Cost
1959
Westinghouse
$1,
,200,000
1960
Thomson Ramo-
Wooldridge
100, 000
1961
General Electric
100,000
1965
General Electric
135,000
1965-
B arte lie Northwest
117, 000
1966 Laboratories, Rich-
land, Washington
1966 Nuclear Fuel Services 151,000
Subject
Techniques and Devices for
Nuclear Materials Control
Study of Mathematical Models
&t Decision Functions
Nuclear Materials Control
Manual
Tamper-indicating Safing System
(Four studies on safeguarding
facilities and instrument
development)
Safeguards Procedure Manual
for a Chemical Reprocessing
Plant
1968/ Technical Support Organization (TSO)
Present of the Brookhaven National Laboratory has
spent an average of 1. 5 man-years per year
on IAEA safeguards support.
181
-5-
Past R&D Projects (continued)
Date Contractor
1968/ Battelle Northwest Laboratories (BNWL),
Present Richland, Washington, has spent an average
of 1 man-year per year on IAEA safeguards
support
Also, in 1974, a joint ACDA-ERDA-IAEA project to develop and test
several on-line safeguards instruments at the GE Mid-West Fuel
Recovery Plant was in operation when GE decided to stop work on the
plant. Consideration is being given to test the salvageable equipment
in another plant.
In addition, the results of uncleassified R&D performed for the U.S.
domestic safeguards program have routinely been made available to the
IAEA.
Technical Meetings and Consultants
One of the primary means the IAEA has to develop its safeguards
program has been to hold meetings of specialists to discuss specific
potential safeguards problem areas and propose solutions. Most areas
of the safeguards program have been covered over the past years
including, for example, ADP applications, an international network of
analytical laboratories, statistical concepts, organization of the Safe-
guards Department, safeguards system analysis, safeguarding isotope
enrichment plants, safeguards design information requirements, use
of isotopic composition data, etc. The meetings have ranged from 2 or
consultants working rather informally for a few days, to delegations
representing several countries meeting for a week or more of formal
sessions. The U.S. has participated in nearly all of these meetings,
being represented by people from AEC (ERDA) Headquarters, labora-
tories, and contractors; the ACDA and State Department; and U.S.
industry and universities. In many cases, U.S. participation has
involved separate preliminary R&D efforts and meetings with U.S.
experts and occasionally with experts of other nations to prepare the
U.S. positions.
ACDA Role
In addition to the joint projects cited here, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency has independently funded several projects which
182
-6-
support effective international safeguards, including some highly-
sophisticated techniques in the area of tamper indicating surveillance
and containment measures (e.g., fiber optic seals, unattended cameras,
track etch monitors, etc. ) The AEC (ERDA) and ACDA support
programs are fully coordinated.
Current U.S. Projects
Current U.S. projects in support of effective IAEA safeguards include:
1. Perimeter safeguards study: The U.S., recognizing the unique
and difficult problems of future international safeguards at isotopic
separation plants, has undertaken a special support project in this
area involving (a) participation in IAEA technical advisory meetings
on the subject; (b) formation of a U.S. Technical Working Group (of
experts from ERDA, ACDA, Brookhaven, LASL, Sandia Laboratory,
Union Carbide, and Goodyear Atomic); (c) joint development activities
with the UK, Dutch, and German centrifuge group; and (d) R&D
contracts for specific hardware needs (e.g., $100,000 specifically
budgeted for LASL for FY- 1975). ACDA is funding complementary
work in this area.
2. Development of statistical and technical bases for IAEA inspection
strategies (BNWL; $50,000 specifically budgeted for FY-1975).
ACDA is funding complementary work in this area at BNWL.
3. IAEA safeguards planning exercise at a power reactor (Dresden),
and a low-enriched fuel fabrication plant (GE/Wilmington, N. C. )
to give the IAEA additional experience in and constructive criticism
of their inspection planning procedures for such facilities. This
experience can be directly applicable to their safeguarding of
similar facilities in non-nuclear weapons states.
4. Study and Report on "Elements of a State's System of Accountability
for and Control of Nuclear Material. " This work, being done at the
request of IAEA, has been assigned to TSO, Brookhaven. The
product will be used by IAEA in its preparation for an Advisory
Group Meeting on the subject in July 1975. The object is to provide
detailed guidance for other nations in setting up domestic safeguards
accountability and control systems (parallel to the IAEA's "Gray
Book" guidelines on physical security).
5. Review and comments by U.S. experts of draft chapters of the
IAEA's Safeguards Technical Manual.
183
• 7-
6. Develop technology of isotopic correlation techniques and their
possible application to safeguards problems (primarily an ACDA
effort).
7. Based on procedures used by the IAEA in analyzing specific
facilities from a safeguards viewpoint, the U. S. is developing
possible procedures for the IAEA to use in verifying a plant
operator's nuclear material accountability data. Such studies
are being done for uranium fuel fabrication plants, plutonium mixed
oxide fuel fabrication plants and for spent fuel reprocessing plants
(for Pu recovery).
Training
In addition, over the years the United States has made known its
willingness, and has provided opportunities for individuals from other
countries to come to the United States for special programs of training
in the area of nuclear material safeguards. Several nations have taken
advantage of this offer. Also 69 individuals from other countries have
attended the AEC-sponsored Safeguards training courses at the
Argonne National Laboratory over the years from 1968 to 1972.
IAEA Staffing
Also, the U.S. has recruited highly qualified professionals in the
safeguards field from U. S. industry, the AEC and AEC contractors, to
serve on the safeguards staff of the IAEA. There have been U.S.
nationals on the staff since the beginning of the Agency and, currently,
9 of the 72 professionals in the Agency's Department of Safeguards &
Inspection are U.S. nationals, the majority of which hold senior positions,
Physical Security
As noted above, physical security is not an area in which its Statute
grants authority to the IAEA. Despite this limitation and in view of
the marked increase of international terrorism in the early 1970s, the
Agency saw a legitimate role for itself in convening experts in the area
of physical security of nuclear material in order to develop guidelines
which could be used by States, if they so wished, in developing their own
national systems to physically protect nuclear material. The outcome
of this effort was a booklet which wac pubr'shed by the IAEA in June 1972
entitled "Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear
184
-8-
Material. " The Agency reconvened a group of experts again early in
1975 to revise, update and expand the original guidelines. In both
of these sessions the United States played a major role in providing
technical content and substance to these guidelines.
The United States offered, during the September 1974 general conference
of the IAEA, to have technical discussions with any interested nations on
the subject of physical protection systems. Following the expression of
interest for these kind of discussions by several nations, we have
developed a program which includes meetings with U.S. technical experts
in Washington and at the Sandia Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
where demonstrations of security equipment are given. Several nations
have participated in this program and several more are planning to
participate.
185
(Enclosure 2)
STATISTICS- CN
THE WORLD NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
AND
US AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION AND REIATED SAFEGUARDS
186
U.S. -TYPE NUCLEAR POl'.ERPLANTS ABROAD ±/ OPERATING
IN CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER, AS OF JUNE 1, 1974
Country and plant
Austria
Tul In 1
Belgium
Tihange
Doel-1
Doel-2
Doel-3
Tihange- 2
Finland
Loviisa-1
Loviisa-2
Finland- 3
Finland-4
Olkiluoto
France
Sena
Fessenheim-1
Fessenheim-2
Bugey- 2
Bugey-3
Bugey- 4
Bugey- 5
Grave lines Bl
Gravel ines B2
Gravel ines B3
Gravelines B4
Tricastin-1
Tricastin-2
Tricastin-3
Tricastin-4
St. Laurent -3
St. Laurent -4
Caux-1
Caux-2
Caux-3
Caux-4
Dampierre-1
Dampierre-2
[Megawatts electrical]
In operation
In construction
or on order
266
700
NSSS supplier
KWU
870
ACLF Group
390
ACECO
390
ACECO
900
FRAM/ACECO
900
FRAM/ACECO
440
U.S.S.R.
440
U.S.S.R.
600
ASEA
600
ASEA
660
ASEA Atom
ACEO/FRAA'-,/
Framatome —
890
890
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome
925
Framatome - ,
ALST/SOGERCA.i,
ALST/SOGERCX.-'
971
971
750
Framatome
750
Framatome
750
Framatome
750
Framatome
905
Framatome
90S
Framatome
Footnotes at end of table.
187
U.S. -TYPE NUCLEAR POWERPLA.VTS ABROAD^ OPERATING
IN CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER, AS OF JUNE 1, 1974
[Megawatts electrical.!
In construction
Country and plant In
operation
or on order
NSSS supplier
Germany
KRB Gundremmingen-1
237
GE
KWL Lingen
256
AEG
KWO Obrigheim
328
Siemens
KKS Strade
630
Siemens
KKW Wuergassen
612
KWU
Biblis-1
1,150
KWU
Biblis-2
1,240
KWU
Brunsbuettel
770
KWU
KKP Philipsburg-1
864
KWU
KKP Philipsburg-2
864
KWU
Unterweser
1,230
KWU
Nordenham
1,300
KWU
Neckarwe s the im- 1
762
KWU
KKI Isar
870
KWU
Muelheim- Kaerlich
1,215
BBC-BBR
Kruemmel
1,260
KWU
WYHL-SUD-KWS-1
1,250
KWU
WYHL-SUD-KWS-2
1,250
KWU
GKN Neckarvestheim-2
1,300
KWU
Dettingen
1,200
KWU
BWAG-1-Grafenrheinfeld
1,300
KWU
BWAG-2
1,300
KWU
BWAG-3
1,300
KWU
Gundremm ingen - 2
1,250
KWU
Gundremmingen - 3
1,250
KWU
Grohnde/Oberweser
1,300
KWU
RWE-6
1,240
KWU
RWE-7
1,240
KWU
PJVE-8
1,240
KWU
RWE-9
1,240
KWU
RWE-10
1,240
KWU
RWE-11
1,240
KWU
VEW-A
1,240
KWU
VWE-B
1,200
KWU
Footnotes at end of table
188
Country and plant
Iran:
Iran-1
Iran-2
Iran- 3
Iran-4
Italy:
SENN
SELNI
ENEL-4
ENEL-5
ENEL-6
ENEL-8
Netherlands :
Borselle
Spain:
Zorita-1
Nuclenor
Lemoniz-1
Lemoniz-2
Almaraz-1
Almaraz-2
ASCO-1
ASCO-2
Cofrente
Undesignated
Switzerland:
Beznau-1
Beznau-2
Muhleberg
Kaiseraugst
Leibstadt
Gosgen
Graben
Brazil :Angra-l
Mexico:
Laguna Verde -1
Laguna Verde- 2
U S -TYPE NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS ABROAD^ OPERATING,
IN CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER, AS OF JUNE 1, 1974
[Megawatts electrical]
In operation
150
247
450
153
460
350
350
506
In construction
or on order
NSSS supplier
1,200
KWU
1,200
KWU
900
Framatome
900
Framatome
4',
783
AMN-GETSCO
952
ENI
982
AMN
626
600
600
KWU
W
GE
902
W
902
W
902
ff
902
w
902
ff
902
w
902
w
974
GE
W/BB
W/BBC
SETSCO/B5
850
GE/Sogerca
850
GETSCO/BB
1,100
K1VU
1,140
BBC/GE
GE
GE
Footnotes at end of table.
189
- 4 -
4/
U.S. -TYPE NUCLEAR P01VERPLANTS ABROAD^' OPERATING.
IN CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER, AS OF JUNE 1, 1974
Country and plant
Sweden :
Oskarshamn-1
Oskarshamn-2
Ringhals-1
Ringhals-2
Ringhals-3
Ringhals-4
Barseback-1
Barseback-2
Forsmark-1
Forsmark- 2
Oskarshamn-3
Japan:
Tsuruga
Mihama-1
Mihama-2
Mihama-3
Fukushima-1
Fukushima-2
Fukushima-3
Fukushima-4
Fukushima-S
Fukushima-6
Fukushima- I I - 1
Takahama-1
Takahama-2
Shimane - 1
Genkai-1
Oi-1
Oi-2
Hamaoka-1
Hamaoka-2
Onagawa- 1
Tokai Mura-2
Ikata-1
India :
Tarapur-1
Tarapur-2
(Megawatts
electrical]
In construction
In operation
or on order
NSSS supplier
440
ASEA
580
ASEA
760
ASEA
900
W/Monitor
900
W
900
W
580
ASEA
580
ASEA
900
ASEA
900
ASEA
900
ASEA
340
GE
320
W
470
'
MAPI
781
MHI
460
GE
784
GE/Toshiba
784
Toshiba
784
Hitachi
784
Toshiba
1,100
GE/Toshiba
1,100
Toshiba
780
W/MAPI
780
MHI
460
Hitachi
559
MHI
1,122
W/MHI
1,122
W/MHI
500
Toshiba
750
Toshiba
500
Toshiba
1,100
GE-HITACHI
559
MHI
200
GE
200
GE
Footnotes at end of table.
190
U.S. -TYPE NUCLEAR POKERPLANTS ABROAD^ OPERATING.
IN CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER, AS OF JUNE 1, 1974
[Megawatts
electrical]
In construction
Country and plant
In operation
or on order
NSSS supplier
Korea:
Ko-Ri-1
Ko-Ri-2
Ko-Ri-3
Ko-Ri-4
S64
564
600
600
W
W
AECL
AECL
Philippines :
Philippine-l
Philippine- 2
626
626
W
W
Taiwan:
Chinshan-l
Chinshan-2
Kuosheng-1
Kuosheng-2
Taipower - 5
Taipower-6
604
604
800
800
992
992
GE
GE
GE
GE
W
W
Yugoslavia:
KRSKO
600
w.
— Abroad refers to non-soviet bloc foreign countries.
— Framatome , of which Westinghouse is important shareholder, employs
PWR technology.
3/t.x.^.,
of BWR technology.
a.' . >v-'»~ - a L.
4/
— General Electric.
-Westinghouse.
191
NON-U. S. -TYPE NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS ABROAD, OPERATING,
IN CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER
(Megawatts electrical)
In
In Construction
Country and plant
Operation
or On Order
Supplier
Argentina:
Atucha-1
318
Siemens
Atucha- 2
600
AECL
Cordoba
600
AECL
Canada :
Douglas Point
308
AECL
Gentilly-1
2S0
AECL
Picker ing-1
508
AECL
Pickering -2
508
AECL
Pickering-3
508
AECL
Pickering -4
508
AECL
Pickering- 5
750
AECL
Bruce- 1
750
AECL
Bruce -2
750
AECL
Bruce- 3
750
AECL
Bruce- 4
750
AECL
Gentilly-2
600
AECL
Gentilly-3
500
AECL
New Brunswick- 1
600
AECL
Bruce- S
732
AECL
Bruce -6
732
AECL
Bruce- 7
732
AECL
Bruce -8
732
AECL
Picker ing-6
508
AECL
Pickering-7
508
AECL
Pickering- 8
508
AECL
Czechoslovakia: Bohuniee A-l
110
SKODA
India:
Rapp-1
200
AECL
Rapp*2
200
Italy: latina
200
TNPG
Japan: Tekai Mura=l
Pakistan: Kanupp
1S7
BNDG
125
CGB
South Korea:
Ke>Ri-3
600
A1CL
Ke»Ri=4
600
AECL
Spain: Vandellos
487
EDF
France:
Phenix
250
Chinon- 2
200
Chinon-3
480
St. Laurent- 1
480
St. Laurent- 2
515
Bugey-1
540
Usited Kingdom:
01dbury-l
300
TNPG
Oldbury-2
300
TNPG
Winfrith
94
■»
UKAEA
192
NON-U. S.-TYPE NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS ABROAD, OPERATING,
IN CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER
(Megawatts electrical)
In
In Construction
Country and plant
Operation
ov On Order
Supplier
United Kingdom (Continued)
Calder Hall-1
50
UKAEA
Calder Hall-2
50
UKAEA
â– Calder Hall-3
SO
UKAEA
Calder Hall-4
50
UKAEA
Chapel Cross -1
50
UKAEA
Chapel Cross- 2
50
UKAEA
Chapel Cross -3
50
UKAEA
Chapel Cross -4
50
UKAEA
Berkeley- 1
138
TNPG
Berkeley- 2
138
TNPG
Bradwell-1
150
TNPG
Bradwell-2
150
TNPG
Hunterston A-l
160
GEC
Hunters ton A- 2
160
GEC
Trawsfynyd-1
250
APC
Traws£ynyd-2
250
-
APC
Hinkley Point A-l
250
EE-BW-TW
Hinkley Point A- 2
250
EE-BW-TW
Dungeness A-l
275
TNPG
Dungeness A- 2
275
TNPG
Sizewell A-l
290
EE-BW-TW
Sizewell A- 2
290
EE-BW-TW
Wylfa-1
590
EE-BW-TW
Wylfa-2
S90
EE-BW-TW
Windscale
35
UKAEA
Hinkley Point B-l
625
TNPG
Hinkley Point B-2
625
TNPG
PFR
254
UKAEA
Dungeness B-l
625
APC
Dungeness B-2
625
APC
Hunterston B-l
625
GEC
Hunterston B-2
625
GEC
Hartlepool- 1
625
BNDC
Hartlepool- 2
625
BNDC
Sizewell B-l
660
EE-BW-TW
Sizewell B-2
660
EE-BW-TW
Sizewell B-3
660
EE-BW-TW
Sizewell B-4
660
EE-BW-TW
Heysham-1
625
BNDC
Heysham- 2
625
BNDC
Dungeness C-l
1,300
TNPG
Dungeness C-2
1,300
TNPG
' Dungeness C-3
1,300
TNPG
193
WORLD RESOURCES OF URANIUM
[Tons U3O8]
Reasonably
Assured
Estimated
Additional
Total
$10:
Australia
Canada
South Africa and South
West Africa
France, Niger, Gabon,
c.a.r;
Other 1
Foreign subtotal
United States 2
$10 subtotal (rounded)
$10-15:
Aus tralia
Canada
South Africa
Sweden^
France, Niger, Gabon,
C.A.R.
Other
Foreign subtotal
United States 2
$10-15 subtotal
Less than $15 subtotal
(rounded)
300,000
240,000
260,000
80,000
160,000
80,000
350,000
50.00Q
250,000
10,000
40,000
280,000
30,000
50,000
350,000
490,000
270,000
140,000
60,000
70,000
60,000
210,000
120,000
1,000,000
340,000
440,000
700,000
1,440,000
1,040,000
1,340,000
1,140,000
2,480,000
120,000
440,000
110,000
400,000
40,000
30,000
50,000
60,000
90,000
90,000
740,000
180,000
510,000
300,000
1
,250,000
480,000
920,000
810,000
1
,730,000
2,260^000
1,950^000
4
,210,000
Footnotes at end of table
194
Reasonably Estimated
Assured Additional ' Total
$15-30: 3
Canada 100,000 300,000 400,000
South Africa 55,000 70,000 125,000
Sweden 4 150,000 200,000 350,000
Spain 15,000 250,000 265,000
Other 70,000 140, 000.- 210,000
i
Foreign subtotal 390,000 960,000 1,350,000
United States 2 180,000 700,000 880,000
$15-30 subtotal 570,000 1,660,000 2,230,000 .
Grand total (rounded) 2,830,000 3,610,000 6,440,000
J-Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Zaire.
2Does not include 90,000 tons U3O8 by product of phosphate and copper
through year 2000.
3ENEA/IAEA September 1967.
^Expected to be a source of only limited production.
195
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196
CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED FOREIGN ENRICHING PRODUCTION CAPACITY
AND SEPARATIVE WORK REQUIREMENTS
[In millions of separative work units]
Country 1975 1979 1981 1983 1985
U.S.S.R, 1 7-10 7-10 7-10 7-10 7-10
Eurodif 6 - 3.5 10.5 10.5 10.5
Urenco 2 .4 2.0 4.0 10.0
United Kingdom/Capenhurst .4 .4 .4 .4 .4
France/Pierrelatte 3 .4 .4 .4 .4 .4
South Africa 4 2.4 8.0 8.0
Canada 4 8.0 8.0
Japan . 7- . 8
Total foreign capacity 5 - 7.8 11.7 22.7 38.3 45.0
Total foreign seoarative work
requirements 7 - 5.1 14.3 20.9 27.8 39.8
Foreign separative work
requirements (excluding
Soviet bloc and People's
Republic of China) - 4.0 11.1 16.1 20.4 28. S
U.S. Enriching Production
Capacity - — - 18.2 26.5 28.8 35.8 44.9
U.S. Separative Work Require-
ments 8 - - 6.1 12.6 18.9 17.8 18.9
Capacity data for U.S.S.R. enrichment plant is unpublished; capacity
range shown is taken from an unauthenticated and unclassified source.
^Includes the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands.
^Primarily for military requirements; not economically competitive for
commercial power reactor fuel production.
4 Unlike French-led, Eurodif and Urenco who are each firmly committed
to construction of enriching capacity, the South African and Canadian
projects are still in the exploratory stages and may not meet the
production schedule shown. Hence foreign capacity shown for latter
years may be overstated. South African pilot enrichment plant now
operating.
5of the amounts shown, the Eurodif capacity is reportedly fully committed
with 50 percent lo France (101 of which Iran now has an option on) , and SO percent
to Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Japan for delivery 1980-89; for Urenco, approximately
60 percent of planned 1981 production of 2,500,000 separative work units, ccrrdtted
by contract or letter of intent to United Kingdom and German utilities for delivery
197
- 2 -
through mid-eighties. The USSR has recently concluded with non-Soviet -bloc
countries a number of enrichment contracts for about 8,500,000 separative
work units for delivery through about 1990.
Planned capacity shown does not include that for second Eurodif plant,
currently under discussion and scheduled for possible launching late 1975
to early 1976. Europe, Canada and Australia under consideration as sites
for Eurodif II.
Based on ERDA's Planning and Analysis Forecast for 1975, using .3 tails assay.
Domestic deliveries committed under enrichment services contracts, based on
transaction tails assay, plus U.S. Government requirements.
198
STATUS OF FOREIGN URANIUM ENRICHING SERVICES ACTIVITIES-APR. 1, 197 5
U.S.S.R.
Customer country:
Firm signing contract
Amount (mt SWU)
End use/reactor Delivery
to be fueled Date
Comments
A. CONTRACTS WITH THE WEST
France:
Commissariat a 1'Energie. . . .250 Fessenheim-1
Atomique (CEA) 3500 Unspecified
Italy:Agip Nucleare About 4200 Unspecified
West Germany:
Rheinisch-Westfalisches 600 Biblis-B
Elektrizitatswerk (RUE) 3100 Muelheim-Karlich
1973-74.,
1979-83.,
1972-83.,
1974-77.
1978-90.
.Estimate based on
approximate reload
requirement for eac
reactor through
1990 assuming 75%
powerplant availa-
bility and 0.3%
tails.
Kraftwerk Union 2600 Iran (2)
Gemeinschaf tskernkraf twerk
Neckar (GKiN) About 600 Neckarwestheim.
Gesellschaft fur
Kernforschung (GFK) Niederaichbach.
.1979-80.,
.1976-80. .Options for re-
loads, 1981-85.
Nuklear-Chemie und-
Metallurgie (NUKEM) 1350 Various ,
Various About 500 Graf enrheinf eld,
Krummel
Belgium: Synatom 1300 Doel-3,Tihange-2
Sweden:Svensk Kernbrans-
leforsorining 300 Unspecified
Finland :Teollisuuden Voima
Oy (TVO) 300.
.01kiluoto-l.
.NA Permanent shutdown
announced. Dis-
position of
contracted amount
not known.
.1976-80..
1976-77 . .Option for reloads,
dates not available
1979-85..
.1979 Option for 1100 mt
SWU for delivery
1980-89.
.1977-79.. Option for 350 mt
SWU for delivery
1980-85.
Spain:Empresa Nacional del
Uranio (Enusa) 5100
Austria : Gemeinschaf ts
kraftwerk Stein 1260 Stein. .
United Kingdom:CEGB 1000 Various
Unspecified 1978-79. .
Separative work u nit. This is tho vnit of -"isurcont of ur.?iiun
m|IIUIL l„J ...... J III I I III ~U . HT T
1978; 1980-89
1980-89. .Partial reload re-
quirements for 2
SGHWR's.
enrich-e^.t ?rcd':r.tion.
199
STATUS OF FOREIGN URANIUM ENRICHING SERVICES ACTIVITIES-APR. 1, 1975-CONTINUED