valour, he decided to
wait until the French and Swedish armies had consumed
their provisions, and then to drive them into Franconia,
i.e. the district which they had already traversed and
devastated on their march to the Danube, a district in
which it would be impossible for them to remain for
want of food. When they should have left it in search
of supplies, he flattered himself that he would be able to
recover the fortresses taken by the French and the
Swedes, without any serious fighting, and thus rob them
of all the fruits of their campaign.



1646 ^T. 35] CAMPAIGNING IN SNOW 109

On the appearance of forces so greatly outnumbering
their own, Turenne and Wrangel thought it prudent to
raise the siege of Augsburg and retire to Lauingen, a
town on the Danube thirty miles to the north-west.
Their plan of campaign from the first had been some-
what hazardous ; and now that the middle of November
was approaching, in spite of their successes things
began to have a very ugly look. They were in an
enemy's country, they were gready outnumbered, they
were more than 150 miles from the nearest friendly
boundaries, their communications were practically cut,
as the Imperial army on its way to Augsburg had
passed behind them ; or, to be more accurate, they had
no communications to be cut. Their troops "were weak
and fatigued," wanting "horses, arms and clothes,"^
and winter was now setting in, with unusual severity,
the ground being already covered with snow.

To realise what follows, we may imagine an ill-
shaped square of territory, with Rain on the north-east,
Ulm on the north-west, Meiningen on the south-west,
and Landsberg on the south-east, with the river Lech
flowing towards the north from Landsberg to near
Rain, the Danube flowing towards the south-west from
near Rain to Ulm, and the river I Her flowing towards
the Danube in the north from Meiningen to Ulm.
The side of our square from Landsberg to Rain, that
is the eastern side, is the longest, and the four sides
vary in length from something over thirty to a litde
over forty miles. Augsburg, it may be observed, lies

^ Ramsay,



no MARSHAL TURENNE [1646

about half-way between Landsberg and Rain, and
Lauingen about half-way between Rain and Ulm.

The Imperial and Bavarian generals, apparently
thinking that Turenne and Wrangel had marched to
the north-west with the object of making their way
through the rich country still farther to the west,
marched westward themselves to intercept them and to
prevent them from obtaining supplies from either Ulm
or Meiningen.

Both Turenne and Wrangel, contrary to the advice
of most of their staff, advanced westwards over the snow-
covered roads towards the enemy ; either, says Turenne,
"to fight them, or when in sight of them to consider
what to do". When they did come within sight of
them, near Meiningen, and, saw them at a distance
of three miles in a very strong position, with marshes
in their front, Turenne and Wrangel decided not to
fight them, especially as the Archduke, as usual, had
been busy entrenching himself, but "to consider what
to do". This they did to some purpose!

They had ascertained that, although the richest coun-
try lay to the west of our square, the enemy had a very
large stock of provisions at Landsberg, and had only left
100 horse as a garrison for that town, never dreaming
that the French and Swedes, in the face of greatly
superior forces, would dare to advance still farther to
the south-east, direct into their enemy's country and in
an opposite direction to their own line of retreat.
Turenne and Wrangel, therefore, determined to de-
ceive the Archduke by affecting to make Ulm their



1646 JET. 35] AT THE GATES OF MUNICH 11 1

objective, while they seized Landsberg and all its
stores.

Turenne left 2,000 horse facing west, ostentatiously
drawn up within sight of the enemy, as if he was prepar-
ing to give battle, while he hurriedly marched away to the
east in the direction of Landsberg. He and Wrangel
thus made the whole march to within a few miles of
that town before the Archduke, who was doubtless still
dia^Sline, had realised that they had started. The
march had been a very rapid one ; and when Turenne
had advanced his infantry as far, over the distance of
some thirty miles, as it was possible in one day, he
sent on sufficient horse to the river Lech, to cross the
bridge, which happily was not broken, and to call
upon the little garrison of 100 men at Landsberg to
surrender. Tired as were their troops after their long
march, Turenne and Wrangel had them on foot again
before the night was over ; and during the day follow-
ing they got their whole army with its baggage safely
across the Lech, cut off all danger of pursuit by the
enemy at the bridge, and possessed themselves of the
ample store of provisions at Landsberg.

There was yet another important step to be taken,
which Turenne took as soon as he was able, and this
was to send 3,000 horse to the gates of Munich, which
was then occupied by the Duke of Bavaria. The
route to Munich was a continuation of our imaginary
straight line from Meiningen to Landsberg, Landsberg
being half-way between Meiningen and Munich. " 'Tis
affirmed," says Turenne, "that nothing ever provoked



112 MARSHAL TURENNE [1646

the Duke of Bavaria to such a degree, or excited him
so much to make peace, as to see the army of the
confederates, in the beginning of winter, send parties to
the grates of Munich, and to have no news of the
Imperial army or his own, for which he had been at so
great an expense, and which he believed, as it was
true, much superior to ours."

And peace he made! Although the Imperial and
Bavarian armies still largely outnumbered the French
and Swedish, which, moreover, were in an enemy's
country, the Duke of Bavaria recalled his troops and
left the Archduke Leopold, whom he refused even to
see, to take care of himself The Archduke then re-
tired and marched eastwards with his army.

From the contents of this chapter — it may be added
from the contents of the whole of this book — it may be ob-
served thatTurenne endeavoured to succeed in his cam-
paigns rather by strategic marches than by great battles.
He is reported to have said: "The cause of general
battles is either the hope of victory, the necessity to re-
lieve a place besieged, the want of provisions, such an
ardour and courage in your troops as cannot easily be
restrained, a considerable reinforcement known to be on
its march to join the enemy in the near future, which
would make their numbers much superior to yours,
some happy conjuncture which the enemy's movements
may give you, such as the passing of a river, or the
weakening or separation of their forces. The occasions
which oblige you to avoid a battle are, when there is
little to be got and a great deal to be lost by it, when



1646 yET. 35] GP:NIUS of TURENNE 113

you are weaker than the enemy, when the enemy is
very strongly posted, when your troops are separated,
when there is any misunderstanding among your
superior officers, when you perceive fear or consternation
among your soldiers, or when you suspect their fidelity,
or, in short, when you think you can waste the enemy
by delays."

Of the latter part of this campaign, Napoleon said :
' ' The manoeuvres by which the Archduke was dislodged
from his camp between Meiningen and Landsberg, dis-
play great boldness, sagacity and genius : they are fertile
in grand results, and ought to be studied by all military
men "/

^ Two cardinal generals have already been mentioned. Dur-
ing the year in which Turenne's last described campaign, took
place, a third cardinal was given command of an army. This
was Cardinal Michel Mazarin, who was sent by his brother. Cardinal
Jules Mazarin, to besiege Lerida, an attempt in which he failed.



CHAPTER X.

There is probably no disappointment more keen, or
more vexatious, than to be robbed of the fruit of a
hardly-earned victory; and great was Turenne's cha-
grin, when he was forbidden by Mazarin to reap the
reward of the campaign of 1646 by conquering the
Imperial army in 1647, a task which he believed
would have been easy, now that it was weakened by
the withdrawal of the whole of the Bavarian army.
Worse still, orders came from Mazarin that Turenne
was to proceed with all his troops to Flanders, as a
large French force had been taken away from there to
proceed against the Spaniards in Catalonia.

Turenne had two special objections to leaving
Bavaria for Flanders. The first was that he still
thoroughly distrusted the Duke, or, as he was more
often called, the Elector, of Bavaria, who, he felt per-
suaded, would not hesitate to break his promises and
rejoin the Emperor if he should think it to his interest
to do so. The second was his strong suspicion that, if
he were to start for Flanders, his German or Weimarian
cavalry, which had fought so valiantly for him at
Nordlingen, would refuse to follow him because their

pay was five or six months in arrear. He sent to im-
114



i647 ^T. 36] ROSEN 115

plore Mazarin for these arrears ; but Mazarin replied
by saying that one month's pay was all that he could
possibly send for them at the moment.

The event proved the reasonableness of Turenne's
fears. With the exception of one regiment, the Ger-
man horse flatly refused to go to Flanders until they
were paid their full arrears. Rosen, who had only
lately been a prisoner of war, had been made Lieu-
tenant-General of the Horse at the request of Turenne.
Instead of being grateful to Turenne for this appoint-
ment, Rosen felt ill-disposed towards him ; because he
supposed that Turenne must despise him for having
been the cause of the disaster at Marienthal, the only
battle in which Turenne had ever been defeated.
Galled at this imagined contempt, Rosen took a dis-
like to him, and secretly encouraged the German
cavalry in their refusal to move until they were paid
their arrears. Turenne, however, had no suspicion of
the disloyalty of Rosen. Still believing that, if he put a
bold face on it, the German cavalry would follow him,
he started with his infantry for Flanders, taking Rosen



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