The Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 online

UK


1970




S1130M


(24-)


(Rapier)












Surface to Air


UK


1971




$2.5 M


12'


i Seat: at i












Surface to Air


USA


1972




$100 M


(240)


(Hawk)












Air lo Air


USA


1971


72,74


$78 7(3462)


(Sidewinder)












Air to Air


USA


1971


72 74


$521 7(261t


(Sparrow)












Surface lo Surface


Italy


1971




$1 8M


(60)


(Sea Killer)












Surface to Surface


France


1974




S4 27M


(1421


(EKOcetl












Torpedo (MK 46)


USA


1975




$70 0M


414


'Launchers












Helicopter*






Cost $1007.5 No


709


Other Aircraft






Cost $111.0 No. 22


Fwd Air Control


USA


1970




SI OU


12


10-2)












Reconnaissance


USA


1971




520 0M


4


(HF-4)












Anti-Sub War


USA


1972




$90 0M


6


(P-3 Orion)












Tanki






Cost $416 No


500


Med Tank


UK


1971




$346 M


600


(Chieftain |












Lt Tank


UK


1972




S41 M


400


(Scorpion)












Armored Car


UK


1972




$31 M


300


Other Equipment






Cost $76 4 No


475


Blmdftre Radar


UK


1973




$14 4 M
k


nown


Artillery (175 mm


USA


1973




S12M


75


155mm, all












seit-propeiied)












Arm personnel


USSR


1974








Carrier (BMP-761












Self Propelled


USSR


1974




IS25 M -


200-


Anti-Air Gun








SO M )


400)


(2SU 23/41












Artillery


USSR


1974








Ships




Cost $671 62 M No


43


Patrol Boats


USA


1970




S2 t M


3


Hovercrati


UK


1970.


M.73


S32 62M


10


FngalelSaam)


UK


1971




$32 0M


4


Store. Repair Ships


UK. USA


1971.73


S160M


3


Destroyer


USA


1972




$ 1 M


3


(Sumner)












Fast Patrol Boal


France


1974




S57 6M


12


(Combattante)












Patrol Boal


Germany


1974




$2 1 M


3


Destroyer


USA


1975




S726 5 M


6


(Spruance)















SAUDI ARABIA








Year


No. et


Weapon


Supplier


Ordered


Coet Weepone


Fighter-Bombers




Cost $1349.5 No 206


Tiger l(F-5A)


USA


1971


S130 0M 50


BAC-167


UK


1972


$4 5M 10


Tiger II (F-5E)


USA


1973-75


90
$1095 0M


Tiger UF-5B)


USA


1973


20


Mirage III


France


1973


$120 0M 36


Transports






Cost $80 2 No 10


Hercules (C-130)


USA


1970


S60 M 6


Cessna


USA


1970


S 2M 4


Helicopters






Cost $20.0 No. 36


Alouettelll


French


1970


$1 4M 6


Missiles




Cost $296 3 No 1848


Air lo Air


USA


1971.73.


74 S21 BM (960)


(Sidewinder)








Anti-Tank


UK


1971


$1 4 M 300


(Vigilant)








Air to Air


France


1973


$3 1 M (228)


(Matrai








Surface lo Air


USA


1973


S270 M (300)


(Hawk)








Surface to Air"


France


1974


un-


(Crotale)






known



•Part of package which also included 250 Armored Personnel
;arners (AMX-10) and 200 AMX-30 Tanks



Tanks

Med Tank
(AMX30)

Lt Tank
(Scorpion)



Arm Car (Fox)



Other Equipment






Artillery


USA


1974


Arm Personnel


USA


1974


Carriers (M-113)






Aim Personnel "


France


1974


Carners(AMX-IO)






Spare Parts


UK


1972



Cost $816 8 No 430
1972.74 $800 M " 230



$16 8 M 100-



Cost $960+ No. 950



S335 M 400



"Cost of Package which included Crotale Air to Air Missiles and
AMX-30 Tanks and AMX-10 Armored Personnel Carriers



Ships

PalrolBoal UK 1970.71

Hovercraft UK 1971

Oestroyer Escons- USA 1974
Patrol Boats

(Numbers m parentheses are estimates )



Cost $870 .8 No. 59

$21 7M 31

$26 1 M 8

$823 M 20



Since 1970 Persian Gulf countries have
ordered more than 1800 aircraft, 4000
tanks and land weapons, 15,000 mis-
siles and 100 ships.



Arms sales data for Iraq. Kuwait. Qatar. Bahrain. Oman
jnd United Arab Emirates are available from the Center
These are excluded from the above list due to lack of space



478



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 6



The Iranian Connection: New Dangers



Wilh American assistance Iran has become the dominant
military power in the Persian Gulf. Iranian military forces
are twice as large as those of Iraq and five times larger than
those of Saudi Arabia. Iran spends on its military forces
Tour times what Iraq spends and twice what Saudi Arabia
spends. This expansion of Iranian military power poses
significant risks, both for the U.S. and for other Persian
Gulf states. A few years ago the late Senator Richard
Russell, commenting on US military capabilities, pointed
out that "If Americans find it easy to go anywhere and do
anything, they will always be going somewhere and doing
something." The same can be said of Iran. If we make it
easy for Iranians "to go anywhere and do anything," they
will "always be going somewhere and doing something.' 1 By
massively expanding Iranian military capabilities the U.S.
may be encouraging Iranian ambitions to dominate the Per-
sian Gulf. Even if the present regime remains in power there
are dangers in this policy.

As the Soviet-Iranian detente has moved forward, the
deployment of Iranian military forces has been altered to
reflect the new international situation and Iranian am-
bitions. In the late 1%0's, Iranian army units were moved
from the northern border area to south of Teheran. The Ira-
nian Navy moved its headquarters to Shiraz in the South.
Three-fourths of the F-14's that Iran has ordered from the
U.S. will be based in the central and southern part of the
country. This pattern indicates that Iran is much more con-
cerned with dominating the politics of the Gulf than it is
with the Soviet threat.

New Iranian Bases

Consistent with its new concern with dominating the Per-
sian Gulf, Iran has built several new military bases in the
southern part of the country. New bases have been built at
Kharg Island, Tunbs Island and Abu Musa. A new base is
also being built at Chah Bahar near the Straits of Hormuz
on the Indian Ocean, while facilities are being modernized
and expanded at Bandar Abbas and Bushire. The continued
growth of Iranian military power and its southward deploy-
ment will make many of the smaller countries of the Persian
Gulf increasingly insecure.

In justifying U.S. arms sales to Iran, U.S. officials have
recently emphasized the shared interest between the U.S.



and Iran in safeguarding the flow of oil from the Persian
Gulf to the U.S., Europe and Japan. The Shah has insisted
that he will not participate in another embargo under any
circumstances. While there is no reason to doubt the Shah's
commitment to this goal — especially given the very high
prices he is now getting for his oil — there are some poten-
tial dangers One possibility is that the Shah's ambitions
and Iran's growing military power might lead to conflicts in
the Persian Gulf area that would disrupt the flow of oil — or
might even end with the Shah in control of all Persian Gulf
oil. The U.S. policy of virtually unlimited arms sales to Iran
increases this danger.

Military Forces and Instability

The backward and oppressive governments in power in
the Persian Gulf — seven of the eight are monarchies and
the other one is a military dictatorship — are constantly
faced with the threat of domestic unrest, coups and
rebellion. It is worth remembering that Saudi Arabia
abolished slavery as recently as 1964. Iran maintains
domestic tranquility by means of a powerful and pervasive
secret police organization. The recent assassination of King
Faisal is rather typical of the kinds of threats that Persian
Gulf governments face, especially the conservative
monarchies. Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia have all
experienced coups, attempted coups or assassinations in re-
cent years. Thus, while military forces are created to
enhance political stability, in developing countries they
often produce just the opposite. In sum, political and social
change is inevitable in the Persian Gulf, and U.S. programs
that create excessive military establishments can actually
stimulate political upheavals.

A second result of creating new and powerful military
forces in Persian Gulf countries is that once military es-
tablishments become powerful domestic political forces
their appetites for weapons grow. They come to absorb
larger and larger quantities of resources and aspire to newer
and more expensive weapons. Indeed, once they have their
appetites whetted for sophisticated modern weapons, we can
expect the political and military leaders of the Persian Gulf
countries to begin to think about acquiring nuclear weapons
— especially in light of the recent Indian nuclear explosion.
Iran has already indicated that planning is underway to
build nuclear air-raid shelters.



The Rapid Growth Of Iranian M


ilitary Might


1965


1975


1985*


Defense Spending $217 Million


S4 lo 5 Billion*


$10 to 20 Billion


Aircraft 90


500


2000


Ships 32


41


90


Tanks 500


1260


2460

•Projected



479



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 7




It



Intervention For Oil?



lhal would am
There

.

ries sell

Israel

i

â–  .

— and certai

-

Militar> Obstacles to Intervention

Persian
Fundamental mi

Gulf are militai
is Iran.

1




members of

i
I

-

pi * ii

the problem is no; si
mlt but lo hold, pi
lime while the
itton in the U S .

; guen

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militarj prol

â– â–  irical corn-
Suez,
ions. First, it
'ilems that would
Hie British,
-",000
ps and about 1000 aircraft to
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• inva-

pe in 1944.

(peel the I

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pressure os the
which British and Israeli

the Persian Gulf the in-
i id beg! â– 

i take
tviets

e vers



480



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 8



CENTER CONCLUSIONS

1. There should be a U.S. moratorium on arms transfers to Persian Gulf countries. This would
provide a period in which the Congress, the Executive branch, and the American people could
carefully reassess American policy toward this volatile region of the world. Today the U.S. seems to
have no policy except unrestrained arms sales.

2. The U.S. should convene a conference of arms suppliers to attempt to establish controls on the
kinds and amounts of weapons introduced into the Persian Gulf. No serious effort along these lines
has yet been made.

3. The U.S. should sell no offensive weapons to the Persian Gulf. The sale of weapons with long-
range offensive capabilities, such as bombers, sophisticated fighter bombers, refueling planes and
large warships, does not serve U.S. interests. The British have set a precedent by refusing to sell
offensive weapons to Libya.

4. The Executive branch should be required to submit regular reports to the Congress assessing
the military and political impact of the introduction of particular weapons into the Persian Gulf in
clear, comprehensive terms.

5. Congress should set an annual ceiling on arms sales to the Persian Gulf area and should be re-
quired to approve all major arms sales.



THE STAFF

Dim tor

Rear Admiral Gene R LaRocque

U S. Navy (Rei )

Deputy Director

General B K Gorwjiz

U S Army I Ret ,

Director of Research
David Johnson
Senior Editors, this issue:
Bob Berman and
Stefan H. Leader

Bruce Butlerworth Doron Bar-Levav

Phil Stanford (Consultant) John Gile

Evelyn LaBnola Elizabeth Campbell

William Mako Elaine Richardson

Jim Slack

A Project of the Fund for Peace



Board of Advisors













Engineer International Consultant for In-
dustrial Developmeni


Oxford. England founder and farmer
President of Student Vole and Harvard


Slock Eichange




HarTy Huff - Parmer. Arnold and Porter.


Dr Herten s. „.,ri f . Jr. . Former Deputy








Dortt Z Baio - Cot Cob. Connecticut


Welfare A Retnemeni Fund




Arthur D Beriltt, Jr. â–  Captain, USNR




Dr Jeremy J Slow- Director Federation


(Bel ). former Vice-President, Allen-






Holla ndei Co


Paal Ntxmaa - Motion Picture*


Phillip A Sirnm- Partner. Neuberger and


Jama ft CoaiptM - President I R


1 i.rmf S Phillip • President, Phillips-


Berman, Members. Ne» York Slock


Compton Development Company.


Van Hcbscn Corporation


Exchange


President s Council, Eiperimenl in Inter-


Rudolph 5. Rasia - President The Rasm


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national Lmng


Corporate. Chicago


Secretary of Defense. International


< okwel Jam« D«K»an. USMC (Ret ) -




Secunt> Affairs


Author, former publisher. Journal of trie


Asian Division (Systems Analysis). Of nee


Harold Wilkin • Chairman of the Board.


Armed Forces


of Secretary of Defense


Factory Equipment Corporation


Clurla H. Dy*on - Chairman of the


lohn Rotk*ood - Publisher, Chicago.




Board, Dyson- tusmer Corporation


Illinois


fcadcl V. nion and Polls. Ne* York, N Y


Marriavr S. Ecdea - Former Chairman of








J B Williamt Company




COI supports a strong defense but apposes excessive expenditures or forces ll belie\


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structures contribute equally io dtlense


and are eitrnnal to the strength and ttabilnt of our country




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Washington DC 20002
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481




THE DEFENSE

MONITOR



CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION— A Project of the Fund for Peace



Volume Four Number Two



February 1975



22.000 TACTICAL AND 8.000 STRATEGIC

30,000 U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS



The United States has nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons at
home, at sea, in Europe, and in Asia. 8000 of these weapons
are considered strategic weapons, 22,000 are considered tac-
tical weapons. The main difference between strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons is the difference in range. Tactical
nuclear weapons have a shorter range but are sometimes
more powerful than strategic weapons.

The 8000* U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are on (I) the
1054 U.S. Mmuteman and Titan land-based missiles, (2) the
656 Polaris/Poseidon missiles on the 41 U.S. ballistic mis-
sile submarines, and (3) the nearly 500 U.S. SAC bombers.
The U.S. has been producing strategic nuclear weapons at
the rale of three per day for the past four years, and the total
promises to grow to about 21.000 U.S. strategic nuclear
weapons under the limits set by the November 1974 U.S.-
Soviet Vladivostok Agreement

•U.S. will have 8,500 strategic weapons by mid-1975.



Less publicized and understood is the fact that nearly
22.000 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are in position
worldwide. 7000 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are on land
In Europe. Approximately 1 700 are located on land in Asia.
2.500 tactical nuclear weapons (as well as 4.500 strategic
nuclear weapons) are estimated to be aboard U.S. Navy
combat ships. The remainder, approximately 10,800 tactical
nuclear weapons, are assigned to U.S. bases and forces in
the United States.

U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Widely Dispersed

Europe 7.000

Atlantic Fleet (U.S. Navy) 1,000

Asia 1,700

Pacific Fleet (U.S. Navy) 1,500

United States 10,800

Total U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons 22.000



DEFENSE MONITOR IN BRIEF

• The United States has 30.000 nuclear weapons in Europe, Asia, the United States and at sea.
Eight thousand of those are strategic nuclear weapons; 22,000 are tactical nuclear weapons.

• There are 7000 nuclear weapons aboard U.S. Navy ships and submarines. 4500 are strategic
weapons on nuclear missile submarines. 2500 are short-range tactical nuclear weapons; 1400 of
these are aboard U.S. aircraft carriers.

• There is no coherent doctrine for using land-based tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear
weapons create an impossible command and control problem and they invite pre-emptive nuclear
strikes by an enemy. If tactical nuclear weapons were used in a war abroad the likely result would
be the destruction of the country in which they were used.

• The very presence of tactical nuclear weapons abroad creates a dangerous situation for the
United States. The likelihood is great that an exchange of tactical nuclear weapons would escalate
into a full-scale nuclear war.

• The dispersion of so many tactical nuclear weapons around the world greatly increases the
danger of theft, terrorism, and accidents.

• Most land-based U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe should be removed. All land-based
tactical nuclear weapons in Asia should be removed. All nuclear bombs and nuclear air-to-surface
weapons aboard U.S. aircraft carriers should be removed. The safety and security of U.S. citizens
would be enhanced by such a move.

• The excessive secrecy surrounding tactical nuclear weapons hinders oversight by Congress and
is unnecessary to preserve U.S. security. A national debate on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is in
the public interest.



Copyright 1975 by the Center for Defense Information All rights reserved. The Center for Defense Information encourages quotation of
any of the material herein without permission, provided the Center is credited. The Center requests a copy of any such use.



482



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 2



7,000 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

In Europe the U.S. and Us NATO allies have 2250 air-
craft, missile launchers, and nuclear cannons that can
deliver 7000 U.S tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons
carry a combined explosive capability equivalent to an es-
timated 460,000,000 tons of TNT — roughly 35,000 times
greater than the nuclear weapon that destroyed Hiroshima
in 1945. These U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are in all
NATO European states with the exception of Norway, Den-
mark. Luxembourg, and France. France maintains its own
tactical nuclear weapons in France and Germany. U.S.
nuclear forces in Europe are most heavily concentrated in
West Germany where 207,000 U.S. military personnel are
based

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe include at least
four different kinds of surface-to-surface missiles (Lance,
Sergeant, Honest John, and Pershing), two sizes of nuclear
artillery shells (155 mm and 203 mm), and over 500 US.
nuclear capable fighter-bombers. The aircraft can be loaded
with air-to-surfacc missiles or four different sizes of bombs
or a combination of missiles and bombs. The largest tactical
nuclear missile has over 400 kilotons in explosive power,
equivalent to over 30 "Hiroshimas". Forward-based
systems such as the Pershing surface-to-surface missile or
the nuclear-loaded aircraft are capable of attacking targets
inside the Soviet Union from Western Europe.

U.S. Has 2-to-l Advantage in Europe

The first U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were introduced
in Europe m 1954, three years before the Soviet Union.
Since that time the U.S. arsenal has grown dramatically and
has undergone extensive changes as new U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons replaced older ones. Soviet tactical nuclear
deployment has been later, slower, and shows little weapon
turnover, Soviet weapons in Europe have accumulated
without much retirement of earlier weapons. This resembles
the pattern of their deployment of strategic nuclear
weapons

Still, there are two U.S. tactical nuclear weapons for each
Soviet tactical nuclear weapon in Europe. Altogether U.S.
forces in Europe have 7000 tactical nuclear weapons to 3000
to '500 lor Soviet military forces in Europe.

The U.S. armed forces deployed nuclear weapons to
Europe in the early I950's to offset numerically superior
Soviet forces in Central Europe. At the time the Eisenhower
administration was seeking to check Soviet manpower ad-
vantages through a strategic policy which threatened



"massive retaliation" and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe were part of that policy. When the U.S. first placed
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe the Soviets had no tac-
tical nuclear weapons. Bv the late I950's the U.S. monopoly
on tactical nuclear weapons was ended.

1700 U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Asia

Far less information has been released to the public by the
Pentagon about the estimated 1 700 tactical nuclear weapons
that the U.S. maintains on land in Asia. U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons are in Korea and the Philippines as well as
at U.S. installations on Guam and Midway. Most of these
weapons are for U.S. fighter-bombers, except in the
Republic of Korea where Army and Air Force tactical
nuclear weapons are based

Thousands of U.S. Nuclear Weapons at Sea

The U.S. today has approximately 7000 strategic and tac-
tical nuclear weapons at sea. There are 284 ships and sub-
marines in the U.S. Navy that can carry nuclear weapons.
In 1965, only 38 percent of U.S. ships could carry nuclear
weapons. Today 56 percent are nuclear capable and the
percentage is increasing each year.

The U.S. Navy is capable of delivering up to 12,000 tac-
tical nuclear weapons in bombs, depth charges, torpedoes,
and missiles Many of these are capable of carrying both
conventional and nuclear explosives. Center for Defense In-
formation estimates place the number of U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons at sea at 2500*. This number of weapons
carries an explosive punch equivalent to 150 million tons of
TNT. more than 75 limes the amount of explosives dropped
from 1941 to 1945 on Germany and Japan by U.S.
bombers. Over 90 percent of this nuclear destructive power
is found in the 1400 tactical nuclear weapons aboard 14
U.S. attack aircraft carriers.



"This is a conservative estimate. The maximum loading of
nuclear weapons would result in a number four times larger
than the Center estimate. SL BROC (a rocket propelled
nuclear torpedo) is assumed to be loaded one-third nuclear,
two-thirds conventional. All other U.S. Navy tactical nuclear
weapons are assumed to be one-quarter nuclear loaded and
three-quarters conventional.



AWESOME TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN EUROPE

The significance of our nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe, only in Europe, becomes all too apparent when one
realizes that the destructive force, in T\T equivalent, of the nuclear weapons we have currently stockpiled alone is more
than 20 times that of the combined tola! force of all the air ordnance expended in World War II. the Korean war and the
war in Vietnam "

Senator Stuart Symington
March 7, 1974



483



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 3



Nearly 15,000 Nuclear Weapons in U.S.

An estimated 14.800 U.S. nuclear weapons are kept in the
United Stales. 4000 strategic nuclear weapons are deployed
at U.S. Minuteman and Titan missile sites and at SAC
bomber bases An additional 10.800 U.S. tactical nuclear



weapons are estimated to be in the custody of U.S. forces in
the U.S. The seven Army divisions on active duty in the
U.S. have the full spectrum of tactical nuclear weapons.
Stateside Navy and Air Force units also have a full comple-
ment of tactical nuclear weapons. Thousands more are
stockpiled at U.S. storage facilities.



TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SEARCH OF A DOCTRINE



According to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. the
U.S. deploys nuclear weapons to Europe to: (I ) deter Soviet
use of tactical nuclear weapons and Warsaw Pact attacks,
and (2) to provide a nuclear option short of all-out war
should deterrence fail and our conventional defenses
collapse. As Morion Halperin, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, recently put it. "The NATO doctrine
is that we will fight with conventional forces until we are
losing, then we fight with tactical nuclear weapons until we
are losing, and then we will blow up the world."

No one yet has been able to devise any reasonable set of
scenarios for the use of our European-based tactical nuclear
weapons. Defense Secretary Schlesinger had admitted to
continuing to search unsuccessfully for a doctrine whereby
tactical nuclear weapons could be confidently used without
triggering all-oul war. That is likely to be a fruitless search.
It is a Center conclusion that there is no rational doctrine
lor the use of the i S land-based tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe and Asia.

Defending Allies By Destroying Them

Something is wrong with a strategy which, if imple-
mented, would destroy the country it is designed to de-
fend. The use of 10 percent of the 7000 U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe would destroy the entire area where such
massive nuclear exchanges occured. War games practiced
by NATO troops indicate the tremendous collateral damage
thai would be inflicted upon cities and people bordering the
battle area. A NATO war game named Carte Blanche was
run lor 48 hours during which 335 tactical nuclear weapon
explosions were simulated, 268 on German territory. A very