The Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 online

Union Electric Company

United Aircraft Corporation

United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipe Fining Industry of the United States
and Canada

United Engineers & Constructors, Inc.

The United Illuminating Company

United Nuclear Corporation

United Nuclear-Homestake Partners

United Nuclear Industries, Inc.

United States Testing Company, Inc.

Universal Oil Products Company

The University of Arizona

University of California, Berkeley

University of California, Los Angeles

The University of Chicago

University of Cincinnati

University of Florida

University of Illinois
University of Maryland
* The University of Michigan
The University of Missouri-Columbia
The University of Missouri-Rolla
The University of New Mexico
The University of Tennessee
University of Virginia
University of Washington (Seattle)
The University of Wisconsin
URS/Energy Services Company
URS/John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers
Utah International Inc.



'Western Massachusetts Electric Company
Western Nuclear, Inc.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Weston Geophysical Research, Inc.
Roy F. Weston

"Wheeling Electric Company
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts
Wisconsin Electric Power Company

"Wisconsin Michigan Power Company
Wisconsin Power and Light Company
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
Dean Witter & Co., Incorporated
William D.Winer, Inc.
Woodward-Clyde Consultants
Woodward-Envicon, Inc.
Woodward-Lundgren & Associates
Woodward-McNeill & Associates
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
John L. Wortham & Son

Yankee Atomic Electric Company
Charles Yulish Associates, Inc.

H.B. Zachry Co.



Valley National Bank

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Volpe, Boskey & Lyons

Wald, Harkrader & Ross

State of Washington

Office of Nuclear Energy Development

Washington Public Power Supply System

The Washington Water Power Company

George L. Weil, Consultant

' West Penn Power Company

'West Texas Utilities Company



55-430 n - 75 - 9Q



444



AIF ORGANIZATION MEMBERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES



Australia

Australian Atomic Energy Commission (Sydney)

The Electricity Commission of New South Wales (Sydney)

Mary Kathleen Uranium Ltd. (Melbourne)

Queensland Mines Limited (Sydney)

Ranger Uranium Mines Ltd. (Sydney)

Western Mining Corporation Limited (Melbourne)

Austria

International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna)

Osterreichische Studiengesellschaft fuer Atomenergie
Ges. m.b.H. (Governmental Advisory Committee on
Atomic Energy) (Vienna)



Belgium

Centre et Sud, S.A. (Brussels)

Compagnie Generale d'Entreprises Electriques et
Industrielles. S.A. (ELECTROBEL) (Brussels)

Comprimo Belgie n.v. (Antwerpen)

EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community)
(Brussels)

EUROCHEMIC (Mol-Donk)

Ministere des Affaires Economiques (Ministry of Economic
Affairs of Energy) (Brussels)

'Societe d'Electricite de Sambre et Meuse des Ardennes et
du Luxembourg, S.A. (ESMALUX) (Brussels)

* Societe de Traction et d'Electricite, S.A. (Brussels)

* Societe Financiere de Transports et d'Entreprises

Industrielles, S.A. (SOFINA) (Brussels)

Societe Generale des Minerals (Brussels)

'Societe Intercommunale Beige de Gaz et d'Electricite, S.A.
(INTERCOM) (Brussels)

* Societe pour la Coordination de la Production et du

Transport de I'Energie Electrique, S.A. (C.P.T.E.)
(Brussels)

* Societe Reunies d'Energie du Bassin de I'Escaut (EBES)

(Brussels)

Syndicat d'Etude de I'lndustrie Atomique (Brussels)

* Union des Centrales Electriques de Liege-Namur-

Luxembourg-Hainaut, S.A. (U.C.E. Linalux-Hainaut)
(Liege)

Union des Exploitations Electriques en Belgiques (Brussels)

* Union Intercommunale des Centrales Electriques du

Brabant, S.A. (INTERBRABANT) (Brussels)

Brazil

Centrais Eletricas de Sao Paulo S.A. (CESP) (Sao Paulo)

Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (National Nuclear
Energy Commission of Brazil) (Rio de Janeiro)



Furnas-Centrais Eletricas SA (Rio de Janeiro)
Promon Engenharia S.A. (Sao Paulo)

Canada

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Ottawa)

Brinco Limited (Montreal)

Burns Bros, and Denton Limited (Toronto)

Department of Energy, Mines & Resources (Ottawa)

H.F. Ditchburn & Associates Ltd. (Toronto)

Eldorado Nuclear Limited (Port Hope)

Environmental Protection Service

Department of the Environment (Ottawa)

Great Plains of Canada, Ltd. (Alberta)

Intsel of Canada Ltd. (Toronto)

Ministry of Energy (Toronto)

Quebec Hydro-Electric Commission (Montreal)

Rio Algom Mines Limited (Toronto)

A.H. Ross & Associates (Toronto)

China, Republic of

Taiwan Power Company (Taipei)

Denmark

Danish Atomic Energy Commission (Roskilde)

The Isefjord Power Company (Hellerup, Copenhagen)

Finland

EKONO Oy (Helsinki)

Franca

Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique (C.E.A.) (French
Atomic Energy Commission) (Paris)

COMURHEX (Paris)

Credit Lyonnais (Paris)

Electricite de France (French Power Bureau) (Paris)

Inter Conseil Nucleaire (Paris)

O.E.C.D. Nuclear Energy Agency (N.E.A.) (Paris)

Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann (Paris)

URANEX (Neuilly S/Seine)



German Federal Republic

Der Bundesministerium fuer Forschung und Technologie
(Federal Ministry for Research and Technology) (Bonn)

Gelsenberg AG (Essen)

Gesellschaft fuer Kernforschung m.b.H. (Company for
Nuclear Research) (Karlsruhe)



445



Kraftwerk Union Aktiengesellschaft (Erlangen)

Nordwestdeutsche Kraftwerke Aktiengesellschaft
(Hamburg)

NUKEM, Nuklear-Chemie und -Metallurgie G.m.b.H.
(Wolfgang bei Hanau, Main)

Rheinisch-Westfaelisches Elektrizitaetswerk A.G. (Essen)

Uranerzbergbau-GmbH & Co. KG (Bonn)

Urangesellschaft m.b.H. & Co. KG (Frankfurt/Main)

URANIT. Uran-lsotopentrennungs-GmbH (Juelich)

Great Britain

Babcock & Wilcox, Ltd. (London)

British Nuclear Fuels Limited (Lancashire)

The Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation Limited (London)

United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (London)

Urenco Limited (Buckinghamshire)

Greece

Greek Atomic Energy Commission (Athens)
Material Sciences, Inc. (Athens)
Technical Chamber of Greece (Athens)

Israel

Electra (Israel) Ltd. (Tel-Aviv)

Israel Atomic Energy Commission (Tel-Aviv)

Italy

AGIP NUCLEARE, Sp.A. (Milano)

Comitato Nazionale per I'Energia Nucleare (CNEN)
(National Committee for Nuclear Energy) (Rome)

Comitato Nazionale per I'Energia Nucleare-Programma
Reattori Veloci (Bologna)

COREPEC (Consorzio SNAM PROGETTI-
ITALIMPIANTI-Reattore PEC) (Milan)

Ente Nazionale per I'Energia Elettrica (ENEL) (Rome)

University of Genoa, School of Engineering (Genoa)

Japan
*C. Itoh&Co. Ltd. (Tokyo)

* Marubeni-lida Company Ltd. (Tokyo)

* Mitsubishi Corporation (Tokyo)

* Mitsui & Company Ltd. (Tokyo)

Nippon Genshiryoku Sangyo Kaigi (Japan Atomic
Industrial Forum, Inc.) (Tokyo)

Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development
Corporation (Tokyo)

Sumitomo Shoji-Kaisha, Ltd. (Tokyo)



Mexico

Comision Nacional de Energia Nuclear (National Nuclear
Energy Commission) (Mexico, D.F.)



The Netherlands

Bureau Ellens (The Hague)

N.V. Gemeenschappelijke Kernenergiecentrale Nederland
(Arnhem)

Reactor Centrum Nederland (RCN) (The Netherlands
Reactor Center) (The Hague)

Norway

Norwegian Water Resources & Electricity Board
Thermal Power Department (Oslo)

Statskraftverkene (Oslo)

Portugal

Junta de Energia Nuclear (Lisboa)

South Africa

Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Limited
(Johannesburg)

Atomic Energy Board (Pretoria)

Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa (Proprietary)
Limited (Marshalltown, Transvaal)

Spain

Auxini Ingenieria Espanola, S.A. (AUXIESA) (Madrid)

Centrales Nucleares del Norte, S.A. (NUCLENOR)
(Santander)

Compania Sevillana de Electricidad, S.A. (Sevilla)

Electra de Viesgo, S.A. (Santander)

Empresa Nacional del Urano, S.A. (ENUSA) (Madrid)

Equipos Nucleares S.A. (Madrid)

Fuerzas Electricas de Cataluna, S.A. (Barcelona)

Fuerzas Electricas del Noroeste, S.A. (FENOSA)
(La Coruna)

Hidroelectrica Espanola, S.A. (Madrid)

Iberduero S.A. (Bilbao)

Ibernuclear, S.A. (Madrid)

Instituto Nacional de Industna (Madrid)

Junta de Energia Nuclear (Nuclear Energy Council)
(Madrid)

S.E. de C. Babcock & Wilcox C.A. (Bilbao)

Sener S.A. (Las Arenas-Bilbao)

Tecnicas Reunidas, S.A. (Madrid)

Union Electrica, S.A. (Madrid)



446



Sweden

Aktiebolaget Asea-Atom (Vasteras)

Aktiebolaget Atomenergi (Nykoping)

Aktiebolaget Skandinaviska Elverk (Stockholm)

Angpanneforeningen (Stockholm)

Atomkraftkonsortiet (AKK Atomic Power Group)
(Stockholm)

Statens Vattenfallsverk (Swedish State Power Board)
(Vallingby)

Svensk Karnbransleforsorjning AB (Swedish Nuclear Fuel
Supply Co.) (Stockholm)

Svenska Atomforsakringspoolen (Swedish Atomic
Insurance Pool) (Stockholm)

Sydsvenska Kraftaktiebolaget (South Swedish Power Co.,
Inc.) (Malmo)

Uddcomb Sweden AB (Karlskrona)

Switzerland

Abteilung fuer Wissenschaft und Forschung
(Division for Science and Research) (Bern)

Brown, Boveri & Company Limited (Baden)

Electrowatt Ltd. (Zurich)

Motor-Columbus Consulting Engineers Inc. (Baden)

Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerke A.G. (Baden)



10



447

Senator Glenn. Mr. Adrian Fisher. Mr. Fisher is dean at the
University of Georgetown and a former U.S. negotiator of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

TESTIMONY OF ADRIAN FISHER, DEAN, GEORGETOWN UNIVER-
SITY LAW CENTER, FORMER U.S. NEGOTIATOR OF THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Senator Glenn. Do you have a prepared statement you wish to
enter into the record or what is your pleasure ?

Mr. Fisher. Mr. Chairman, because of the timing of my invita-
tion to appear, I do not have a prepared statement. I would just
like to say a few words about the bill and then submit myself to
attempt to answer your questions.

Senator Glenn. Fine.

Mr. Fisher. The purposes of the bill in terms of getting a cen-
tralized control over the problem of exports of nuclear materials
and the relation of that to the Nonproliferation Treaty is, I think,
very, very good. Although various stages of my career, I have
worked with practically every agency that is mentioned in your bill,
the State Department, the Commerce Department, the old Atomic
Energy Commission and the

Senator Glenn. You are the renaissance man we have been look-
ing for.

Mr. Fisher. No, I just could not hold down a job. That was my
problem.

But I do not have any strong thoughts about where you put the
power except to thoroughly support the concept of a nuclear pro-
liferation assessment stage in section 8 of the bill. That is consistent
with what the House is doing in the new authorization legislation
for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency requiring, in effect,
a form of impact statement — that the International Relations Com-
mittee is so considering.

But the thing I would like to direct my attention to are two
issues of policy that are raised by the bill, Mr. Chairman.

First : There is an area in which the U.S. policy — to avoid any ap-
pearance of partisanship and this goes back with many demonstrations
— which in my judgment has been erroneous. The U.S. policy has been
a strong supporter of safeguards of the material that we export. How-
ever, we have been rather benignly neglectful of the attitude of the
indigenous operations of the country to which exporting nuclear ma-
terial.

I am not suggesting that that is a violation of the Nonprolifer-
ation Treaty. I think a reasonable interpretation of article III of
that treaty is that all that is required is that the materials exported
be subject to safeguards.

On the other hand, the Canadian experience with the Indian Gov-
ernment has shown that there are certain dangers of building up a
nuclear industry on the one hand, but thoroughly safeguarded, and
having an indigenous industry on the other hand, not subject to
safeguards because you cannot put any safeguards on the brain of a
man. When you build up an industry and build up a know-how, if



448

there are nonsafeguarded around, you have really gone contrary to
the direction of the Nonproliferation Treaty. I think the Indian-
Canadian experience is an illustration of that.

We are doing the same thing with respect to quite a few countries
in which we are requiring our material to be subject to safeguards.
But we really do not care about the other nuclear activities.

See, we are in the danger of really — this policy seems to be wrong
in two ways, Mr. Chairman. One is the diversion thing which I
indicated. You build up an industry and then it can be developed in
nuclear weapons with indigenous material.

And second, safeguards work best if the whole ball of wax is
under them, because the whole nature of the material controls.

So I would recommend that the statement of policy by the Senate
that the United States start moving in the direction of requiring
as a precondition with enriched nuclear systems, the acceptance of
complete IAEA safeguards. Now, we cannot do that completely,
because we already have some contracts. We already have agree-
ments.

Senator Glenn. What was that again? To put it all under IAEA
safeguards?

Mr. Fisher. We will say, "Look, it isn't just enough that you put
the material that we supply you in the safeguard. If you are a non-
nuclear power, unless all of your nuclear activities are under safe-
guards, we are not going to assist you." Such a policy would require
cooperation with France.

On the other hand, the French, even though they have not signed
the Nonproliferation Treaty have taken the public position, and I
believe them, they are going to act as if they were a party to it.
They stated that in the Security Council of the United Nations in
June of 1968 and they have said it at every occasion since then.

Senator Glenn. Why didn't they sign it?

Mr. Fisher. That involves some segment of French psychology
that I think is a little bit hard for me to explain.

Paraphrasing Mr. Churchill's saying, the hardest cross he had to
bear was the cross of Lorraine.

Many of my friends say that we ought to say, "Look, join the
treaty or we are not going to assist you." I think — while I would
like to do that, I do not think we could make it stick. We clearly
could not get French cooperation on that. We might, however, get
cooperation on an increasingly severe program of not giving nuclear
assistance to countries who are only put under safeguards the portion
that we assist them.

I think generally leaning in that direction would make a possible
repetition of — what I refer to and it is almost slang — the Canadian-
Indian syndrome of less more than likely, which is exactly what
happened there in leading a rather irritated Prime Minister of
Canada and leaving the relations between the two countries on
rather a bad basis.

So much for one change in policy, that is, as long as our material
is safeguarded we do not really care. As I say, I do not think we
could require adherence to the treaty as a precondition for exports,
because that, I think, would be interpreted as blackmail.



449

On the other hand, everyone loves the IAEA in requiring increased
acceptance of IAEA safeguards across the board would not be inter-
preted as blackmail, and the chances of getting the French coop-
eration on that seem to me to be greater than they would be if
you

Senator Glenn. Would you give IAEA more authority if every-
body sort of generally accepted their viewpoint or looked at them
as the lead dog in this international effort? Doesn't IAEA act as
an information gathering, a monitoring service at the present time?
Would you give them more authority and control or keep them as
they are?

Mr. Fisher. Well, I think you have to give them more support. In
terms of legal authority, I do not think you can give them much
more authority and control without running into problems of the
members of the IAEA.

Senator Glenn. Of course, this bill, that we are discussing, would
set up our own interagency operations here in this country. To get
back to the bill, the question is whether we give NRC a veto, or go
to IAEA, or give it to the State Department, as Mr. Walske indi-
cated he would like to have done. There are all sorts of ways we can
approach this.

If we were to give the only veto to IAEA, turning over our oper-
ations more or less to an international organization, it would be an
entirely different agency — an agency to coordinate the problem in
this country — than it would be if we retain the veto in NRC, make
Commerce the lead agency to coordinate business interest, and get
other agencies to sign off on export licenses before they are put into
effect.

It would be a different operation if we were contemplating that it
would be a better idea to go with the full IAEA authority.

Mr. Fisher. Well, I do not think it is realistic to think in terms
of full IAEA sort of quasi-governmental type of authority. I do not
think the IAEA is going to be anything more than a monitor. But
having said more than a monitor, a really good effective reservoir,
particularly when you have at least three of the major nuclear
powers in agreement with the Nonproliferation Treaty

Senator Glenn. Let's take that. As they blow the whistle then
what happens?

Mr. Fisher. Well, I assume that if their safeguard system has
been violated the other parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty would
break off any form of nuclear assistance to them.

Senator Glenn. We had some problems in previous testimony
along the lines that it is all nice and good to have information, but
what happens at that point. It does not do much good to have the
information unless there is some follow-up on it.

Mr. Fisher. I think any party to the Nonproliferation Treaty
would be justified in withholding any form of nuclear — in fact, they
would be required to withhold any form of nuclear assistance if the
IAEA had blown the whistle and that problem had not been satis-
factorily resolved.

Senator Glenn. Are you satisfied with the safeguard provisions
as finally negotiated by the Nonproliferation Treaty ?



450



Mr. Fisher. Well-



Senator Glenn. You must have been or you would not have signed
off on it.

Mr. Fisher. Well, I was satisfied that they were the best we could
get in that they were better than nothing. You can play worse case
arguments on the safeguard system of the Nonproliferation Treaty
or any safeguard system. Just like you can play worse case argu-
ments on — as we use to do gaming various control problems, what
happens if the Soviets cheat this way or that way. You can always
play worse case arguments.

But on the whole, I think it is the best achievable.

Senator Glenn. Under Nonproliferation Treaty, I do not believe
there is any difficulty in getting a system for safeguarding nuclear
materials against a terrorist attack. Would it be just left to the
commonsense of the host country to take care of that ? Everyone is —
as Mr. Walske pointed out — everyone is concerned with the terrorist
aspect. We do not have to tell them about being concerned with
terrorist attacks. They already are. Were there any requirements
discussed in the Nonproliferation Treaty negotiations with regard to
that?

Mr. Fisher. No, there were not. Mr. Chairman, the Nonprolifer-
ation Treaty negotiations represent in some ways a classic case book
story on how not to negotiate an agreement, because the principal
problem of safeguards was left open. The Nonproliferation Treaty
merely said the parties agree to negotiate safeguards with the IAEA.
Now, you can say it and that is silly. It is an agreement to agree. It
is just meaningly.

Senator Glenn. IAEA negotiates these in secret and you never
know what happens with the negotiations.

Mr. Fisher. Well, not really. The principal thing the Soviets were
concerned about, about safeguards was the IAEA EURATOM
Agreement. That has worked out pretty well. No one is really con-
cerned that there is any cheating under the arrangement that IAEA
and EURATOM have worked out. So by and large the notion —
even a professor in international negotiations which is what I seem
to be now to make fun of this technique of negotiating it — as a
practical matter, it was the only way you could do it. Because if you
had made a precondition for the signing of the Nonproliferation
Treaty, the IAEA agreement with all the various other groups,
Japan, EURATOM and others, you would not have had it yet.

Senator Glenn. Do you think we in the United States are in vio-
lation of the Nonproliferation Treaty by licensing nuclear exports
to nonNonproliferation Treaty countries such as India or Africa
that have not placed all of their nuclear facilities ard materials
under IAEA safeguards ? Are we in violation of our own agreement ?

Mr. Fisher. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. When the agree-
ment was presented to the Senate that point was raised. And the
point was made, and one can say a reasonable man could make it,
at least I am committed to that proposition, erroneously or not,
because I made it, that as long as the materials that we supplied
were under safeguards that that was all that was required under the
treaty.

But the problem is, the fact that you can do it under the treaty,
without violating the treaty, does not mean you have to.



451

We are in a situation now where many of the parties with which
we are assisting, say Argentina and Brazil, are under a positive
incentive not to sign the treaty. Why should they put other things
under safeguards when they can get from us as long as the material
they get from us have safeguards ?

Well, I felt that the opposite point of view, say amend the treaty
to say either sign or you don't get anything, might be counter pro-
ductive. On the other hand, there is clearly no obligation under the
treaty to supply anything to nonparties.

Senator Glenn. That was just along the line I was going to ask
you about. What legislation might you introduce to implement the
policies you are advocating here ?

If we insist on uniform application of IAEA safeguards covering
all the facilities, what would this do to our commercial enterprise?
Would France jump in or would we pretty much eliminate ourselves
from the whole international commercial picture and lose whatever
influence we had there?

Mr. Fisher. I think it might be a little extreme to say as of July
1 no more unless everything is under IAEA safeguards. But a state-
ment of policy by the Senate, that is the way the United States is
leaning into trying to do in cooperation with other nuclear suppliers.
That does not seem to me to present a problem. As far as I know,
we have never really negotiated with the French along these lines.

I would just like to add one thing in that I agree with Mr. Walske
about the problem of the impact of original reprocessing. It may
well be that all of our technology you indicate, Mr. Chairman, would
be obsolete in another 10 years, but you cannot plan on that. Under
the circumstances then, it seems to me that the combination of
economics and the politics of the nonproliferation both go together
with respect to increasing our regional fuel cycle. It does make
tilings much more highly visible.

One of the things that held up this treaty for almost a year was
making the arrangements for EUR ATOM and IAEA. I was not
worried about that. I had a good deal of trouble persuading my
associate colleagues that this was going to be workable. But I per-
sonally feel that the combination of the IAEA and the Europeans
and national plants is probably a more workable combination. So I
think it is good. The whole notion of working towards — in other
areas towards the regional fuel cycle is, I think, a policy that is
more healthy rather than unhealthy.

Senator Glenn. Having been through all of this and being an
expert in this area, how much fear and trepidation do you have, for
instance, with respect to China being outside the NPT. Do you think
they behaved irresponsibly? I know we would like to see everyone
agree to the same treaty that we agreed to. That is not quite the
real world we are operating in. Does this represent a real hazard or
should we renegotiate the whole thing? Should our regulatory pro-
cesses here reflect any different attitude in having commercial plants
abroad since China and France both have the capability to provide
some of these same facilities?

Mr. Fisher. I am not sure about the Chinese economic capability.

Senator Glenn. I would presume it is coming along.

Mr. Fisher. It is coming along.



452

The French, however, generally speaking, say that they do not