The History of Thucydides. Newly tr. into English...with very copious annotations...Prefixed, is an entirely new life of Thucydides: with a memoir of the state of Greece, civil & military, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war online

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Online LibraryThucydidesThe History of Thucydides. Newly tr. into English...with very copious annotations...Prefixed, is an entirely new life of Thucydides: with a memoir of the state of Greece, civil & military, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war → online text (page 17 of 59)
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specious pretext, are desirous to benefit your natural enemies,
and to destroy, in conjunction with their openfoes^ those who
are yet more your natural friends.

" But this were not justice; no, that would require you to
render us assistance, and not stand in awe of their power. For
if we all band together, it will not be formidable, but only if,
on the contrary (which they study to promote), we split into
parties ; since neither when they came against us singly, and
gained the advantage in battle, did they effect what they in-
tended, but departed in haste.

LXXX. " So that there is no reason for us (at least if we be
but united) to be d^ected, but to enter into alliance with the
more alacrity, especially as assistance will soon arrive from the
Peloponnesians, who are m all respects superior to our foes in
military affairs. Nor should you think that that cautious fore'-
thought^ namely, to aid neither, as being allies of both, is either
just with respect to us, or safe in regard to yourselves. For
this is not so equitable in effect as it is in allegation.v^ For if,
through your not rendering succour, the suffering party * be
ruined, and the victor carry his purpose, what else do ye do
by this same keeping aloof, but not assist the one party to be
saved, and not hinder the other from doing evil ? ^ Whereas,
it were nobler for you, by joining with the wronged party
(and, moreover, your kindred), to preserve the common safety
of Sicily, and not to suffer your friends^ forsooth, the Athe-
nians, to do wrong.

" To sum up the whole, we, Syracusans, say that it were
an easy though superfluous task to clearly show either you or
others what you yourselves know just as well. But we,
withal, protest, if we fail to persuade you, that we are plotted
against by our own perpetual foes, the lonians, and are by you
betrayed, Dorians by Dorians ! And that if the Athenians do
•subdue us, they will, indeed, conquer hy your means; but will

» T^ suffering party,] Namely, he who suffered the injury ; meaning
the Syracusans. Consequently, in 6 Kparwvy the victor, is implied also the

* Not assist the one, ^c.] This sounds somewhat harsh m our language;
•and may in a free translation be rendered, with Hobbes, « leave the safety
of the one undefended, and suffer the other to do evil."

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have the honour of it in their aum namcy and for the reward
of their victory, they will have no other than the very party
which put the victory into their hands. If, however, on the
other hand, we obtain the upper hand, you must yourselves
suffer punishment for the perils you will occasion us.

" Consider, therefore, and now choose, either slavery exempt
from present danger, or, saving yourselves with us, not to
basely take those as your masters, and thereby avoid an enmity
with us which could not quickly be appeased."

LXXXI. Thus spoke Herraocrates; after whom Eupbe*
mus, the Athenian ambassador, spoke to the following effect :

LXXXII. " Our coming hither was only for the renewal
of the formerly existing alliance; but as the Syracusan orator
has inveighed against us, it is necessary for us to speak re-
specting our dominion, showing that we hold it justly. Now,
the greatest proof of this he hath himself adduced ', in saying
that the lonians have been ever at enmity with the Dorians.
The fact is even so. ^ For we, being lonians, and having to
do with Peloponnesian Dorians, both superior in number
and close at our door, have ever had to consider in what
manner we might best avoid subjection to them. And,
having become masters of a navy, we, at the close of the
Median war, freed ourselves from the dominion and guidance
of the Lacedaemonians, there being no more cause why they
should dictate to ^ t^, than *isoe to them^ except that they were
at the present the stronger. And we ourselves being con-
stituted leaders of those states which were before under the
king, have continued to administer the office '*, thinking that
we should thus be least likely to fall under the Pelopon-

1 Adduced,] Or, let fall in his speech. From the verb a participle of the
fame sense must be taken.

4 7^ fact ii even so.] Or, the case is this ; for it has been rightly ob^
served by Haack, that the worcb refer not so much to the preceding as the
following. . . . i.

5 Dictate to.] Such is the sense here of I'iriTdtffffiv, which literally signi-
fies ** issue commands to.** .

* Have continued to admmister the qffice,] The present tense is here used
for the first aorist

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nesians^ having power wherewith we might defend ourselves,
and) to speak the real truth, having not unjustly subdued the
lonians and islanders, whom, though our kindred, the Syra-
cusans say we enslaved. For they came against us, their
parent state, with the Mede, and did not venture by revolting
to destroy their property, or to abandon their city, as we did ;
but were willing to be themselves slaves, and would have
brought slavery upon us.

LXXXIII. " For these causes we took upon ourselves
the dominion, and have exercised it, both as being worthy
thereof (because we furnished to the service of Greece the
greatest fleet, and the most unhesitating alacrity, and because
/A^, by readily doing as much for the Mede, injured us),
and, moreover, having been actuated by a wish to thereby fur-
nish ourselves with strength against the Peloponnesians. * '
Nor are we using ^ fine rhetorical speeches ^, — as that we
justly hold the dominion, as alone beating off the Bar-
barian, or that it was for the liberation of these ^y rather than

^ For these causes, ^c] Snch is, I conceive, the sense of this perplexed
passage, the true scope of which has been, I apprehend, not clearly seen by
the commentators. ^ Goeller offers the following explanation : ^ D^os, ait,
nos censerous esse iropeno, quod in socios exercemus, duabus de causis,
quia ut nos animum maxiroe strenuum in bello Persico exhibuimus, ita hi
in servitium regis et in damnum nostrum proni erant. Deinde, ut tuti sirous
a Peloponneso, socios imperio coercemus.** But there would appear to be
three causes. The truth, however, is, that the orator first ui^ges two claims
to the dominion oyer tlie lonians. l. That it was for the good of Greece
that they should be held in subjection ; and none were so worthy of the
addition to dominion as the Athenians, by whose means the whole that any
poflB«»ed was preserved. S. That thev had a sort of right of conquest, as
over enemies and injurers. So much for the right; then comes the induce^
ment by which they were led to take it, namely, their own security and defence
against the Peloponnesians.

s Nor are we using.] This version is preferable to *' nor do we use ; ^
because the Athenians did sometimes, nay, it seems, not unfrequently,
employ the very mode of arguing in question. See c. 1, 73 and 74.

3 JFW rhetorical speediesS\ I have here followed the version of three
MSS. caXXic9rov/xf^a, which has been adopted by Bekker and Goeller, after
Valdinaer, who adduces two examples of the word from Plato. To which
may be added Thcophyl. Sim. 76. D. oi furaftop^v rbur) KticaKKiirrifUvov
r^c (ffpaeiuQ, where read KfKaXXufrrifUvov, SchoL on Eurip. Hec. 382. rd
jesKaXKicfrrifikva (trifiara Xlyciv.

' * That it was /or the liberation of these,] Namely, the lonians; as if,
haying delivered them from fiarbarian slavery, they bad a right to rule oyer

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that of the Greeks at large and of ourselves, that we en-
countered the dangers. But in fact it is excusable for all to
provide means for their own preservation. ^ And now,
having for own safety's sake, come hither, we conceive that
your advantage is the same. This we shall show even from
what they make matter of calumnious accusation, and you of
too fearful surmise. Being well aware that those who enter-
tain violent suspicions, though they may be for the moment
won over by the charms of insinuating oratory, yet after-
wards, when the thing comes to performance, act as their
interest guides. ^

" Well, then ^^ we have told you that we hold our empure
there through fear ®, and we are come with the same view, in
concert with our friends, to establbh matters on a secure foot-
ing Jiere, with no view to enslave any, but rather to hinder
any from suffering oppression.

LXXXIV. " Nor let any one object that we are solicitous
for your welfare, who are nothing to us ' ; for he cannot but
see, that by your being preserved, and being not too weak to
resist the Syracusans, we shall be less annoyed by those

them. The orator avows that it was more for their freedom than for that
of the Greeks at large, and also of themselves.

i It U excusabie, ^c,] The same phrase dvtvip^ovov ivri is used at c. 1,
75 and 82. And so in a kindred passage of Eurip. Hi|>poL 499. vvv ^ &yi$»p
nkyoQ Xwrcu (3iov <t6v, KoifK M^ovov ri^e. Similar to which is the Homeric
oi ydp TIC vsfuffif ^vyUiv Kcucdv (II. ^ 80.); whence may be illustrated a similar
use of dvffiitniTov in .^schyl. p. 50. 51. and 63, 8.

^ nough they may be for the moment, 4^.] This is one of the man^
eternal truths contained in this icriifAa ic ^^h &nd, as a maxim of policy, is
peculiarly valuable to governments like our own, where the adoption of
measures depends much upon the strong appeals of oratory. We may here
compare that diet of Pencles 1, MO. init. ** I am well aware that men are
not m the same disposition wlien at first induced to undertake a war, and
when engaged in its toils and dangers, but that their minds fluctuate accord-
ing to events."

7 Weil then.] The ydp is inchoative.

' Through /ear,] i. e. fear of the consequences of laying it down ; a
subject often adverted to in the orations of Athenian orators.

> That we are soUcitous, ^c.] Literally, " though it does not belong to us ; '
though we have nothing to do with it.'* At oi/dkp '^poetiKov supply dv, and
take the phrase as a nominative absolute. The orator means to refute the
objection, that as there was no natural bond of connection between Athena
and Camarina, for the former to be busy in caring for the latter might seem

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sending any forces to the aid of the Peloponnesians. Now,
in this respect you are very much to us. Wherefore -also, it
is colourable and reasonable to re<-settle the Leontines, not in
a state of subjection, as their kindred in Euboea, - but as free
and powerful as possible, in order that from their territory,
as being borderers on the Syracusans, they may annoy them
in our behalf. For thercy indeed, we are of ourselves a
match for our enemies ; and the Chalcidaeans (whom, says the
orator, having enslaved there, we inconsistently ^ pretend to
make free here) 4§ most beneficial to us, unprovided with
military defence, and only contributing money ^; but the
states here (both the Leontines and our other friends) will
be most so, in the possession of perfect independence.

LXXXV. " And, assuredly, to any individual, as po-
tentate, or to any state in the exercise of government*,
nothing is inconsistent which is profitable ^ ; nor is kindred
anything, unless there be sure reliance. ^ Friend or foe we
must be, seasonably for each conjuncture. ^ And it is here

« Incomittently,] Or, absurdly and contradictorily.

9 Is most beneficial to us, j-c] By this it seems that Euboea did not, like
some other islands, contribute ships or troops, but money : and certainly it
was the most effectual way of holding them m subjection, not to allow them
the use of arms, and to levy no troops from them; a policy probably
adopted after the final subjugation of the island by Pericles. *' At this
time, indeed," Haack observes, '' most of the allies of the Athenians assisted
the state, not with ships and arms, but only with money, or tribute ; a cus*
torn which had arisen since the Persian wars, partly from the allies being
averse to military operations, and partly from the Athenians themselves
choosing to have it so, that they mignt the more securely exercise dominion
over their allies, as destitute of ships and military skill.'^

* To any individual, ^c,] Here, it should seem,Thucydides means simply
to designate the two forms of government, monarchy and democracy ; by
the former of which is to be understood unlimited monarchy ; for such
TvpawoQ denoted.

» Nothing is inconsistent, ^c] This is meant as an answer to the above

6 Nor is kindred, ^rc] Smith renders, ** nothing is secure that cannot be
safely managed." That, however, is any thing but the sense, which has not
been ill expressed by Hobbes, except that ouctiov must here denote, not

friends, but Jcindred; for there is a reference to the Chalcideans of Euboea,
who, though their kindred, were little to be relied on, and therefore ought
not to be trusted with arms.

7 Friend or foe, ^rc] Such seems to be the sense of this obscure passage,
which may be partly illustrated by another at 1. 1, 45. yvdvni tovtov Utlvov
§tvcu rhv Kaipbv, iv <p 8, re vTrovpywv, ^cXoc fuiXcora, xai 6 dkriCTdc, ex^P^C*
and I9 56. 5 furd ftcycVrtov Katp&v oUitovrai Kai woXtfiovrai,

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our benefit, not to weaken our friends, but to contrive that
by the strength of our friends our enemies may become

" This you ought not to disbelieve ; for we rule over our
allies there, in the very way that each may be useful to us*
The Chians and MethymnsBans ® we permit to be independentj
on the condition of contributing ships ; but the greater part
we rule somewhat more severely, by requiring a tribute of
money : others, again, we permit to be allies in complete liberty,
though islanders ^ and easy to be subdued, because they are
Situated in places very opportune around Peloponnesus. So
that it is likely that the affairs here should be managed in
conformity to our interest ^^, and, as we said, our fear of the
Syracusans. For they aim at dominion over you, and desire, by
leaguing you together ^^ for their interest, through suspicion of
us on our departing (by force or by destitution) without accom-
plishing our object, themselves to rule over Sicily. And that
cannot but be the case if ye rally around them ; for neither
will so great a force combined on our part be again easily
practicable to be got together, nor will they, if we be absent,
be without power to accomplish their designs against you.

LXXXVI. ^^ And him who entertains other opinions
the event itself will refute. For before^ you called us in for
assistance, holding out no other terror ^ than that if we should

> Methutntueant.'] Not the Lesbians id general ; since, on their reduction
after revolt, they were condemned to a pecuniary payment, and that not
as tribute, but rent for their lands. Thus it appears that the ships, men-
tioned occasionally of late as furnished by the Ijetbiaru, must be understood
of the Methymnseans ; which accounts for their paucity.

9 Other t^ again, ^c] Namely, the Zacynthians and Cephallenians.

•0 ConformUy to our interest^ With the phrase irpbQ rb Xv^irtXovv may
be compared Issus p. 44, 5 1 . Reisk. oh^lg ydp dv^p^trtav fiitni t6 XvcnrfXovv.
and iEiSchin. p. 15, 41. oiS^ Uvvaro ivafikveiv t6 Xv<rtrcXovv.

'1 Leagwngyou.'j i. e. not the Camarinsans only (as interpreters sup-
pose), but the Siceliots in general. Hobbes has mistaken the sense of the
whole sentence.

• Holding out no other terror,] The true sense of irpootiuv here has
been learnedly explained by Duker and Ruhnk. To the passages cited by
them may be added Eurip. Here. Fur. 1 189. ri ^ot Trpocrifiov x<W fftifutivtic
^vov; Hence may be emended a corrupt possage of iElian frag. 1015.
Kal IvUiivro rrjv iK avrov irpo^povric, icai irpwriomQy wc rtircev, Vopyova^
Kartfriyaffav, <4XX' wff wp6\aKov ovra koI WafMV. where I would read Koi


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permit you to fall under the dominion of the Syracusan% we
should ourselves be in danger. Now surely it were not just
that you should discredit the same argument wherewith ye
then sought to persuade us, nor that we should be suspected be-
causewe are here with a larger force against the power of the Sy-
. racusans; nay, it is rather just thiit you should •give no fakh
tp them. For i»e should ueither be able to remain, except by
your aid» and if eveu we were so perfidious as to reduce any
states to subjection, we should be unable to hold dominion
over them, by reason of the length of the voyage, and the
impracticability of keeping watch over great cities and pro-
vided with continental forces.^ Whereas they^ not posted at
a camp, but occupying ^ a city near you more powerful than
our present armament ^, are always plotting your subjection ;
and whenever tliey find an opportunity for attacking any of
yoa% they will not let it slip. Other events have shown
this, and now the affiiir of the Leontines. And yet they
have the ^rontery to solicit you, as if you were very dolts,
to act against those who hinder such proceedings, and have
hitherto prevented Sicily from being under their dominion.
But wcj on the odier hand, invite you to a mpre assured
safety, entreating you not to betray that which we now
mutually hcM by each other, and to consider that those have
always, even without allies, a ready access to you by reason
of their numbers ; whereas, you will not often have it in your
power to oppose them with so considerable an aid, which if,
through suspicion, ye shall suffer to depart without effect, or
even be defie^ted, ye will then wish ® to see even the smallest

IvkKuvTO rrjv iZ aircv irpo^ipovrtQ [vonoduriav] Kai irpo^tiovrtc, utQ iiKth/g
rdpyova, Kaiwiycurav dSXug trpokaXov ovra lud trafiov.
Sd irpoTiivia is used at Eurio. Andr. 428. and Heracl. SI.

2 CotUinenial forces.] Sucn as cavaliy and heavy-armed, together with
such stores as were bulky and difficdlt of conveyance so for.

3 Not posted at a camp, but, 4rc,] There is here a play upon the two
senses ofiiroiKM, the former of which involves the notion of a tempofary

4 More powerful t/um our present armqmenf.] The expression fuiZovt
r^C nn^npac trtipowriat is one of more than Pindaric boldness^ not to say
harshness, and certainly unsuitable to an oration of no very elevated

^ Any of tfou,] Namely, Sicdiot cities.

YcuMth^witkf^'] There is a very similar passage in XenopluCyn

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portion, when, even if present^ it could no longer be of any
service to you.

LXXXVII. " But neither be ye, Camarinaeans, per-
suaded to give ear to tbe calumnies of those, nor let others
be so ; for we have told you the whde truth of the matter
whereof we have been suspected, and shall now only address
a brief recapitulation by way of remembrance, which we
think ought to prevail with you. We sajr, then, that we hold
dominion over those yonder, that we may not be subject to
any ; and we are liberating those here, that we may not be
injured by them. Many undertakings, however, we are com-
pelled to embark in, because we are obliged to be on our guard
many ways ' ; and both now and before, we came hither not
as uncalled, but sent for as helpers to sucl^ of you as suiFered
wrong. And you, attempt not as judges of what is done by
us, nor as moderators, to divert us from our purpose (which
were now hard to do^), but inasmuch as this our busy
meddling humour^ is also profitable to yoUy take and use it;
nor think that it alike injures all men, but, that it benefits far
more of the Grecians. For all in evtry place ^ (even with

5, 4, 7. il dk tffiac A^fietre, mesyf/a&^t iro^fv av^i/Q Av roiavrtiv ivwauw Xa^tn
KvfifMxov. and Liv.3l^ 89. sera ac nequidquam^ quum dominum Romamiin
habebitis, sociuin Philippum quseretis.

» We are conweiied to embark iuy ^c] This exactly describes the present
state of our Indian empire.

3 Which were now hard to do.] Because, as the expense of the expedition
had been exceedingly heavy, the Athenians would not easily be brought to
abandoti tbe purpose of it.

' This busy meddling humour.] The orator here uses the expressions
employed by the enemies of Athens. Thus Acacius aptly cites Eurip.
Suppl. 570. Upttffmw e^ ir^XX' d^t^ao, # ri m) ir<(Xic. Duker, indeed, tMnkt
that the orator uses ^oXvirpay/uxr^vi) in its primitive and favourable sense :
but thus the sentiment will be exceedingly enervated.

« For all m eyerif place, 4rcJ] Such seems to be the true sense and closest
version of this involved sentence, of which the general scope is correctly
pointed out by the Scholiast ; but no tolerable assistance is afforded either
bv him or the commenUtors in extricating the difficulties of the phrase-
ology. The chief of these are seated in /i^ &Suic ilvai Kivdwt{>uv and
dva-j^Ka^vrai — dirpayu6vk>s eui^ieBat, where ddnts is to be taken in a
passive sense, like the Latin participles in dut. At tuvivvwup is to be sup*
plied airrov, and 17/iac and Hare at aSul^ Hvai : a somewhat harsh ellipsis.
At ivayKdZoin-ai dirpay/i6vmQ aw^a^ai the sense of avayic. is not to be
pressed on, but, by dilogia, somewhat modified to the second clause of thb
sententia bimembris.

K 2 This

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which we have no friendly connection), both he who fears
he shall be wronged, and he who meditates wrong, by reason
of the present hope the one has of obtaining aid from us, and
the full expectation of the other, that if we come, he may run
the risk of finding us formidable enemies — both parties are
obliged, the one to learn moderation, however unwillingly^
the other to seek his safety without troubling others*

" This common security, then, which now is presented, both
to the power that asks it ^ and to yourselves, reject not ; but,
acting like other men, instead of always standing on your
guard against the Syracusans, now unite with us, and take
your part to counterplot against them, as they have against

LXXXVIIL Thus spoke Euphemus. As to the Cama-
Hnssans, they stood thus affected: they were, indeed, well
disposed to the Athenians, except as far as they supposed that
they meditated the subjugation of Sicily; while with the Syra-
cusans they had ever been at difference on account of questions
about borders,^ Standing, however, in not less awe of the
latter, as being so near them, and apprehensive lest they should^
even without their aid, obtain the superiority, they had at the
first sent that small body of cavalry, and now resolved for the
fxdure rather to aid the Syracusans, though, in fact, as sparingly
as possible ; but for the present^ that they might not seem to
concede less to the Athenians^ since they had been victors in
the battle, they resolved to return an equal answer to both.

So, after having deliberated, they returned this reply. " That
since there happens to be a war between those who are their
allies, it seemed to them most agreeable to their oaths to at

This sort of influence, it may be obserred, has long been exercised by
Great Britain in the affairs of Europe, not to say the world at large.

^ The power that asks t/.] i. e. Athens, which is here, as often, considered
as a person.

^ Instead ofalwai/s, 4rc.] It is not difficult to perceive the general mean-
ing of the sentence; but to express it so as not to sacrifice the sense, or
lose the point, hoc opus, hie labor est.

There is something similar at 1. 7, 12. fin.

I On account of questions about borders.] Or, by reason of being bor-

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present aid neither party," And with this answer the am-
bassadors departed.

And now the Syracusans put their own affairs in pre-
paration for the war ; while the Athenians who were encamped
at Naxus were negotiating with the Siculi, that as many as
possible should join their party. And those, indeed, of the
Siculi who inhabited rather the lowlands, being under sub-
jection to the Syracusans, most of them kept aloof ^ ; but of
those that occupied the interior (their habitations being ever
aforetime independent and inviolate ^) all but a few were im-
mediately on the side of the Athenians, and brought down to
the army provisions, and occasionally money also. Against

Online LibraryThucydidesThe History of Thucydides. Newly tr. into English...with very copious annotations...Prefixed, is an entirely new life of Thucydides: with a memoir of the state of Greece, civil & military, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war → online text (page 17 of 59)