United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Arme.

Efforts to determine the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related programs : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, January 28, 2004 online

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S. Hrg. 108-678



EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF IRAQI
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELAT-
ED PROGRAMS




Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-678

Efforts To Determine The Status

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION



JANUARY 28, 2004



Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



SUPERlMTEr>iQE?iT OF DOCUMENTS
DEPOSITORY




BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS




U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-675 PDF WASHINGTON : 2004



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax; (202) 512-2250 Mail; Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001



S. Hrg. 108-678



EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF IRAQI
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND REUT-
ED PROGRAMS




Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-678

Efforts To Determine The Status



BEFORE THE



COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION



JANUAEY 28, 2004



Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



SUPHRIMTENQE^^T OF DGCiJ^
DePOSITGR^'



JAN 1 4



^jz^



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS



96-675 PDF



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2004



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001



COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES



JOHN WARNER,
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JOHN CORNYN, Texas



Virginia, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JACK REED, Rhode Island
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BILL NELSON, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas



Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director



(11)



CONTENTS



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Efforts to Determine the Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction
AND Related Programs

JANUARY 28, 2004

Pag

Kay, Dr. David, Former Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence
on Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

(HI)



EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF
IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND RELATED PROGRAMS



WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2004

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:05 a.m., in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Colhns, Ensign, Dole, Cornyn, Levin,
Kennedy, B3rrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson,
Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.

Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff direc-
tor; and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.

Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional
staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Regina A. Dubey, re-
search assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Lucian L. Nie-
meyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Richard F.
Walsh, counsel.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic
staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Rich-
ard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, pro-
fessional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter
K. Levine, minority counsel; and William G.P. Monahan, minority
counsel.

Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C. Brewer, An-
drew W. Florell, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell, assist-
ant to Senator Inhofe; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator
Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway
II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to
Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign;
Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Sen-
ator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn;
Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans
and Terrence E. Sauvain, assistants to Senator Bjrrd; Elizabeth
King, assistant to Senator Reed; Caroline Tess, assistant to Sen-
ator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator E. Benjamin Nel-

(1)



son; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro,
assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator
Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,
CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to review a far-
ther report, and I stress a further report, from Dr. David Kay on
his efforts and the efforts of the team which he was privileged to
work with, known as the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). He served as
the special advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in
determining the status of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
related programs in Iraq.

After assuming this position last July, Dr. Kay made his initial
interim official report to this committee on October 3. As members
of the committee are aware, Dr. Kay has stepped down from this
position and has been succeeded by Charles A. Duelfer, a former
colleague and member of the U.N. Special Commission with Dr.
Kay, who has been appointed by Director Tenet to continue this
important mission. I met with Mr. Duelfer the day before yesterday
and we just momentarily met with him in the Intelligence Commit-
tee room.

Dr. Kay volunteered, and I emphasize that, volunteered to re-
sume his public service, worked diligently for 6 months in Iraq
under difficult and often dangerous conditions, and just concluded
his work last week and reported to the DCI. I thank you and I
thank your wife for your public service.

Working with General Dajrton and the ISG, your mission was to
search for all facts, I repeat all facts, relevant to the many issues
about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related programs. You
initiated what was and continues, I emphasize continues, to be a
very difficult, complex mission, that in your own words is yet to be
completed.

As you cautioned us when you took up this post in July, patience
is required to ensure we complete a thorough assessment of this
important issue. In this hearing today, we hope to receive your as-
sessment of what has been accomplished to date, I repeat to date,
and what, in your professional judgment remains to be done by the
ISG. It is far too early to reach any final judgments or conclusions.

In recent days, I mentioned I met with General Dayton, I met
extensively with Dr. Kay over the recess period, and Mr. Duelfer,
and have received the assurances of General Dayton and Mr.
Duelfer that they will be prepared to present to Congress a second
official interim report of the ISG in the timeframe of late March.

It is crucial that the important work of the ISG go on. Thus far,
the findings have been significant. Dr. Kay has stated that al-
though we've not found evidence of large stockpiles of WMD or for-
ward-deployed weapons, the ISG has made the following evidence
as a part of their record that will be forthcoming: first, evidence of
Saddam Hussein's intent to pursue WMD programs on a large
scale; actual, ongoing chemical and biological research programs;
an active program to use the deadly chemical ricin as a weapon,
a program that was interrupted only by the start of the war in
March; evidence of long-range missile programs that, in all prob-



ability, were ultimately going to be used to deliver WMD; evidence
that Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his fledgling
nuclear program as late as 2001; and most important, evidence
that clearly indicates Saddam Hussein was conducting a wide
range of activities in clear contravention of the United Nations' res-
olutions.

As you recently stated, Dr. Kay, and I quote you, "It was reason-
able to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. What we
learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place
potentially than in fact we thought it was even before the war."
Further, you said on NBC's Today show on Tuesday that it was
"absolutely prudent for the U.S. to go to war."

Dr. Kay, I concur in those conclusions. I believe a real and grow-
ing threat has been eliminated and a coalition of nations acted pru-
dently in the cause of freedom. I'd be interested if you concur in
my conclusions.

While some have asserted that the President and his senior advi-
sors may have exaggerated or manipulated pre-war intelligence on
Iraq's WMD programs. Dr. Kay reached the following conclusion,
which I think is different. As you stated recently, "We have to re-
member that this view of Iraq (pre-war assessment of WMD capa-
bilities) was held during the Clinton administration and did not
change in the Bush administration. It is not a political got-you
issue. Often, estimates are different than reality. The important
thing is, when they differ, to understand why."

That's precisely why I called this meeting, Dr. Kay, to continue
the work of this committee in developing a body of fact from which
reasonable people at the conclusion of that collection of facts can
reach their own objective thoughts and conclusions. It's been a dif-
ficult process, but the ISO work is not completed.

Now, you have stated that you believe there did not exist large
stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, but I hope that you
will, in your testimony, indicate that since the work is not com-
pleted, since Iraq is as big as California and Baghdad approximates
the sprawling territory of Los Angeles, that we could find caches
and reserves of weapons of mass destruction, chemical or biological,
or even further evidence about the nuclear program.

We also would hope that you'd address the question of whether
or not Saddam Hussein had some kind of "breakout" capability for
quickly producing chemical or biological weapons, and was this not
a basis for constituting a conclusion that there was an imminent
threat from Saddam Hussein and his military.

Why were the Iraqi WMD records systematically looted or de-
stroyed, and why do scientists in custody today continue not to be
forthcoming, if there was nothing to hide or nothing substantial ex-
isted?

The work of the ISG has shown that Saddam Hussein had WMD
intentions, had WMD programs that did survive, and did outwit for
12 years the United Nations Security Council and the resolutions,
indeed, the inspections in large measure. If ultimately the findings
of the ISG do differ from the pre-war assessments of our Intel-
ligence Community, differ from assessments of the United Nations,
differ from assessments of intelligence services of many other na-
tions, indeed, that is cause for concern. But we are not there yet



in terms of the totality of fact on which to draw such serious con-
clusions.

Today and tomorrow our policymakers must be able to rely on
the intelligence they are provided. The safety and security of the
men and women of the Armed Forces are dependent on intel-
ligence, and indeed, the security of our Nation. So collectively all
of us, Congress, the executive branch, and other nations, we must
vigorously continue to pursue the collection of the facts as the ISG
is doing, and upon that completion, then draw our conclusions and
take such corrective measures as may be necessary.

As we speak, over 1,400 individuals, military and civilian, are on
the ground in Iraq seeking the facts about Iraq's WMD programs.
I have confidence in the commitment and the ability of General
Dayton, Mr. Duelfer, your successor, and representatives from our
coalition partners to complete this mission. They have some of the
best and brightest of our military and our Intelligence Community
to complete this task, and Congress has provided the necessary
means, a very substantial appropriation of recent. We remain com-
mitted to providing the resources that are necessary for the com-
pletion of the ISG work.

Dr. Kay, I thank you for your public service once again.

Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me join you
in welcoming Dr. Kay to the hearing and stating our thanks for his
work on the Iraq Survey Group.

Dr. Kay's recent reported statements — for example, that the In-
telligence Community was wrong about there being stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the war; that it is the
Intelligence Community's consensus that the two alleged "biologi-
cal" trailers were for hydrogen production, not for producing bio-
logical warfare agents; and that Iraq had not reconstituted its nu-
clear weapons program — stand in sharp contrast to the statements
made by the administration before going to war in Iraq. Dr. Kay's
recent statements raise serious questions about the accuracy and
objectivity of our intelligence and about the administration's public
statements before the war that were supposedly based on that in-
telligence.

Before the war, the administration, in order to support its deci-
sion to go to war, made numerous vivid, unqualified statements
about Iraq having in its possession weapons of mass destruction —
not "programs," not "program-related activities," and not "inten-
tions." Actual weapons is what the administration's statements fo-
cused on.

For example, on August 26, 2002, Vice President Cheney gave a
major speech about a threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruc-
tion.

He asserted the following: "Simply stated, there is no doubt that
Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no
doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our
allies, and against us."



Vice President Cheney was not talking about programs or inten-
tions; he was specifically referring to existing weapons that were
being amassed for use against us.

Here is what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in his testi-
mony to this committee on September 19, 2002: "Saddam Hussein's
amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of biological weapons, includ-
ing anthrax, botulism toxin, possibly smallpox. He's amassed large,
clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX, sarin,
and mustard gas.

Notice again, not programs or intentions, it's stockpiles that Sad-
dam Hussein was said to have amassed.

On September 27, President Bush said that we must make sure
that Saddam Hussein, "never has the capacity to use the stockpiles
of anthrax that we know he has, or YK, the biological weapons
which he possesses." Notice again, not reference to programs or in-
tentions. The representation is stockpiles and weapons in the pos-
session of Saddam Hussein.

On October 7, 2002, President Bush said that, "It [Iraq] pos-
sesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." Possesses
and produces, not programs or intentions.

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke at
the U.N. He said, "We know from sources that a missile brigade
outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads
containing biological warfare agent to various locations. Most of the
launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm
trees — and were to be moved every 1 to 4 weeks to escape detec-
tion. There can be no doubt," Secretary Powell said, "no doubt that
Saddam Hussein has biological weapons . . . and he has the ability
to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can
cause massive death and destruction."

Secretary Powell talked about "the existence of mobile production
facilities used to make biological agents." He said that, "We know
what the tanks, pumps, compressors, and other parts look like. We
know how they fit together. We know how they work. We know a
great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted- We
know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile biological agent
production factories."

Then he said, "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has
a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent.
That is enough to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets." He followed on by
saying, "Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. . . We have
sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field com-
manders to use them." Secretary Powell, in other words, spoke of
actual weapons, not about "program-related activities" or "inten-
tions."

On March 11, 2003, just before the start of the war. Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld said the following: "We know he continues to
hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different lo-
cations as often as every 12 to 24 hours and placing them in resi-
dential neighborhoods."

About 2 weeks later. Secretary Rumsfeld said, "We know where
they [weapons of mass destruction] are."

Just in case there was ever any doubt about the reason given for
why we went to war, the President's Press Secretary restated the



point this way on April 10, 2003: "Make no mistake ... we have
high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. That
is what this war was about and it is about. We have high con-
fidence it will be found."

Incredibly enough, administration leaders are still saying that
we found weapons of mass destruction production facilities. Just
last week. Vice President Cheney said that the two trailers found
in Iraq were part of a mobile biological weapons lab program and
were, in his words, "conclusive evidence that he did in fact have
programs for weapons of mass destruction."

But today's witness, Dr. David Kay, is reported in the New York
Times as sa3dng that the consensus in the Intelligence Community
is that those two trailers were for producing hydrogen for weather
balloons or possibly rocket fuel — but not for biological weapons.

Surely we should find out what is the basis for Vice President
Cheney's recent statement, as well as the basis for the unqualified
administration statements made before the war which I have just
quoted.

Unfortunately, as of now, the leadership of the Senate will not
allow an inquiry into how the administration characterized the in-
telligence about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Intel-
ligence Committee's inquiry is limited to the question of the pro-
duction of intelligence. That committee is not looking into how that
intelligence was used and characterized by policymakers.

We will continue to press for an inquiry looking to get the whole
story, the full picture. If the only way to obtain that is to have an
outside, independent, nonpartisan commission to conduct a com-
prehensive and objective review of the entire matter, so be it.

Whether one agreed or disagreed with the decision to proceed to
war, and whether one agreed or disagreed with the decision to pro-
ceed without the support of the international community acting
through the U.N., the case made by the administration for initiat-
ing the war against Iraq was not because Iraq had intentions to
someday resume production of weapons of mass destruction. It was
because they had in their possession weapons of mass destruction.

Although the issue of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction inten-
tions or ambitions and program-related activities is a serious issue,
it is not why we went to war. The case for war was Iraq's posses-
sion, production, deployment, and stockpiling of weapons of mass
destruction. A different case for war against Iraq can be made, but
the case which the administration made to the American people
was the presence of actual weapons of mass destruction.

When lives are at stake and our military is going to be placed
in harm's way, in other words, when we decide to go to war, it is
totally unacceptable to have intelligence that is this far off or to ex-
aggerate or shape the intelligence for any purpose by anybody.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Dr. Kay, we'll now receive from you any pre-
liminary comments you wish to make.



STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID KAY, FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON STRAT-
EGY REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROGRAMS

Dr. Kay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As we discussed,
I do not have a written statement. This hearing came about very
quickly. I do have a few prehminary comments, but I suspect you're
more interested in asking questions. I'll be happy to respond to
those questions to the best of my ability.

I would like to open by saying that the talent, dedication, and
bravery of the staff of the ISG that was my privilege to direct is
unparalleled and the country owes a great debt of gratitude to the
men and women who have served over there and continue to serve
doing that.

A great deal has been accomplished by the team and I do think,
I echo what you said, Senator, I think it important that it goes on
and that it is allowed to reach its full conclusion. In fact, I really
believe it ought to be better resourced and totally focused on WMD,
that that is important to do it.

But I also believe that it is time to begin the fundamental analy-
sis of how we got here, what led us here, and what we need to do
in order to ensure that we are equipped with the best possible in-
telligence as we face these issues in the future.

Let me begin by saying we were almost all wrong, and I certainly
include myself here. Senator Kennedy knows very directly. Senator
Kennedy and I talked on several occasions prior to the war that my
view was that the best evidence that I had seen was that Iraq in-
deed had weapons of mass destruction. I would also point out that
many governments that chose not to support this war, certainly the
French, President Chirac, as I recall, in April of last year referred
to Iraq's possession of WMD. The Germans, certainly the intel-
ligence service, believed that there were WMD.

It turns out we were all wrong probably in my judgment and
that is most disturbing. We're also in a period in which we've had
intelligence surprises in the proliferation area that go the other
way. The case of Iran, a nuclear program that the Iranians had
was 18 years old, that we underestimated, and that in fact we
didn't discover. It was discovered by a group of Iranian dissidents
outside the country who pointed their national community to the
location. The Libyan program recently discovered was far more ex-
tensive than was assessed prior to that.

There's a long record here of being wrong. There's a good reason
for it, there are probably multiple reasons. Certainly proliferation
is a hard thing to track, particularly in countries that deny easy
and free access and don't have free and open societies.

In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this
point by the ISG, in fact that I reported to you in October, Iraq was
in clear violation of the terms of Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441
required that Iraq report all of its activities, one last chance to
come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of
cases based on both documents, physical evidence, and the testi-
mony of Iraqis of activities that were prohibited under the initial
U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under
Resolution 1441 with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell



8

the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid
material.

I think the aim, and certainly the aim of what I've tried to do
since leaving, is not political and certainly not a witch hunt at indi-
viduals. It's to try to direct our attention at what I believe is a fun-
damental fault analysis that we must now examine.

Let me take one of the explanations most commonly given: Ana-
lysts were pressured to reach conclusions that would fit the politi-
cal agenda of one or another administration. I deeply think that is
a wrong explanation. As a leader of the effort of the ISG, I spent
most of my days not out in the field leading inspections, it's typi-
cally what you do at that level. I was trying to motivate, direct,
find strategies.

In the course of doing that, I had innumerable analysts who
came to me in apology that the world that we were finding was not


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Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. Senate. Committee on ArmeEfforts to determine the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related programs : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, January 28, 2004 → online text (page 1 of 7)