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United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Gove.

The Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 online

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conservative estimate placed Germans killed at between 1.5
and 1.7 million plus an additional 3.5 million wounded. In
the six years of World War II 305.000 Germans were killed
and 780.000 were wounded. Thus a very limited tactical
nuclear war would produce over five times as many German
casualties in two days as occurred in the entire Second
World War

A similar NATO war game. Operation Sagebrush,
simulated the use of 275 tactical nuclear weapons that
ranged in yield from 2 to 40 kilotons. According to the
evaluation of the exercise, "the destruction was so great that
no such thing as limited nuclear war was possible in such an
area." Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain



Enthoven. in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, quoted a Defense Department report on war
games conducted in Europe in the I960's as saying that:
"E»en under the most favorable assumptions about
restraint and limitations in yields and targets, between 2
and 20 million Europeans would be killed in a limited tac-
tical nuclear war. . . and a high risk of 100 million dead if
the war escalated to attacks on cities."

Any Nuclear War Likely to be Total

Once the nuclear threshold has been broken, it is highly
likely that the nuclear exchanges would escalate. Radio,
radar, and other communications would be disrupted or cut.
The pressures to destroy the adversary's nuclear forces
before they land a killing blow would lead to preemptive at-
tack. In the confusion, subtle peacetime distinctions
between lower level tactical nuclear war and higher level
tactical nuclear war, and all-out spasm nuclear war would
vanish. Once the threshold is crossed from conventional
warfare to nuclear warfare, the clearest "firebreak" on the
path to complete nuclear holocaust will have been crossed.

Small Weapons Trigger Big Ones

One risk of developing tactical nuclear weapons, especial-
ly those now euphemistically called "mini-nukes", is that
they may create the illusion that a limited nuclear war can
be fought. Small weapons such as the 155mm nuclear ar-
tillery projectiles have already been introduced. The trend is
for more of the same. As smaller, "cleaner", and more ac-
curate tactical nuclear weapons are added to the U.S.
arsenal, they will add to the dangerous illusion that tactical
nuclear weapons can be used with no risk of escalation.

This overlooks two factors. First, the U.S. tactical
nuclear arsenal is still loaded with large "Hiroshima-size"
weapons. Second, the Soviet Union would respond massive-
ly to U.S. nuclear attacks. Even if all larger U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons were replaced by new "mini-nukes", using
them would trigger the older, bigger, and "dirtier" Soviet
weapons with the same consequences for persons living in
the area and the same resultant escalation.
, The idea of a limited nuclear war is an illusion. However,
it may encourage policy-makers to be more reckless and
make nuclear war. especially during acute crises, more likely.



484



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PAGE 8



FOUR NUCLEAR SAFETY DILEMMAS



Dilemma 1 : Danger From Nuclear Terrorists

The risk of war with Ihe Soviet Union has long been
regarded as the primary threat to the security of the United
States In hopes of averting such a catastrophe, thousands
of man-years have been spent by analysts exploring how
such a war is likely to erupt.

The research and contingency plans designed to control
escalation of crises and limited wars, to prevent accidental
war or unauthorised attacks, and to deter a surprise attack,
may be ignoring ,1 likelier danger to U.S. national security
— the nuclear terrorist.

A half-do/en terrorists with a home-made or hijacked
nuclear weapon could cause thousands of deaths in a city
like New York. Yet thousands of nuclear weapons are
deployed by the United Slates, Soviet, French, and British
forces in many different locations, some with questionable
security precautions If a terrorist group stole and detonated
one "small" 10 kiloton nuclear weapon in New York City,
the explosion could cause nearly 100,000 deaths — more
lhan all the U.S. battle deaths incurred together in the Viet-
nam and Korean Wars.

One of Ihe hundreds of U.S. tactical nuclear bombs in the
one megaton range, if exploded on Manhattan Island.
would inflict casualties exceeding the combined totals of the
war dead f'om the American Revolution, the War of 1812,



the Mexican War. the U.S. Civil War. the Spanish-
American War. the First World War, World War II, the
Korean War. and the Vietnam War. Nearly one-and-a-half
million people would perish in such an event.

More than 50 major terrorist groups are reported to exist
worldwide. Urban guerrilla activities. Olympic murders,
airplane hijackings, terror bombings, and airport massacres
are all well known.

How safe are nuclear weapons from theft by terrorist
groups.' Not very, according to the few indicators available
in this highly classified area. U.S. Army Special Forces
exercises ha\e shown that nuclear weapons storage areas
can be penetrated successfully without detection despite
guards, fences, and sensors. Their example could obviously
be followed by a daring and well-organized terrorist
organization.

The United Stales, Us allies, and Ihe Soviet Union have
now deplovcd thousands of tactical nuclear weapons across
ihe world, each in an effort to bolster its own national
security In doing so. these governments have made their
societies more vulnerable to the nuclear terrorist. Our cities,
as a result, are more likely to become casualties from
nuclear terrorist attacks than from attacks by other coun-
tries.



Dilemma 2: Seizure by Allies

More lhan half of all U.S. nuclear weapons are stationed
abroad or on the high seas. Countries where US. nuclear
weapons are reportedly stationed include:

Federal Republic of Germany Greece

United Kingdom Turkey

Netherlands Spam

Belgium Portugal

Italy Philippines

Iceland Republic of Korea

Once the US deploys nuclear weapons to an allied coun-
try, we pul in jeopardy our control of those weapons if that
nation ever becomes unfriendly to the United States. Allied
sei/ures of U.S. weapons could result in the United States
having to fight Us way inlo an allied country in order to
rescue its own weapons.

This scenario takes on more plausibility in the light ol ihe
recent Greek and Turkish fighting on Cyprus. Both Greece
and Turkey are host countries for U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons and U.S. security forces were put on maximum
alert guarding Ihe weapons compounds during the short war



between these two NATO allies.

Too many of ihe allied host countries that permit U.S.
nuclear bases are dictatorships with oppressive regimes that
spark dissent. Franco of Spain and Chung Hee Park of
Korea are vintage examples of the genre. Some allies who
permit U.S. nuclear weapons already have domestic in-
surrections on their hands. The Philippines and the United
Kingdom are current examples. In Greece and Portugal re-
cent coups d'etat have changed the complexion of the ruling
groups. In countries plagued by civil wars and coups, U.S.
tactical nuclear bases may not be safe from our "allies".
During internal political disruptions in allied countries,
I S bases might find themselves caught in the middle of a
firelight. One side or the other might find it advantageous,
or even necessary, to seize U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to
gain the upper hand in the local struggle. Nor can we dis-
count the possibility that allies such as the Republic of
Korea might seize U.S. weapons in order to defend
themselves from — or possibly to attack — their an-
tagonists



Letter From A Concerned U.S. Soldier to Senator Symington

"I am aware of ihe existence of [U.S.I tactical nuclear warheads. in Greece and in Turkey- If Greece and
Turkey should tome to blows and seek to gain ihe advantage by forcibly taking these warheads to use upon the other it
would undoubtedly cost many American lives and plunge the L S. into an untenable position .Xo more than 4 to 6
L S soldier*, guard the hunkers « Inch store ihe nukes! Most of the troops I about 40 per detachment I are housed about a
quarter of a mile from the bunkers and could easilv be isolated from ihe warheads"



488



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 9



Dilemma 3: I nauihori/ed Use of Nuclear Weapons

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490



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 11



CENTER CONCLUSIONS



The secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons
has made il nearly impossible for the Congress
and the public to understand how many U.S. tac-
tical nuclear weapons exist, where they are, how
lhe> would be used, and what the effects of their
use would be. Increased Congressional oversight
and public understanding is necessary and secrecy
should be abandoned to the extent necessary to
guarantee it.

Most of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons
overseas can be brought home with no loss in
national security. Indeed, there should be a net
gain in security as the chances decrease for ac-
cidents, for theft, and for unauthorized use of the
weapons. Increased U.S. national security would
be the result of adoption of these Center
recommendations:

I Substantially cut the number of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe. Perhaps no more than 500
would be enough to guarantee the participation of
the U.S. strategic deterrent forces, yet this
number would substantially cut the safety
problems and costs of maintaining the force.
Phasedowns could be gradual (e.g. 1 000 per year)
and might serve to produce similar Soviet
phasedowns as the danger to them somewhat
receded.

2. Restructure the remaining tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe so that they are under the con-
tinuous operational control of the Supreme Com-
mander of NATO (SACEUR). Weapons should
be taken away from frontline field commanders
of local units and deployed in the rear. This will
improve security and control of these weapons.

3. Remove all Quick Reaction Alert Aircraft
iQRA). Such systems are vulnerable to a surprise
attack and lend themselves to the danger of hair
trigger reactions and unauthorized use by U.S.
and NATO pilots. Their missions can be taken
over and performed more effectively by the
ballistic missile submarine fleet.

4. Remove all forward deployed atomic ar-
tillery. Such weapons are subject to unauthorized
use if forward units are surrounded and under at-
tack. Moreover they might be easily captured if
not used and turned against the NATO army they
were designed to serve. Their forward deployment
makes it likely that any war in Europe will be
nuclear.

5. Remove all forward deployed atomic demoli-
tion munitions (ADMs) and all of those not per-



mitted to be prechambered where that is
necessary. Forward deployed ADMs, even if
prechambered, would guarantee nuclear escala-
tion of a conventional conflict — something to be
avoided. ADMs that have not been prechambered
to the optimal depth can cause excessive nuclear
lalloul and high damage to surrounding civilians
and troops

6. Remove aircraft and surface-to-surface mis-
siles capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union
or deploy them to the rear where their status as
tactical weapons is clear to the USSR. This also
reduces the danger of unauthorized launching of
bombs and missiles by U.S. forces directly
against the Soviet Union.

7. Remove all nuclear weapons from South
Korea, the Philippines, and other Asian states
where they exist. Such U.S. weapons pose
dangers of theft, unauthorized use, allied seizures,
and accidents. They threaten to involve the U.S.
in areas where we would be forced to intervene.
Such situations not only make our foreign policy
hostage to our weapons policy but might force the
U.S. to create another precedent of nuclear first-
use.

8. Substantially increase the security
precautions around U.S. nuclear weapons com-
pounds and more intensively screen U.S. personnel
who handle tactical nuclear weapons.

9. The program to "modernize" tactical
nuclear weapons should be shelved. Nothing is
gained by their introduction and the dangers of
creating illusions of "usable" nuclear weapons
and blurring the distinction between conventional
and nuclear war both increase rather than reduce
the threat to U.S. national security.

10. Nuclear capable missiles, and missile
launchers, should not be sold or given to countries
that have a near-nuclear capability. To do so in-
creases the risks of new countries "going nuclear"
and increases the dangers to U.S. security
thereafter.

I I Remove all nuclear weapons from U.S. air-
craft carriers. Carrier aircraft have no strategic
nuclear role that cannot be better carried out by
other systems. Carriers are unlikely to exist for
long in a nuclear war and their primary remaining
useful mission is as mobile launching platforms
lor aircraft engaged in conventional attacks.
Nuclear weapons aboard would degrade the
capability of the carriers to perform that role.



491



DEFENSE MONITOR



PAGE 12



U.S. - U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS



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Since mid-1973 the U.S. has deployed almost three times as man> new strategic nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union.

(DoD Figures)



THE STAFF
Director

Rear Admirjl Gene R La Rocque
U.S. Nav) (Rei )

Dim tor of Research

David Johnson

Senior Editor, this issue
Bam R Schneider

Sally Anderson
Bob Berman
Slefan H. Leader
Phil Stanford
Evelyn LaBrtola
William Mako
Doron Bar-Levav
James Schear
Elizabeth Campbell
Elaine Richardson
James Pans



MorraB *brin.Jr - Pembroke College.

Oiford. England launder j.nd former

President of Sludenl Vole and Hor.jrd

Independent

Doni Z Baio - Cos Lob, Connection

Arthur D Serliss. li - 1 ipUM L S"-R



Mitt



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Janre R Cmpcoo - P-ei.dent J R



Ourln H D**on -



Board of Advisors



Hmrr* Haft- Partner. UnoM ind Puncr.

Chairman Board of Tranca UMWA

Welfare i. Retirement Fund

S*r»tn Moll ■ Philanlhropisl

Paul Nfonua - Motion Picture*

Li-r«H( S. Phillip* - Pro-dem Philljpv

\jn Heusen Corporation

Rudolph S Raun - President. The Risin

( urfurjliun. I rtJCigO

Of. EmI ( Ra>enni - Former Director,

Asian Di>inon(Svslemi Analyst!). Ofr>ce

ol Setretar) of Defense

John Rw»»rx>d - Publisher. Chicago.

Albert M Rtwitkus - Vice- President.
J B Williams Company



Ro*trt P Srhiuii • Metallurgical

Engineei International Coowlwni for In.

dustrui Development

Dr HeftertSoi.Uk.Jf ■ Former Depul)

i tnitjl Intelligence Agencj
Alfred P Manet - President kayser-Roth

Dr Jeremy J . Sloe* - Director. Fedef anon

of Amentjn SOCBUMS

Phillip A. Straw- Pjrmer Scjberger and

Herman. Members, He* Vork Stock

Exchange

Paul Waruke - FOimet Annum

S-^reiar. »l DeHnse. International
Ufam

Harold Willero - Chjirman ol Ibc Board.
Factor] tnwpmenl Corporation.
4bra.ru.in » ilun - MtOMey. Pjrtncr
kaJel Wihon ind Polls, We* Ycrk.N >




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ADDRESS CORRECTION REQl ESTED



492

[From Newsday, May 1, 1975]

Does the Shah Need Those F-14s?

More Aerospace Jobs on Long Island Are Not Worth the Higher Tensions
That Billions of Dollars of American Arms Sales Are Producing in the
Persian Gulf Area, These Defense Analysts Say.

(By Stefan Leader and Bob Berman)

Many Long Island residents were probably very happy when Grumman
Aerospace Corp. announced last year that Iran will buy 80 F-14 jet fighters.
The sale means that the F-14 production run will be longer — resulting in more
jobs for Long Island aerospace workers. The $1.8 billion that Iran will pay for
these planes will help Grumman's ailing financial situation and provide a shot
in the arm for Long Island's economy.

These are real and immediate benefits, but the U.S. policy of growing poli-
tical involvement and unrestrained arms sales to the Persian Gulf, of which
the F-14 sale is part, is not without some significant costs and dangers. In
time these costs and dangers could make the financial gain seem rather small
and insignificant.

U.S. political and military involvement in the Persian Gulf has been expand-
ing rapidly in recent years. The leading edge of our involvement in this area — ■
as it was in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s — is military assistance and
arms sales. The F-14 sale is the tip of the iceberg.

The United States is not the only supplier of arms to the Persian Gulf, but
it is by far the largest one. In 1974 the United States sold more than $4.4
billion worth of arms to Persian Gulf countries. Russia sold $1.5 billion ;
France sold $1.5 billion ; Britain sold $50 million. Saudi Arabia and Iran have
been the chief customers for U.S. arms. In 1974, these two countries alone
bought $4.4 billion worth of American weapons. Recently Iran and the United
States announced a $15 billion five-year trade deal that is expected to include
the delivery of $5 billion worth of American arms. U.S. arms are helping to
make Iran a major world military power. The major countries of the region
are now spending about $5.8 billion a year on their military forces. Just five
years ago the total was $1.6 billion.

One justification U.S. officials give for arming Iran has been to make direct
U.S. involvement in the area unnecessary. There are indications, however, that
Pentagon officials have decided that an American presence in the area is neces-
sary in any case. The Navy has begun regular visits to the Persian Gulf and
deployment of a carrier task force to the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the
United States is in the process of developing a base at Diego Garcia and there
are plans to use the former British base at Masirah. In addition, the U.S.
Middle East force has a base at Bahrain. All of this points to growing Amer-
ican involvement in a highly volatile region of the world.

The character of U.S. military assistance and arms transfers has undergone
major changes in recent years. In the past it was unusual for the United
States or any other country to provide or sell its most advanced weapons to
foreign governments. With the possible exception of some favored allies, foreign
recipients of military aid had to content themselves with older or obsolecent
equipment.

This pattern has changed quite radically in recent years, particularly in the
Middle East and Persian Gulf, where oil-rich governments can afford to pay
for the most up-to-date equipment. In addition to F-14s now on order, Iran
has already received the F-4 Phantom. The F— 4 was, and still is, one of the
first-line fighter aircraft of the U.S. Air Force. Iran will also be adding ocean-
going DD-963 destroyers to its navy soon after the last of these destroyers are
introduced into the U.S. Navy. It will soon receive improved Hawk surface-to-
air missiles and it has TOW antitank missiles. All of these are currently being
added to the U.S. inventory.

From Britain. Iran has purchased Chieftain tanks, the first-line tank of the
British Army. Kuwait has announced plans to purchase the Mirage F-l air-
craft from France, and will begin adding it to its inventory at the same time
France acquires the Mirage in large numbers for its own air force. The funda-
mental point is that the sophistication of the weapons available to the countries
of the Persian Gulf as escalated substantially in recent years and a full-scale
war in the region is likely to prove highly destructive and very costly.



493

This infusion of advanced military technology has greatly increased the
offensive military capabilities of several Persian Gulf countries, Iran in par-
ticular. The countries in the region are acquiring the capability to make war
at ever-increasing levels of potential destructiveness. Neighbors who previously
did not have the means to threaten each other are now becoming capable of
waging full-scale wars. Such conflicts could lead to U.S. involvement. We must
also ask whether the United States may also be creating military powers that
some day will turn against us.

Supplying these advanced long-range weapons, such as the F^, F-14, and
DD-963 destroyers to Iran, has strategic implications beyond the Persian Gulf.
The Iranian military build-up and Iranian aid to Pakistan (Iran has given 90
F-86 jets and several modern C-130 transports to Pakistan) could in the future
be seen as a threat by India. At present Iranian-Indian relations are cordial
but a continued Iranian build-up and more Iranian aid to Pakistan could turn
the relations between these two countries sour over the next few years.

In similar fashion, Saudi and Kuwaiti arms may soon have an impact on the
Arab-Israeli military balance. As Saudi Arabia and Kuwait grow in power, the
Israelis may have to begin to weigh them in the total balance. This may make
the Israelis less secure and increase Israel's need for U.S. military assistance.

With American assistance, Iran has become the dominant military power in
the Persian Gulf. Iranian military forces are twice as large as those of Iraq
and five times larger than those of Saudi Arabia. Iran spends on military
forces four times what Iraq spends. This expansion of Iranian military power
poses significant risks, both for the United States and for other Persian Gulf
states.

A few years ago the late Sen. Richard Russell (D-Ga.), commenting on U.S.
military capabilities, pointed out that "if Americans find it easy to go any-
where and do anything, they will always be going somewhere and doing some-
thing." The same can be said of Iran. If we make it easy for Iranians "to go
anywhere and do anything," they will "always be going somewhere and doing
something." By massively expanding Iranian military capabilities the United
States may be encouraging Iranian ambitions to dominate the Persian Gulf.
Even if the present regime remains in power there are dangers in this policy.

Until recently, the shah clearly shared U.S. concerns about a Soviet threat
to Iran. While the shah still speaks of the Soviet danger, Iran has increasingly
deployed its armed forces to the south. Three-fourths of the F-14s ordered will
be deployed there. This has caused some alarm among its neighbors. There is
increasing evidence of the shah's fundamental ambition to rebuild the ancient
Iranian empires.

In justifying U.S. arms sales to Iran recently, U.S. officials have emphasized
the shared interest between the United States and Iran in safeguarding the
flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the United States, Europe and Japan. The
shah has insisted that he will not participate in another embargo under any
circumstances. While there is no reason to doubt the shah's commitment to
this goal — especially given the very high prices he is now getting for his oil —
there are some potential dangers. One possibility is that the shah's ambitions
and Iran's growing military power might end with the shah in control of all



Online LibraryUnited States. Congress. Senate. Committee on GoveThe Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 → online text (page 42 of 47)