United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Gove.

The Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 online

. (page 38 of 47)
Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. Senate. Committee on GoveThe Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 → online text (page 38 of 47)
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want to facilitate the spread of nuclear weapons. And they have been
rather astute in requiring the material that they supply be subject
to safeguards.

It is very hard for me to be critical of the French for saying that
they do not require the entire industry to be subject to safeguards,
because I once raised that question to a Frenchman. And he said,
"Well, you don't either." That was rather the shortest discussion in
history, particularly for me.

Senator Glenn. How serious a development, in terms of weapons,
do you see in the South African breakthrough in uranium enrich-
ment? Does this make for a whole different concept? Is it going to
require changes in Nonproliferation Treaty?

Mr. Fisher. I do not think it means that much if the principal
support for the Nonproliferation Treaty is we are prepared to do
other things to support in terms of political will. For example, with
the current discussion with the Geneva Review Conference Treaty,
T cannot understand why we are not prepared to enter into a nonuse
pledge with respect to the nonnuclear powers who are not attacking
someone in concert with a nuclear power. Why we get so fussy about
a nonuse pledge on the one hand and say, "We won't promise to
bomb you, but please don't develop the things themselves." It seems
to me that is a rather hard position to sustain very long.

We got away with it — that is the wrong way of saying it — the
old concept of security assurance is under the Nonproliferation
Treaty many people said it did not make any sense in the first place.
Again, I am committed to the proposition that it did because I
worked them out. But on the other hand, it is based on the assump-
tion that if we and the Soviets agreed to something the Security
Council would have to stick to it, That assumption seems to me to
have disappeared somewhere 2 or 3 years ago with the advent of the
Chinese People's Republic in the Security Council.

Senator Glenn. As long as there is a seminuclear monopoly in the
world I think — I presume in your testimony here this morning you
think we have gotten a few steps beyond those days when we could
really put everything under an international management. It might
have been possible at that time. Do you feel we are beyond that
stage now ?

Mr. Fisher. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. In my discussions — when I
was in the Government and informally since then with the Soviet
Union officials does not change my mind any on that. I think we
are further down that road.

I just came in the room when Mr. Percy was talking about the
issue was nuclear power here to stay, and the answer is, of course,
internationally it is. There are many countries in the world that are
critical of the United States on the grounds we have not been sup-
portive enough in the obligation for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. Some of them are even critical that we have not been sup-
portive enough of the peaceful explosions, which I regard to be-
that is the so-called plowshare program, which I think is basically a
hoax. I do not think it really exists. But it is a hoax that we created
and we are unfortunately living with. It is awfully hard to explain
to a representative from another country that something that is


printed on U.S. Government stationery — do not pay any attention
to it.

Senator Glenn. Do you have any other comment on the bill, spe-
cifically, as to the proposed licensing arrangements, or controls, or
vetoes, and so on before we close here ?

Mr. Fisher. Only if you could insert in it in some form of finding
a policy of pushing a little bit in the direction of total IAEA
sa f eguards.

Senator Glenn. What was that ?

Mr. Ftsiier. Pushing in the direction of making a requirement, not
an absolute requirement, but a total acceptance of IAEA safeguards.
Also if you could make a slight push, Mr. Chairman, in the direc-
tion of a regional fuel cycle, I think it would be helpful in the cause
of peace.

Senator Glenn. Do you think that NRC is the agency most ca-
pable of pushing toward acceptable IAEA safeguards? They have the
expertise and should they be the ones outside the 3 executive branch
of Government to do that ?

Mr. Fisher. I am not sure about that, Mr. Chairman. I do not
really have any — I do not know the names and numbers of the
players well enough now to have any strong feeling about it.

I do think the nuclear proliferation assessment statement required
by section VIII, that was very good. That gives Mr. Ikle and his
successors a chance to comment on things they are vitally interested

Senator Glenn. Thank you.

Our next witness will be Mr. Gene La Rocque, director of the
Center for Defense Information.

I believe you did submit a statement in advance. Would you care
to have that placed in the record or read it or summarize it ? What
is your pleasure ?



Admiral La Rocque. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. How is our time?
T would really like to read it. It would take about 7 or 8 minutes, if
there is time enough ?

Senator Glenn. Sure. If your time is all right, ours is. We have
at least a half hour. That would be enough time to do it.

Admiral La Rocque. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

I thank you for this invitation to discuss with you some of the
provisions of the Export Reorganization Act of 1975. The Center
for Defense Information has been concerned for a long time with
the control and regulation of the export of arms, ammunition, and
implements of war as well as nuclear materials and technology and
is delighted to see that this committee shares our concern with this
matter. It is a matter which has a major impact on U.S. foreign
policy and U.S. national defense policy. I share with this committee
a strong commitment to improving the efficiency and economy of the
operations of the executive branch. More than 31 years in the Navy
have made me acutely aware of the many ways in which the efficiency
of the executive branch can be improved.


Mr. Chairman, the Center for Defense Information has just pre-
pared a very brief analysis of this whole matter of arm sales, and
particularly to the Persian Gulf. It is a complementary piece to
Senator Percy's very excellent report of his visit there. I think it
would make a useful addition to this committee's report, if you were
willing to have that for your record. 1

The export of the munitions of war by the U.S. Government is
growing at a rapid pace. While grant military assistance by the
United States has declined in recent years from $5.7 billion in 1952
to about $600 million a year in recent years, foreign military sales
have sharply increased. U.S. foreign military sales orders have
grown from less than $2 billion in 1971 to more than $9 billion in
1974. This includes $8.2 billion sold on a government to government
basis and about $1 billion in commercial sales. This makes the United
States the largest exporter of arms in the world.

Orders for U.S. weapons in 1974 increased dramatically and were
almost as large as total world arms exports in 1973. In other words,
in 1974 we sold in arms about as much as the entire world sold in

There is every reason to expect that U.S. foreign military sales in
1975 will be at least as large. The first 9-month figures are available
and it shows it is going to be up over $10 billion this year. For this
reason S. 1439 is a particularly significant piece of legislation.

It is essential to keep in mind that arms sales — whether on a gov-
ernment to government basis or on a commercial basis — constitute
the first steps toward a U.S. commitment to the government of the
purchasing country. Sales of U.S. weapons are normally followed
by U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen as well as U.S. civilian tech-
nicians who become actively involved in training foreigners to use
and service U.S. weapons. In Iran, there will be up to 19,000 U.S.
citizens, including their dependents, by this summer.

I understand also by 1980 it is expected there will be 40.000 U.S.
citizens there in an advisory capacity, including their dependents.
So the number is growing rapidly. Since this appears to be unavoid-
able, it is imperative that no weapon be sold to a foreign government
unless the sale is in consonance with our foreign policy and contrib-
utes to our national defense. Many recent U.S. arms sales, particu-
larly in the Middle East, appear to have been made without an
in-depth consideration of their long-term impact on U.S. foreign
policv and national defense.

The region of the world that has been the largest customer for
U.S. arms is the Middle East — including the Persian Gulf. Seventy-
nine percent of the dollar value of orders for U.S. arms in 1974
came from the Near East, Within the Near East area, the Persian
Gulf has been the largest customer for U.S. weapons. In 1974 the
United States sold more than $4.4 billion worth of weapons to Per-
sian Gulf countries, most of this amount to Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The United States is not the only supplier of arms to the Persian
Gulf, but it is by far the largest, By comparison, the Soviets sold
$1.5 billion of arms last year to the Persian Gulf countries; the

1 See appendix p. 473.


French sold $1.5 billion; the British sold $50 million. In all, the
United States sold 59 percent of the weapons purchased by Persian
Gulf countries in 1974.

The character of U.S. arms sales has undergone major changes in
recent years. In the past, it was unusual for the United States or any
other country to sell its most advanced weapons to foreign govern-
ments. With the possible exception of some favored allies, foreign
purchasers of U.S. arms had to content themselves with older and
obsolescent equipment. This pattern has changed quite radically in
recent years particularly in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, where
oil-rich governments can afford to pay for the most up-to-date equip-
ment. Beginning in the mid-1960's, Iran began acquiring the F-4
Phantom which was, and still is, one of the first-line fighter aircraft
of the U.S. Air Force and Navy. Iran has recently purchased and
will soon begin to receive sophisticated and expensive F-14 fighters
from the United States. It is scheduled to get these aircraft in 1976,
only 21 months after the first F-14's were placed in the U.S. Navy's

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we are splitting our procurement this
year of F-14's with the Iranians. We have gone to some lengths to
accommodate the Iranians. Iran will also be adding the oceangoing
DD-963 Spruance Class destroyers to its Navy. As you know, it is
about 8,000 tons. It is really a cruiser. It is bigger than some of the
Soviet cruisers which are as small as 6,000 tons. Iran and Saudi
Arabia will soon receive improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles and
Iran has TOW antitank missiles, both being added to the U.S. in-
ventory. The fundamental point is that the sophistication of weapons
available to the countries of the Persian Gulf and to other U.S. arms
customers has escalated substantially in recent years and a full scale
war in the region is likely to prove highly destructive and very
costly. A war in the Persian Gulf would obviously be counterpro-
ductive to U.S. national interests.

There is another way in which U.S. arms sales have changed in
recent years. In past years, the United States gave military assistance
to countries that could contribute to the defense of the United States.
This is no longer the case.

We introduced something, Mr. Chairman, called Annex J — of the
joint strategic operations plan — in the joint staff. We would list in
there the amount of weapons we thought each country ought to have.
Nowadays, the primary emphasis is on what can be conveniently sold
and has very little relationship to our own national defense.

We must also ask whether the United States may also be creating
military powers that some day will turn against us.

Many of these advanced long-range weapons such as the F-4, F-14,
and DD-963 destroyers supplied, or about to be supplied to Iran, have
military implications beyond the Persian Gulf. The Iranian military
build-up and Iranian aid to Pakistan — Iran has given 90 F-86 jets
and several modern C-130 transports to Pakistan — could in the future
be seen as a threat by India. At present Iranian-Indian relations are
cordial, but a continued Iranian build-up and more Iranian aid to
Pakistan could cause the relations between these two countries to
«our over the next few years. In similar fashion Saudi and Kuwait
arms may soon have an impact on the Arab-Israeli military balance.


As Saudi Arabia and Kuwait grow in power the Israelis may have
to begin to weigh them in the total balance. This may make the
Israelis less secure and undermine a key tenet of U.S. policy which
is to insure the survival of Israel. It may also increase Israel's need
for military assistance and cost the U.S. money in the long run.

The two largest purchasers of U.S. weapons in the Persian Gulf
area — Iran and Saudi Arabia — are traditional rivals. At the root of
their rivalry are a number of long-standing differences. Saudi Arabia
has been a strong opponent of Israel and a supporter of Israel's Arab
enemies while Iran has quietly supported Israel and continued to sell
oil to Israel. Finally, and most important of all, the Shah's ambi-
tions to be the dominant power in the Gulf clash with Saudi aspira-
tions and undoubtedly make the Saudis uneasy about their own

U.S. sales of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia can only serve to
further increase tensions and reduce the chances of peaceful cooper-
ation. Arming one power leads in turn to increased demands for
arms by the other. Such a policy stimulates business for U.S. arms
manufacturers, improves our balance of trade, and may in the short
run gain a few friends. In the long run we will probably rue the day
we sold all these modern weapons to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The provisions of the bill which deal with the problems of nuclear
proliferation — sections 7 and 8 — are of considerable importance. It
has been my long-standing view that the most serious danger here
is that nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials might fall into
the hands of terrorist groups. More than 50 major terrorist groups
are reported to exist worldwide. Their recent activities — murder,
kidnapping, hijacking, blackmail — are well known to members of
this committee. Efforts at preventing proliferation should be directed
at keeping nuclear weapons and the materials to make them out of
the hands of these groups. This is a goal that all present and future
nuclear nations are likely to share and as a result international agree-
ments in furtherance of this objective should be actively pursued.
When one considers these many potential dangers and potential
threats to U.S. security that could develop from the sale of weapons
and the export of other strategic materials by the United States, it
becomes clear that the ability of the executive branch to fully assess
these long-term dangers needs to be improved. We are hopeful that
the legislation proposed by this committee can improve these capa-
bilities, and at the same time provide the Congress with an oppor-
tunity to participate in the process.

Unrestrained weapons sales based on the State Department's view
of our national interests may again result in the Congress coming in
on "crash landings" without having had an opportunity to review the
flight schedule.

I would recommend that where arms sales to any one country
exceed $50 million for 1 year or include first-line U.S. equipment,
the executive branch be required to submit to the Congress a foreign
policy impact statement prior to the sale.

In addition, I would suggest that the Secretary of State be re-
quired to transmit his written approval for the export of arms to
the Congress along with a full explanation of the reasons for his


That completes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
to discuss any aspects of it or anything else.

Senator Glenn. Thank you.

Would it be fair to say from your testimony you feel that the
commercial industry sort of has overriden our national security inter-
est in these areas with the U.S. exports of conventional arms as well
as nuclear technology?

Admiral La Rocque. Yes, sir. That is precisely my point. That is
the trouble I have with this S. 1439 in that it seems to put the pri-
mary emphasis on the commercial sales without any guidelines, with-
out any sort of ethical consideration about to whom these sales will
be made, and even worse the ultimate impact that these sales will
have on our own national defense and our own security.

Senator Glenn. It does apply to several areas in your testimony,
although the major thrust of most of your testimony has been in
regard to conventional and nuclear weaponry, but it does include
other areas.

You suggest a foreign policy impact statement. Would you care
to elaborate on that a little bit. We are beginning to have impact
statements on anything and everything in this country. We have
been getting energy impact statements. We are having environmental
impact statements. We are having health impact statements. We are
now getting a foreign policy impact statement. Who would control
it? Who would pass upon it? I am a little bit vague on this impact

Admiral La Rocque. Since you mentioned some of the other impact
statements, Mr. Chairman, I think it has been very helpful to have
these environmental impact statements.

Senator Glenn. I might add here, if you do not mind me inter-
rupting you, I did not mean to belittle this in any way, shape, or
form. It was a novel title to this that I have not had any exposure
to yet. I do realize it was made in a serious tone. I do not mean to
slight it at all.

Admiral La Rocque. I do not think you have.

It is one way, I think, of bridging the gap between the executive
branch and the Congress. It is one way of insuring a cooperative
action in terms of our foreign policy. It is one way of getting the
Congress into the act before we have committed ourselves so far
down the line that there is nothing they can do but back whatever
the executive branch has done.

I think we have learned in Vietnam and elsewhere that we are
going to have to draw this country together. The country itself is
going to have to be supportive of whatever actions our Government

Too long our executive branch has almost assumed the mantle of
our Government, ignoring the Congress— and this is particularly true
in foreign policy. This is an attempt to suggest that before the
State Department or the executive branch authorizes a sale of $50
million worth of arms, for example, to an area of the world, that
they submit to the Congress simple impact statements, just like the
N"avy submits an impact statement on the construction of a new
Trident submarine. This gives people an opportunity at least to know
the basis for which the decision was made, the dangers and the ad-
vantages for this sale of arms.


Arms sales, in my opinion, far transcend the sale of trucks, or
housing equipment, or other commercial ventures partly because the
stuff may some day come back to either bite you directly or involve
some of your own allies in a situation that causes you then to have to
get into a war.

I know our whole system is built on a beautiful capitalistic system.
And I would like very much to preserve it, but I think we have to
look very carefully at this commercial arms sale.

Senator Glenn. I was interested in your comment on this because
almost a month ago now I put in a bill which will come to hearing
some time in mid-May before the Judiciary Committee with regard
to the executive agreements. As you have indicated, you feel that the
executive branch has sort of run off with this area of checks and bal-
ances. In that respect, we conducted a 9-year war in Vietnam by an
executive agreement for the first time in history. Now, we have the
War Powers Act to prevent that. We are in the process of negotia-
tions with Diego Garcia on arms sales on all of these different things
around the world by an executive agreement, which prior to the last
two or three decades was done by treaties only. We are now using
the executive agreements as a bypass treaty.

I know this is not the subject of our hearing today, but I put this
bill in — well, it is a bill that Senator Hughes had put in — which was
approved last year requiring executive agreements to be sent to the
Senate now. But they just sit there and they are there and somebody
reviews them, but unless someone picks it up and does something
about it, there is no commitment or noncommitment with regard to
whatever the President may have proposed to a foreign nation.

The bill I submitted would require that the Senate meet its tra-
ditional role of advice and consent as it applies to treaties, but also
exercise its role with regard to executive agreements on any execu-
tive agreement the President wishes to make that was going to be a
commitment of any of our resources in this country. It would require
the Senate to either give a yea or nay immediately, or it could lay on
the table for 60 days and if nothing was done with it, it would, in
fact, become a commitment by this country by our inaction. In that
way foreign governments would know exactly what commitment we
have in this country and our President would know what commit-
ment he has with the advice and consent of all of the Senate backing
him up.

We are a unique Nation here. We do not have a prime minister
who — if he goes to make some crazy commitment to give somebody
something, such as an arms deal, or a nuclear plant or whatever —
when he comes home, can be put out of office by a vote of no con-

Our system of checks and balances works a little differently. The
Chief Executives in this country in the recent past have somehow
learned to bypass this by means of the executive agreement route.
I think it is time we redressed that imbalance which is virtually the
method of conducting foreign policy around the world.

I did not mean to give a lecture. I did not come here to give a
speech. I came to get your information. If the bill goes into effect, it
seems to me, it would almost meet the impact statement that you
are talking about, at least it would allow us to exercise a role in our


role of advice and consent that the founding fathers envisioned us
having. I do not think the founding fathers envisioned the day of
nuclear weapons, and supersonic airplanes, and moon landings, and
a few other things when they set up our traditional treaty arrange-
ment and it took a month and a half to get back and forth to Europe
and things like that.

I think we have gradually used this executive agreement mecha-
nism because it is so convenient in a modern world where transporta-
tion and communications have shrunk the world to essentially one
community. It is easier now to get a message to Europe than it used
to be to walk down the other end of whatever village you lived to
talk to somebody.

Let's get on with your ideas and not mine.

Admiral La Eocqtje. That sounds like an excellent bill, Mr. Chair-
man. It does dovetail exactly the thoughts that I have for the Center
for Defense Information about getting the advice to the executive
branch before the consent and not just wait and assume that they
have it.

Senator Glenn. I was led into this by the fact that when I got to
the Senate this morning I had to try to decide whether we give more
aid to Vietnam and Cambodia — or don't we. What are our commit-
ments ? I do not want to renege on commitments.

We have tried to find out what our commitments are. We asked
the State Department, we asked the White House, we asked every-
body in sight. We went to the Library of Congress and dug out old
newspapers. All of our commitments were couched in terms of well,
it was generally understood, or the South Vietnamese understood,
and we did not disagree with them so they would accept the fact.
Everything was couched in those terms. We went months and months
of trying to find out this. I finally gave up.

The President keeps referring to moral obligations and commit-
ments and all of these things, and in light of the letters that came
out last night, there were more things written than I was able to find

We are no longer in a time that we can afford to just have these
various vagaries running around as international peace settlements

Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. Senate. Committee on GoveThe Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 → online text (page 38 of 47)