United States. Congress. House. Committee on Inter.

U.S. interests in South Asia : hearings before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first and second session, December 5, 1995 and April 18, 1996 online

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Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. House. Committee on InterU.S. interests in South Asia : hearings before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first and second session, December 5, 1995 and April 18, 1996 → online text (page 3 of 19)
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hearing will serve to ease those concerns by clarifying a number of
apparent misunderstandings.

Let me first of all emphasize the Brown Amendment will not re-
establish an arms supply relationship between the United States
and Pakistan. Under Brown, a one-time-only exception to the Pres-
sler Amendment will permit us to release about $370,000,000



15

worth of military equipment that has been embargoed under Pres-
sler sanctions.

A second Brown-related concern is that the military equipment
that we would release to Pakistan might upset the regional bal-
ance. A list of the equipment to be released is attached to this writ-
ten statement. We have carefully reviewed the items on this list
and have concluded that releasing it to Pakistan will not upset the
Indo-Pak conventional arms balance. I would be happy to respond
in more depth to any questions regarding the impact of specific
items to be released. My written testimony already does that.

I would emphasize that in regard to the Pakistani F-16s we have
no plans or intention to deliver them to Pakistan, unless it com-
plies with the Pressler Amendment. Instead, we are seeking to re-
solve the F-16 issue by selling the aircraft to a third country and
returning the proceeds to Pakistan.

While the Brown Amendment does not permit a reestablishment
of an arms supply relationship, it does permit us to provide limited
military assistance to Pakistan in areas of great importance to the
United States.

As I indicated earlier, the Brown Amendment will enable the De-
partment of Defense to work more effectively with the Pakistani
Armed Forces in peacekeeping, an ti -terrorism and counternar-
cotics. We believe such cooperation will serve the United States as
well as Pakistani interests. Authority to facilitate military-to-mili-
tary contacts and training to include reestablishing the IMET pro-
gram will enable us to engage the Pakistani military more effec-
tively.

In closing, I would like to emphasize that the Department of De-
fense views South Asia as an important region for a number of rea-
sons, most importantly because of the potential for nuclear conflict.

We believe that we can best pursue our interests in the region
to include nuclear and missile non-proliferation by engaging the
militaries of the various countries of the region, particularly those
of India and Pakistan.

To that end, I am pleased to report that this Administration has
made important and substantial progress in our military relation-
ships with the countries of South Asia.

I am happy to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Riedel appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Secretary Riedel. Congratulations,
you finished right on the button for 10 minutes.

I would begin the questioning by asking you, Secretary Raphel,
what role, if any, do you think the United States has in helping
to find a solution to the Kashmir problem?

Ms. Raphel. Mr. Chairman, as I have said in my statement, we
have repeatedly said that we are willing to play a facilitative role,
if all parties welcome that, particularly India and Pakistan. Up to
this point, Pakistan has and India has not.

But failing any kind of direct role and let it be said that I am
not promoting that, what we have tried to do is to stay in touch
with all the parties, the government of Pakistan, the government
of India, the Kashmiri leadership, the various Kashmiri leaders
themselves, to urge forward-looking thinking, compromise, political
solutions.



16

Specifically with the Pakistanis, I repeat, we have urged them to
do everything they can to stop military support for the Kashmiri
militants going across their borders. This only enhances, rather
than reduces tensions.

We have urged the government of India to engage politically with
Kashmiri leadership. We have provided a forum, what we call track
two diplomacy for Indians and Pakistanis to talk, private sector
people to talk about the issues that concern the two countries and
Kashmir, of course, is on that list.

So on the margins and in our bilateral diplomacy, we are urging
people to lean forward, to look to the future and not to the past
and to get this resolved as soon as possible. I think it is a drag on
the whole region, particularly on India and Pakistan.

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. My second question and I guess prob-
ably my last question under the limit is addressed to both of you.

My overall impression from listening to your statements is that
the U.S. effort is not having much impact on the decline in Indo-
Pakistani relations and the movement toward the deployment of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

I would ask, is that a fair characterization of the issue and if it
is — if, in effect we are not having a positive impact on these two
crucial issues, problems — what other options are being considered
by the Administration?

Secretary Riedel, would you like to go first, since it is first and
foremost a security question?

Secretary Raphel, if you wish.

Ms. Raphel. In my prepared statement, I was trying to make the
point that there are core security perceptions, both in Pakistan and
in India that make both governments think they need a nuclear op-
tion and the trimmings, delivery systems, ballistic missiles and so
on.

It is very hard for an outside power to change those core security
and threat perceptions and those definitions of what national secu-
rity means for another sovereign state.

But that being said, I think we have made a certain amount of
progress in recent years in shedding light again on the margins of
how these countries view, for example, the potential for ballistic
missile systems. What would that mean for the region.

I think for a long time, people thought that there was no concern
here. There was no potential slippery slope. I think we have gotten
the attention of both countries on that particular point.

Similarly, on the nuclear side, with all that we have engaged in
with the Russians on nuclear disarmament and so on, there are ex-
amples out there of how to handle these issues, of how threat per-
ceptions can evolve.

So, I think there has been quite a bit of education that has gone
on, even though we have not touched the core issues.

Mr. Bereuter. Secretary Riedel, do you care to respond?

Mr. Riedel. If I could just add one point. When this Administra-
tion came into office, our relations with the respective military and
defense establishments of both India and Pakistan were really
quite small.

With India, because of the cold war, we had basically had a dis-
tant relationship for some time. With Pakistan, because of their ac-



17

tions which led to the Pressler Amendment, a well established rela-
tionship had been considerably atrophied.

What we have sought to do is try to get those relationships start-
ed up again, and begin a program of engagement, but it is going to
take quite a long time.

In the process of that engagement, we hope that we will be able
to give them insights from our own experience in the cold war and
in other areas which may help them in thinking their problems
through in more realistic ways.

But it is going to be very difficult. For example, when we met
with our Indian counterparts this September, one member of their
delegation noted it was his first visit to Washington versus 19 pre-
vious trips to Moscow.

So, we had a great deal of hard work there to do to start convinc-
ing him of the value of a relationship with the United States.

Mr. Bereuter. Without objection, I think Mr. Berman wishes to
swap his time with Mr. Ackerman as a personal courtesy; is that
correct, Mr. Ackerman?

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much and Mr. Berman, thank
you very much as well.

We have gone through a rather testy period of going through the
Brown Amendment here in the Congress, which was basically
packaged to us as a one-time exception to the Pressler Amendment.

I note that Secretary Riedel has taken great pains to restate that
in his testimony and to cite the President's policy as a reason for
that, claiming that this is and I will quote from page nine of the
testimony, "A one-time exception to Pressler to permit the release
of the embargoed equipment.

"I want to assure all concerned that there will be no arms supply
relationship with Pakistan until such time as the requirements of
the Pressler Amendment are met in full. That is, until the Presi-
dent can certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon."

I just wanted to check with you, Secretary Raphel, to make sure
that the State Department and the Defense Department are recit-
ing from the same hymnal and that it is your view as well that this
is a one-time exception to Pressler, as was packaged to us.

Ms. Raphel. Absolutely, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. I just wanted one other
further clarification, if I might. In response to the Chairman's
question and I am not sure which of you said it at this point, but
it was that India had rejected outside assistance in settling the
Kashmiri dispute and that Pakistan had not.

Did you mean to say that Pakistan was looking toward inter-
nationalizing the dispute and India wanted to not do that or that
India rejects any suggestions or support or enabling vehicles that
might be suggested or proposed by friends on the outside?

Ms. Raphel. I simply meant to say that Pakistan has over the
years urged us to become involved to help resolve this dispute.
India sees it purely as a bilateral dispute with Pakistan. We are
not putting a value judgment on that one way or another.

Mr. Ackerman. But indeed you do speak with the Indians about
the Kashmiri issue and exchange views as well as with the Paki-
stanis?

Ms. Raphel. Indeed we do.



18

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The gentleman from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Raphel, I characterized the Kashmiri problem as a fun-
damental to bringing peace to South Asia. Do you think I over-
stated that?

Ms. Raphel. No, Congressman.

Mr. Rohrabacher. I am sure the people of India and the people
of Pakistan want to put this dispute behind them and the peoples
would like to do that.

Am I incorrect and again I am honestly asking this because I
may have wrong information or misreading things, are we not just
basically talking about some sort of plebocite that could be offered
to the people of Kashmir to determine what they want?

Would that not basically solve people's problems there?

Ms. RAPHEL. To be fair, I think it is a little more complicated.
The earlier U.N. resolutions called for a plebocite.

Some Kashmiris and the government of Pakistan have, over the
years, urged that those resolutions be implemented. The difficulty
is that a Fot of history has gone by since that time, No. 1.

No. 2, the government of India, at this time, does not share the
view that those resolutions are still relevant and third, in practical
terms, as I said in my statement, it is time to move forward, not
to look to past prescriptions, but to come up with a prescription
that fits the situation on the ground and current political realities.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There is nothing that fits any formula better
than a free election, as far as this Congressman is concerned.

If people do not have the right to determine their own destiny,
they will turn to violence and that is exactly what has happened
in Kashmir.

To the degree that there is terrorism that exists and we should
oppose terrorism, we as Americans do not believe that people
should be shooting police officers or businessmen or whatever and
we do oppose that and I oppose that. I think it is wrong.

To the degree that people are not permitted the right of the bal-
lot, they quite often and I think history shows us, they will turn
to the bullet.

I would hope that this spiraling waste of money that is going on
in this horrendous arms race and for these people an extra two or
three million dollars or $20,000,000 for a couple of jets means a lot
more to their standard of living than it does for the American peo-
ple and we do not want to waste our money on weapons that are
unnecessary.

So, I do not have any complaints about the way the Administra-
tion has been handling it, but I would say that whether we are
talking about the Pressler Amendment or the Brown Amendment
or whatever it is, these things would not be relevant, if we could
just give the people of Kashmir a vote and then things might settle
down there.

One other issue very quickly. I have spent a lot of time and ef-
fort, as you know, trying to find an end or some solution to the sit-
uation in Afghanistan.



19

Some people in Afghanistan involved in this arena have been
suggesting that perhaps there has been some opposition from our
own government to the King of Afghanistan returning, if the course
of events leads in that direction.

Do you have any position on that? Does the Administration have
an official position on that?

Ms. Raphel. Can I just make one comment on your previous
statement? One, to say that we certainly share your concerns with
resources going into military equipment and so on. Totally share
that.

But it is a little more complicated than just having an election.
It does depend on the frame of reference, what is on offer, what is
being voted for or against, all of those complications come into play.

So I want it to be registered that we recognize that it is a little
more complicated than that.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Usually when you are working with dip-
lomats and lawyers, things get very complicated. Go right ahead.

Ms. Raphel. On Afghanistan, let me repeat. If the former King
of Afghanistan were to be accepted and requested to return to Af-
ghanistan, if the Afghan people would like to have the former King
come back, the transitional figure as I have heard a lot of Afghans
suggest in recent months, by all means it is not our place to object
and frankly whatever works, again, to bring that sorry chapter to
an end we would certainly support.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.

Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Chairman.

The gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, we all know that India does have nuclear ca-
pability, even though it exploded only one nuclear device. Some
have even estimated that India now probably possesses 80 nuclear
warheads or nuclear bombs, if you want to call it that.

By somewhat of a contradiction in my reading, we are trying to
restrict Pakistan from having similar capability. Of course it is in
Pakistan's national interest, the fact that they are somewhat mili-
tarily imbalanced if India has the upper hand as far as nuclear
testing is concerned or having nuclear capability.

I just wanted to ask you, we are trying to tell Pakistan that they
cannot do this, but we continue to allow France to continue its nu-
clear testing program to improve its missile delivery system and I
wanted your comments on this.

Ms. Raphel. If I may stick to the South Asian context. In our
view, both India and Pakistan are now nuclear capable.

Legislation has focused on Pakistan in the past, because India
exploded a nuclear device before the relevant legislation came into
play and because it is widely perceived that Pakistan developed its
nuclear capability by importing technology parts and so on and so
forth.

Mr. Faleomavaega. Madam Secretary, do you see the sense of
hypocrisy that we are faced with here? India needed only to prove
to the world that it also has nuclear capability by exploding just
one device.



20

The Prime Minister of India appealed to the United Nations that
we want to clear of anything dealing with proliferation of nuclear
bomb, warheads or whatever you want to call it.

But not the super powers that have the capability. No, we cannot
do this. No, we have to continue having a nuclear capability as a
deterrent. This is the magic word that we are using all over now.
It is a deterrent.

Now, whether you call it history or what, this is what we are
faced with here. What right do we have to tell Pakistan that it can-
not do this when militarily it does not have the capability, simply
because India has the upper hand as far as nuclear capability is
concerned?

Ms. Raphel. We are not talking about rights or wrongs here. We
are talking about a practical problem of how we respond to the fact
that both India and Pakistan, neither of which are signatories to
the NPT, neither of which are declared nuclear powers, have a nu-
clear capability and how we can best work in the region, work indi-
vidually with those countries, with the region as a whole to make
sure that this capability does not move beyond the region and is
contained within those countries.

It is not a question of what is right or wrong. It is a question
of what is in our interest and what is in the interest of global sta-
bility and regional stability.

Mr. Faleomavaega. I notice Secretary Riedel did mention that
in our IMET program we are giving $200,000 to Pakistan mili-
tarily. This is not even the worth of one tank. Is this a joke?

Mr. Riedel. This goes for training programs to allow Pakistani
officers to take training courses in the United States.

We find over the years that IMET programs are among the most
successful ways of helping to encourage foreign military officers to
have a better understanding of how the American system works, of
understanding American concerns about global issues. Penny for
penny, it may be one of the most effective programs we have.

Mr. Faleomavaega. So my concern here, Madam Secretary and
Mr. Secretary, is that we all know that the five members of the nu-
clear club have the capability, but they do not even agree among
themselves how we should go about controlling this proliferation of
nuclear arms race.

So we are telling Third World countries we cannot do this and
yet the super five members cannot even agree among themselves
on how to best address that issue. That is my question.

My time is done. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Bereuter. I will regard that as a rhetorical question in light
of the previous one. Is that all right?

Mr. Faleomavaega. I did make it as a question. It was just a
slight observation of what is happening.

Mr. Bereuter. The gentleman from California, the vice-chair-
man.

Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to ask if my full opening statement and referenced
articles could appear in the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There have been repeated reports in the press of Chinese M-ll
missile transfers to Pakistan. These reports include quotes from



21

U.S. intelligence sources that we have photographs of M-ll mis-
siles in shipping crates at Pakistan military installations.

The Administration continues to take the view that conclusive
evidence of the transfer is not available. It is my understanding
that if the Administration were to have conclusive evidence of the
transfer, then sanctions would be triggered against China.

I would like to know what the Administration would consider
conclusive evidence of the transfer. That would be my first ques-
tion.

Second, there is a feeling by many of us in Congress that the Ad-
ministration is unwilling to act on the intelligence we do have, be-
cause it would further complicate our relations with China.

On October 18, 1994, President Clinton had stated and I quote,
'There is nothing more important to our security and the world
stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ballis-
tic missiles."

By failing to act on the M-ll transfers from China to Pakistan,
is the Administration now taking the position that assuaging the
Chinese is more important than our non-proliferation policy?

Ms. Raphel. Congressman, you correctly report or cite the Ad-
ministration's view that we do not have conclusive evidence that
China has transferred M-ll missiles to Pakistan.

We do have a lot of evidence. I do not want to get into it in this
kind of forum, but it is not conclusive evidence.

China and Pakistan have both said to us that China has not
transferred and Pakistan has not received MTCR class missiles.
That statement you can evaluate in many different ways, but for
the record, that is their official position.

I would say again, we do not have conclusive evidence. If we did,
sanctions would come into play, both against Pakistan and against
entities in China that had transferred these missiles.

Mr. Berman. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Royce. Let me ask one question and then I will yield.

Would photographs be conclusive evidence? Then I will yield to
the gentleman from California.

Ms. Raphel. I would prefer not to get into defining what would
be conclusive evidence. Again, in a different forum we would be
happy to discuss it.

Mr. Royce. Let me yield to my colleague, Mr. Berman.

Mr. Berman. The one question I wanted to ask was, does the Ad-
ministration consider the M-ll to be a missile within the scope of
the missile technology control regime? Does our Administration,
the United States, consider M-ll to be such a missile?

Mr. Riedel. That question is also not as easy to answer as it
first appears, because much would depend on the precise missile
that we were talking about, which is why it is difficult to enunciate
exactly how we would know you have violation of the MTCR re-

fime. It would require an abundance of intelligence of different
inds.

Mr. Berman. My question was, if it could carry a certain amount
of weight a certain distance, it was covered. I am sorry to take the
gentleman's time.

Mr. Riedel. In broad terms that is correct. When we have seen
the missile tested in China, it has gone that kind of distance. The



22

question is, we cannot know what type of that missile might be ex-
ported, if it has been exported.

Mr. Bereuter. The time of the gentleman has expired. Perhaps
the gentleman from California would want to yield on his 5 min-
utes. He is finished? All right.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman, then is recognized.

Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I might say in sort of following up on Mr. Faleomavaega's ques-
tions and I think the response. We are not dealing here with ques-
tions necessarily of rights or hypocrisies.

We had a treaty regime signed at a certain point. Certain states
were not initial signatories and Pakistan was not one of them. Peo-
ple not in the "nuclear club" have frequently raised with us the hy-
pocrisy of the distinction between the haves or the have nots.

That does not take away from U.S. interest in limiting the num-
ber of nuclear powers or in any way, I think, undercut the impor-
tance of non-proliferation regimes, but there was a quid pro quo
thrown out, which was, why do not you guys who are in the club
stop testing?

India and Pakistan, as I understood it, at least at one point ac-
cepted that position. Now I understand that in recent months there
seems to be some backing away by both countries from the support
for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

I was wondering if my information is correct, if you could com-
ment on it, what we are doing about it, is this accurate?

Ms. Raphel. Let me say a couple of things in response to that.
Over the last couple of years, both India and Pakistan have cooper-
ated with us in our pursuit of a comprehensive test ban and fissile
material cutoff treaty.

In recent months, since the NPT review conference, there seems
to have been some re-evaluation of support, particularly for the
comprehensive test ban.

In part, this is because there is the feeling among some that
there is no definitive government of India or government of Paki-
stan position that has changed on this. But there is certainly the
feeling among some that indefinite extension of the NPT treaty
means that there is now not enough incentive for the nuclear pow-
ers to proceed in a time-bound manner with nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, there is talk about holding the CTBT and the FMCT
treaties, which the nuclear powers care about, hostage to some
kind of nuclear disarmament schedule.

You hear talk about this in India. Certainly now among defense
experts. To a degree in Pakistan. So that is definitely out there.

Mr. Berman. But it is not an official government position.

Ms. Raphel. It is not an official government position at this
point and needless to say, we are working with both governments
to persuade them of the need to move quickly on both of these trea-


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Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. House. Committee on InterU.S. interests in South Asia : hearings before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first and second session, December 5, 1995 and April 18, 1996 → online text (page 3 of 19)