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ence of the three Allied High Commissioners in
whom the three Foreign ilinisters are happy again
to express their full confidence.

2. The Allies are resolved to pursue their aim
laid down in the Washington agreement of April
1949, and reaflSrmed at Petersburg that Germany
shall reenter progressively the community of free
peoples of Europe. When that situation has been

May 22, J 950

fully reached she would be liberated from con-
trols to which she is still subject and accorded her
sovereignty to the maximum extent compatible
with the basis of the occupation regime. This
regime is imposed on the Germans and on the
Allies by the consequences of the division of Gei"-
many and of the international position. Until
this situation is modified it must be retained in
accordance with the common interests of Germany
and of Europe.

The Western powers desire to see the pace of
progress toward this end as rapid as possible.
Progress will depend upon the degree of confident
and frank cooperation displayed by the govern-
ment and the people of the Federal Republic. Itv
the first place the pace will be determined by the
extent to which the Allies can be satisfied that
their own security is safeguarded by the develop-
ment in Germany of a desire for peace and
friendly association with themselves. In the sec-
ond place the pace will be set by the rate at which
Germany advances toward a condition in which
true democracy governs and the just liberties of
the individual are assured. Therefore, the West-
ern powers wish to emphasize most strongly that
the natural desire of the German people to secure
relaxation of controls and the restoration of the
sovereignty of their country depends for its satis-
faction only upon the efforts of the German peo-
ple themselves and of their government. They
earnestly trust that the Federal Republic will ful-
fill in this respect the hopes placed in the wisdom
of her people and her leaders. Meanwhile, the
High Commissioners in exercising the powers re-
served to them will continue to place their main
emphasis upon essential elements of securitj' and
fundamental democratic issues of real importance.

3. In view of the continued refusal of the Soviet
Government to permit the inhabitants of their
zone of occupation to rejoin their fellow country-



men in a democratic and united Germany, it has
not been possible, and will not be as long as this
Soviet policy persists, to proceed to the conclu-
sion of a treaty of peace with Germany. The
Ministers accoi'dingly agi'eed to set up a study
group in London to undertake the necessary pre-
paratory work to enable the occupation statute
to be reviewed at the appointed time and to make
reconmiendations for eliminating the major prac-
tical inconveniences arising in the countries con-
cerned from the state of war, on the understanding
that in the present situation of Europe supreme
authority must remain in the hands of the allied

4. Wliile retaining the framework outlined
above the Allies intend to give Germany the possi-
bility of developing freely, while at the same time
safeguarding the possibility of peaceful reunifi-
cation of Germany, which remains the ultimate
object of their policy. The three Governments
reaffirm the offers which were formulated during
the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers
last June, and express the hope that the necessary
conditions for the establishment of a government
for all Germany may be achieved which would
guarantee to all Germans respect for their laws
and fundamental liberties and they have agreed
upon the conditions which are necessary in their
opinion for this purpose.

Acting Secretary Webb

Reports to the American People ^

In reporting to you on the work of the State
Department, let me say first that the aim of our
foreign policy, today, is exactly what George
Washington and Thomas Jefferson believed it
ought to be — to make us happy at home and re-
spected abroad. We have learned from two world
wars and one great depression that we cannot be
happy at home if men and women in other lands
are losing their fight for freedom and oppor-
tunity, and justice, and religion, and even for de-
cent food and shelter. We also sense that we may
be the next to suffer these losses. We know that
we cannot be respected abroad unless we are a
forceful, determined, and vigorous democracy,
fully prepared to defend what we stand for. We
intend to be just that.

During the late war, we cooperated with many
friends and allies in the complete defeat of a

' Made nt the National Democratic Conference and
Jefferson .TulMlee at ChieaKO on May 14, 1950, and released
to the press on the same date.

virulent combination of aggressor nations which
started out to conquer the world. Since the war,
we have continued to cooperate generously with
every nation which would extend the hand of
friendship and work for a peaceful world.

But, all of this effort has not brought us peace.
Nor is it likely to unless we press forward with
increased vigor and a unity of purpose that will
be clear to all the world.


It is because the rulei'S of one nation have ruth-
lessly suppressed the liberties of its citizens and
are directing a world-wide campaign of hate, con-
spiracy, violence, and aggression. This campaign
has already snuffed out the liberties of hundreds
of millions of human beings. It would have en-
slaved hundreds of millions more but for the
things we have done to stem this red tide.

^^Hiat have we done?

First of all, we have broken the shackles of
isolationism and have joined in creating the
United Nations which, despite all efforts to un-
dermine it, we shall continue to work through and

Then, there is the Marshall Plan, which has
breathed new life and hope into Western Europe.
There is the Truman Doctrine, which has saved
the independence of Greece and Turkey and neigh-
boring nations of the Near East. There is the
Rio pact, and the North Atlantic pact, and the
Military Assistance Program — all helping to
unite free people in both hemispheres for the com-
mon defense.

All this, and much more, we have accomplished
since the war. Never before in history have there
been 5 years of such solid, constructive, and, we
believe, enduring work for peace and human bet-
terment on such a gigantic scale. And let me
say that no wild and irresponsible attacks, either
abroad or at home, will divert us from forging
ahead with this vast program. We turn with
courage and confidence to face the future.

And now, I bring you a message from the man
who, under the President, is our chief builder of
the peace. It is from London. It says:

Today, the eyes of the old world are turned to the new
world. You who meet in Chicago with the leaders In our
Government are citizens of a nation which in war has
brought all its strength to tight for peace and which now
brings it to work for peace. We do not stand alone.
The nations outside the Iron Curtain are with us, and we
with them. Millions of men and women behind the Iron
Curtain are with us, and we with them. They know, as
we know, that mankind is not doomed to live forever in
fear, in poverty, and in chains. They know, as we know,
that all peoples can be free, and propserous, and secure.

Hut they know, as we know, that freedom, and pros-
])erity, and security are not easily won. The price is
high — high in worldly goods and higher still in the wisdom
and determination that it demands of us. But, I believe
that we will pay that price and that all free peoples will
pay it.

If we do, we can build a peaceful world on the wreckage
of the past. With God's help we will do it.

That message is signed "Dean Acheson."


Department of State Bulletin

The Problem of International Organization

Among Countries of Europe and the North Atlantic Area

Address by Secretary Acheson '

Mr. Chairman, Your Grace, Your Excellen-
cies, My Lords, and Gentlemen : I am deeply
grateful for the welcome you have given me, a
welcome which has been extended to so many
American visitoi-s who have been privileged to en-
joy the hospitality and the company of the So-
ciety of Pilgrims in this city.

The Society now looks back on a life of nearly
half a centur}'. Since these dinners began, they
have been the occasion of many statements and
discussions concerning the relations between our
two peoples. In the past, tliis subject presented
itself largely as a problem of the relationship be-
tween just the two of us. It was customary ix) in-
dulge in what might be called joint introspection,
■with emphasis on the solidarity of our relation-
ship. Philosophic, and sometimes witty, refer-
ences were made to tlie asperities of our particu-
lar family relationship which often make it in-
comprehensible to others.

Today, we meet in other circumstances. This
strictly bilateral nature of our relationship has
been broadened to include the problems of a wider
community, of which we are both a part. Our
own prospects for the future are deeply entwined
in the fortunes of this wider community. But it
is perhaps useful for us, and healthy for our re-
lationship to each other, that this is so. We are
now forced as a regular procedure to direct our
eyes outward — as we have heretofore done spo-
radically — to the requirements of a common prob-
lem. As time goes by, I am sure that the deeper
significance of this association in a common pur-
pose will make more apparent the lack of real
substance in many of those things which have
troubled the surface of our relationship in the

But this also requires from us, as well as from
all members of the larger community to which we

' Made before the Society of Pilgrims, London, May 10,
1950, and released to the press on the same date.

belong, a deeper understanding not only of the
nature of our common problems but also of the
kind of action necessary to meet them. In the
complexity of organization which characterizes
modern life, both national and international, there
is great danger that the simple and basic con-
siderations may be lost sight of and that the instru-
ments may come to obscure, and eventually
replace, the purposes they were designed to serve.

Problem of International Organization in Europe

We are enga":ed, at this moment, in work-
ing on the problem of international organiza-
tion among the non-Communist countries of
Europe ancl the North Atlantic area. The For-
eign Secretaries of the North Atlantic Treaty
states will sit down together next week to decide
what actions are necessary to advance this project.

As I understand it, the purpose we are pursu-
ing in these efforts is to make certain that the
great differences which have wracked the world in
recent years do not lead to the catastrophe of a
third world war. We want to assure to those
peoples of Europe who have retained their na-
tional independence a prospect of progi-ess and
stability — even, if necessary, in a divided Europe.
At the same time, we want to see to it that every-
thing is done on our side to preserve the possibil-
ity of eventually overcoming this unfortunate
division and reunifying the peoples of the entire
European family.

I repeat : our purpose is peace, not war. And
what folly it is to believe that the prospects of
peace can be enhanced by means which exclude the
vigorous strengthening of Europe and, indeed, of
the Western community of which it is a part.

Let me make clear that, for our part, these are
our only motives. We have no interest in limited
international organization in the Atlantic and Eu-
ropean areas other than the preservation of peace,
the assurance of happier conditions to the free

May 22, 1950


peoples of Europe despite a divided continent,
and the cultivation of those values and institutions
which will be necessary for the complete restora-
tion of Europe. In our minds, these purposes do
not weaken in any way — on the contrary they
strengthen — the efficacy of the broader frame-
work of cooperation which we have at hand in the
United Nations.

We are not urging anyone to join any inter-
national grouping for any purpose of our own
which is not supported by the recognized self-
interest of every other one of the countries con-
cerned. We have no interest in these arrange-
ments except as means to an end which we know
to be a common end. We have no wish for war
or for national slavery or for the perpetuation of
a divided Europe.

We are fully aware of the power and legitimacy
of national tradition and feeling in this part of
the world. We are aware of the value which all
people attach to that which is uniquely and tra-
ditionally theirs. We know how much the
peoples of this area have contributed to the ad-
vance of civilization. We know that this contri-
bution results in large measure from the very fact
of their diversity and the interplay of their na-
tional personalities. We have no desire to see
these things weakened or disrupted.

Economic Arrangements

We are also aware how important are the pecul-
iar economic difficulties with which the nations
of Western Europe and the North Atlantic have
been grappling in recent years. We know that
circumstances have compelled them to approach
tliese economic problems within the national
framework. Each has done this in accordance
with his own necessities and national predilec-
tions. The margins of economic strength have
been so narrow that nations have been unable to
move rapidly in the direction of international ar-
rangements which involved for them heavy risks
and uncertainties. We have full sympathy for
these things and no desire to urge our friends into
the impossible, the unnecessary, or the unwelcome.

But two facts stand out in our minds which
seem to us to be incontrovertible realities of our
time. Both call for accommodations on the part
of all of us which may well conflict with our
habitual feelings and desires.

The first is that a variety of causes has led to
imbalance in our international economic relation-
ships which we have all been trying hard to over-
come. We have had a very encouraging measure
of success thus far. But the efforts we have made
to date will not bring entire success. The Mar-
shall Plan was designed to correct a portion of
the causes of this disbalance, and it is successfully
fulfilling this function ; but another portion

If this remaining portion of the problem could

be overcome by individual national effort and
without cooperative international arrangements,
no one would be happier than ourselves. But if
that is not the case — and it is our analysis that
it is not — , then, some sacrifice of purely national
interest will be unavoidable for all of us. We
must all accustom ourselves to that thought.

Need for United Germany

The second factor which we must not lose sight
of is that we have in our midst the people of West-
ern Germany. For better or for worse, inevitably
they are a part of our company. And Germany is
in a poor position to face the problems of the
future wholly independently and in the national
framework alone. There is a peculiar need
for closer and more organic contact of Germany
with its Western neighbors. The need arises,
first, from the unfortunate split of Germany into
East and West, caused by the policy of the Soviet
Union, then, from the great pressure of population
in the Western zones and the natural insecurity
and unhappiness of millions of homeless people,
and, finally, from all the tragic experiences which
have torn German society so violently out of the
general context of European society in recent

We would not be realists if we did not recog-
nize that no single country can or will take upon
itself the exclusive burden of this reintroduction
of Germany into community life. The reestab-
lishment of Germany in the family of Western
civilization must be a cooperative enterprise, in
which the risks and responsibilities are shared
by all. No harder enterprise than this has ever
been undertaken jointly by a group of nations.
No enterprise has been more heavily encumbered
with fears and sensitivities and divergencies of
outlook. But it is a problem dictated to us by the
demands of the times.

I do not mean to imply that this is a problem for
the non-Germans alone or that Western Germany
may stand as a passive spectator of its own fate.
On the contrary, if this process is to be successful,
the Germans themselves must be prepared to ac-
cept their full measure of responsibilities and the
full measure of what may appear to them as risks.
They have tasted in the past — some innocently,
some not innocently — the fruits of the violent and
extreme methods of national self-assertion. The
bankruptcy of those methods is tragically ap-

Today, German national purposes can be served
and a hopeful future secured to the German people
only by sharing in those slower and less dramatic
devices of forbearance, understanding, and re-
straint, which begin in victors and vanquished
alike with a sense of national humility in the face
of the great catastrophes of our times. If the
Germans approach us in this spirit and if we,
on our part, remain considerate of the world's


Department of State Bulletin

need for German energies, talents, and enthusiasm
in the preservation of civilization, then, I am sure
that our purpose will be accomplished.

Sacrifices in Approaching Mutual Problems

These are two main considerations which force
us to apply ourselves to the study of further pos-
sibilities of international cooperation. We hope
that these considenit ions, whether or not they com-
mand agreement, will be respected here as the
reflection of an attitude on our part which views
the problems of the entire Western community
as our own and which is not motivated by narrow
national purposes. The guaranty of this lies, I
think, in our own awareness that such an approach
to our uuitual problems will call upon us in the
United States to make sacrifices no less disagi'ee-
able and no less difficult for ourselves than those
which will be called for by any of the countries on
this side of the Atlantic.

In the past months, some of you may have felt
that a strange and confusing dissonance has
crowded the trans-Atlantic frequencies from
America. And so it has. But, if I might hazard
an opinion about my own country, I should say
that the dissonance flows from the very awareness
that difficult decisions must be made and is a part
of the process of making them.

The first act of the Pilgrim on approaching the
shores of Massachusetts was to sign the Mayflower
Compact under which they combined themselves
into a "civill body politick." The entire male
population met in a body which constituted a Gen-
eral Court and was the source of all local political
power and judicial decisions.

Political Institutions of the U. S.

Today, the political methods, customs, and
mores under which the United States operates de-
rive directly from this Mayflower Compact and
the familiar New England town meetings which
grew from it. Quantity and size have had their
effect. The klieg lights, the newsreel cameras,
the radio, and the problems of the daily press have
sometimes obscured, sometimes distorted, the
original pattern. But, the tradition is there.

In keeping with this tradition, everyone is en-
titled to — and everyone has — his "say" as a pre-
requisite to being bound by a decision of the
majority. And this right to speak out is not re-
lated to position, knowledge, or wisdom. We re-
sent — and bitterly resent— the attempt to shut
anyone off.

The result seems to be — and sometimes is — con-
fusion and dissonance. And, here, geography
combines with tradition to make the workings of
our democracy even more bewildering to our
friends overseas. For we are, in truth, a fed-

erated half continent. The very diversity and
strength of our states and their sundivisions make
their representatives less amenable to party dis-
cipline than is familiar elsewhere. Ana, so, there
are not two opinions of two parties but numy
opinions of many individuals. But when the
American people reach a decision, their repre-
sentatives respond and action follows quickly.

These political institutions of ours, puzzling
as they are to others, are among the most durable
in the World. They have adapted themselves for
175 years to political upheaval, social change, sci-
entific revolution, the challenge of size, the test
of M-ar — and all without loss of our liberties.

Today, democratic institutions are facing per-
haps the greatest test of all— in many ways more
dangerous, more perplexing, more demanding
than any in the past. I have no doubt, no fear,
that in our own way we shall meet that test too.

Aid to Southeast Asia

Statement by Acting Secretary Webl>
[Released to the press May ll'\

A special survey mission, headed by R. Allen
Griffin, has just returned from Southeast Asia
and reported on economic and technical assistance
needed in that area. Its over-all recommenda-
tions for the area are modest and total in the
neighborhood of 60 million dollars. The Depart-
ment is working on plans to implement that pro-
gram at once.

Secretary Acheson on Monday at Paris cited
the urgency of the situation applying in the asso-
ciated states of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.
The Department is working jointly with ECA to
implement the economic and technical assistance
recommendations for Indochina as well as the
other states of Southeast Asia and anticipates
that this program will get underway in the im-
mediate future.

Military assistance for Southeast Asia is being
worked out by the Department of Defense in co-
operation with the Department of State, and the
details will not be made public for security

Military assistance needs will be met from the
President's emergency fund of 75 million dollars
provided under IMDAP for the general ai-ea of

Economic assistance needs will be met from the
ECA China Aid funds, part of which both Houses
of Congress have indicated will be made available
for the general area of China. Final legislative
action is still pending on this authorization but
is expected to be completed within the next week.

May 22, 1950


Emerging Structure of Collective Security Arrangements

hy Walter A. Surrey ^

It is our purpose now to examine the rea-
sons for our entering into collective security ar-
rangements, their objectives, and the manner in
which those objectives are to be achieved. By col-
lective security arrangements, we mean an asso-
ciation of countries who imdertake to improve
collectively their defensive strength and to meet
an armed attack against any one member by co-
ordinated action. By United States participation
in collective security arrangements, our traditional
policy of isolationism is now only of historical
significance, not of current application. Thus, in
two collective security arrangements, the Rio
Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, we have
committed ourselves to take action, including the
possible use of our military forces, should certain
countries be attacked.

The maintenance of our security is basic to our
participation in both the Eio and Atlantic Treaties
although they stem from different causes. The
emergence of the Rio pact represented a logical
step in the development of inter-American solidar-
itj' and cooperation. The Rio pact was envisioned
prior to the adoption of the United Nations Char-
ter. Indeed, the intention of the American states
to enter into such a regional arrangement was
largely responsible for the incorporation in the
United Nations Charter of chapter VIII, author-
izing regional arrangements, and article 51, recog-
nizing the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense against armed attack.

The Rio pact goes beyond what had been accom-
plished in previous inter-American agreements.
It defines the consequences to all signatoi'ies in
event of an armed attack from outside the region
against any signatory. The Rio pact also estab-
lishes the mechanisms and procedures for assur-
ing peaceful relations among the signatories

'An address made before the American Society of Inter-
national Law at Washington, D. C, on Apr. 27, 1950, and
released to the i) on tlie same date. Mr. Surrey is
Assistant Legal Advisor and Consultant to the Mutual
Defense Assistance Program.

themselves. Its implementation has been largely

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 22, Apr- Jun 1950) → online text (page 54 of 116)