Customer country:
Buyer/user
Amount (mtSWU)
End use/reactor Delivery
to be fueled Date
Comments
B. POTENTIAL COMMITMENTS
Japan:NA 1000/yr.
.NA.
.1976-
2000
U.S. :General Electric 100 Foreign reactors 1974
not specified
3500 1974-94
Switzerland:NA NA NA NA
West Germany : KWU NA Proposed
Kaliningrad reactors
.USSR has offered
at least' 1000 nit
SWU annually
beginning in 1976
â– and reportedly woul
•'prefer to supply
^. to 4 times that
much.
, .Authorized to con-
clude contract with
USSR but no action
taken.
, .Reports of talks in
1973 concerning
Soviet provision of
enrichment services
No firm date.
..Reportedly, KWU to
purchase natural
uranium on free
world market with
toll enrichment in
USSR.
2. EUR0DIF (FRANCE)
1
A. REPORTED AGREEMENTS /CONTRACTS
JapaniFederatien of eleetrieal.1000 yr.. Te be shared
.1910=11
pewer eempanies representing
9 utilities.
SpaimNA 400.
300.
600.
700.
800.
900.
by 9 utilities
.NA.
.1979
.1980
.1981
.1982
.1983
.1984
SwitierlandsNA 200 or 1000 Kaiaeraugst 1977-89
^urodif's production has been reported as already sold for a 12-yr period.
n'n..Te..»n»» nflf all rnnf.-if.pe X. amnnnfo nf e flnl *• a f 4 .pa .
.Agreement signed
1/26/74, eentraet
signed 6/27/74.
.Spain repertedly
.has given iuredif
.a letter ef intent
.for these amounts
.whieh total 3900
.mtSWU.
. Contract figures ef
200 and 10j6 mtSWU
reported. One sourc
indicates France's
CEA will supply
enrichment for the
first core and firs
2 reloads for
delivery 1977 thru
1979 with Eurodif
supplying subsequen
9 reloads thru 1989
fli-a /rirt'.ti
200
STATUS OF FOREIGN URANIUM ENRICHING SERVICES ACTIVITIES-APR. 1, 1975-CONTINUED
2. EURODIF (FRANCE) -continued
Customer country: End use/reactor Delivery
Buyer/user Amount (mtSWU) to be fueled Date Comments
A. REPORTED AGREEMENTS/CONTRACTS-continued
West Gennany:RWE, EVS 300 2 reactors ..1981 These 2 utilities
currently under have placed orders
construction with Eurodif.
120 1982 '.
120 1983. . . ;'.
120 1984 ,-
B. POTENTIAL COMMITMENTS
Belglum:NA 800/yr NA Post 1980. Annual order
expected to be
around 800 mtSWU.
No firm contracts.
France :EdF 3000/yr NA NA Unconfirmed report
that EdF has placed
an order for this
amount annually for
10 years. No firm
data on contract.
Estimates of EdF' :
requirements fror.
Eurodif amount to
4500/yr.
Iran:NA NA French- NA Under terras of
supplied recent Franco-
reactors Iranian agreement,
Iran will have an
option to receive
10% of Eurodif 's
production.
Italy :CNEN,AGIP 800/yr NA 1981-82. .Italy's estimated
1600/yr NA 1983 requirements from
2000/yr NA 1984-88. .Eurodif . It has beei
2400/yr NA 1989-90. .reported Eurodif ha:
requested Italy to
accept first
delivery in 1979—2
years in advance of
that given in the
estimate.
3. URENCO (UNITED KINGDOM-NETHERLANDS-FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY) 1
A. REPORTED AGREEMENTS .. -
Jest Germany, United Kingdom. .270 NA.... 1977 5 utilities in '..'est
5 utilities 340 1978 Germany have signed
Data pertaining to URENCO sales are conflicting and generally not verified. Most reports
indicate commitments of about 2000 mtSWU for delivery in 1980; figures for total orders
covering 10-yr contracts range from 9000 to 20,000 mtSWU.
201
} STATUS OF FOREIGN URANIUM ENRICHING SERVICES ACTIVITIES-APR. 1, 1975-CONTINUED
3. URENCO (UNITED KINGDOM-NETHERLANDS-FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY) -continued
Customer country:
Buyer/user
Amount (mtSWU)
End use/reactor Delivery
to be fueled Date
Comments
West Germany, UK
5 utilities (cont'd) 750
1250
West Germany, Netherlands 750 NA
6 utilities
Switzerland :NA.
.NA.
B. POTENTIAL COMMITMENTS
France:Electricite de France.. NA.
Japan:NA.
.NA.
Spain :ENUSA.
.NA.
.NA.
1979 letters of intent
1980 for these amounts.
1980. .. .'.Negotiations with
•'6 other utilities
/or orders expecte-
to bring the total
to over 2000 mtSVU
for delivery in 198
NA Reported to have
placed an order wit
URENCO.
.NA NA Unconfirmed reports
in April 1974 that
EdF planned to
discuss a contract
with URENCO. No
further data.
• NA NA Reported discussi.
negotiations for
post-1980 supply.
• NA NA Discussions with
Urenco as part of
Spain's plans to
diversify source of
supply.
202
ACTUAL 5 PROJECTED NUCLEAR POWER EXPORT REVENUES
SELECTED FISCAL YEARS - BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Enrichment Services-
Production Facilities
§ Other Nuclear Power
Related Equipment^/
Total Nuclear Power
Exports
Cumulative
thru FY 1974
1975
1980
1985
1990
199!
.7
.2
.4
.7
1.1
1.9
3.2
1.0
1.1
1.9
3.5
4.3
3.9
1.2 1.5 2.6
4.6
6.2
^Enrichment revenues through FY 1974 are actual. Projected export revenues
effective FY 75 are based on the price in effect January 1975 of S42.10 per
separative work unit and assumes U.S. will capture in FY 85 and beyond some
45% of projected foreign enrichment demand including Soviet bloc and Peoples
Republic of China
— Projected nuclear power equipment export revenues assumes that the U.S.
will furnish 10-151 of supplier country requirements and up to 100% of
non-supplier country requirements.
203
c
co
00
a ^
â– o
u
c
§
a
(A i-i
•U 3
00 O
^ £
u
cm to
60
O
o
o
u O
•H O
o (J vO
• con 00
h DHN
>s cj 0>
"••» H i"H
9 3 <-"
t>o oo io "H
S 2 H _
O O <B
O O S> 60
00 »3- P3 S
81
9 T3
o c-
o>
o
00 00
CO
w
oa
â–º
<
i-i
c
1-1
<
cj
o
c«
o
a
o
o
0)
CM
z
u
•O r-l
o
CM
OS
6£
o
Cm
c
o •
w
1-1
u
os
4J
oo >,
CO
^•^-
â– j
>-)
03
u
01
O X
3
a
o w
lb
o
CM -O
00
X
1/1 •
u
y£
n
• x
n (tj
3 O
u-i
O ^>D
cm -o cyv
« — . r-i
i-i 9 ^
oo
co
•a
60
CO
M
60
s
o
o
I
o
o
c
CO
a
o
1-1
1-1
a.
CO
e
CO
01
>
CO
•a
a>
j=
u
•H
h
C
W
CM
O
D
a
CO
C9
CM
O
S
U
01
a o
o
j3 oi m
00 l-i
fl o
r-> U U
01
« 4J T3
01 CO 01
"Si
•H CJ
.C X-H
Q. > IJ
CO CO C
l-i 01 01
60 S
I i-l
0] T3 01
CO C 3
O CO 14-1
91
3
o
O 3
CO Cm
a. t
CO 9
OS -^
CO
u
3
u
CO
c
1-1
o
u
O
03
01
u
c
o
CJ CO
3 -U
â– D 0i
O E
M
0- 3
01
X
o
u
o
01
•o
1-1
x
o
01
D-TJ
3 i-t
C X
^i o
3
XI 3
3 J- •
Cm 60 1m
I 1M C
9 SO)
H
u
1-1
SH
^M
1m
â– H
u
u
c
a
3
b
U
0)
J=
3
M
co
«-i
1M
CO
C i
ra *:
OJ
o
U
o
3
W
-4
01
s
01
•a
0)
o a.
C ra
co o
Im
6m
0)
&
CO
X
CO
I
<
01
l-M
3
O
o
IM
CO .
S
c
o>
4-1
c
o
I
s.
CO
B
5 5
H
H
<
I
O
204
HI u >s
U G u u
•
C CO tH 9)
-o
â– H p-t O "O
<D
it P.V c
X
a a
u
C >W (0
to
O CJ •
>— *
u u tj >,B
to h ii ■»«. o
i
U CO T3 3 •*
1/ u C *â– >
-~-
O. w CO 60 a)
3
o ai as u
l-i X 0/
60
u_i d; O "0
X
y-\
•« O -H
U1
<r js co a
O
00
4-i r-» 4-i C
o
o>
3 <J\ i-l O
m
1-t
© r-i s u u
CJ
<S
a
a
o
o
u-l
CN ,-s
os
6s os
eo r-i
â– o
60
E^
3 •
T-l
U
4-J
60 5s
CO
J»i -s»
U
w
CD
CM 6s
Oh
• CO
O
i-l "O
tM
I
<u
si
u
•H
c
«l
00
os
a
3
01
a
5s
4J
1
OS
o
CN
6s
CO
•o
3 •
60 6s
X ■*».
B]
O 5s
O CO
04
j=
CJ
1-1
C
04
a
3
E
CO
u
01
o
CO
>>
cfl
•a
o
U1
CN
5s
CO
â– v
60
CO
O 04
US 5s
J
?>OS
. OS
01 r-l
â– u ^
•ri
X /-^
•
^£
01 ' —
X CO
i-( 5s
e co
â– o
60
X o
u-i
us cn
a
3
CN
O
2
CO
04
•D
â– H
X
o
3
â– a Ph
04
X 5-S
t-l US
2 <-i
CN
O
i
CN
O
JS
H
a
o
o
5s
US /"N
u-l ,-s
<8
CN v©
CN <&
T3
^-^ ^rj
S-* vr>
OS
OS
O
5sp-<
5sp-i
ui
CO *-*
CO N^
CN ^^
TJ
T3
s^ vO
*»^ ^-s
^- -~N
VO
3 •
3 •
6s OS
1-1
l-i
CO i-(
60 5s
60 5s
â– rj s_x
X ^-.
X -^
-s^
W
CO
60 ^s
O 5s
O 5s
Sri •
O CO
O CO
U
PI *o
cn -u
u-l 5s
CN
O
3
04
6-S
UI
a
3
e
CO
l-i
04
u
•o
0)
J5
u
l-<
c
04
â– a
5n
u
H-l
â–º
H
1-1
•rl
4-1
CJ
c
i-3
3
U-,
u
04
o
â– o
£
c
i
u
4J
•H
at
â– o
04
i
04
J3 .-s
c_>
E
E o <
3 W
s
CO
C
â– H l-i 25
H
C
60 3 W
M
3
p-i W -—
04
205
X
a
â– ^o
CMS
O 0>
D r*
"U
81
C
g
c
n
a
o
<s
>->
o
01
ft.
oo
«_^
â–º
u
£
o
^^.
*"\
ra
r-
CO
CO
u
e*
m
1/1
i-i
ON
ON
***
•
p-i
r-l
H
s^
N-*
•
>>
H
»•».
•
•
x
s
ri
u
M
•^
X
>.
C
S
oo
»»»
•^.
i-l
s
a
D
u
60
a
S
o
60
DO
h
o
£
23
<u
o
u-l
Ch
o
«
O
o
o
â– *
CM
r-l
r-t
CM
i""N
CO
1
CM
CO
01
O
Ol
U
CO
r-l
eg
ON
\^
r-l
r-l
W
s«r
â–
•
â–
>>
£
S
3
$
g"r
1?
©
U1
o
O r-»
o
U1
r-l o>
o
*
CM r-l
er\
F*
0) 01
^^
B B
1-4
r-.
D D ~
o
•w* ^^•3•
r-l
<o
^
â–ºl xo>
«^s
co - ro •— i
u
o>
"rj d, "O *— '
c
•d-
~-^ td "«^
a
ON
3 U D OJ
r-i
r-l
r-l
a
vy
oo C tC XI
.« bo.* th
i—i
r-l
•rl 9!
r-i
r-l
O W O W
«
=3
U1 OJ O
B
E
en "o r-» a.
w
CO
I
to
I
o
•
•
•
D
CM
r-l
D
rl
u
u
o
a
u
r-l
c
6
8
- I
D
M
X
01
01
s
o|
H
•o
s
u
5
H
K
K
r-l
en
01
a
u
at
en
n
CI
01
3-
Oj
u
e
t
•H
A
<g
u
u
4J
•
H
r-l
01
r^
u
H
r-l
1
03
U
01
u
u
r-l
a
9
a.
9
a
9
eg
u
8
8
D
•
0<
1
a
n
—
CM
CM
CM
CM
4J
|
s
01
H
r!
s
s
s
D
s
£
e
E
CO r^
«^
P S
o]
r-l e~
e»
01 <-4
01
rl
ft. w
*^
> Or
>!
r*
â–º.
9
â– r4
u
0}
a
£
01 T<
•ri
X
u
OS u
â– H
u
01
i
U CO
CO
a
9
^
H
a>
rl
i-l
CO ^
^
rO
a
J< r*
•rl
"O
e
CO
> O
E
CO
CO r-l 1-1
u
a
c
9
e *
•rl H
H
CO
rl
T3 CO ft.
c
a
•H
«
H
— i
u
CO
CO X
3
b
3
a
an
ft.
â– o
H
H
e u
u
M
CO
s
r-l
CO
206
V
u
01
•o
•0
OJ
an
c
2
c
CO
o
rH
o
O.
u-i
â–º
I
60
a
•H
4J
ca
h
•
01
<
9
SB
1
*
1
I
I
8
B D
c
0/
3
207
FOREIGN- LIGHT WATER REACTOR FUEL FABRICATION FACILITIES
Country
Belgium
France
Plant:
Dessel
FBFC
Owner
MMN
U.S. Equity
Partic ipa t ion
Franco-Beige de West. 16%
Fabrication de
Combustibles
Capacit"
(Tons l-d.
Year) l
200
200
France
â– SICN
SICN
50
France
SICREL
SICREL
N.A.
France
Eurofuel
Eurofuel
West. 407.
N.A.
France
Romans
CERCA
Sylvania 22%
80
FRG
RBU
Reaktor
Brennelemente
Union
General Elec.
20%
550
FRG
Alkem
45
FRG
FRG
BBR
Nuklear
Brennstoff
FRG
KRT
Italy
Bosco
Fabricazoni
Marengo
Nuc leari
Italy
Saluggia
Coren
Italy
LFCEC
W-enese
Japan
Yokosuka
JNF
Japan
Tokai Mura
Nuclear Fuel
Industries
Babcock &
Wilcox 74%
N.A.
Westinghouse 407„ N.A.
220
General Elec. 45% 200
Westinghouse 51%
Westinghouse
60
20
560
40
Excludes Communist Bloc Countries.
208
- 2 -
U.S. Equity
Country Plant Owner Participation Capacity
(Tons L'U,
Year) i
Japan Tokai Mitsubishi 420
Netherlands Interfuel Interfuel 30
Sweden Stockholm ASEA Atom 50-100
Sweden Vasteras ASEA Atom 50-100
Sweden ASEA Atom 350
U.K. Springfields BNFL 400
Spain ENUSA N-A .
209
AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION' IN THE
CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
A. BILATERALS KITH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
Country:
Scope
Effective Date Termination Date
Argentina
Research and
power
July 25, 1969 .
i July 24, 1999
Australia
do
May 28, 19S7
.May 27, 1997
Austria
do
Jan. 24, 1970
" Jan. 23, 2014
Brazil
do
Sept. 20,. 1972
Sept. 19, 2002
Canada
do
July 21, 1955
Julv 13, 1980
China,. Republic of
do
June 22, 1972
June 21, 2014
Colombia
Research
Mar. 29, 1963
Mar. 28, 1977
Finland
Greece-"-
Research and
power
July 7, 1970
July 6, 2000
Research
Aug. 4, 1955
Aug. 3, 1974
India
Power (Tarapur)
Oct. 25, 1963
Oct. 24, 1993
Indonesia
Research
Sept. 21, 1960
Sept. 20, 1980
Iran
do
Apr. 27, 1957
.Apr. 26, 1979
Ireland
do
July 9, 1958
July 8, 1978
Israel
do
July 12, 1955
Apr. 11, 1977
Italy
Research and
power
Apr. 15, 1958
.Apr. 14, 1978
Japan
do
July 10, 1968
Julv 9, 2003
Korea
do
Mar. 19, 1973
Mar. 18, 2014
Norway
do
June 8, 1967
June 7, 1997
Philippines
do
July 19, 1968
Julv 18, 1998
Portugal
do
June 26, 1974
June 25, 2014
South Africa
do
Aug. 22, 1957
Aug. 27, 2007
Spain
do
June 28, 1974
June 27, 2014
Sweden
do
Sept. 15, 1966
Sept. 14, 1996
Switzerland
do
Aug. 8, 1966
Aug. 7, 1996
Thailand
do
June 27, 1974
June 26, 2014
Turkey
Research
June 10, 1955
June 9, 1981
United Kingdom
Research and
power
July 21, 1955
July 20, 1976
Do
Power
July 15, 1966
July 14, 1976
Venezuela
Research and
power
Feb. 9, 1960
Feb. 8, 1980
Vietnam, Republic of
Research
July 1, 1959
June 30, 1979
1/
Superseding research and power agreement in abeyance; U.S. material coverej.
by IAEA (NPT) safeguards.
210
AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE
CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
B. BILATERALS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Organization: !
European atomic energy Joint nuclear power program Feb. 18, 1959 Dec. 31, 1985
community (EURATOM) - ;
EURATOM Additional agreement to July 25, 1960 Dec. 31, 1995
joint nuclear power
program
International Atomic Supply of materials, etc. Aug. 7, 1959 Aug. 6, 2014
Energy Agency (IAEA)
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Special arrangements:
United States-U.S.S.R. Agreement on scientific and June 21, 1973 June 20, 1983
technical cooperation for
the peaceful uses of atomic
energy .
United States - Memorandum on cooperation in Jan 1 , 1973
Romania peaceful uses of atomic
energy .
2/
y
Remains in effect until representatives of the USERDA and Government of
Romania have the opportunity to discuss a renewal of the memoranda.
211
UNITED STATES- IAEA TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS FOR
APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO U.S. -SUPPLIED MATERIALS
Effective
Termination
Date 1
3d Party
Date
Argentina .
Australia (suspended July 10, 1974)
July 25, 1969
AC •'
Sept. 26, 1966
.: AC
Austria (suspended July 23, 1972) 1
Brazil (amended Sept. 20, 1972)
Jan. 24, 1970
. AC
Oct. 31, 1968
" AC
China, Republic of
Dec. 6, 1971
AC
Colombia
Dec. 9, 1970
AC
Denmark (suspended Mar. 1, 1972)1
Feb. 29, 1968
AC
India
Jan. 27, 1971
AC
Indonesia
Dec. 6, 1967
AC
Iran (suspended May 15, 1974) 1
Aug. 20, 1969
AC
Israel
June 15, 1966
April 4, 1975
Japan
July 10, 1968
AC
Korea (amended Mar. 19, 1973)
Jan. 5, 1968
AC
Philippines (suspended Oct. 16, 1974) 2
July 19, 1968
AC
Portugal
July 19, 1969
AC
South Africa (amended June 28, 1974)
July 26, 1967
AC
Spain (amended June 28, 1974)
Dec. 9, 1966
AC
Sweden
Mar. 1, 1972
AC
Switzerland
Feb. 28, 1972
AC
Turkey
June 5, 1969
AC
Venezuela
Mar. 27, 1968
AC
AC indicates termination on same date as agreement for cooperation
^ Suspended in view of NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA
212
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND SAFEGUARDS STATUS OF COUNTRIES
WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
Country
NPT Status
Safeguards
Argentina
IAEA Trilateral
Australia
Ratified
IAEA-NPT
Austria
do
Do .
Brazil
IAEA Trilateral
Canada ^
China, Republic of
Ratified
IAEA-NPT
do
IAEA Trilateral
Colombia
Signed, but
not
ratified
Do
Denmark
Ratified
IAEA-NPT
Finland
do
Do
Greece
do
Do
India
IAEA Trilateral
Indonesia
Signed, but
not
ratified
Do
Ireland
Ratified
IAEA-NPT
Iran
do
Do
Israel
IAEA Trilateral
Japan
Signed, but
not
ratified
Do
Korea
Ratified
Do
Norway
do
IAEA-NPT
Philippines
do
Do
Portugal
IAEA Trilateral
South Africa
Do
Spain
Do
Sweden^
Ratified
Do
Switzerland
Signed, but
not
ratified
Do
Thailand
Ratified
IAEA-NPT
Turkey
Signed, but
not
ratified
IAEA Trilateral
Venezuela
do
Do
Viet Nam
Ratified
IAEA-NPT
United Kingdom- 3
1 An NPT safeguards agreement has not been concluded between the
IAEA and ROC as a result of the ROC's explusion from the IAEA in December
1971. The IAEA Trilateral Safeguards Agreement, however, is still in
effect and being implemented.
* Negotiation of an NPT safeguards agreement is underway with the IAEA
3 The United States/United Kingdom agreement for Cooperation in the power
reactor field envisages the application of IAEA safeguards on any enriched fuel
provided by the United States. No such material has been provided to date.
213
NON-PROLIFERATION' TREATY AND SAFEGUARDS STATUS OF COUNTRIES
WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
NOTE: In addition to the above, the Euratom states (Belgium, Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) are
in the process of ratifying the NPT, following which the IAEA/
Euratom safeguards agreement will come into force. In the-'
meantime, Euratom safeguards apply. France, which is not an
NPT party, will continue to be subject to Euratom safeguards insofar
as United States-supplied materials and equipment are concerned.
214
Responses to Senator RLbicoff's Questions
Question 1. Last week, Dr. David Rosenbaum provided details of an
alleged incident in which nuclear officials in India confiscated
the tape of a plutcnium-neasuring device used by an IAEA
inspector. This allegedly took place before India detonated
its peaceful nuclear explosion last year.
(a) What information do you have on this alleged incident?
When was this information first received, and was it
relayed by the IAEA?
(b) If India refused to allow IAEA to take independent
measurements of plutcnium generated by its imported
reactors, what action did the IAEA take against India?
(c) Ihder the circumstances, how can EEDA justify continued nuclear
exports to India, a non-NPT nation?
(d) What advance knowledge did we have of India's plans to
detonate a "peaceful nuclear explosive?"'
Answer
1. a t b We were aware of Dr. Rosenbaum' s report of the alleged incident
la»t June or July. However, the facts of the situation do
not support the contention (a) that the tape was confiscated,
(b) that the device in question was a plutcnium measuring
215
device, or (c) that the data on the tape was safeguards
inspection data. The facts, which were obtained frcm the
IAEA, are as follows:
Seme of the individual rods in the Tarapur reactor fuel
assenblies in the core were leaking. The Indian authorities
wished to take low burn-up rods from already discharged
assemblies to put in place of the leaking rods in the fuel
assemblies in the core. However, they did not have a way
of verifying which rods had least bum-up. The IAEA became
aware of this problem and advised the Indian authorities that
they were developing an instrument for possible safeguards
application which could measure burn-up in rods, but that they
did not have access to actual irradiated fuel rods. The IAEA
worked out a mutually beneficial arrangement with India whereby
an IAEA instrument specialist, designated as an ad-hoc inspector,
went along on a routine IAEA inspection in January 1974 to do
developmental work with the instrument and, at the same time,
to identify the low burn-up rods the Indian authorities were
looking for. The instrument readout is a real-time display on
a cathode ray tube. In order to have the ability to replay this
data for further evaluation and review on-site, the information
was recorded on a magnetic tape cassette. Successful evaluation
of the data was performed on-site by the IAEA and Indian
authorities. According to arrangements between the IAEA and
India which were made prior to the experiment, the tape is kept
on file at the reactor site and is available for additional review
216
by Agency inspectors or facility personnel at any time.
Thus, India did not violate any of its safeguards commitments
and the episode in question was an experimental exercise which
benefitted both the IAEA in testing its developmental techniques
and India in locating its low bum -up rods . Both the IAEA and
India agreed in advance that the magnetic tape cassette
would remain at the reactor.
l.c The Agreement for Cooperation between India and the US
is limited. to cooperative activities associated with the
Tarapur Atomic Power Station. Nuclear exports under this
Agreement are therefore limited to this civil application of
nuclear energy and are subject to IAEA safeguards. The
Agreement for Cooperation provides that the Tarapur reactors
will only be fueled with US supplied nuclear material. The
uranium fuel supplied for the Tarapur is low enriched uranium
which cannot itself be used for a nuclear explosive. The
Agreement furtfvaT r>-rrt"±^p*f f^afc the irradiated Tarapur
reactor fuel (which contains plutonium) may be reprocessed
in Indian facilities upon a joint determination that safeguards
may be effectively applied, or in other mutually acceptable
facilities. Following our request, the Government of India
217
-4-
has recently assured the Government of the United
States that it shares our understanding that, under the
agreement, the nuclear material that has been or will
be made available or used, or produced in the Tarapur Atomic
Power Station will be devoted exclusively to the needs of
that station unless the two governments specifically agree
that such material be used for other purposes. This under-