United States. Dept. of State. Office of Public Co.

Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 22, Apr- Jun 1950) online

. (page 50 of 116)
Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 22, Apr- Jun 1950) → online text (page 50 of 116)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook

the government of such country would give im-
meduitc consideration to the representations of
the other. If satisfactory settlement were not
possible, the article provides for an arbitral tri-
bunal. The particular dispute envisaged by the
article related to possible future increase in the
diversion of Lake Michigan waters through the
Chicago Drainage Canal. The issue as to the
Chicago Draining Canal was settled by the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Illinois,
in April 1030, which enjoined the objectionable
diversion. The international Joint Commission
has complete jurisdiction over diversions of
boundary waters in general, and both countries
have regarded with satisfaction the exercise of
that jurisdiction by the Commission. Because of
these facts, it is believed that this provision for a
special arbitral tribunal is unnecessary.

Added Provision for Tolls

The present legislation also adds a provision
that is not contained in the 1041 agreement,
namely, a provision for tolls, or the self-liquida-
tion of the new navigation portion of the project
through the collection of charges on shipping
which uses the new seaway facilities. The resolu-
tion provides that the President shall negotiate
a further agreement with the Government of
Canada defining, within limits also stated, the
rates of charges to be levied for the use of the sea-
way facilities. This new subject matter has been
discussed with the Canadian Government, and we
have been informed that "the Canadian Govern-
ment is prepared to agree to the principle of
making the St. Lawrence Seaway self-liquidating
by means of toll charges, subject, however, to the
conclusion of arrangements satisfactory to both
governments for the implementation of this prin-
ciple." The Government of Canada has been
fully advised as to the provisions of the present
legislation, including both the deletions from
and the addition to the agreement of 1041. This
Government has no reason to believe that satis-
factory agreement cannot be worked out on these
matters, and I am confident that this will be done.

I have not stressed the many economic benefits
that will accrue to the United States from this
project. That is not my role. I do wish to say,
however, that I believe these benefits are of suffi-
cient importance to warrant the contemplated ex-
penditures at this time. The creation of a great
inland waterway would enable goods originating

May 15, 1950


in the midcontinent area, shared by both Canada
and the United States, to be shipped to European
markets at reduced cost. It would make possible
the shipment of iron ore from the Quebec-Labra-
dor area of Canada. The low-cost power provided
would materially reduce the acute shortage in both
northeastern United States and southeastern

Both the seaway and power developments would
enhance the defense potential of Canada and the
United States. This was pointed out by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1946. In May 1947, the Perma-
nent Joint Board on Defense, United States-
Canada, of which I was a member, said :

The Board considered the significance of the St.
Lawrence Seaway Project from the point of view of the
joint defense of the United States and Canada. It was
recognized that the completion of a deepwater navigation
route from the sea to the heart of the continent would
provide additional facilities for the movement of ships

and essential supplies in wartime and would also make
possible the construction of oceangoing vessels in inland
areas. Furthermore, the new source of power made avail-
able by the St. Lawrence project would greatly increase
the defense potential of tlie two countries. It is, there-
fore, the view of the Board that the early completion of
this long-delayed enterprise on a cooperative basis satis-
factory to both Governments would directly contribute to
the security of the North American Continent.

The prosperity of the United States and the ability
to arm for our own defense has been a result of
the development of our natural resources. The
long-overdue development of one of the world's
greatest waterways and power sources by Canada
and the United States will further expand the
economies of both countries, thus increasing our
joint peacetime prosperity and the ability to de-
fend ourselves successfully.

I urge the Committee to report the resolution

Nonintervention and Collective Responsibility in the Americas

hy Edward G. Miller^ Jr., Assistant Secretary of State ^

I mean to address myself this evening to certain
basic features of our inter-American policy and
to deal with them in rather broad historic terms.
We have to keep in mind the historical perspective
when we are dealing with international policy, or
we cannot possibly maintain the consistency and
clarity that are essential to its development. To
the extent that a foreign policy is truly a national
policy, it is, in its essence, traditional. It repre-
sents the attitude of a whole nation as it has been
forged over the generations, as it has been ex-
pressed in the words and actions of successive ad-
ministrations, and as it has been applied to the
solution of successively new international prob-
lems. We have such a national policy in the inter-
American field, and it is this policy that I shall
examine this evening.

Monroe Doctrine in Force

In his proclamation of what later came to be
known as the "Monroe Doctrine," President Mon-
roe declared that the political system of the powers
in the Old World was essentially different from
that of America, and "that we .should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to
any portions of this Hemisphere, as dangerous to

■ Address made before the Pan American Society of New
England, Boston, Mass., on Apr. 26, 1050, and released to
the press on the same date.

our peace and safety." We are no longer con-
cerned today with the political system of the Holy
Alliance, based on monarchy and the exploitation
of peoples kept in colonial servitude. We are con-
cerned, however, with the alien political system
of Communist Russia, based as it is on totalitarian
dictatorship and the enslavement of populations
at home and abroad. The Monroe Doctrine has
not lost its meaning with the passage of a century
and a quarter, for, today, we consider any attempt
to extend the Conmiunist system to any portions
of this hemisphere as "dangerous to our peace and
safety." This attitude is still basic to our policy.

The enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine was
never purely a military problem, since the im-
perialism that it proscribed could realize its ob-
jectives by other than military means. Extreme
weakness in the political and social structures of
small states has always made them vulnerable to
diplomatic pressures and to penetration by politi-
cal and economic means. Such internal weakness
characterized many of the Latin American states
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. It invited, and at times seemed to justify, the
interference of overseas powers. To forestall that
interference, which would have been contrary to
the Monroe Doctrine, the United States felt con-
strained (o undertake certain protective interven-
tions in the Caribbean in tlie first quarter of this

It is easy for us today, in the light of present


Department of State Bulletin

thought and prosoiit oirciiinstances, to assume a
high moral attitude toward those protective in-
terventions and to regard our statesmen of those
times as guilty of political iunnorality. We
should do thcin the justice, however, of appreciat-
ing some of the hard facts that they themselves
had no clioico but to appreciate.

The Monroe Doctrine was, of course, not de-
signed to exclude the legitimate business interests
of Old AVorld powers from the hemisphere.
Those interests, and the nationals who represented
them, were, under the law of nations, entitled to
certain protection by the states in which they
operated. There are standards of civilization
and civilized treatment that all states are obliged
to maintain. All states, through their govern-
ments, have this responsibility. The internal
weakness of certain Caribbean states a generation
ago, manifesting itself in utterly chaotic condi-
tions, sometimes made them unable to sustain this
responsibility and so confronted United States
policy with a serious dilemma. Rightly or
wrongly, but certainh^ with reluctance, the United
States finally felt itself obliged to intervene tem-
porarily in certain extreme cases for the restora-
tion of order. Its purpose was the exclusion of
European states that might themselves intervene
to redress their just grievances and enforce the
standards of behavior on which the international
world was agreed. The danger was that, having
once intervened, the European states might make
their own interventions permanent.

Whatever may be said against our protective
interventions of these times, they accomplished
an objective equally vital to all the states of the
Western Hemisphere. They played their part in
bringing about the situation that we have today,
in whicli no American state has become the pro-
tectorate of a foreign power, in which the weakest
are free to enjoy their sovereignty along with the
strongest. For the United States itself — and his-
tory has proved this — had and has no desire to
establish protectorates of its own. We regarded
our interventions as necessary evils to be ended
as soon as circumstances allowed us to end them.
It is fair to ask what other great power in the
history of the world has made such a record of
willing forebearance.

Alternative to Intervention

No American state was more anxious than the
United States to find a practicable alternative to
the interventions of the early twentieth century,
bearing in mind the necessity of maintaining the
independence of the hemisphere. We can now
see, in the long perspective of events, what form
that alternative took. After a period of un-
certainty, it presented itself in the gradual as-
sumption by the American states, as a regional
community, of a common responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and order in the hemisphere
and the defense of its independence.

May 75, 1950

The record of history does not, on its surface,
show the close relationship between the non-
intervention agreement of the American states and
the assumption by tlicin of collective responsibil-
ity. To see the relationship, however, you have
only to look closely at the logic and at the coinci-
dence of events. In 1933, at the Montevideo con-
ference, the United States, mindful of its
responsibilities rather than desirous of conquest,
felt compelled to make some reservation in agree-
ing to the doctrine of nonintcrvent ion. In 1!);^G, at
Buenos Aires, it accepted that doctrine unreserv-
edly when it was presented jointly with another
instrument in which the American governments
provided for consultation and collaboration of
their 21 nations in the event of any act sus-
ceptible of disturbing the peace of America. In
the years since Buenos Aires, the American states
have defined tlieir responsibility more circum-
stantially and have greatly strengthened the or-
ganization of their connnunity for meeting it. In
the treaty of Rio de Janeiro, they now have a com-
mon defense pact and procedures for carrying out
a common defense against any aggression or threat
of aggression, whether fi-om overseas or from one
of their own number. If the circimistances that
led to the protective interventions by the United
States should arise again today, the organized
community of American states would be faced
with the responsibility that the United States had
once to assume alone.

Now, all this seems very clear and simple to me.
Like so much else in international ali'airs, however,
it has been the subject of serious confusion in the
use of words. Some people have gone to the dic-
tionary, instead of to the historical context, for
their definition of "intervention" and have con-
sequently concluded that any official correspond-
ence with another state about some action on its
part constitutes a violation of the nonintervention
commitment. Others have said that, on the con-
trary, the absence of any manifestation of official
concern with afi'airs of another state may consti-
tute a negative intervention that violates the
commitment. By debating such propositions we
can, in time, make what is really very simple seem
unutterably complicated and abstruse.

The worst confusion, however, has been that by
which the action of the internatiional community
in the discharge of its collective responsibility has,
on occasion, been identified with the word "inter-
vention." At Montevideo and again at Buenos
Aires, "intervention" had been carefully identified
with the unilateral action of a single state. The
Montevideo convention said: "No state has the
right to intervene in the internal or external af-
faii"s of another." The Buenos Aires protocol
said : "The High Contracting Parties declare in-
admissible the intervention of any one of them
... in the internal or external aft'airs of any
other of the Parties." It is true that the Bogota
charter of the Organization of American States
says, "no state or group of states has the right to


intervene . . ." but an exception is made in the
case of "measures adopted for tlie maintenance of
peace and security in accordance witli existing
treaties . . . ." The fact is that the doctrine of
nonintervention never did proscribe the assump-
tion by the organized community of a legitimate
concern with any circumstances that threatened
the common welfare. On the contrary, it made
the possibility of such action imi)erative. Such
a collective undertaking, so far from represent-
ing intervention, is the alternative to intervention.
It is the corollary of nonintervention.

Intervention was repugnant to the people of
the United States as of all the American countries.
Its occasional practice, moreover, made it impos-
sible for us to put our relations with the other
American states on a footing that reflected the
community of our interests. It actually prevented
the development of a community responsibility
and a community organization for tlie mainte-
nance of peace and security. Under all these cir-
cumstances, it died a universally unlamented
death. We are well rid of it today.

faith in them, believing that the time is well past
when it had to look to itself alone for the defense
of a hemisphere, the independence of which is
essential to its own independence. The last war
justified that faith. It is even more justified by
subsequent developments culminating in the pur-
poseful way in which tlie Council of the Organ-
ization of American States, acting on the terms of
the Rio treaty, has come to grips with the recent
threat of impending conflict in the Caribbean.

The American states have made and continue
to make their contribution to international co-
operation and peace. The world has drawn on
their experience and their example for its most
constructive attempts at the establishment of a
world-wide order. If all of us continue purpose-
fully along the path on which we have set our
feet, the historians of a future age may have reason
to say that the subversive challenge of com-
munism, instead of weakening the hemisphere,
strengthened it in the unity of its purpose and
enabled it to triumph over its conmion problems.

The Situation in the Hemisphere Today

The basic situation in the hemisphere today is
this. The 21 American states together face the
challenge of Communist political aggression
against tlie hemisphere. This aggression bears
directly on the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine,
which is as much our national policy today as it
ever was. It bears directly on the purpose of the
treaty of Rio de Janeiro, which in some of its
aspects represents a IMonroe Doctrine of our inter-
American community. The ability of our com-
munity to meet that challenge depends on its own
inward strength and, of course, on tlie inwai-d
strengtli of its individual meml)ers. By this, 1 do
not mean just military strength or especially mili-
tary strength. I mean primarily moral and polit-
ical strength. Govermnents should be self-reliant
and able to command the su])poi-t of their pcnple
so that they can maintain intrin.sic order and deal
effectively with Comnninist attempts at subver-
sion. They should be tmcomiiromiscd in their
determination lo achieve this end. States that are
strong in this sense will almost surely const it \ite a
strong and (effective I'egional coniinunity, alert to
the conmion responsibilities, and able to maintain
a peaceful oi-der among it.s members. Such a
community, in turn, liy acting intelligently and
courageously, can {jroniote the jiolitical and social
health of its niembeis and make the hemisi)hei-e
impervious to clandestine Communist penetration.
That is its basic, i-esponsibility, and the liasic re-
sponsibility of its members.

The United States is conunitted to this ]iui'pose
and these means for its attainment. It places its

Ecuadoran Radio Director
To Visit in U.S.

Luis Ferando Ajora of Quito, who is director
of Casa de la Cultura, the only radio station in
Ecuador to devote itself exclusively to cultural
subjects, arrived in Washington on March 31 to
spend a short period of time. He has been
awarded a grant-in-aid by the Dejiartment of
State for a period of 3 montlis to enable him to
visit the United States for the purpose of observ-
ing methods of script writing, announcing tech-
nifjues, and program direction employed by com-
mercial radio systems and the Voice of America,
and to confer with colleagues in his field.

Burmese Journalist Visits U.S.

U Ba Kin, managing editor of the Ilantha-
■iiuiddi/ J'nxs of Rangoon, Burma, rei-ently arrived
in Washington to begin a ;i-m()nth visit in the
United States for the purpose of observing various
newsjjapers and studying welfare methods. His
visit has been made possible through a grant-in-aid
awarded by the Department of Stale under the
])i'ograni of I'xchange of persons.

In addition to visiting various United States
newsi)a]ieis. Mr. Ba Kin will inspect a number of
printing estalilishmcnts in this country and will
visit organizations six-cializing in social welfare
and rural reconstruction.


Department of State Bulletin

OAS Decisions on Cases Presented Under Rio Treaty
by Haiti and Dominican Republic

The Council of the Organization of American States, at
a special meeting held on January 0, 1950, took copcnizance
of botli the Note prfseutetl i)y the Delegation of Haiti,
dated January 3, 1950, wliich requested that the Organ
of Consultation be convoked in conformity with the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and the Note
presented at that meeting l)y the Delegation of the Domin-
ican Republic. At that meeting the Council decided to
convoke the Organ of Consultation as provided in the
aforesaid Treaty ; to constitute itself provisionally as
Organ of Consultation; and to appoint a Committee to
investigate on the spot the events and antecedents men-
tioned in the Notes of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
The Committee, which was composed of Ambassadors
Jos^ A. Jlora (Uruguay), Chairman; Paul C. Daniels
(United States) ; Guillermo Gutierrez (Bolivia) ; Ed-
uardo Zuleta Angel (Colombia) ; and Minister Alfonso
Moscoso (Ecuador), submitted a report giving the results
of its work to the Council at the meeting of March 13,
1950. At tlie April 8 meeting, the Council adopted the
following decisions :

The Council of the Organization of American States,
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation.

Having seen the Report presented by the Committee
which investigated the facts and antecedents to which
the Note of the Haitian Government of January 3, 1950,
refers ; and

Considering :

That the Organ of Consultation, convoked January 6,
1950, in conformity with Article 6 of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, should take the steps it
considers most advisable for the maintenance of the peace
and security of the Continent,


1. That the facts verified by the Investigating Commit-
tee, from among those charged against the Government
of the Dominican Republic, are contrary to norms con-
tained in several inter-American instruments, such as the
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed at
Montevideo in 1933 ; the Additional Protocol Relative to
Non-intervention, signed at Buenos Aires in 1936, the
principle of whicli is also contained in Article 15 of the
Charter of the Organization of American States, as well
as in other provisions that govern the peaceful relations
of the Members of the Organization ;

2. That the danger to international peace that might
arise from the events that have affected relations l)etween
Haiti and the Dominican Republic has fortunately been
dispelled ; but that, because of their gravity, those events
might have very seriously disturbed American solidarity ;
and that, if repeated, they would give occasion for appli-
cation of the procedures of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance in order to protect the principle
of non-intervention and to ensure the inviolability or the

Editor's Note: This summary of chapter III is the
second of a series.

integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or the politi-
cal independence of any American State against aggres-
sion on the part of any State or group of States ;

3. That, on the other hand, the laws that have been
passed in the Dominican Republic to repeal the war
powers granted by its Congress to the Executive Power,
and to prevent subversive activities on the part of po-
litical refugees in its territory, express a clear intention to
maintain peace, and show its disposition that, in the
future, those events will not be repeated ; and


1. To request the Government of the Dominican Re-
public to take immediate and effective measures to pre-
vent government officials from tolerating, instigating, en-
couraging, aiding, or fomenting subversive or seditious
movements against other Governments ;

2. To request the Dominican Government to comply
strictly with the Joint Declaration of June 9, 1949, the
observance of which is equally the responsibility of the
Haitian Government ;

3. To point out to both Governments the advisability of
strengthening their relations on the basis of a bilateral
treaty inspired in the aims of the Habana Convention of
1928 on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of
Civil Strife, and also, taking into account the special
geographical situation of Haiti and the Dominican Re-
public, the advisability of incorporating in the agreement
or treaty that they sign special provisions to prevent the
inhabitants, national or foreign, of each country, from
taking part in activities of any kind capable of disturbing
the internal order of the neighboring country ;

4. To point out to the Governments of Haiti and the
Dominican Republic the advisability of reaching a bi-
lateral agreement to deal with the problems connected
with tlie employment of Haitian workers in the Domini-
can Republic ;

5. The request the Governments of Haiti and the Do-
minican Republic to make every effort, within the limits of
their respective constitutional powers, to avoid the continu-
ation of any systematic and hostile propaganda, expressed
through any medium whatsoever, against each other, or
against other American countries and their respective
Governments ;

6. Finally, inspired by the basic principle of American
solidarity, to express its fervent hope that both sister Re-
publics, once the present ditficulties liave been removed,
will find means of reestablishing, as soon as possible, tlie
good relations that should always exist among all the
members of the American community.


The Council of the Organization of American States,
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation,

Considering :

That the Report submitted by the Investigating Com-
mittee which was created by the Organ of Consultation
in its Resolution of January 6, 10,50, clearly establishes
that in the past there did exist, and that in some respects

May 15, 7950


there still persists, an abnormal situation constituting a
tlireat to tlie established Institutions of the nations in
the Caribbean area and an obstacle to the maintenance of
normal friendly relations among certain States located

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 22, Apr- Jun 1950) → online text (page 50 of 116)