The Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 online

safeguards only, and not health, safety or environmental



422

Senator Abraham Ribicoff
page 2

protection. It is not clear from the Proposed Findings,
moreover, whether even provisions such as those in the
amended Austrian agreement are embodied in all our other
bilateral agreements. Finally, the Proposed Findings do
not indicate when and how the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration may exercise its authority under such
agreements; what standards it would apply in passing on the
acceptability of reprocessing and waste storage facilities;
or to what extent (if any) other public officials and the
public would participate in the agency's decisionmaking
process .

(2) At .the licensing stage of the export process - a
stage which presumably occurs a number of years after execution
of an agreement for cooperation — it is not clear whether
there is a formal review, as such, even from a safeguards
standpoint, of reprocessing and waste storage plans. However,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must determine whether is-
suance of the license would be within the scope of and con-
sistent with an agreement for cooperation. Proposed Findings,
p. 35. Conveivably this may involve an examination of whether
reprocessing and waste storage operations will be carried out
in accordance with understandings previously reached in im-
plementation of the provisions of an agreement for cooperation.
In any event, under current licensing practices, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission makes no independent judgment in this
regard, but merely relies upon the advice of the Division of
International Security Affairs of the Energy Research and
Development Administration which reviews license applications.
It is not indicated in the Proposed Findings on what basis the
Energy Research and Development Administration makes its
judgments with respect to consistency of export licenses with
agreements for cooperation.

As the above discussion indicates, the nature and extent
of control exercised by the Energy Research and Development
Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission over
plutonium reprocessing and waste disposal in the export pro-
cess are relatively obscure. A substantial effort by your
Committee and others promptly to clarify these issues and to
seek a rational, overall regulatory scheme is highly desirable.



423



Senator Abraham Ribicoff
page 3



I hope the information presented above answers your
questions. If you have any further questions, please do not
hesitate to contact me, and I shall be most happy to respond
as best I can.



Sincerely,




Eldon V. C. Greenberg



424



Senator Glenn. Our next witness will be Mr. Carl Walske, who
is the president of the Atomic Industrial Forum.

TESTIMONY OF CAKL WALSKE, PRESIDENT OF THE ATOMIC

INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC.

Senator Glenn. Mr. Walske. we are glad to have you with us this
morning. We have a short statement from you. Would you prefer
to enter that in the record or would you like to read the statement?
What is your preference ?

Mr. Walske. Well, I can condense it a little bit. It is already
mercifully short, but for that reason a summary is almost equivalent
to the full statement. It can be inserted.

Senator Glenn. Fine. It will be inserted in its entirety at the con-
clusion of your testimony.

Mr. Walske. I would like to emphasize, as I say in the statement,
that I am appearing here presenting my own views, although I do
believe that most of the 625 member organizations of our associa-
tion would generally agree with my views.

The bill you are considering; is certainly a bill that has as its ob-
jectives ones that most people would fully support; and I would
also. There is a question of how — once the objectives are set forth —
how best they might be achieved. Here, perhaps, reasonable people
would differ.

Going back a little bit, historically, some years ago the United
States was in quite a dominant position with regard to nuclear tech-
nology and the supply of nuclear services, such as the enriching of
uranium. If it had so chosen, perhaps it could have dictated the sub-
stance of international arrangements for the commerce in nuclear
technology. As a matter of fact, we did not dictate. Instead, we
chose to influence others by persuasion and leadership. In general,
we achieved what we set out to achieve.

For example, the treaty on nonproliferation came into being. The
safeguards system of IAEA exists today. The export of highly en-
riched uranium, to the extent it was exported, took place under the
controls for which we asked.

While the danger of additional nations becoming nuclear weapon
powers was recognized years ago, the possible threat from terrorists
or criminals has only recently been recognized. This is a different
matter. It is not a question of national intentions with all their mili-
tary, economic and foreign policy ramifications. Safeguards against
criminal elements are different and depend in essence on the same
type of physical protection given to any very valuable material.

With the recent recognition of the threat of diversion by criminal
elements, the United States has increased the priority on avoiding it.
We have all been impressed as acts of terrorism and violence in-
creased throughout the world. In every country political leaders are
anxious to provide adequate safeguards against the seizure of nu-
clear materials by criminal elements.

I think that is an important point. This being a really rather re-
centlv recognized threat, I don't believe that we should assume that
the fact that we did not ourselves deal with it 10 years ago and
others did not deal with it 10 years ago means that they are not



425

interested in dealing with it. I sincerely believe that sensible people
all over the world would want to control plutonium in such a way
that it represents no undue threat to people.

In the present situation it seems to me that the most effective ap-
proach to improving safeguards against criminal elements must be
based on cooperative international efforts, both bilaterally and multi-
laterally through IAEA or some other organizational arrangement.
In my opinion, we cannot dictate at this point, even if we want to,
because we are only one of many possible suppliers for nuclear ma-
terials and technology.

On the other hand with regard to nuclear proliferation we must,
I believe, in our new agreements for cooperation take such steps as
we can to inhibit proliferation. I have in mind, in particular, the
need to urge upon new entrants into the nuclear power field that
they enter into regional type arrangements for reprocessing nuclear
fuel. It is, of course, only at this stage that weapons grade material
becomes available from the operation of most current reactor types.

I should interject here also the same thing might well be applied
to uranium enriching facilities which have the capability for bring-
ing uranium to a weapons grade.

If we avoid the proliferation of nationally operated reprocessing
plants, and also enriching plants which have the capability for turn-
ing out weapons grade material, we will certainly alleviate to an
extent the problem of new nations becoming nuclear weapon powers.

Incidentally, because of the economics of reprocessing nuclear fuel
it makes good sense commercially to pool reprocessing capacity.

Applying my philosophy to S. 1439 I suggest that it would be
more effective if it were modified to :

One : Make the State Department, as the foreign policy agent of
the President, the ultimate judge of whether nuclear exports are ad-
visable, based on advice from NRC, ERDA, DOD, and our intelli-
gence services.

Two: Recognize that adequate safeguards are a function not only
of the level of physical protection, but also of the threat existing in
any country, and, therefore, they may vary from case to case in order
to be suitable.

Third : Call upon the executive branch to proceed more on a coop-
erative path with other countries than on the basis of a U.S. veto.

With that, I would be pleased to answer any questions you may
have.

Senator Glenn. We do appreciate this very much. You do repre-
sent a very broad base group here. Part of your statement you
skipped over such as the first page. Just for the record, it indicates
you have some 625 members in your organization and 20 percent of
your membership is from abroad. It covers the whole spectrum of
nuclear atomic energy, I believe. So you do represent quite a group
and have a broad basis from which to draw your information.

I would like to review this just a little bit of your last recom-
mendation there to call upon the executive branch to proceed more
on a cooperative path with other countries than on the basis of a U.S.
veto.

This would indicate that you are in favor — I can presume, and
correct me if I am wrong — you would favor giving authority over



426

controls, safeguards, and so on to some international organization
of an IAEA type. If that is true, would it move out of the account-
ancy program* which it is basically engaged in now into a real au-
thoritarian control type organization ?

Mr. Walske. Well, if I can expand a little bit ?

I think it is absolutely vital that we take this word "safeguard"
and divide it into two separate problems or areas — and I will answer
your question. The one area, the old area if you like, that we all have
been working on and have recognized for a long time, is the area of
proliferation, that is, the area of Government action by an inde-
pendent Government. That is one type of thing.

Another type of thing is safeguards against criminal elements or
substantial elements, as Ted Taylor likes to call them, or even ele-
ments foreign to a country. Basically this type of thing requires
not exactly the police type of protection, but something very much
like police type protection in order to deal with it.

In the one case you are dealing with the intentions of a sovereign
government, that is, in the first case you are dealing with the inten-
tions of a sovereign government. The way that you deal with that
might be very different than the case where you are concerned with
how well another government runs its police force or its police forces
— sercurity forces or whatever you want to call them.

I think the governments may get very delicate when it comes to
their sovereign rights regarding whether they are going to become a
nuclear power or not. And the way that we dealt with that over the
years was a very, very, sensitive thing. We pushed it as hard as we
could and we achieved a Nonproliferation Treaty. And it seems to
have been just about the upper limit of what we could get. Maybe
we would have liked more, but I think we got just everything that
the traffic would bear.

But in the other area of safeguards against criminal elements or
subnational groups, I do not believe it is correct to assume that any
government would want to leave that problem unsolved.

I have just come back from a recent — just last week — two weeks
in Europe. The subject of safeguards for plutonium is a very keen
subject over there among government leaders and among the indus-
try. I see no indication whatsoever that these people think that it is
trivial and that it should not be treated in a serious manner. Well,
to take a sovereign government in Europe — and an industrialized
power- — and to sit down with them and dictate to them exactly what
their security arrangements are going to be — I suppose it is possible,
but it seems to me much more practical and totally achievable to sit
down with them and talk it over and come to a common conclusion.

I spent, and the record does not show it, but I spent — before these
last 2 years in the position I am in — seven years in the Department
of Defense as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic
Energy. In that position I think I had the senior civilian responsi-
bility in the Government in a full-time sense for the security of
nuclear weapons. In that position and from that perspective I think
I have a fair appreciation for the security attitudes of the indus-
trialized countries, certainly the ones that have been involved in
atomic energy. I find no inclination whatsoever on their part to be
cavalier with security matters.



427

Senator Glenn. If I am reading properly from what you are
saying, and correct me if I am wrong, you are saying part and
parcel of delegating authority, the international organization would
go ahead and sell controls to the individual nations and let them
pretty much decide on their own how they want to use them and
exercise their own good judgment. Is that correct?

Mr. Walske. Well, I think that the international agency — the
International Atomic Energy Agency is, in fact, only serving a
monitoring function. As a monitoring function, and this is over the
actions of governments really, the most that it does, in reality, is to
sound an alarm bell if something is being done improperly — if a
Government is not accounting for the special nuclear materials that
are within its control. That is a very useful function especially if
the government has taken a pledge they are not to become a nuclear
power.

With regard to the safeguards against criminal elements, I think
probably there is a big handicap in working through an interna-
tional agency, the handicap being that in security systems — at least
in the final details of security systems — it is a good idea not to make
public every single thing that you have in mind in order to have
protection. I think that bilateral governmental discussions are prob-
ably rather effective, particularly in the police area. I do not think
Interpol or other international cooperative police efforts publicize
all of their techniques. It would be a bad thing if they did.

Senator Glenn. Would you propose then no detail controls, except
the State Department working out appropriate arrangements with
foreign governments — involving NRO or anyone else, involving safe-
guard arrangements or anything else — rather than going to strict
control in this country or a strict international atuhorization con-
trol, which IAEA might develop into. You would favor just work-
ing this out on a diplomatic basis without any detailed power by
any other agency or government here or internationally?

Mr. Walske. Well, sir, you said something about just the State
Department and I do not think they have to be trivial. They
should

Senator Glenn. Let me put it differently, solely the State Depart-
ment.

Mr. Walske. All right. I think the State Department is a pretty
conservative organization, especially in having dealt with them from
the vantage point of the Pentagon. I believe as a matter of fact that
with the advice of the NRO and others that they would act rather
conservatively in these matters. Beyond that I also believe that Con-
gress serves a very useful function in being informed on what is
going on in these areas and being able to take important action
when necessary and when the system is not working as it should
work.

So I believe, based on years of contact with the type of security
arrangements that have been used internationally both in the
weapons area and also with regard to the IAEA and Agreements for
Cooperation in the civil area, that there is no reason at all why our
basic past procedures cannot be extended rather effectively to include
safeguards against the criminal elements abroad.



55-430 O - 75 - 28



428

Senator Glenn. You comment by saying, "The need to urge upon
new entrants into the nuclear power field that they enter into
regional type arrangements for reprocessing nuclear fuel." That may
be satisfactory now, but I think probably within a few years you
will find whole new means of reprocessing and enrichment — who
knows what type of formula it will take for scientific advancement.
But I think the ability to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium
would become more common probably. It seems to me it might be
sitting up something that is not going to be realistic for a few years
down the road, if all precedents in scientific development can be
relied upon.

Mr. Walske. Well, I follow you very well. I agree with you that —
I think the thrust of what you are saying is that a reprocessing plant
could be a small one. After all the Indians apparently separated
their plutonium from a pilot scale plant that could not have been
terribly expensive. Enrichment may get simpler as centrifuges are
proven out and also perhaps larger enrichment is proven out and
these could lead to smaller plants. I think that would increase the
difficulty, no question about it.

The principle that I am enunciating does not depend entirely
upon the size of the plant and upon the capital investment required,
although today that is a major factor. The principle I am enunciat-
ing is to urge people to enter into joint undertakings with regard
to these plants. And in that way, I think that they will be more
open. They will be more visible, and visibility with regard to nation-
al proliferation is a very valuable thing. In fact, that is the whole
principle of IAEA safeguards, to keep visible what is happening to
the special nuclear material when it is in the cycle.

Senator Glenn. I want to request, just for the record, so that we
know the groups and the wide diversity of the groups that you rep-
resent, for the record, a list of the members of the Atomic Industrial
Forum.

Mr. Walske. We would be glad to do that.

Senator Glenn. Thank you very much, Mr. Walske. We appre-
ciate your testimony and your statement.

Mr. Walske. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walske with attachment follow :]



429



Statement of Carl Walske
President of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
before the Committee on Government Operations
Senate of the United States

May 1, 1975



Mr. Chairman and other members of the Senate Committee on Government
Operations, I am pleased to appear here, albeit on fairly short notice, in
response to your request.

The Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., of which I am the President is an
association of some 625 member organizations which share a common interest
in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Our member orga-
nizations come from a broad spectrum: electric utilities, reactor and com-
ponent manufacturers, architect-engineer-constructors, fuel cycle service
companies including uranium miners and millers, financial institutions, law
firms, insurance companies, universities, government agencies and private
consultants. About 20 percent of our membership is from abroad.

I should make it clear however, that the views I am presenting today
are my own and not necessarily those of the Forum's members. I believe,
though, that most of the Forum's members would agree with my views.

The bill before you, Sl*09, has as its evident objectives the inhibi-
tion of nuclear proliferation and, in addition, the promulgation of adequate
nuclear safeguards against illicit uses of special nuclear materials. Those
are laudable objectives to which I personnaly fully subscribe. Based on
many impressions that I have from discussions in the U.S. and abroad I feel
the nuclear industry, too, fully agrees with the bill's objectives.

We all struggle with the question of how best to achieve our objectives.
Years ago the U.S. was in such a dominant position with regard to nuclear

-1-



430

technology and the supply of nuclear services, such as the enriching of
uranium, that perhaps it could have dictated the substance of international
arrangements for commerce in nuclear technology. In fact we did not dictate,
but instead chose to influence others by persuasion and leadership. In general
we achieved what we set out to achieve.

For example, the treaty on non-proliferation came into being. The safe-
guards system of IAEA exists today. The export of highly enriched uranium,
to the extent it was exported, took place under the controls for which we asked.

While the danger of additional nations becoming nuclear weapon powers was
recognized years ago, the possible threat from terrorists or criminals has only
recently been recognized. This is a different matter. It is not a question
of national intentions with all their military, economic and foreign policy
ramifications. Safeguards against criminal elements are different and depend
in essence on the same type of physical protection given to any very valuable
material .

With the recent recognition of the threat of diversion by criminal
elements, the U. S. has increased the priority on avoiding it. We h.3ve all
been impressed as acts of terrorism and violence increased throughout the world.
In every country political leaders are anxious to provide adequate safeguards
against the seizure of special nuclear materials by criminal elements.

In the present situation it seems to me that the most effective approach
to improving safeguards against criminal elements must be based on cooperative
international efforts, both bilaterally and mul ti lateral 1 y through IAEA or
some other organizational arrangement. We cannot dictate at this point, be-
cause we are only one of many possible suppliers for nuclear materials and
technology.

- 2 -



431

if

On the other hand with regard to nuclear proliferation we must, I
believe, in our new agreements for cooperation take such steps as we can to
inhibit proliferation. I have in mind, in particular, the need to urge upon
new entrants into the nuclear power field that they enter into regional type
arrangements for reprocessing nuclear fuel. It is, of course, only at this
stage that weapons grade material becomes available from the operation of most
current reactor types. By avoiding the proliferation of nationally operated
reprocessing plants, we may mitigate the problem of new nations becoming nu-
clear weapons powers. Incidentally, because of the economics of reprocessing
nuclear fuel it makes good sense commercially to pool reprocessing capacity.

Applying my philosophy to S . 1 439 I suggest that it would be more effective

if it were modified to:

\V

(1) make the State Department, as the foreign policy agent of the

President, the ultimate judge of whether nuclear exports were
advisable, based on advice from NRC , ERDA, DOD aj*f our in-
telligence services.

(2) recognize that adequate safeguards are a function not only of
the level of physical protection, but also of the threat exist-
ing in any country. V.,

V

(3) call upon the Executive Branch to proceed more on a coopera-
tive path with other countries than on the basis of a U.S. veto.

With that short statement I would be pleased to have any questions that
you may choose to ask.



432



Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

475 Park Avenue South
New York. New York 10016
Telephone (212)725-8300
Cable Atomforum Newyork



Carl Walske

President

May 12, 1975



Senator Abraham Ribicoff

United States Senate

Committee on Government Operations

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Ribicoff:



**«aejsgs




V^SHt



Thank you fo
the hearing
Senate, May
at the heari
be addressed
my own answe
the Secretar
of my answer
Forum, Inc . ,
ible with th



r your letter and qu
of the Committee on
1 , 1975 . I , too , am
ng. Some of your qu

to government offic
rs, drawing in part
y of Defense (Atomic
s are my own and not

although I do belie
ose of most of our m



estions regarding my testimony at
Government Operations of the U.S.
sorry that you were unable to be
estions should more appropriately
ials, however, I shall give you
on my experience as Assistant to
Energy) from 1966 to 1973. All
those of the Atomic Industrial
ve my views are generally compat-
ember organizations.



"1. We have heard testimony from Dr. Ikle and other experts to the
effect that a close relationship exists between the export of peace-
ful nuclear technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

" (a) Do you agree?

"(b) Are you and other representatives of the nuclear

industry concerned?
"(c) What are you doing about it?"

Countries with nuclear power programs generally have the know-how
and access to proceed with or without the U.S. At this stage there
is no way that they can be dictated to by the U.S. as regards wheth-
er or not they initiate a nuclear weapon program. We can, however,
influence them through diplomatic processes.

Countries which have had little or no experience with civil nuclear
power would certainly be assisted in achieving a nuclear weapons