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United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Gove.

The Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 online

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Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. Senate. Committee on GoveThe Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 → online text (page 22 of 47)
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devices (PNE's) is indistinguishable; thus, it is the position
of the United States that PNE's are banned under the agree-
ments. In recent years, the United States has made a point of
officially informing cooperating countries in this regard.
For example, the U.S. issued a formal statement in 1972 before
the IAEA Board of Governors. In addition, Ambassador Tape
made a similar statement reiterating the US position at the
meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in June 1974. Such statements
are part of the official Agency record. Moreover, to assure that
there can be no misunderstanding, we have begun to reaffirm formally
in the Agreements for Cooperation the understanding of the parties
that U.S. material may not be used for PNE's.



239

lU.'JMUt,, t IAL

(cnly when filled in)



INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS AND INSPECTION



D



w



FORMATIOr



QU



O



■ fnk\



O C



The purpose of this document is to obtain the facility
design information required by the Agency in order
to discharge its safeguards responsibilities. It will also
serve as a check list for examination of design infor-
mation by Agency inspector(s). If, in any area, in-
sufficient space is available add further sheets to the
extent necessary.



IAEA USE ONLY


COUNTRY




COUNTRY OFFICER




TYPE




DATE

OF INITIAL DATA




VERIFICATION




LAST REVIEW
AND UPDATING














240



GENERAL INFORMATION


1 NAME OF THE FACILITY
(incl. usual abbreviation)




2. LOCATION AND POSTAL ADDRESS




3. OWNER (legally responsible}




4. OPERATOR (legally responsible)




5. DESCRIPTION (mam features only)




6. PURPOSE




7. STATUS

(planned; under construction; in operation)




8. CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE DATES
(if not in operation)


Start
of Construction


Commissioning


Operation








9. NORMAL OPERATING MODE

(days only, two-^hift, three shift, number of
days/annum, etc.)




10. FACILITY LAYOUT

(structural containment, fences, access, nuclear
material storage areas, laboratories, waste disposal
areas, routes followed by nuclear material,
experimental and test areas, etc.)


DRAWING(S) ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.

%


11. SITE LAYOUT

(site plan showing m sufficient detail, location,
premises and perimeter of facility, other buildings,
roads, railways, rivers, etc.)


DRAWING(S) AND/OR MAPS ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.


12. NAMES AND/OR TITLE AND ADDRESS OF
RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS
(for nuclear material accountancy and control
and contact with the Agency. If possible attach
organization charts showing position of officers)









241



OVERALL PROCESS PARAMETERS



13. FACILITY DESCRIPTION

(Indicating all process stages, storage areas and feed, product
and waste points)



GENERAL FLOW DIAGRAM(S) ATTACHED UNDER
REF. Nos.



14. PROCESS DESCRIPTION

(identifying sampling and key measurement points; MBAs;
inventory locations)



FLOWSHEETS) FOR NORMAL OPERATION ATTACHED
UNDER REF. Nos.



15. DESIGN CAPACITY

(in weight of principle products per annum)



16. ANTICIPATED THROUGHPUT

(in the form of a forward programme indicating the
proportion of various feeds and products)



NUCLEAR MATERIAL DESCRIPTION AND FLOW



17. MAIN MATERIAL DESCRIPTION

i) Chemical and Physical Form

(for feed, include types of fuel element/
assemblies)



ii) Throughput, Enrichment Ranges and Pu
contents (for normal flowsheet operation
indicating if blending and/or recycling takes
place)



iil Batch Size/Flow Rate and Campaign Period



ivl Storage Inventory

(indicating any change with throughput!



v) Frequency of Receipt or Shipment



PROOUCT 11)



242



NUCLEAR MATERIAL DESCRIPTION AND FLOW


18. WASTE MATERIAL

i) Source and Form

(Indicating major contributors, liquid or solid;
range of constituents, enrichment range end
Pu content; include conteminated equipment)

II) Storege Inventory Renge, Method and
Frequency of Recovery/Dispose!




19. CONTAINERS. PACKAGING AND STORAGE
AREA DESCRIPTIONS


SEPARATE NOTE TO BE ATTACHED

describing for feeds, products and wastes the size and type of containers and
packaging used; method of storage including fuel element locations, handling
equipment and Its capabilities; any specie) identification features.


20. RECYCLE PROCESSES

(briefly describe eny such processes giving source
end form of materiel, method of storage, normal
inventory, frequency of processing)




21. MEASURED DISCARDS AND RETAINED
WASTE

I) Ai% of input;


"V



243



NUCLEAR MATERIAL DESCRIPTION AND f COW


22. INVENTORY

i) In-Process

(within plant and equipment during normal
operation, indicate quantity, form and main
locations and any significant change with
time or throughput)

ii) Other locations

(quality, form and location of inventory not
already specified)


'


PLANT MAINTENANCE


23. MAINTENANCE, DECONTAMINATION.
CLEAN-OUT


SEPARATE NOTE TO BE ATTACHED

describing plans and procedures and defining all sampling and key measurement

points associated with:

i) normal plant maintenance;

II) plant and equipment decontemination and subsequent nuclear material
recovery;

Hi) plant and equipment clean-out including means of ensuring vessels ere empty.


PROTECTION AND SAFETY MEASURES


24. BASIC MEASURES FOR PHYSICAL

PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL




25. SPECIFIC HEALTH AND SAFETY RULES
FOR INSPECTOR COMPLIANCE
(if extensive, attach separately)


-



244



ntrnuucooinu ri«nn



NUCL&AR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY



26. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Give 8 description of the nuclear materiel
accountancy $y»tem, the method of recording and
reporting accountancy data and entabluhlng
material balancei, frequency ot material balance*,
procedure* for account ad|u»tment after plant
Inventory, mlitakei, etc, under the following
heedlngi:

I) General



SPECIMEN PORMS USED IN ALL PROCEDURES ATTACHED UNDER
REF.Noi.



245



ncr nwst.001



NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY



SYSTEM DESCRIPTION CONTINUED

II) Receipts

(Including method of deellng with shipper/
receiver differences end subeeguent account
corrections)



Hi) Shipments

(product end waste)



246



NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY



SYSTEM DESCRIPTION CONTINUED

iv) Physical Inventory

(frequency, procedures, estimated distribution)



v) Measured Discards and Retained Waste



vi) Operational Records and Accounts

(including method of adjustment or correction
and pJace of preservation and language)



LIST OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT REGARDED AS NUCLEAR
MATERIAL CONTAINERS ATTACHED UNDER REF. Nos.



"N



247



tern w ^ t_ oo i ■



NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY



27 FOR EACH KEY MEASUREMENT POINT
IDENTIFIED UNDER Qs. 14 AND 23 GIVE
THE FOLLOWING.

i) Identification



ii) Chemical and Physical Form of Material



Sampling Procedure and Equipment Used



v) Measurement/ Analytical Method and
Equipment Used



v) Source and Level of Random and Systematic
Errors
(weighing, volume, sampling, analytical)



vi) Method of Converting Source Data to Batch
Data

(standard calculative procedures, constants
used, empencal relationships, etc.)



248



NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY



rti) Calculative and Error Propagation Technique



Technique and Frequency of Calibration of
Equipment Used



x) Programme for the Continuing Appraisal of
the Accuracy of Weight. Volume, Sampling
and Analytical Techniques and Measurement
Methods



x.) Programme for Statistical Evaluation of
Data from (vni) and (ix).



mmmmmmmm mm ,



i ^JH ■ UHWI ji



nmpttnmRPora qmmm&m



249



ncrnuucdanvo ruMNlfc



NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY



28. OVERALL LIMIT OF ERROR

Describe procedure to combine individual
measurement error measurements to obtain the
overall limit of error for:

i) S/R Differences

ii) Book Inventory

iii) Physical Inventory

iv> MUF



OPTIONAL INFORMATION



29. OPTIONAL INFORMATION

(that the operator considers relevant to safeguarding
the facility)



250

STATEMENT OF JOHN K. TABOR
ACTING SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
ON APRIL 30, 1975

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Department's role with respect to exports of
nuclear facilities, materials and technology for peaceful
purposes, and to comment on S.14 39, the Export Reorganization
Act of 1975.

There are obvious economic benefits to be derived from
exporting nuclear facilities, materials and technology for
peaceful purposes. Sales abroad have made and can continue
to make a significant contribution to our national effort
to develop a favorable balance of payments. On the other
hand, there is the justifiable concern with the possibility
that these exports will lead to the proliferation of
nuclear explosives, unless effective safeguards are devised
and faithfully applied. As is the case with so many of our
national issues, a judicious balance must be struck between
these two basic considerations.



251

2

The risks of proliferation of nuclear explosives and the
development of effective safeguards to prevent it are
matters that are properly the concern and statutory
responsibility of other agencies. Accordingly, I propose,
when commenting on S.1439, to limit myself to treating
only with Sections 4 and 11 which provide for transferring
to the Secretary of Commerce certain functions currently
being performed by other departments or agencies. I shall
deal principally with the Department's role with respect
to various aspects of the Nation's program for exporting
nuclear facilities, materials, and technology for peaceful
purposes, since the Committee's invitation focused on this.

In the nuclear field, as you know, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) , the Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA) and the Office of Munitions Control
(OMC) in the Department of State have primary export
licensing jurisdiction. The Department of Commerce performs
a supportive role.

Our supportive role may be more clearly understood if I
were first to summarize the controls exercised by the other
agencies.



252



NUCLEAR AGENCIES

The two agencies that were formed from the Atomic Energy
Commission (the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and the Energy
Research and Development Administration) now license
between them exports of nuclear technology and all "special
nuclear materials" (uranium 235, uranium 233, Plutonium),
"source materials" (normal and depleted uranium and thorium) ,
"by-product materials" (radioactive isotopes produced in a
nuclear reactor) ; "utilization facilities" (nuclear reactors)
when the components to be exported constituted a complete
or substantially complete reactor; "production facilities"
(isotopic separation plants) and any component part thereof
that is specially designed for use therein.

In short, these agencies license the items that are most
critical to the supply of nuclear energy, whether for power
or for nuclear weapons and explosive devices.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State, as reflected by its Munitions
List, licenses exports of goods and technology specially
designed for the design, development, fabrication and
testing of nuclear weapons; naval nuclear propulsion plants
and technology; and other military-oriented nuclear-related
goods and technology. (Nuclear weapons are the responsibility



253

4

of the Energy Research and Development Administration and
the Department of Defense.)

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE



The Department of Commerce licenses exports of all other
nuclear and nuclear-related commodities and technology to
complement the primary controls of the two nuclear agencies
and the Department of State. These items generally fall
into four categories :

a. Radioactive isotopes other than those produced
in nuclear reactors.

b. Components of nuclear reactors. Although these
may be important and specially designed components,
these are licensed by the Department of Commerce

if they constitute substantially less than a
complete reactor.

c. Maritime (civil) nuclear propulsion equipment and
technology.

d. Multi-purpose items that can be used in connection
with the design, development, fabrication or testing
of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices but
are also used in nuclear research and industrial
applications predominantly of a non-military
application. Examples of these are certain pumps



254



and compressors, certain computers, neutron
generators, high speed cameras, porous nickel
and the like.

Some 100 items on the Department's Commodity Control List
were identified by the Atomic Energy Commission as being of
special interest to it, and, during its existence, the
Atomic Energy Commission was consulted before a licensing
decision was made on an application to export these commodities,
This procedure is continuing through a liaison office in
the Energy Research and Development Administration. In no
case does Commerce license such items without the concurrence
of this liaison office.

Applications for exports of maritime nuclear propulsion
equipment and technology are also cleared with the Departments
of Defense and State before the Department of Commerce
issues an export license. Beyond this, certain transactions
involving multi-purpose commodities may, selectively, also
be referred to the Department of State either by the ERDA
liaison office or by the Department of Commerce for advice
and concurrence prior to licensing if they involve the
national nuclear non-proliferation policy. Moreover, for



255

6

any export license application over which there is any
disagreement or question as to the appropriate licensing
decision, the transaction is subjected to formal inter-
agency review by the Operating Committee of the Advisory
Committee on Export Policy. Permanent members of the
Operating Committee include the Department of State, the
Department of Defense and the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration. Finally, proposed exports to the
Communist nations of any nuclear-related commodities under
the Department of Commerce's jurisdiction are referred
to the Operating Committee for review and advice under the
more stringent policy applicable to these destinations.

S.1439



Let me turn now to the provisions of Sections 4 and 11 of
S.14 39, that would consolidate, within the Department of
Commerce, the export control licensing functions now
performed by the Departments of State and Treasury, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and
Development Administration.

The proposal does not effect a complete consolidation of
all the Government's export control authority; certain
responsibilities currently lodged outside the Department
are unaffected and would remain where they are. These are,
however, modest in scope. Under S.1439 the significant
control functions of other agencies would be merged with



256

7
those exercised by Commerce.

There are both advantages and disadvantages in the
consolidation proposed by S.14 39. As the sponsors of the
bill have noted, putting all significant export controls
in one agency would promote the coordination of policy and
administration of controls. Consolidation would also
simplify matters for those business interests affected by
controls. Instead of a multiplicity of agencies with
unclear jurisdictional lines, there would be essentially
one authority to which commercial interests could turn for
licenses or guidance.

Consolidation would permit codification of regulations in
one publication and would achieve economies and heighten
efficiency by eliminating some duplication in the application
of control resources. Lastly, Congress could look to one
agency for accountability in the administration of the
various laws providing for the control of exports.

On the other hand, there are significant disadvantages to
consolidation as proposed by S.14 39 that must be recognized.

The Secretary of Commerce is made responsible for the
administration of the consolidated controls. Yet before
the Department may issue a license for the export of any
commodity or technology transferred to Commerce, the



257

8

written approval of the agency formerly having jurisdiction
must be obtained. In short, the authority of the Department
is not commensurate with its responsibility.

This same need to secure the written approval of other
agencies will produce delays in processing applications,
since the net effect of consolidation will be the introduction
of another agency, Commerce, into the application processing
cycle. The advantage of simplification accruing to commercial
interests would be reduced, if not eliminated, by these delays
in processing.

In many respects the consolidation proposed by S.1439 would
also present unusual administration problems. Control over
exports would be exercised under four different statutes,
each with its peculiar policy thrust and procedural require-
ments. Moreover, in the compliance and enforcement area,
there are different authorities and sanctions provided by
the various statutes.

On balance, I believe that the disadvantages of consolidation
as proposed outweigh the advantages. The most prominent
advantage, enhanced coordination of control policy and
administration, particularly in the nuclear area, can be
achieved through other devices. For this reason the
Department opposes the enactment of Sections 4 and 11 of S.14 39



258



9

In view of the little time afforded us before this Hearing,
I am unable to comment on whether the Bill in its present
form contains substantive and technical defects which, if
retained, would give us serious administrative difficulties.
It is our understanding that the Committee intends to hold
further hearings on S.14 39 and that we would have the
opportunity to make further comments to the Committee at
that time.

This concludes my prepared statement. I shall be pleased to
answer any questions.



259




THE UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

Washington, DC. 20230



Honorable Abraham Ribicoff
Chairman, Committee on Government

Operations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:



G0VE!?i>:me!»jt nptoAT

n^ - - - -



7



p —



! .







This is in response to your letter of May 5, 1975, in which
you request answers to several questions about export licensing
of nuclear reactor parts, for insertion in the record of the
hearings of the Committee on Government Operations. For the
sake of clarity, I shall answer your questions in the order
you raised them.

Q. How did the Commerce Department come to license component
parts of nuclear facilities, inasmuch as this authority is
vested in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under Section 109
of the Atomic Energy Act?

A. The Commerce Department does not license exports of parts
and components for nuclear production facilities, such as
uranium isotopic separation facilities and plants for the
reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel elements.
Exports of such parts and components are licensed by the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) under
Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act. The Commerce Depart-
ment does, however, license exports of parts, components and
accessories specially designed for nuclear utilization facili-
ties, that is, nuclear reactors. (Commerce also licenses
various commodities that have significant applications in con-
junction with nuclear reactors but are not caught by Section
10 9 of the Atomic Energy Act.)

The Department began licensing components of nuclear reactors
in 19 63, following agreement among the fifteen nations who
are members of the international strategic control organization
(COCOM) that exports of major components of nuclear reactors
to the Sino-Soviet bloc should be embargoed. At that time,
the Department indicated to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
that we wished to implement this embargo by requiring specific
validated licenses to export such components to all destinations
in order to guard against transshipments through non-COCOM



260



countries. The AEC agreed to our undertaking this licensing
function. This Department continues to handle applications
for licenses to export reactor components, consulting ERDA,
formerly AEC, for policy direction in each case.

Q. Why does the Commerce Department consult with ERDA rather
than NRC in the issuance of such licenses? Doesn't this
arrangement circumvent the NRC's regulatory authority over
exports?

A. The NRC staff has communicated informally with Commerce's
export licensing authorities about the licensing of nuclear
reactor parts, but these contacts to date have been chiefly
of an information-gathering nature. Although the NRC is aware
of the licensing function performed by this Department, it
has not yet requested us to consult with NRC nor to transfer
licensing responsibilities to the Commission.

You will note from the testimony of NRC's Chairman, Mr. William
Anders, before the Committee on April 30 that the Commission
is devising new procedures for working with the Executive
Branch in connection with licensing exports of nuclear facili-
ties or nuclear material. Although I assume that the new
procedures will relate also to nuclear reactor parts, I am
soliciting Mr. Anders' views and asking to be advised of the
Commission's wishes with respect to the control and/or
clearance procedures to be followed by Commerce.

I hope that this information will be helpful to you. Please
do not hesibate to let me know if there is additional infor-
mation you would like from this Department.

Sincerely,



• H-i )/IWl



John K. Tabor



261



Senator Glenn. Our next witness is Dr. Gerald F. Tape, U.S.
Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Dr.
Tape is certainly not to be considered the least by being last, because
he is the U.S. Representative to that agency, which has been referred
to here repeatedly this morning. Dr. Tape, we certainly welcome you
here, and I am sorry the time has gotten away from us. I appreciate
your being here. Do you have a prepared statement? If you do not,
then we could get on with the questioning — whatever your prefer-
ence is.

TESTIMONY OF DR. GERALD P. TAPE, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Dr. Tape. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a prepared statement.

Senator Percy. Before you start, I would like to tell you how
extraordinary sorry I am that I have to leave. I am hosting a lunch
for a dozen Egyptian parliamentarians, and the uniqueness of their
being here requires that I leave, but I will read your testimony with
great interest, and you are in the benevolent hands of our distin-
guished chairman.

Senator Glenn. I hope you discuss the nuclear aspects while you
are there.

Dr. Tape. Senator Percy, before you leave, may I say that if after
reading, there are questions, I would appreciate a chance to talk to
you about them.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have found in the past, in hearings such
as you have had this morning, that perhaps the greatest contribu-
tion I can make is to listen to the debate, and pick up a few of the
items that would benefit by additional information and clarification.

First, let me say that my purpose in being here is not to comment
on the bill itself, in the sense of authorities, procedural arrange-
ments, et cetera, within the various branches of the Government,
because that is not my expertise. However, you do bring into con-
sideration matters such as nuclear safeguards, international atomic
energy problems, the role of the IAEA, questions of bilateral
arrangements versus multilateral arrangements, and I would hope
in a few minutes that I could add some perspective at least from my
point of view.

Let me first say that the word safeguards, in the American
language it is a much overused and misunderstood word.

It is not only used in atomic energy, but it has been used in
defense activities and other activities as well. Safeguards, as used
by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and as it is reflected
in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, refers to the timely detection of
diversion of special nuclear material.

It does not specifically address the question of physical security
against terrorist types of activities, and so when Senator Percy was
addressing the question of what is the Agency doing in the area of
physical security, I want to make clear that that authority does not
exist under the present agreements involving Agency safeguards.

Now, let me come back to the question of what has been done, but
I want to emphasize there is this difference. I think probably what



Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. Senate. Committee on GoveThe Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 → online text (page 22 of 47)