The Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 online

able to the Soviets, would be compromised; and would create an unac-
ceptable burden on the U.S. naval reactors program. The net effect of
these factors would be a serious dissipation of the U.S. strategic
advantage over the Soviet Union in this critical area.

Second, this risk cannot be justified on military grounds. The lim-
ited numbers of nuclear-powered submarines our allies could produce
and maintain, even with U.S. assistance, would be negligible as com-
pared to the U.S. and Soviet forces.

Finally, it would 'be inefficient and wasteful to establish in these
smaller countries the huge technical and industrial base required to
build or maintain nuclear-powered submarines, when the United
States has a far superior base already established. To diffuse U.S.
resources among these lesser powers would weaken, rather than
strengthen, the net allied capability in this field.

STATE DEPARTMENT PROPOSES U GIMMICKY" ARRANGEMENTS

The State Department has not concurred in these views. Instead,
they have repeatedly clouded the issue by proposing additional studies
of various "gimmicky" arrangements, such as the sale of older class,
U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarines (for example, Triton) to
certain allies. This, I believe, must be what Senator Aiken was refer-
ring to a few minutes ago — the proposed sale of used propulsion

plants.

They have also suggested assistance to a consortium of European
NATO allies in the development of nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines with costs borne by the Europeans, or giving U.S. consent to
permit the United Kingdom to cooperate with "a few other key NATO
allies,"' by disclosing to them technology obtained from the United
States.

As the committee will recognize, these proposals are simply cir-
cuitous ways of disclosing the same sensitive technology the rest of us
have been trying so hard to protect. All of these alternatives have been
given due consideration by the responsible technical, military, and
intelligence authorities and found to be unacceptable on the same
grounds as direct U.S. assistance. We have repeatedly tried to explain
to the State Department some of the technical realities of building,
operating, and maintaining these complex nuclear reactors, particu-
larly why we cannot simply sell [classified matter deleted] an old sub-
marine and have them drive off in it like a used car, or why the con-
struction of a U.S.-designed nuclear-powered submarine by a novice
government in this field would require massive technical assistance



470

from the Tinted States and divert critically needed resources from
our own program. Hut they are bent on seeing this whole matter as
"Rickover's plaything"; thus, the State Department keeps raising
tlic^' phony proposals to keep the issue alive and our allies in a state
of suspended animation.

As late as January 23, of this year, the State Department advised
the Department of Defense, with respect to assisting [classified matter
deleted] in nuclear submarine propulsion, that —

The Department of State has never taken the position that there should be
additional agreements. We do not yet have a position on this subject. But we
do believe that there have been sufficient new developments in this field that
all relevant factors — political, military, intelligence, technological — should be
studied before we decide on a course of action.

This statement is misleading in two respects. First, as every mem-
ber of this committee knows, the State Department has for years been
in favor of disseminating our Polaris submarine propulsion technol-
ogy abroad, largely as a means of ingratiating the United States with
its allies. If they were not in favor of additional agreements, their
constant maneuvering and delays in the face o f unanimous opposition
by all the other agencies concerned would simply be incomprehensible.
To say, in these circumstances, that the State Department does ''not
yet have a po -"tion" is sophistry, at best.

Second, this is but one of numerous references the State Depart-
ment has made in recent months to "new developments" which have
not been considered. But they never say what these new developments
are, or how the State Department gained access to new information
not available to the Defense Department [classified matter deleted].
Apparently, it is so secret that they cannot reveal it even to the other
executive agencies.

This is where the matter stands today, sir, as far as I know. I regret
I cannot give you a more precise answer, hut the picture is very vague
and muddy. At this point I would hesitate to predict what direction
it might take next.

NO EXPLANATION* FOB STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION

Chairman Holifield. What is the basis for the State Department
position?

Admiral Rickover. They do not tell us, Mr. Chairman. They pub-
lished a paper on this subject, entitled "Views of the Department
of State," in which they state a number of unsupported conclusions
contrary to those of the responsible agencies. They state, for example,
that assisting European allies to establish naval nuclear propulsion
programs would cause "no sudden, serious strain on U.S. personnel
resources." I am responsible for the U.S. program, and I have repeat-
edly stated that our program could not stand the load of another
assistance program. This committee is well aware of the difficulties we
are having keeping the resources, both personnel and industrial, we
need to compete with the Russians in this field. And you can easily
see what a massive burden it would place on our own people to have
to duplicate this entire technical and industrial program, starting
from scratch, in a totally inexperienced country. It staggers the mind.
Yet, the State Department blandly says it would cause no strain. They
were going to send that paper to the President.



471

Chairman IIourn:u>. Is it possible (hey do have information they
are not tolling you about?

Admiral Rickovkk. I do not know, sir. Here is another item. The
committee is also aware of how [classified matter deleted] and how
closely we need to guard our own technology to protect the narrow
technological lead we still have. Any major compromise at this point
could easily give them a decisive advantage over us. [Classified matter
deleted. J Yet, the State Department paper concluded that "The sig-
nilicant advances made by the Soviet I nion in developing and deploy-
ing high-speed nuclear submarines have substantially reduced the
weight of the security element as a factor in considering this issue."
In other words, it is their expert assessment that it is all right now to
give away our secrets.

Chairman IIoi.ii - iki,i>. Can you supply a copy of the State Depart-
ment paper for the record ?

Admiral Rickovk.r. I am sorry, sir. As you know, I am not author-
ized to release a document issued by another agency. I am sure,- how-
ever, that the State 1 >cpartmcnt will be happy to apprise the committee
of their views. I would also note that they are committed to inform
the committee of any new developments in this matter, and they
now want to advise the President there have been sufficient new de-
velopments to warrant a restudy of our entire position in this field.
I assume they will want you to know of these important new develop-
ments. 1 hojK' that when you find out what they are you will tell the
Defense Department and the [classified matter deleted].

Representative Hosmer. Did you have any success in [classified mat-
ter deleted].

Admiral Rickovkr. No, sir. (Classified matter deleted.]

EXPORT OP ADVANCED U.S. COMPUTERS

Chairman Homfield. "We had a case recently where advances were
made forour best computer. "What is that number?

Mr. Murphy. The CDC 6000.

Admiral Rickover. I believe you are referring to the attempt by the
Soviets to obtain a CDC 0000 computer for their accelerator at Ser-
pukhov. You should realize that the A EC helped pay for the develop-
ment of that computer from the money Congress appropriated.

Chairman I Ioufiklo. The. Soviets have been doing everything under
the sun to get the AEC, through the State Department, to make some
kind of deal whereby they could buy this. They said, "We just want
to use it. You can put a padlock on it, and we won't steal the technology
or anything like that." You should know what that would amount to.

Admiral Rickovkr. Hack in September of 100!), the AEC asked for
my comments on a study they were doing of the pros and cons of
placing a CDC 0000 computer at Serpukhov. I made my views known
in a memorandum dated September 10, 1000,' in which" I pointed out
that the study underestimated the risks and did not address several
important considerations. From my review of the issues, I concluded
that it was not in our national interest to permit Soviet purchase of
our high-speed, high-performance computers with or without controls.
Of course, the United States has already sold CDC 6600'sto the French
and a number of other countries.

i Memo U classified and is on file with the Joint Committee.



472

| ( 'lassified matter deleted.]

l 'hainnan ITolfkiem*. When did these go?

Mr. Greer. It was in 1907 that the French bought their first 6600
and there arc now seven of these units that Control Data Corp. has
sold to the French. The last meeting on the operation of this machine
was held in Zurich, Switzerland.

Chairman ITolieieli). Did the AEC attend?

Mr. Greer. A limited number of AEC contractors attended.

Chairman TTolteield. Are we talking about the same machine?
That is not the latest machine.

Mr. Greer. The CDC 6600 is the current production model. The
ODC 7600 machine is just coming on the market. AEC laboratories
are just obtaining delivery on the 7600; [classified matter deleted],

HOW GOVERNMENT HANDLES COMPUTER EXPORT

Senator Atken. May T ask who handles these transactions for the
State Department? I am not satisfied that the top echelon knows what
the lower echelon may be doing.

Admiral Rtckover. I will get the answers to Mr. Ilolifield'S ques-
tion and to your question. (Sec p. IS.)

Chairman TIoliiteld. Isn't it true that there are two later models
than the 6600?

Mr. Greer. There is a standard CDC 6600 machine, and then there
is what we call a dual CDC 6600 machine which is tying two of the
6600's together. There is a later CDC computer model [Classified
matter deleled]. That is the 7600 machine. In addition. IBM has an
advanced computer with capabilities similar to the CDC 7600 called
the model 195.

When the United States agreed to sell a CDC 6600 to the French,
il was the biggest, most powerful computer of its time.

Senator Aiken. To France?

Mr. ( irekk. To F ranee among others : yes, sir.

Representative IIosmei:, In connection with t lie Serpukhov acceler-
ator, it is the C>(')(i() thai the Soviets spoke to our scientists alxmt re-
peatedly. That is the one they had in mind.

Mr. Greer. Yes, sir. The 6600 machine is the model which the Soviets
stated they would like to have. It still is one of the most powerful
computers in the world.

foreign sales by CONTROL DATA CORP.

Senator Aiken. Has just one l>een delivered to France? What about
other countries?

Admiral Rickover. Seven have, Senator Aiken. Also one has gone to
the CERN in Switzerland which I am sure you know is open to the
Soviets. I do not know what other countries have received them but
I am sure I can obtain it.

Chairman Holifteld. Please do that.



473




THE DEFENSE

MONITOR



CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION — WASHINGTON, D.C.



Volume Four Number Three



May, 1975



U.S. Arms to the Persian Gulf:
$10 Billion Since 1973



U.S. political and military involvement in the Persian
Gulf has been expanding rapidly in recent years. The leading
edge of our involvement in this area — as it was in
Southeast Asia in the I950's and 1960's — is military
assistance and arms sales.

The U.S. is not the only supplier of arms to the Persian
Gulf, hut it is by far the largest. In 1974 the U.S. sold
over $4.4 Billion worth of arms to Persian Gulf countries-
Russia sold $1.5 Billion. France sold $1.5 Billion and Bri-
tain sold $50 million Saudi Arabia and Iran have been the
chief customers for U.S. arms. In 1974, these two countries
alone bought $4.4 Billion worth of American weapons.
Recently Iran and the U.S. announced a $15 Billion five-
year trade deal, that is expected to include the delivery of $5
Billion worth of U.S. arms. U.S. arms are helping to make
Iran a major world military power.

The major countries of the region are now spending about
$5.8 Billion a year on their military forces. Just five years
ago the total was $1 .6 Billion. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are
among the leading countries of the Middle East and the
world in per capita military expenditures, ranking second
and third in the Middle East and thirteenth and nineteenth
respectively in the world.



One justification U.S. officials give for arming Iran has
been to make direct U.S. involvement in the area un-
necessary. There are indications, however, that Pentagon
officials have decided that a U.S. presence in the area is
necessary in any case. The Navy has begun regular deploy-
ment of a carrier task force to the Indian Ocean and visits to
the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the U.S. is in the
process of developing a base at Diego Garcia and there are
plans to use the former British base at Masirah and perhaps
the base at Gan. In addition, the U.S. Middle East Force
has a base at Bahrain. All of this points to growing U.S. in-
volvement in a highly volatile region of the world.

Changing Sales Patterns

The character of U.S. military assistance and arms
transfers has undergone major changes in recent years. In
the past it was unusual for the U.S. or any other country to
provide or sell its most advanced weapons to foreign
governments. With the possible exception of some favored
allies, foreign recipients of military aid had to content
themselves with older or obsolescent equipment. For exam-
ple, in the early 1960's, Saudi Arabia's air force consisted of
obsolete U.S. B-26's, British Vampires and some Korean
war vintage F-86's.



MONITOR IN BRIEF

• U.S. political and military involvement in the Persian Gulf is growing rapidly, but there is
no coherent U.S. foreign policy for the area. While peace in the Persian Gulf is obviously in the
U.S. interest, U.S. military aid programs and massive arms sales increase tensions in the
region and increase the likelihood of war.

• Since 1973, the U.S. has sold $10 Billion worth of arms to Persian Gulf countries, making
it the leading supplier of arms to that part of the world. The U.S. is also acquiring new military
bases in the area.

• In contrast to past practices, the U.S. and other countries are arming Persian Gulf coun-
tries with the most advanced offensive weapons. This will raise the level of destructiveness of
future wars.

• Iran is becoming a major military power, largely as a result of arms purchased from the
U.S. — $7.8 Billion since 1973. Soon Iran's power will be felt in areas outside the Persian Gulf.

• Any short-range financial benefits to the U.S. from the sale of arms to the Persian Gulf
are outweighed by long-range political and military costs. Restraints on weapons sales by all
countries to the region, on both amounts and kinds, are needed if peace and stability are to be
preserved.



Copyright I97S by the Center for Defense Information. All rights reserved The Center for Defense Information encourages quotation of
any o( the material herein without permission, provided the Center is credited The Center requests a copy of any such use.



474



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 2



This pattern has changed quite radically in recent years,
particularly in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, where oil-
rich governments can afford to pay for the most up-to-date
equipment. Beginning in the mid-1960's Iran began
acquiring the F-4 Phantom which was, and still is, one of the
first-line fighter aircraft of the U.S. Air Force. Iran is now
about to buy sophisticated and expensive F-14 fighters from
the U.S. It is scheduled to get these aircraft in 1976, only 21
months after the first F-14's are placed in the U.S. Navy's
inventory. Iran will be adding ocean-going DD-963
destroyers to its Navy soon after the last of these destroyers
are introduced into the U.S. Navy. It will soon receive im-
proved Hawk surface-to-air missiles and has already
received TOW anti-tank missiles, both currently being
added to the U.S. inventory. From Britain, Iran has
purchased Chieftain tanks, which are the first-line tank of
the British Army. Kuwait has announced plans to purchase
the Mirage F-l aircraft from France, and will begin adding
it to its inventory at the same time France acquires the
Mirage in large numbers for its own Air Force. The fun-
damental point is that the sophistication of the weapons
available to the countries of the Persian Gulf has escalated
substantially in recent years and a full-scale war in the
region is likely to prove highly destructive and very costly.



Growing Potential for Destruction

This infusion of advanced military technology has greatly
increased the offensive military capabilities of several Per-
sian Gulf countries — Iran in particular. The countries in
the region are acquiring the capability to make war at ever-
increasing levels of potential destructiveness. Neighbors
who previously did not have the means to threaten each
other are now becoming capable of waging full-scale wars.
Such conflicts could lead to U.S. involvement. We must



A.C.D.A. SEES DANGERS

"In some cases the flow of weapons to an already
tense region can further aggravate the situation by
raiting doubts about the recipient's intentions, par-
ticularly when the transfers involve a marked
ffi - eleration of a recipient's rate of acquisitions or a
sudden shift to a more advanced weapon system In
such a climate of heightened distrust, the chances of
miscalculation and precipitate military action may in-
crease."

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Report to the Congress, 1973



also ask whether the U.S. may also be creating military
powers that some day will turn against us.

Many of these advanced long-range weapons, such as the
F-4, F-14, and DD-963 destroyers, supplied or about to be
supplied to Iran, have strategic implications beyond the Per-
sian Gulf. The Iranian military build-up and Iranian aid to
Pakistan (Iran has given 90 F-86 jets and several modern C-
1 30 transports to Pakistan) could in the future be seen as a
threat by India. At present Iranian-Indian relations are cor-
dial but a continued Iranian build-up and more Iranian aid
to Pakistan could turn the relations between these two coun-
tries sour over the next few years. In similar fashion Saudi
and Kuwaiti arms may soon have an impact on the Arab-
Israeli military balance. As Saudi Arabia and Kuwait grow
in power the Israelis may have to begin to weigh them in the
total balance. This may make the Israelis less secure and un-
dermine a key tenet of U.S. policy which is to insure the sur-
vival of Israel. It may also increase Israel's need for military
assistance and cost the U.S. money in the long run.



U.S. Foreign Military Sales To The Persian Gulf

(Thousands of Dollars)



1950-1969 1970



Iran $647,497

Iraq $ 13.152

Kuwait

Oman

Saudi Arabia $161,468

Total $822,117



$ 14,854
$128,138



1971



1972



1973



1974



1975*



$113,284 $396,613 $528,022 $2,108,787 $3,794,369 $1,935,242



$ 53 $ 18.154 $ 331,671

$ 1,613

$ 83,984 $ 587.698 $1,101,774

$2,192,824 $4,400,221 $3,370,330



$ 95,815
$492,428



$342,295
$870,317



TOTAL
$ 9,523,816
$ 13,152
$ 349,878
$ 1,613

$ 2,387,887
$12,276,346



"First Nine Months of fiscal year



475



DEFENSE MONITOR



The Persian Gulf Tinderbox



PAGE 3




Mastrah (Possible
U 8. Base)



INDIAN OCEAN





Key


-*-


Air base


1f^


Helicopter base


.Jah


Army base


—*-


Naval base


*


Conflict areas



55-430 O - 75 - 31



476



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 4



Disputes Make Gulf a Volatile Area

The Persian Gull is a highly volatile area. Numerous dis-
putes among countries in the region make it an area of great
instability. As Senator Kennedy has pointed out, "Passions
are deep and distances are short."

The two largest purchasers of U.S. weapons in the Per-
sian Gulf area — Iran and Saudi Arabia — are traditional
rivals. At the root of their rivalry are a number of long stan-
ding differences. Both are strongly nationalistic and dis-
agree over whether the Gulf that separates them is the Per-
sian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Saudis are Arab and Iranians
are Aryan. They are divided by religious differences —
Iranians are Shia Muslims and Saudis are Sunni Muslims.
Saudi Arabia has been a strong opponent of Israel and a



supporter of Israel's Arab enemies, while Iran has quietly
supported Israel and continued to sell oil to Israel. Finally,
and most important of all, the Shah's ambitions to be the
dominant power in the Gulf clash with Saudi aspirations
and undoubtedly make the Saudis uneasy about their own
security Despite the avowed intention of the U.S., sales of
arms to Iran can only serve to further increase tensions and
reduce the chances of peaceful cooperation. Arming one
power leads in turn to increased demands for arms by the
other. Such a policy may stimulate business for U.S. arms
manufacturers, but it could lead to war.

The continuing dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia is
the most prominent among the Persian Gulf countries, but it
is by no means the only one.





Conflicts in the Persian Gulf Region


OPPONENTS


SOURCES OF CONFLICT


STATUS


Iran and Iraq


Boundary dispute.


Agreement signed in March
1975 may temporarily
resolve conflict.

Iran has agreed to
cease support in return
for settlement of
river boundary.


Iran and Iraq


Iranian support for Kurdish rebels
fighting for autonomy from Iraq.


Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Kuwait, UAE, Oman


Domination of Persian Gulf — Iran
has treated Gulf as own lake
— has seized islands of Abu Musa
and Tunbs — Iraq, Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait resent Iranian domina-
ation of Gulf. Conflict also
embedded in ancient antagonisms
between Iran and the Arabs.


Unresolved —
source of tension.


Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia


Iraq claim to Kuwaiti territory

to insure access to harbor

at (mm Qasr. Saudis back Kuwait.


Temporarily resolved —
Iraq has withdrawn
claim to Kuwaiti land.


Oman and Dhofar
Rebels, Peoples Republic
of Yemen


Rebels In Dhofar province of Oman
are fighting for independence —
Oman government supported by
U.K., Iran, Jordan, and U.S.


Rebellion is in con-
tinuing state of
ferment.


Afghanistan and
Pakistan


Afghanistan has supported aspira-
tions of Pashtu tribes for inde-
pendence from Pakistan. Iran has supported
Pakistan.


Unresolved — in
state of ferment.


Pakistan and Baluchi
Rebels


Baluchi tribesmen seek independence
from Pakistan — Pakistan
trying to keep remainder of
territory intact — Iran has provided
military assistance to Pakistan.


Unresolved — in state
of ferment.


India and Pakistan


Long history of Indian & Pakistani
hostility — 3 wars in past 30
years — most recent in 1971.
Iran opposes further dis-
memberment of Pakistan and has
expressed support for Pakistan.


Unresolved —
source of tension.



477



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 5



Arms Transfers to Major Persian Gulf Countries
1970 - 1975

(Millions of Dollars)







Yea






No ol


Weapon


Supplier


Ordered


Coat


Weapon*


Fighter-Bombers






Cost $27166 Nc


. 359


Phantom II (F-4|


USA


1971


72.74


S581 6M


136


Tiger II (F-5E)


USA


1972




S285 0M


141


Tomcal/


USA


1974




$1850 0M


80


Phoem* (F-14)












Transport












Planet






Cost $41203 f* O


125


Hercules (C-130)


USA


1970


72


$203 30 M


50


Fokker(F-27)


Neth


1971


73,74


$30 93 M


20


Bonan:a|F-33 690)


USA


1972




$1 60 M


30


Aero-Commander


USA


1972




S2 50M


3


Boemg (707)


USA


1972




$62.50 M


6


Aero-Shrike


USA


1973




S5 00M


6


Fokker (F-28)


Neth


1973




$7 20 M


4


Boetng lC-747)


USA


1975




$99 00 M


6


Mlss1.es




Cost 1911.8 No. 10,814


Antitank (SS-11-12)


France


1970




$4 65M


1000)


Antilank(TOW)


USA


1972




$15.0 M


2680


Surface lo Air