Thucydides.

The History of Thucydides. Newly tr. into English...with very copious annotations...Prefixed, is an entirely new life of Thucydides: with a memoir of the state of Greece, civil & military, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war online

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Online LibraryThucydidesThe History of Thucydides. Newly tr. into English...with very copious annotations...Prefixed, is an entirely new life of Thucydides: with a memoir of the state of Greece, civil & military, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war → online text (page 50 of 59)
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or by turning away the prow, which usually indicated defeat, and
was called ^or^erta^cuf Stvarrp^if^y &c. The attack was made on
the sides; nor did the Athenians like to fight prow to prow.
(7, 36.)

To elude these arts, the Peloponnesians, when compelled to
fight on the open sea, aimed at throwing their fleet into the form
of a ball. They, moreover, sought out confined situations, which
the Athenians, on the other hand, avoided, as not favourable to
quick-sailing vessels, since they could not have room for their
evolutions ; but the sea-fight became similar to a land engage-
ment. (1. 2, 89. 7) 36.) Such will apply to all the engagements in
which the Peloponnesians either conquered, or fought a drawn
battle ; as 1. 2, 90. 4, 25. 7, 54. That they might keep clear of
the beak, and themselves break down the enemy's foreparts {t^
icpuped^ty and To^ icxpiisipea-tai Sofa^fr^ieUy 1. 7, 34 and 36.), they
avoided exposing their broadsides, and rather rushed forward
together, prow first ; and these prows the Corinthians first armed
with ^ir«T/$e(, prominent beams, bound fast to them. Which
useful device the Syracusans adopted, with the improvement of
itvrfipiltiy or Stretchers, six feet long, from the prows to the sides
of the vessel ; at the same time shortening and strengthening the
prow. (1. 7, 36.) They, moreover, resorted to stratagems^ such as
contriving to engage with the enemy when unrefreshed by dinner,
while the other party had dined. (See 1. 7, 39 and 40. 8,95.)
Finally, by the accession, after the defeat of the Athenian arma-
ment in Sicily, of the Syracusans, Chians, and other lonians, the
Peloponnesians made considerable advances in nautical skill, so
that in the batde of Sestus we find a scientific sort of plan pur-
sued. (1. 8, 104.) Yet there, and elsewhere, disorder was apt to arise,
which gave many advantages to the enemy's skill and disciplined
bravery. ( See 1. 2, 91. 8, 104. 7, 23.) Such, however, could not so
well happen in combats similar to battles on land, wherein the
engagement was less between the sailors than the soldiers^ or
marines^ placed on the decks, who strove to prevent the ships
from being held fast by the enemy's harpoons, or grapplings (tVon-
hands)y which Pliny (1. 7, 56.) says Pericles invented. That



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410 STATE OP GREECE, CIVIL AND MILITARY,

those, moreoyer, should not keep their hold, the fore-parts of the
ships were sometimes sheathed with raw hides. 0- 7> 65*) T^^
marines strove to drive the enemy from the decks with missiles^
and then boarded their ships. (1. 7, 65 and 70. ) For which reason,
besides those who were properly styled marines (twitdreu), they
placed many archers and dartsmen, as also heavy-armed» who
fought hand to hand, while the ships stood still alongside of each
other. (1. 1, 49. 7> 40 and 60.) In such battles, it is plain that
strength and courage were of more avail than art. Hence it was
that in the harbour of Syracuse the Syracusans hoped for victory,
and the Athenians lost their whole fleet.

The fleet of the Athenians had, however, before those battles,
been suffering much injury, by their having no facility for careen-
ing, nor even drawing their ships ashore whenever they became
leaky. (1.7>12.) The number of sailors was also much dimi-
nished ; those having been cut off by the enemy's horse, on going
to fetch wood and water : the foreigners, too, had deserted in
great numbers ; besides that, military discipline had grown exceed-
ingly relaxed.*

* It is not neoessaiy to trace, with the Author, the gradual stages bj which tha
Athenian fleet was brought to ruin ; which may better be learnt from the historian
himself: but the student will be interested with the following instructive col-
lection of Tbucydidean nautical phrases, bj the diligent Professor, p. 66, Arma-
menu nautica — kc^, ^p4<rtoPy rpomrrfip (1.2, 93. )f rapahs (7, 4a), Korr6s
(2, 84.), *A.«ol r&pwt&f (3, 15,\ iirofid^pa (4, 11.), — vtufsirouiJ^ai^lf 14.) nav-
wtiyMT^ai (31.), {tv^ai rits TdKaiiu ior§ v\»gt/»ovs ctrcu ical riis AXXas hrurK^fdffm
(1 , 29. ). hrly€toyf r^ipM, vccio'oucoi : — Portiks partes, cr6ita, ftvx6s, ictiKii ^ Xifd^
MtAif<rrof (2, 93. ) , — iwififiyeu M. r^ ravs, ififi^rat et ifffifjpoi is pauv — di^as-cipa^-
i^cu (7, 7.), Hopfi^ T^ wwr ftoi |w«x^«' ''V ^p^^ica^ (7, 14.), ipai (1, 29.),
cipairwf vau0-( et rks pavs Mt r^s T^f (1, 52.), iufdyftr^ai (I, 48.), i u mytayiip
iroicMrJ^at(4, 29) : — modus, quo Tela solvebant, describitur (6, 32.), iarraydytahai
(1, 29.), Ko^tXM^tip pads (2, 93.), — ip^/wp rupttp ( 1, 65. ), rrifmp kpiftm ie»rap4m
.pmr^cu (4,26.), AwXota (2, 85.)— Cibi nautici (3,49.), iLpeew\97p is inrafthp (1,104),
^f^ XPV ''opoar\€iy (2, 84.), iiwh mdXm a-Xetr (4, 25 ), Ko^curoi riLsicdrwas kwiarfi^w
Toi/a-Xot) (2,91.), Aa-mroA.c^u' (1, 137.), ^purr«p€<(ir;^ai (3, 80.J, rii <nifjtudHp^
(1,49.), hrtwatitpurTO &s is irarhovp (1, 50.), rii trxd^ eZXicoy iu^oMfA^pot r&p
pwp (1, 50.), tV »'M»' vpo<rtworfiamno ip9\6fjL99foi tA — pcuwyia icoi p€Kpo6s
(1, 54.), rpowtuop tirrtiaap, hpritrnitrap (ib.), ffprtp $\a0op povp, iip^wrap iw\ rh
'Piop rh *AxcuKhp »of)i rh rpontuop (2, 91.), rois ipoprlois tA ixtlpvp [povdyta ictd
pwpois] {fir6<rwop^ iLw49wrap (ib.), Kariw\§opisrhffrpafr6irt9op{l, 51.), leartdpHP
(1,37.); unde Kdfrapau (4,26.), icardywdai, Kororyttyfi (6, 42.), 6pidtw,6pt»U
iV^cU) ifV***", 2f>fM>»» saepissime — i^pfjdffeur^ai^A, 8.), i^pyuwrivi^ ipopfiutr^ai
Wb Tirof, seepe iwvXoxciv (7, 4.), iwvnipt'p. Subst. t^opftas (3,6.) et i^oppaiats
(8, 33.), icorfoxw, KorwrxfTp, Korwrxhaw U ti (7, 33. 4, 42.), sic crxe'r U
Ti etTO'i (5,2. 8,64.), &«'o^a(rccv cum ^i yrpf et sine eo, vtipe ^ ptsbtrrc&iJMP
wKoiwp (8, 6.), i^poKTW irTp9r6ir§iop (1, 118.), <rra6p0/Aa Ttpkriu pom (6, 66.),
modus quo valll eielluntar (7, 25.).



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AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPOMNE8IAN WAR. 411

CHAP. vn.

ON THE ATHENIAN LAND FORCES.

The forces of the Athenians ihemtehes must be distinguished
from those of the mercenaries^ and the auxiliary troops of the
allies ; and a distinction must also be made among the various
kinds of soldiers.

The Athenian heavy-armed, who were taken from the military
list (ix %aT<tkiyw)y were SJ9,000, of whom 16,000 were appointed for
the defence of the city and the forts. These, however, were not
all citizens, but also Metceci^ or sojourners. (1.2, 31.) Of horse^
or horse-archers, there were 1200 : a number which may seem
small, but it was large compared with that of the Peloponnesian
horse. Many could not keep horses, by reason of the ruggedness
of the soil of Attica, and because of the popular government.^
These horsemen, as also the heavy-armed (1. 3, 17.), seem to have
had servants, who cooked their food and carried their baggage,
and were, therefore, called ^pero*, ^x^Xot;&oi. (7, 75.) There were
also 1600 archers. Regular light infantry, as darters, slingers, or
Peltastae (i. e. middle-armed), they had few or none. Whenever
the Metoeci (as was the case when the population was called forth
en masse) were called out, they used such arms as were at hand.
(1.4,94.) As the Athenians were opulent, they were enabled to
hire excellent light-armed from foreign nations, Thracians, Cre-
tans, and others. (1.4,129. 5^6. 7, 27 and 29. 6,43. 7,57.)
This use of mercenaries afterwards tended much to the ruin of
Greece.

To advert to the forces of the allies, few of these, before the
treaty with the Argives, Mantinseans, and Eleans, furnished
heavy-armed. The Milesians, indeed, sent some to the expedition
against Cythera (1. 4, 54.) ; and in the army passing over to Sicily,
out of five thousand one hundred, two thousand two hundred and
^hy were Athenians, five hundred Argives, two hundred and fifty

* Alas, for the rich ! who could not, it seems, be allowed to keep a horse for
health or pleasure, lest their tant culottes brethren ^ould feel envy, and take offence
at their pride. Such was the state of things in a country where liberty and
equality were perpetually boatted of, but never attained g the higher classes
having to enjoy what wealth they were permitted to keep, by stealth ; as is the
case in Turkey at the present day. We should never have suspected society to be
in so unnatural a sUte, had not Aristophanes ^ven us more than a peep behind
the curtain : we might, indeed, scarcely be disposed to credit the satirist, were
not his representations confirmed by the testimony of Xen<^hon, Isocrates, Plato^
the Greek orators, &c. Ac. (Edit.)



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412 STATE OF GREECE, CIVIL AND MILITARY,

Mantinsans, and the rest consisted of the subject-allies. (1* 6> 43.)
If, however, the treaty with the nations of Peloponnesus, just
mentioned,niad been more lasting, the number of heavy infantry
would have considerably increased; since even the Eleans fur-
nished three thousand. (1. 5, 59 and 75.)

Among the allies who used light arms were the Acarnanians,
excellent slingers. (1. 2, 81.) The ^nians were Peltastse (1. 4,
28.), as were also the Methymnseans. (1.4, 129.) Tlie Rhodians
were slingers. (1. 6, 43.) Others were archers. See 1. 7, 57. 8,
69. Of the Grecian horse the best were the Thessalians, who,
however, only aided the Athenians during the first year of the
war. (I. 2, 22.) In the parts of Tlirace they were assisted by
some Macedonian horse. (1. 1, 61 and 63.)

These, then, were the forces of the Athenians, which, how-
ever, were dispersed throughout many countries, and could not
easily fight conjointly. (1. 2, 39.) It was only to neighbouring
countries 'that they* marched forth in full force, or en masse,
vay^tljAsi, Thus a very considerable force made an irruption into
Megara, consisting of thirteen thousand heavy-armed, of whom
three thousand were Metoeci, and no small number of light-
armed. (U 3, 31. See also 1. 3, 91.) To Delium they led forth not
only all the citizens and Metoeci of military age, but even the
foreigners staying in the city (L 4, 90.)* of whom the light-armed
were far more numerous than that of the enemy. In the first ex-
pedition to Sicily, the fleet conveyed five thousand one hundred
heavy-armed, four hundred and eighty archers, seven hundred
darters, one hundred and twenty Peltastse, and thirty horse (1. 6,
43.) ; who were afterwards joined by two hundred and fifty horse-
men, to be mounted in Sicily, and thirty horse archers. Lastly,
Demosthenes brought five thousand heavy-armed, and archers,
darters, and slingers in considerable numbers. (1. 7> 42.) These
were the greatest armies of the Athenians, in this war, united in
any one place. For, since the Peloponnesians were far superior in
number, the Athenians did not venture to encounter them in a
pitched battle (the only ones worthy of which name were, the
battle at Delium against the Boeotians, that at Amphipolis against
Brasidas, that between the Spartans and Argives, wherein the
Athenians participated, and the battles in Sicily*), but allowed'
their fields to be ravaged, and, cruising around Peloponnesus with
their fleets, made descents at all favourable spots> and committed



* The Author forgets the important and well-contested one with the Corin-
thians (1. 4, 43. )» «)d that near Megara. (Edit.)



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AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 413

rayages. Which^ that they might do in the winter also, and when
the greater part of the fleet was absent, they occupied the
islands near Peloponnesus ; and took in and fortified some penin-
sular promontories, and thus separated them from the continent.
Of this we have instances in Minoa (1. 3, 51.), Pylus (1. 4, S.),
Methone (1. 4, 45.), Cythera (1. 4, 53.) Compare 1. 5» 51 and 75.
Their allies, who were somewhat removed from the sea, they per-
suaded to carry down walls thereto, that if they should be blocked
up on the land side, they might receive supplies by sea. (1. 5, 82.

1, 103. 5> 52. 5, 82.) For, upon the whole, the Athenians were
thought very skilful in attacking fortified places {rux^t^axM I^mw
hwaro) ilvMf 1. 1, 102.) ; and, therefore, they did not decline a war
of siege. How rapidly they fortified places appears from what
was done at Pylus (1. 4, 3 and 4.) and Nisaea. (1. 4, 69.) They had
numerous carpenters (rcxroycf), and stone-masons (Kt^wfyoU 1. 4,
69., Xi^oUyoiy 1. ?» 43.) Of the iron tools used by these artificers
we have mention at 1, 5, 82. 6, 44. 4, 4. 4, 69. They, however,
not only stormed cities, but besieged them, till famine or sedition
should compel the inhabitants to submit. To this were applied the
terms ippo<rrca^i^S(T^at, irpo^nca^^^S^a*, irpw«Jf i«, &c. By famine Po-
tidaea and Melus were reduced; by famine and sedition My-
tilene ; by sedition Mende. That supplies might not be intro-
duced, the places were circumvallated {ift^itraixi^oyro w^qt^ or
ivtruxf^oyri), either (when there was no fear from an external
force) by a single wall, fortified with towers and castles, or some-
times by a double one, of circumvallation also. The labour of these
works was portioned out among the allied states (1. 5, 114. 5, 75.

2, 78.) ; on the completion of which, the major part of the army
returned home, and a garrison (^povpol, ^u^Xaxfc) was left to defend
the walls. The enemy impeded this circumvallation by making
sallies (cTcfi/yeu, ^r/foSoy nFottTa-dou iKtovfirtltf), and themselves carried
out transverse walls. (1. 6, 99. seq.)

The mode of engaging in battle was not destitute of art. Both
parties strove to carry out the wings (especially the right, 1. 5, 71.)
beyond the enemy's line, and thus outflank them (which was
termed ir<p»/%try rf xip<fj or vircpix»y : and, by the later writers, ^cp-
<paXccyyt7v and tnctpxtpfv). They laid ambushes in hollow and bushy
places, and made a sudden attack on the rear (xark »^ov), or
rushed on the flanks (so xt^^wrK U r^ ir>^7*a, 1. 4, 35.), surrounded
them (^xvxXotJyTo), and resorted to stratagems (xXf^*^«tT«) of every
kind. The enemy used to draw out (vir«f4y««y) their wings, so as
to equal those of the enemy ; by which, however, they sometimes
left an interval (§»<£x«yoy), at which the enemy rushed in (1. 5, 7.), as



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414 STATE OF GREECE, CIVIL AND MILITARY,

thej opposed other troops to those in ambush, or defended them^
selves by the ^orm of their array. The plan of array was chiefly
this : the heavy-arined were placed in the centre, the horse and
light-armed at the wings. Sometimes the army was distributed
into two divisions^ one placed in the rear, and as a corps de reserve
to the other, and called the ol ^«<t«xt«J : the depth was from eight
to sixteen, and sometimes twenty-five. (1.4,94.) There was
also a Trrpeiyww^ t<£{k, or square array, formed on emergencies,
consisting of heavy-armed, and within which the light-armed,
baggage-bearers, &c., were placed ; and a %A/er-armed corps
was appointed to charge upon the enemy, on occasion. (1. 4, 125.)
The battle commenced with skirmishing on the part of the light*
armed ; meanwhile, the respective generals delivered harangues,
the soothsayers and augurs offered up sacrifices, and the trum-
peters, &c. sounded a sort of battle-march. The heavy-armed
were of most consequence, and these maintained a close combat
(<rr(iha or avaraZlp fMtxh)* the opposite to which was ire^wrro^iy
wpo<r€oXfi. (1. 7, 81.) The respective armies, as soon as they had
sung the paean, rushed on ( ir/»«<r€/«f «> 5^;*f> 1-4?, 96.), and fought
hand to hand (ii x^'^P^i ^eveM or ^X^erv, kv xep<rl ^/^yeo-Sa*, and tlfcu).
They used their shields for pushing and breaking the enemy's
line. (1. 4, 96. 5, 73. 6, 70.) Sometimes, however, the light-
armed poured in their volleys from a distance (U »©XXoiJ, 1. 4, 32.),
pressing upon the enemy when he retreated, but giving way when
he attacked. (1.2,79. 3,97.) They, by the lightness of their
armour, easily outstripped the heavy-armed, and were often of
great service. By these the Athenians at Spartolus (1. 2, 79.), in
JEtolia (1. 3, 97.), and in Sicily, on the retreat from Syracuse (1. 7,
79.), and the Lacedaemonians at Sphacteria (1. 4, 32.), were van-
quished.* The horse very rarely decided battles ; though some
instances are found at 1. 4, 44 and 96. 2, 79. Their use was
greater before and after battles, in covering the retreat of an
army, or in harassing an invading force, by cutting off stragglers
and parties sent out for wood and water. (1. 7, 13.)

The battles (of which only one in this war was nocturnal) were
obstinate (K«^T«pai), but not bloody. (See 1. 3, 99. 4,44. 4, 101. 5,
11. 6,71. 5,74.

Of commanders among the Athenians there were generally
three (1. 4, 42 ^^^ 53.) ; sometimes two (1. 4, 89 and 129.) ; and
occasionally with full powers to decide on the magnitude of the



• In both these last cases, howe? er, there seem to ha? e been tome heav j-armed
employed. (Edit)



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AT THE BEGINNINQ OF THE PELOPONNE8IAN WAR. 415

army, and all the details of an expedition. (1. 6> 26.) But it was
difficult for them, by reason of the general feeling of liberty inhe-
rent in democracy, to preserve military discipline (1. 7> 14.) ; which
we also see in the Syracusans. (1. 6, 69, and elsewhere.)



CHAP. VIII.



ON THE GENIUS AND POLITICAL FEELINGS OP THE ATHENIANS, THEIR
MODE OP ADMINISTERING PUBLIC APPAIRS, AND THEIR CHIEF PER*
80NAGE8.*

Public afiairs were debated and determined in an assembly of
the people (rjf rov ^fMv ^xXi90-/f ), called by the senate, or council
of ballot (jSet/X^ Tjf SvK^ ToS %vdiAov\ 1. 8, 66.)9 which body was some-
times addressed previously to the people. (1. 5, 45.)

The people determined en dernier ressort concerning war or
peace (1. 1, 139.), alliance (1. 1, 31, 5, 45.)> the magnitude of
armies (1. 6, 24. seqq.)9 the fate of the vanquished (1. 3, 36.), the
mode of administration of the city, and its magistrates (1. 8, 67*)»
and on public offences. (1. 6, 29 and 60.) It created generals (1. 2,
65. 6, 7.)> substituted others in their place (1. 4, 28.), and, by its
sufirages, which the Prytanis (i. e. the president of the Prytanes),
after he had given the orators permission to speak (yv^fAaqvptfj^iiKt)^
used to put or propose (rogabat), which was called imf^^i^c^y,
^^oy iw^u)ff it decreed and confirmed every matter of conse-
quence. (1. 8, 69.) t



* For what is said on the first of these heads, the Editor must r«fer to the
original. The paraliek drawn by Thucydides, at 1. 1, 7a & 9, 37., maj abun-
dandj suffice.

f The places of meeting mentioned in Thucydides, are the Pnjx (1. 8, 97.),
where the people utuatty met ; the temple of Bacchus, near Munydiia (1. 8, 93.),
and the Colonus. (1. 8, 67.) Here may be noted the phrases iiackiialay ir«ic>
and iroi9iir^aty rhif Kj/jlow (vAX^cty, ^^KKffCat r^ iiacXriaUtF is rh KoXmp6w (8. 67. ),
yp^fAJiy iffwrfKfXw h rhf 9fifwp (ib.), pi^opas hrUyai (6, 29. )i ^aptSrr^s^ vaptK^
b6pT9s fiKryow, (1, 139.) The following are the magistrate of the Athenians
(o/ ip WAci, 3, 36., al Mfifut itpx^ (5, 47.), mention^ in Thucydides : ol iwwia
kp^ovm, who, in the time of Cylon, administered the greatest part of public
affiurs (U I, 186.); npvr^ii, who are ordered to administer the oath to the other
magistimtes, in the ArgiTe treaty H. 5, 47.); Tpaiifun^s (7, la) : after the defeat
in Sicily, kpixJh rts irpwfivrdpcnf Mpdp, tXriPts wtfA rmw irap6vrwf vpo^/SovAc^outrc
(8, 1.); afterwards (vyypo^Tf oArittfin'opn (8, 67.), by whom tlit form of
gOTemment was changed.



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416 STATE OF GREECE, CIVIL AND MILITARY,

Sometimes thej consulted twice about the same thing (when
the Prjtanes are said aZ^^ Ty^/^c^y or hayr^fAfiy wp^^weu and ^b«^-
9/^«y, 1.3, 36 and 92. 6,14.), and in the second assembly re-
scinded the decree («f^^/<rfiara) of the former. Thus it was in the
deliberation on the treaty with the Corcyraeans (1, 44.), and on the
punishment of the My tileneans ( 3, 36.)» and on the expedition to
Sicily, though it appears to have been not without offence and
danger. ♦



CHAP. IX.



ON THB NATURE AND EXTENT OP THE LACEOiBMONIAN CONFEDERACY.

The Lacedemonian Confederacy seems, at first sight, to have been
formed on far juster principles, and, as far as respected the exter-
nal condition of the states, was really much more equitable than
the Athenian ; for its first law was, that each of the states should be
free and self-governed. Thus, in the treaties between the Lace-
daemonians and Argives, it is expressly laid down, '< that all the
cities of Peloponnesus shall be free, according to the custom of
their country" (though we shall see that this first law of the Pelo-
ponnesian treaty was perpetually violated by the Arcadians and
£leans). These allies did not pay tribute (o^ twortXtT^ ^^pev, 1,
19.); but, where there was need, they made contributions of
money (co-^p^, 1, 141.). AH, moreover, had equal right of suf-
fhige (ir^^tf t<ri^^t)y and consulted in congress on all matters of
importance, when the opinion of the majority was abided by and
acted upon, unless some impediment of a religious nature arose.
(1. 5> 30.) Thus the Lacedaemonians did not decree the war
against the Athenians before they had held a congress (a^y^h^y) of
the allies, and put the question to the states, great and small, (i. ],
87 and 119 and 125.) Thus they take counsel with them on ad-
mitting the Mytilenseans into the confederacy. (1.3,8.) To the
treaties entered into with Athens, the ambassadors [or deputies.
Edit.] from the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, and Me-
garsans subscribe their names. (1.4, 118.) The peace of Nicias
and Plistoanax some of the allies received, others rejected. (1. 5»

• The part trMting on the great statcsmeii and generals the Editor has
omitted, as containing nothing of originality or importance.



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AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 417

19.) In case there were any disputes between the federate states,
these, if respecting private persons, were to be decided equitably
(hi TJf r<n} xa* i/M^qi)y according to the laws of the state in whose
territory the dispute originated ; but if they regarded the states
themselvesy they were to be determined by impartial arbitration.
(1-5, 79.) The Lacedaemonians, therefore, who held the supre-
macy, seem almost alone, in comparison with the other states, to
have obtained these rights : — first, they presided at the congresses,
and thus convoked the allies to Lacedaemon (1. 1,87 and 119.), or
sometimes Olympia. (1.3,8.) They proposed the affairs to be
deliberated on, and put the question to vote, (^(pw iiniywy 1 , 87
and 119 and 125.) Then they superintended the execution of
what was determined on; and in war, they held the supreme
command. Hence they sent round summonses (tci^trfyyuXwy 2, 8.
4, 8. €TaiaPy 8, S.) to the rest, when and with what quotas of troops
and quantity of provisions they were to repair to the general
muster, for a common expedition ; and the expenses of the war
were laid out by them. (1. 2, 7«) Again, though the states had
each their commanders (oiparyiytii xarit irA<ft(), yet with these
were sometimes associated Lacedaemonian officers (called it^ayot
(wtftarSTt^ hLdtmt^ ifiXtvq, 2, 75.), and the whole army was com-
manded by a Lacedaemonian king, as also the fleet by a La-
cedaemonian vai/apxo^, or admiral in chief. Hence it appears
that the principles of the confederacy, though not very unfair,
were exceedingly imperfect. For they were destitute of a per-
petual common-council, the congresses were tardily held, and
when convened, by different nations deliberating, each as suited
its private interest, the good of the community was postponed, and
each was desirous to throw the trouble and danger upon the rest.
(1. 1, 141 •) Whence arose a great tardiness in their deliberations ;
and, if the thing were decided to be done, excuses were never
wanting for delaying the execution of the general orders from
Lacedaemon. Besides, the very equity of the league was a merl
crafty deceit ; for, in the first place, the Lacedaemonians, who
boasted that they would restore freedom to Greece (1. 1, 69. 2, 8.),
subjected it to the domination of the fewy which they set up in
all the federate cities. (1. 1, 19 and 76. 5, 8.) Again, there was
a suspicion (amply confirmed by subsequent events) that they
only granted the allies an outside show of liberty, in order to
withdraw them from the Athenians. (1. 1, 76.) For, in the treaties



Online LibraryThucydidesThe History of Thucydides. Newly tr. into English...with very copious annotations...Prefixed, is an entirely new life of Thucydides: with a memoir of the state of Greece, civil & military, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war → online text (page 50 of 59)