The Export reorganization act, 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session, April 24, 30, and May 1, 1975 online

required to prepare a "nuclear proliferation assessment" regarding
nuclear exports that would be deemed "strategically significant,"
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) would have an
opportunity to comment on the assessment. Presumably most substan-
tial exports would be deemed strategically significant.

However, NRC would not seem to be in the best position to
make such a nuclear proliferation assessment since its primary
mission is to regulate the U.S. nuclear power industry from the
viewpoint of health and safety and physical security against theft
and sabotage. The connection of NRC to the network of federal
agencies dealing with national security and foreign policy matters



57

is much more tenuous than was formerly the case with the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC> . However, ACDA is charged by statute at
least with responsibility for U.S. arms control policy formulation,
including U.S. policy regarding nuclear weapon non-proliferation.
Therefore, instead an NRC assessment, ACDA might, on request from
NRC, prepare and circulate the nuclear proliferation assessment
which could then be taken into account by the NRC in making a
safeguards finding under section 7 (a) , or by the Department of
Commerce in its decision to grant or deny final approval of a
nuclear export license.

It is also unclear to me what effect the proliferation
assessment would have on the government decision -making process.
Presumably, the results would be classified. It might be appropriate
to require that the assessments be made available to the appropriate
oversight committees of the Congress, as well as all executive
agencies and departments represented on the National Security
Council, if broad review and participation in these decisions
were desired.

An important matter that is unclear to me from my reading
of the bill is the status of toll enrichment services. Would
the bill apply to foreign owned uranium shipped to the U.S. for
toll enrichment that was thereafter shipped abroad for fabrication
into nuclear fuel?

S. 14 39 would also require the NRC to make two safeguards
studies: one would examine the IAEA system and the U.S. system;
the other would investigate the feasibility of "internationalization
of all strategically significant aspects" of the civilian nuclear
fuel cycle.



58

The safeguards study would be unlikely to reveal much in
the way of fresh understanding, since this matter has already been
periodically covered by the former AEC and the IAEA. Obviously,
the primary objectives of the two kinds of safeguards are radically
different: the U.S. system is intended to prevent theft by a
criminal or terrorist group, and the IAEA system is designed to
detect diversion by a national government in violation of an inter-
national agreement. Moreover, the primary means used to carry out
these disparate objectives are consequently very different: the
D.S. system uses primarily a combination of physical barriers and
security forces, and, secondarily, a system of materials accoun-

t

tancy, while the IAEA system uses primarily materials accountancy,
based on national systems, and limited verification through inter-
national inspection.

The initial study of the feasibility of internationalization
of nuclear fuel cycle facilities was made in 1945/46 in the
Acheson-Lilienthal Report. That historic report concluded that
nuclear power must be developed under a strong international
authority with pervasive licensing control over all phases of the
civilian nuclear fuel cycle from the mine to the radioactive waste
management facility. These conclusions formed the basis for the
Baruch Plan presented by the U.S. government to the United Nations
in 1946. Internationalization is technically feasible and
economically desirable. The political will is missing, however.
I believe the time for study of this matter has past, and
the time for action has arrived. Accordingly, I would like to
conclude this statement with some specific suggestions regarding
the substance of U.S. nuclear power export policy. Some of these



59



might be incorporated into S. 1439, while others might form the
basis for U.S. foreign policy initiatives.

First, the U.S. could offer to provide its most advanced
uranium enrichment technology for large enrichment facilities that
would be built outside the United States under multinational
ownership and IAEA safeguards. Such an offer was extended in 1971
and again as part of the International Energy Problem growing out
of the Washington Energy Conference in 1974. It must be pursued
with urgency as part of a broader effort to encourage the multi-
national ownership and operation of chemical reprocessing, fuel
fabrication and associated nuclear material storage facilities.

â– 

Second, in addition to the requirements for IAEA safeguards
under the NPT or under U.S. agreements for cooperation with countries
not parties to the NPT, the U.S. could adopt the following nuclear
export policy :

a. Low-enriched uranium LWR fuel . Nuclear fuel containing
low-enriched uranium produced in U.S. enrichment facilities for
use in power reactors in foreign countries would be reprocessed

either in U.S. facilities or in facilities multinationally owned

i

and under IAEA safeguards. Plutonium recovered from reprocessing
would be stored until fabricated and fabricated into complete
fuel assemblies in a fuel fabrication facility on the same site
as the reprocessing facility.

b. High-enriched uranium HTGR fuel . High -enriched
uranium produced in U.S. enrichment facilities for use in power
reactors in foreign countries would be fabricated into complete

fuel assemblies in the U.S. and reprocessed either in U.S. facilities
or in facilities multinationally owned and under IAEA safeguards.



. 60



Restrictions comparable to recovered plutoniura would apply to
recovered uranium-233.

c. Power reactors . The same restrictions would apply to
fuel used and produced in foreign power reactors exported from
the U.S., or incorporating major components exported from the
U.S., as to fuel enriched in the U.S.

d. Nuclear material exports for nuclear power R&D . U.S.
exports of high-enriched uranium or plutonium for use in foreign
nuclear power research and development activities would be subject
to specially negotiated conditions as to safeguards during use.

e. International safeguards against governmental diversion .
Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT would apply.

f . National safeguards against non-governmental diversion
or sabotage . U.S. exports of nuclear materials and equipment
would be subject to a requirement that they be protected in the
recipient country and any third country to which they may be
transferred by physical security measures designed to give at
least the level of protection afforded similar materials and
equipment in the U.S.

The above policy suggestions do not differentiate between
nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon countries, or between parties
and non -parties to the NPT. The absence of discrimination may be
viewed as an advantage, but it may nevertheless introduce complica-
tions .

Such a U.S. policy would not succeed unless other countries
develop a common view of nuclear power interdependence as being in
their own long run economic and security interests . The non-nuclear-



61



weapon countries must seize the present opportunity they have now —
but not for long — to develop nuclear power on the basis of inter-
dependence instead of self-sufficiency. The major industrial coun-
tries of Western Europe and Japan, the resource rich non-industrial
countries, and the less developed countries need not be dependent upon
the United States or the Soviet Union. Instead, they can develop
cooperation among themselves. This is the kind of interdependence
that will be most important.

In the nuclear era, it is clear from an economic viewpoint,
and even more from a security viewpoint, that the interests of
nations are becoming increasingly interwoven into an interdependent

*

world.



62



Table 1

NUCLEAR ELECTRIC GENERATING CAPACITY*
As of December 31, 1974





In Commercial


Under Construction






Operation


or Ordered


Total


USA


31,000


190,000


221,000


OECD (excluding U.S.)


24,100


86,100


110,200


Austria




692


692


Belgium


390


3,190


3,580


Canada


2,512


6,236


8,748


Finland




2,160


2,160


France


2,888


18,478


21,366


Fed. Rep. of Germany


3,908


16,198


20,106


Italy


547


2,814


3,361


Japan


4,537


11,016


15,553


Netherlands


532




532


Spain


1,073


7,262


8,335


Sweden


1,020


6,329


7,349


Switzerland


1,006


4,847


5,853


United Kingdom


5,332


6,450


11,782


Communist Countries


4,109


7,825


11,934


Bulgaria


440


1,320


1,760


Czechoslovakia


110


1,320


1,430


Hungary




880


880


Rumania




440


440


USSR


3,459


3,250


6,709


Yugoslavia




615


615


Developing Countries


1,044


15,200


16,244


Argentina


319


. - 600


919


India


600


1,140


1,740


Iran




.. 4,200


4,200


Korea




1,764


1,764


Mexico




1,320


1,320


Pakistan


125




125


Philippines




1,252


1,252


Taiwan




4,924


4,924


World


60,253


299,125


359,378



*Source: Nuclear News, Mid-February, 1975.



63

[Whereupon, the committee was in short recess.]

Senator Glenn. We will now hear our second panel of today,
which is as follows: Gen. Edward B. Giller, Deputy Assistant
Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration; Dr. Abraham Friedman, Director, Division
of International Programs, Energy Research and Development
Administration; Howard J. Larson, Director, Division of Materials
and Fuel Cycle Licensing, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Ralph
G. Page, Director, Division of Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; Rauer H. Meyer, Director, Office of Export Admini-
stration, Department of Commerce; Dixon Hoyle, Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Energy and Technology Affairs ; and
David Elliott, staff member. National Security Council.

Before we start with any statements that you gentlemen may
have, any statements that could be put in the record, so we might
have more time discussing some of the items in question, there was
one other thing I would like to have just for the record.

Mr. David Elliott, from the National Security Council staff, had
been asked to testify, and he had refused, or declined to do so. I do not
know whether Mr. Elliott washed to make a statement as to why he
declined to testify. Is Mr. Elliott here?

TESTIMONY OF GEN. EDWARD B. GILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ; ACCOMPANIED BY
DR. ABRAHAM FRIEDMAN, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INTER-
NATIONAL PROGRAMS, ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION; HOWARD J. LARSON, DIRECTOR, DIVISION
OF MATERIALS AND FUEL CYCLE LICENSING; RALPH G. PAGE,
ACTING DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF SAFEGUARDS, NUCLEAR REGU-
LATORY COMMISSION; RAUER H. MEYER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; DIXON
HOYLE, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENERGY
AND TECHNOLOGY AFFAIRS; HAROLD D. BENGELSDORF, DI-
RECTOR OF OFFICE POLICY, PLANNING, AND ANALYSIS, OES,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND DAVID ELLIOTT, STAFF MEMBER,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Elliott. Senator, I did not receive an invitation to testify.

Senator Glenn. I understand from the staff that it had been ex-
tended in written form.

Mr. Elliott. I did not get it.

Senator Glenn. Here is a letter, this is written to Secretary
Kissinger asking that Mr. Hoyle and Mr. David Elliott appear be-
fore the committee on April 24 to participate.

Mr. Elliott. Was that sent to the Department of State or to the
White House, Senator?

Senator Glenn. That was sent to the Department of State.

Mr. Elliott. The Department of State does not exchange mail
with us.

Senator Glenn. I might state, as acting chairman of this com-



64

mittee, I think that is a rather weak one, but it would seem to me,
that with Mr. Kissinger's staff, and his wearing two hats back and
forth to the White House, and as Secretary of State, that he per-
haps would have this staff secure your counsel, but perhaps that is
not the way they operate over there these days.

Mr. Elliott. It is not.

Senator Glenn. You may receive another invitation directly with-
out going through the Secretary.

General, would you like to leadoff? I do not know whether any
of you gentlemen have prepared statements, or statements you would
like to summarize or put in the record. I will leave it up to you.
We obviously want to save as much time as we can, without running
this into the late afternoon.

General Giller. My understanding is that there would be no
statements required. I have none, and I do not know if any of the
other members have any.

Senator Glenn. Do any other members of the panel have a state-
ment? Fine. Then we will proceed with questions.

One of the areas I would like to get into, since you gentlemen
represent the different branches of Government that cooperate in
this whole field of licensing and exports, is to try to learn a little
bit about how you cooperate now, how the bill we propose might
affect your operation, and if you think it would or would not be an
improvement, and how you think it would supply the IAEA, because
it is obviously an international problem.

General, do you want to leadoff here? Let me ask some specific
questions. I will go into this South African matter as a case study.
I do not want to beat it to death, but the South African situation
appears to be an illustration of how these things apply to various
agencies.

General Giller. I think it would be appropriate for Dr. Friedman
to answer that, who has the back history of the reasons we have
agreements with South Africa, the fundamental basis upon which
the agreement rests, to describe the background together with State,
which, of course is a party to this decision.

Senator Glenn. Before you comment, Dr. Friedman, use this
as a case study, if you would, as to what happens in a request like
this, or what the agreements were.

I am not trying to pin anybody to the wall, I would rather use
this as a case study to show how the whole process works, and how
it might be altered to benefit the safety of everyone if we changed
the system.

Dr. Friedman. Senator Glenn, what I thought we might do, and
with your approval, is to summarize what the procedures are in
developing agreements for cooperation, and I will do as you requested
as to the South African situation.

Agreements for cooperation and amendments thereto are con-
cluded between the U.S. Government and other governments or
group of nations pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as 'amended. Conclusion of such agreements involves
the authority of the Department of State with respect to Executive
Agreements and to the conduct of foreign policy.



65

The draft text of a proposed agreement or amendment is typi-
cally prepared by ERDA and the Department of State. Depending
on the country involved and the nature of the proposed agreement,
the views of other executive agencies, such as ACDA are obtained.
Furthermore, we bring to the attention of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy our intention to negotiate an agreement. Following
agreement on a draft text it is presented to the foreign party for
consideration on an ad referendum basis. After ad referendum agree-
ment is reached by the parties, the text must be approved by the
ERDA Administrator and the Department of State.

The approved text is then initialled by representatives of ERDA,
the State Department and the other party to signify agreement
on the text language — subject to further approvals — and submitted
by ERDA to the President for his approval. Before approving and
authorizing the execution of the proposed agreement, the President
must determine in writing "that the performance of the proposed
agreements will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable
risk to the common defense and security." Following this determina-
tion the agreement is formally signed by representatives of ERDA
and the State Department — on behalf of the United States — and
by the other party.

The signed text is then submitted to the U.S. Congress, where it
must lie for a statutory period. Prior to enactment of Public Law
93-485 on October 26, 1974, amending section 123.C. of the Atomic
Energy Act, all agreements for amendments were submitted to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and lay for a statutory 30-day
period. Under Public Law 93-485, all agreements involving signi-
ficant cooperation — that means, assistance involving reactors pro-
ducing more than 5 thermal megawatts — must lie before Congress for
60 days. During this period Congressional hearings on the pro-
posed agreement are generally held by the JCAE. If during the
60-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating
in substance that it does not favor the proposed agreement, the
agreement cannot become effective.

If the Congress takes no such action, the final step which brings
the agreement into force is an exchange of notification between the
parties, by the State Department on the U.S. side advising that all
their respective statutory and constitutional requirements have
been completed.

In the case of the agreement for cooperation with Africa, which
has been in effect for many years, the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy held hearings on the superseding agreement on June 9. 1967.

Senator Glexx. How about followup shipments, do they run
through the same process?

The problem here is that we have sent South Africa four or five
times the amount of fuel needed to run the reactor that we know about
anyway — that is, above and beyond the normal amounts of fuel that
they would be expected to use. If all of this excess is transferable
directly into weapons, there would be sufficient material for eight
nuclear weapons in addition to running the plant.

I am not accusing South Africa of anything, but what procedure
is run through as a follow to the initial sale?



66

Dr. Friedman. Each shipment, of course, requires a license, and
licensing procedures have been discussed.

They are a primary subject to your proposed legislation, of course,
and I think there are people here who will or can discuss it further,
but each shipment is subject to a license.

Senator Glenn. A similar process you outlined a moment ago.

Dr. Friedman. The process I outlined is the basic agreement
for cooperation, under which we then agreed to supply fuel for
reactors, and then the actual supply is subject to the appropriate
licensing and determinations that material would be appropriately
safeguarded.

If I may make a comment on your comment, on the quantity
involved, the South Africa reactor is a 20-megawatt reactor.

It went critical in 1965, and with the schedule of operation pres-
ently in use for a typical 20 megawatt thermal reactor, operating
5 days a week, it requires a reload of core every 3 weeks.

Such a reload requires four new elements of 200 grams of
uranium-235 each load.

Each 6 weeks, it requires a new control rod containing 135 grams
of uranium-235. Over a period of 1 year taking into account a total
of 10 weeks of shut down time, a reactor such as the Safari reactor,
a 20-megawatt reactor, would require an average of 14 reloads of
fuel elements and 7 reloads of control rods.

The annual requirement is therefore 56 times 200 gram elements,
and 7 times 135 gram control rods, giving a total of 12.145 kilograms,
that is roughly 27 pounds, contained in a total of 13.494 kilograms,
or about 29 or 30 pounds of uranium.

So if you consider that there needs to be frequent reloads, that
the elements coming out of a reactor are very highly radioactive
and have to be stored for cooling in a cooling pond for some time,
the quantity of materials is not inconsistent with good reactor
practice.

Senator Glenn. I did not know all of the arithmetic there, but
I do not believe that would require additional orders, that would
account for what was sent — a good chunk of it. Why would they
need all of the additional then?

Dr. Friedman. In view of the fact every 3 weeks an additional
core needs to be supplied, a typical core, I think, well

Senator Glenn. I think rather than going through all of the
arithmetic, will you supply that for the record, and how it totals
out, including their orders, their requests for orders for the future,
the 56 pounds, which totals up to the 112 pounds of extra U235
that they have ordered from the supplier in Oak Ridge, if you
could furnish for the record, we would not have to go through
all of it.

[The information requested and subsequently supplied follows:]



67



SOUTH AFRICA

SAFARI -I RESEARCH REACTOR



REACTOR TYPE: ORR tank, fully enriched (90%) uranium, light

water moderated and cooled, beryllium reflected.

POWER: .20 MW thermal: Initially 6.67 MW cooling

capacity.

LOCATION: National Nuclear Research Center, Pelindaba,

near Pretoria, South Africa.

j
OWNER: South African Atomic Energy Board

DESIGNER/BUILDER: Reactor: Allis-Chalraers Manufacturing Co.

Building, process equipment, etc: Atomic Energy
Board and South African Firms

CONSTRUCTION: Start of Construction: 1961

Reactor Critical: 1965

Typical operating core consists of: 22 fuel elements

5 control rod elements

22 Beryllium reflector elements

23 Al filler pieces

With the present schedule of operation at 20 megawatts thermal
operating 5 days a week SAFARI-I requires a reload every 3 weeks,
when 4 new elements of 200 gm U-2 35 each are loaded. Every 6 weeks
1 new control rod containing 135 gm of U-235 is loaded. Over a
period of 1 year taking in account a total of 10 weeks shutdown
time, the reactor requires an average of 14 reloads of fuel elements
and 7 reloads of control rods. The annual requirement is therefore
56 times 200 gm elements and 7 times 135 gm control rods giving a
total of 12.145 kg of U-235 contained in 13.494 Kg uranium at 90%
enriched.



68



SAFARI-I RESEARCH REACTOR

The following is a list of shipments of highly enriched
uranium supplied to South Africa for the operation of the
SAFARI-I research reactor. All material was supplied in the
form of finished fuel elements by the fabricator. Material
supplied by the UKAEA was of U.S. origin, originally shipped
to the U.K. specifically for fabrication into SAFARI-I
elements. Its subsequent transfer from the U.K. to South
Africa was authorized before the fact by the U.S.



DATE



U



U-235



Feb


65


4.315


3.874


May


65


3.446


3.096


Oct


67


2.526


2.273


Nov


67


8.299


7.469


Dec


67


2.541


2.286


Dec


69


7.558


6.802


June


70


5.767


5.190


Dec


70


.975


.878


July


71


13.334


12.001


Sept


71


.663


.596


May


72


.971


.874


Dec


72


4.641


4.177


June


73


2.139


1.925


Aug


73


3.167


2.850


Apr


73


.300


.270


Oct


73


3.089


2.780


Jan


74


5.217


4.696


Apr


74


3.691


3.322


May


74


3.092


2.782


June


74


3.530


3.177


Nov


74


4.299


4.006


Dec


74


3.437


3.203


Mar


75


3.444


3.209



FABRICATOR/SHIPPER



Babcoc

Babcoc

UKAEA,
ii


k & Wilcox

k & Wilcox

Harwell,
it


U.K.
ii


ii




it


ii


ii




ii


ii


it




it


ii


it




ti


it


ii




ii


ii


ii




it


it


ii




it


ii


ii




n


n


ii




ii


n


ii




ii


n


ii




n


it


it




ii


ii


ii




ii


it


it




n


ii


it




ii


it


it




n


ii



U.S. Nuclear, Inc,
•i ii it



TOTAL



90.441



81.736



Less Returns (34.251) (28.154)
Less Burnup (11.473) (13.897)
thru 12/31/73



Less Burnup
12/31/73 to
4/30/75 at
0.333 kg/mo.



( 5.333) ( 6.460)



Inventory



39.384 kg. 33.225 kg,



69



SOUTH AFRICA

SAFARI- I RESEARCH REACTOR



The following information has been supplied by U.S. Nuclear, Inc.,
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, the firm holding contracts with the South
Africa Atomic Energy Board to supply fuel elements for the South
Africa SAFARI-I research reactor.



One order from South Africa is:

52 elements containing 200 grams U-235 ea. 93. 157,
8 elements containing 135 grams U-235 ea. 93. 15%



Total Order: Approximately 12.411 Kgs U