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trying to sustain the status quo. For the United
States today confronts a world situation unparal-
leled in history. We find ourselves in the throes
of change more rapid and far-reaching than ever
before experienced. This is the nuclear era and
the jet and missile age. It is a time of exploding
populations, of liglitning communication, and of
the conquest of outer space.

All of these aspects of our era are the result of
forces deep in history that are continually evolv-
ing and in so doing pushing us on to new achieve-
ments, literally to new frontiers. These forces
respond in part to human direction and design ; in
part they seem to move on powerfully M'ith a
momentum of their own.

The world is being remade before our eyes. We,
with our wealth, our power, and our acknowledged
leadership in many fields, are being called upon
to play a major role in the task.

Central to our o^vn objectives is our national
security. The problem is not, however, simply
one of our own national defense in the traditional
sense, although this remains of critical importance
in an era of rapidly burgeoning superweapons.
Any quest for real national security today must
take into account the entire international scene.



' Address made before the 13th Annual Student Confer-
ence on United States Affairs at the U.S. Military Acad-
emy, West Point, N.Y., on Dec. 8 (press release 862).



Such a quest would indeed be futile if we con-
ceived of our own country merely as an island to
be fortified and defended in the midst of a hostile
world.

Perhaps the most significant revolution of our
era is that which is resulting in increased interde-
pendence among nations. The new forces that
have overleaped the oceans and penetrated the
hard shell of hitherto impregnable defenses know
nothing of national borders. In scores of ways the
life of our nation has become intermingled with
the life of other peoples in every quarter of the
globe.

Science and technology have swiftly brought
into being the physical reality of an international
community. Too often our thinking has lagged
behind this reality. We have tended to follow old
and familiar grooves of thinking with respect to
national security and foreign policy.

A New World Environment

In searching for a national strategy to meet the
requirements of this era, we must look out toward
the new world environment that is taking shape.
Here we see allies and adversaries, mature states
and peoples barely emerging into nationhood — all
moving forward at an unprecedented pace.

It is of crucial importance that we project our
power and influence into this emerging world com-
munity of peoples, that we attempt to shape it into
the sort of world order in wJiich we and other free
peoples can survive and thrive. The Sino-Soviet
powers are attempting to impose a universal design
upon all peoples, a design of coerced conformity.
Our interest and strategy demand that we foster
the growth of a pluralistic world in which free
nations may develop and flourish along their own
individual lines — make their own history and



Jonuory 22, ?962



131



choose their associations spontaneously as their
common interests dictate.

Thus the great issue of our times is between the
free nations on one hand and the Sino-Soviet
powers on the other as to how the world shall be
organized, as to what sort of international envi-
ronment shall come into being. Unless we can pre-
vail on this issue, our security will remain in
jeopardy and our future uncertain.

If we are to prevail we must establish a central
core of strength about which to build — a core
which will provide needed resources for the task
that lies ahead. The Communists profess to
possess such a core of their own in the heartland of
Eurasia. Even though rifts are showing in the
Sino-Soviet bloc which spans this heartland, their
power is great and we must not allow wishful
thinking to delude us into believing that this rift
offers us an easy way out.

Our best counterpoise to this power is what we
may term the Atlantic Community, linking the
free states of Europe with North America. Here
is already a closely knit association of nations pos-
sessing material and human resources far surpass-
ing those of the Soviet Union and its satellites,
and already having considerable cohesion.

But this by no means exhausts tlie collective re-
sources of the free world. Outside the Atlantic
Community are other groups of nations, more or
less closely associated, which have an important
role to play. All these groupings form the poten-
tial components of a worldwide community of free
nations.

Our problem, then, is to develop this free- world
community, witli tlie Atlantic association at its
core, so that its strength, prosperity, and attrac-
tive power will shape the world of the future —
rather than the Communist design of a world
state. Such a development would also contribute
to a stronger and more effective United Nations
and thus to the achievement of a broader world
community.

The potentialities of an Atlantic Community
are vast, tliough as yet very imperfectly realized.
Wliat are its historic foundations? Tliej' are two-
fold.

First, there has been a trend toward a tightly
integrated Europe.

Second, there has been, at the same time, a trend
toward a larger and looser Atlantic grouping.

The 18th to 20th centuries witnessed the eman-
cipation of the European empires in North and



South America, Asia, and Africa — for a time
slowly, but over the last half century at an ac-
celerating pace. Today the world teems with
newly emergent nations born of the old European
empires.

Europe also suffered shattering losses in two
world wars, lost most of her overseas investments,
and, as a result, experienced a drastic relative de-
cline in her world power position. There occurred
progressively a diffusion of power to other world
areas. Combined, the European powers were by
midcentury overshadowed to the east and west
by the Soviet and American superpowers.

But Europe was not ready to be counted out.
During the fifties Europe experienced a remark-
able recovery, demonstrating great vitality and
recuperative power. She progressed steadily to-
ward unity, toward realization of the "European
idea." She established new bonds to replace her
former colonial ties with her overseas territories.

For centuries the dream of unity had beguiled
European thinkers. There were many "plans" —
Sully's Grand Design, Penn's European Parlia-
ment, the schemes of Kant, St. Pierre, and others —
all of which came to naught. Following the dis-
astrous collapse of the Concert of Europe in the
war of 1914, tliere were renewed efforts by Edou-
ard Herriot and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. But
again authoritarian leaders plunged Europe into
even more catastrophic war in 1939.

It was, however, only when economic collapse
and the Communist threat combined in the after-
math of the war to bring Europe to the edge of
disaster that Europeans undertook practical steps
to unite. Churchill in 1946 declared that the
"sovereign remedy for the continent's ills" was
"to re-create the European family. We must build
a . . . United States of Europe."

In the following decade and a half many men
of stature and vision arose bent on fulfilling this
\nsion in practical terms — Adenauer in Germany,
Spaak in Belgium, Monnet, Schuman, and Pleven
in France, de Gasperi in Italy. Tliey and others
fashioned the institutions that gradually knit the
free states of Europe together — Benelux, OEEC
[Organization for European Economic Coopera-
tion], EPU [European Payments Union], the
Brussels Pact, the Council of Europe, and finally
the Conmiunity of Six with its atomic energy
community, common market, and coal and steel
comuiunity.

Tlie United States, from an early date, per-



132



Department of State Bulletin



ceived the value of European union. In the Mar-
shall plan it strongly encouraged economic inte-
gration of the states to which its aid was directed.
A major achievement of European policy was the
healing of the age-old antagonism between France
and Germany and, above all, the assimilation of
Germany into a tightly knit European Commu-
nity.

There were setbacks, as when the French re-
jected the EDO [European Defense Community]
in 1954. But with the treaties of Rome in 1957
came the culminating move of the Six toward
achieving progressive economic integration over
a span of years on a supranational basis. The
Six have flourished beyond expectations and, al-
though some major matters such as a common
agricultural policy still remain to be mapped out,
now form the nucleus about which a greater
Europe seems gradually coalescing. Britain's
application for full membership in 1961 confirms
the success to date.

Interdependence of North America and Europe

Parallel with these developments it had become
clear by 1949 that purely European economic
imions and defense pacts were not enough. So-
viet imperialism was on the move in Eastern
Europe, and pressures were being exerted else-
where. The satellite empire was being consoli-
dated. National strategy was becoming out-
moded; even local regional defense efforts were
inadequate. Only an Atlantic strategy could hope
to match the pooled power of the Soviet bloc.

The United States and Canada, faced by cold-
war exigencies, were drawn toward a Europe that
formed the great land bastion between them and
Soviet power. Europe, in turn, felt bound not
only by historic, cultural, and trade ties to North
America but also by the imperative necessities of
her own security.

Together, by their mutual attraction and inter-
dependence. North America and Europe formed
the basis for a far-reaching regional community
of free nations — based on their kindred etlinic and
historic origins, their common Western culture,
and their sense of common destiny.

So in 1949 NATO was created — a 12-nation
alliance, within the spirit of the U.N. and des-
tined to be a bulwark of the charter. NATO in-
augurated an epochal experiment in integrated
defense covering tlie vast North Atlantic area and



the commimity of nations adjacent to it. By 1954
it had expanded to 15 states including Greece,
Turkey, and Germany. Since its foundation
NATO has progressed through experience and
evolution, developing a scope and intensity of
concerted defense effort never before paralleled
in peacetime.

A decade after NATO was founded another
step was taken toward Atlantic-wide cooperation
on an institutional basis. The OEEC, offspring
of the Marshall plan and embracing only Euro-
pean countries, was reorganized in 1960 as the
OECD — Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development — including 18 European states,
the United States, and Canada. With it is associ-
ated, for purposes of coordination of aid pro-
grams, the Government of Japan.

Our Common Tasks

These two trends, toward a tightly integrated
Europe and toward a somewhat looser Atlantic
association, suggest the pattern of our future pol-
icy : an increasingly fruitful partnership between
the United States and the European Community
within the framework of the Atlantic Commu-
nity in the discharge of common tasks.

What are these common tasks ?

One is a concerted effort to help the less devel-
oped countries achieve needed progress.

Another is the task of defending the frontiers
of freedom against Communist threats and ag-
gression.

A closer partnership in addressing these tasks
will become more feasible as progress is achieved
toward European integration. The United States
can work more effectively with a single integrated
Europe than with several weaker European na-
tions.

The tasks to be midertaken by the Atlantic na-
tions will, moreover, require increasing resources.
To secure these resources they will need to take
national and joint steps to accelerate their eco-
nomic growth. Trade negotiations between the
expanding European Community, the United
States, and other countries in the GATT [Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] could serve
this purpose by leading to reciprocal reductions
in their trade restrictions and thus to more effec-
tive use of their resources. The benefits of agreed
cuts would, of course, be extended to other coun-
tries on a most- favored-nation basis.



January 22, 7962



133



The European Community, the United States,
and the other OECD member countries could also
accelerate their growth by coordinating economic
and fiscal policies. Such joint efTorts will permit
these countries to press forward with expansion-
ist domestic policies without undue fear of gener-
ating costly and disruptive imbalances in their
international payments.

This process has begun through the Economic
Policy Committee of the OECD. The OECD
countries have set themselves a combined economic
gi-owth target of 50 percent by 1970." If the
OECD countries meet this target, it will mean that
by 1970 they will have added to their combined
economic strength the equivalent of that of the
United States in 1960.

If they are to use their resources in common
constructive and defensive tasks along the fron-
tiers of the free world, the European countries
must have reasonable assurance that their home
base will be secure against Soviet attack. To this
end they must have confidence that adequate nu-
clear power will be available to deter or defeat
attack upon them.

If, however, more individual European nations
should seek to acquire their own nuclear capa-
bilities to assure their defense, fears and divisions
would be created which would place the grand
design of European and Atlantic unity in jeop-
ardy. To avert such a tendency we should be
prepared to join our allies in exploring procedures
and guidelines relating to use of nuclear forces,
both those in Europe and those outside the Con-
tinent, wliich would insure that use of these forces
is responsive to their needs. It should be reas-
suring to our European allies that U.S. forces
cover targets essential to the defense of NATO
Europe and will be used in case of need.

We should also be willing to explore with our
allies, if they wish, the concept of a multilatorally
owned and controlled seaborne MRBM force
which the President put forward in his Ottawa
speech.'

A sound military base for a confident European

( association with the United States in building a

free- world community must also be one which

includes effective NATO nonnuclear forces. "We

cannot count on nuclear forces surely to deter all



' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1014.
" Ihid., June 5, 1961, p. 839.



kinds of Soviet aggression. We want to have as \
wide a range of choices as possible in responding
to such aggression. It is well within the capa-
bilities of the NATO nations to build up the con-
ventional forces needed to this end. European
unity would be greatly enhanced by the addi-
tional feeling of confidence that the possession of
such additional conventional forces would give.

With a secure military base and expanding re-
sources, the United States and Western Europe
would be able to cooperate much more effectively
in meeting the needs of the developing nations.
In many cases Japan would be their partner. The
combined ability of such a grouping to extend
assistance to other nations would provide unparal-
leled opportunities for progress.

But all this presupposes a will in the European
countries to share in costly tasks outside areas of
special historical concern to them. How do we
know that they will respond to this challenge?
Their incentive to do this will be enhanced by
meaningful U.S. consultation with these countries
about the uses of our common power and resources,
which means both theirs and ours.

The forum for concerting about defensive tasks
is NATO. We should be fair and forthcoming in
the process of our NATO consultations. A
forum for concerting about constructive tasks —
notably aid to less developed countries — is the
OECD. Again this requires that the United
States play an active role.

We should seek to strengthen these organs of
Atlantic action — NATO and OECD — as progress
is registered toward European integration. In
this way a coalescing Europe will find a reward-
ing role to play within the framework of an in-
creasingly cohesive Atlantic Community.

Basis for World Order

Although the Atlantic Community is steadily
strengthening, even this is, in itself, not enough.
The interests of the Atlantic nations are global.
Their vision demands a more universal goal — a
world order in which all free nations can concert
to achieve their common purposes — a community
of free nations. This is the kind of world order
called for in the charter of the United Nations.

A basis for such a world order exists in the
consensus among nations determined to progress
in freedom. There is alroadv a great and grow-



134



Department of State Bulletin



mg network of international trade and communi-
cations, a flow of resources and capital, of people
and ideas among the nations free of Commmiist
control. There is the great common denominator
of a imiversal desire for modernization, for dig-
nity and recognition. There are the beginnings
of an emergent system of interdependence based
on mutual interest. We hope that this urge will
eventually take a fonn sufficiently flexible to en-
compass the divergent special interests of most
nations. There can thus be foreseen the basis
for the eventual development of genuine world
community.

The Atlantic Community provides a precedent
for this broader association. It is not merely
concerned with its own internal problems. It is
outward-looking, seeking to replace the old colo-
nial relationships with a new partnership in con-
structive tasks with the less developed nations.
It is, in a sense, both the model and the "motor"
of our effort to build a new world order; it must
supply the great bulk of the external resources
needed for this purpose.

We have, as I indicated earlier, valuable ties
with other nations and groupings of nations as
well. These ties help bind many free countries
closer together and thus contribute to eventual de-
velopment of a community of free nations.

One such grouping is the hemispheric union of
American states — the OAS [Organization of
American States]. This is of particular impor-
tance since it includes our neighbors in the hemi-
sphere in which we live and with which we have
strong economic ties. Here we have a special re-
sponsibility as leading partner of the hemispheric
group, having moved from the mere "good neigh-
bor"' stage in our relations to the more positive
Alliance for Progress.

There are, in addition, the Pacific countries, in-
cluding North America and the free nations of
the West Pacific from Japan to Australasia.
There are also the nations with which we are for-
mally allied in Asia and the Middle East, or with
whicli we have special defense arrangements or
economic ties.

Then there are the so-called emerging and un-
alined nations. These nations have generally two
things in common: They wish to maintain their
independence, and they aspire to economic devel-
opment and modernization. Some of them are of
key importance in their respective regions.



-Vll of these nations, and regional groupings in-
cluding them, are potential components of a
worldwide coimnunity. With many of them we
are just beginning to work toward a real com-/
munity of interest, to make clear the broad iden-
tity between their purposes and ours. We ahso
seek to encourage ties among these countries them-
selves. Thus we favor the formation of coopera-
tive regional organizations where none now exist
but where a natural basis for them can be found.

Such regional organizations are provided for
in the charter of the United Nations and can pro-
vide stable support for the purposes of the charter.
Regionalism, in the spirit of the charter, can help
to bring about the reality of the broader commu-
nity which it envisaged.

The strength and will of the Atlantic Commu-
nity are promising and essential instruments in
our strategy for achieving this long-term goal.
We and our Atlantic partners can offer to all these
states the "umbrella" of our defensive arrange-
ments, if they desire it, and the helping hand of
our aid programs.

Our broader and ultimate objective in all these
efforts is a universal community of nations. Our
best ultimate hope for lasting peace is that,
through evolution, these various emerging and
still incomplete ties and associations will eventu-
ally coalesce into a community with such strong
attraction that no nation or group of nations will
wish to remain aloof from it.

In moving toward this ultimate goal we must
avoid the trap of believing that there is one single
way to achieve it. The United Nations, the Atlan-
tic Commvmity, the Western Hemisphere alliance,
Asian groupings and alliances, and other regional
and bilateral arrangements are not alternative de-
vices. They are complementary, not exclusive.
They are mutually reinforcing and therefore must
be sought simultaneously. The best way to organ-
ize the world is to encourage it freely to organize
itself.

In this grand design the Atlantic Commvmity
has a role of special importance to play. What it
can do, others will be encouraged to believe they
can do. Only it, moreover, can supply the re-
sources, the cohesion, and the sense of direction
which is needed at the heart of our effort to build
a world in which free men can in dignity work
together to improve their lot.



January 22, 7962



135



U.S. Record on the Congo: A Search for Peaceful Reconciliation



hy G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^



The Congo has been very much in the news in
recent days. The immediate focus of course is
on the December 21 agreement between Prime
Minister [Cyrille] Adoula of the central Congo
government and Mr. [Moise] Tshombe, the Ka-
tanga leader, on the reintegration of Katanga
Province into the Congo. As the United States
has made clear,^ we regard this agreement as a
real commitment by Mr. Tshombe to end his at-
tempt at secession and to work out by negotiation
the honorable place which Katanga can and
must occupy under a national Congolese govern-
ment.

As you will recall, the agreement stemmed
from Mr. Tshombe's expressed desire to negotiate
with Prime Minister Adoula, a desire set forth
in a telegram to President Kennedy on December
14. Tlie President then asked our Ambassador
to the Congo to facilitate a meeting between the
two leaders, which was held at Kitona on the Con-
go's west coast.^

The goal we have had in mind is not a weakened
Katanga but a strengthened Congo fully able to
defeat subversion from within or attempts at out-
side domination. This, briefly stated, has been
the objective of U.S. policy in support of the
United Nations in the Congo from the beginning.

The situation in the Congo is subject to daily,
almost hourly, change, as any of you know who
have tried to keep track of events there. The
history of the Congo since independence on June
30, 1960, is in itself a complex study. In addition,
conflicting interpretations — including some that



' Address made before Sigma Delta Chi at Detroit,
Mich., on Dec. 27 (press release 905 dated Dee. 26).

'For texts of Doiiartment statements, see Bulletin of
Jan. 8, 1962, p. 49, and Jan. 15, 1962, p. 95.

" lUd., Jan. 1, 19G2, p. 10.



are highly fictional — have been widely aired as to
United States and United Nations policies. It
therefore seems worth while to present to you to-
night a serious accounting of the Congo problem
and of what we have sought to do about it.*

The first and overriding element of our policy —
and of U.N. policy — is the desire to preserve an
integrated, independent Congo. This policy is
based on the desires of the overwhelming majority
of the Congolese people. It has been opposed by
a relatively small minority in Katanga, who argue
for secession of that province. Kather than come
to an understandmg with their brother Congolese,
these Katangans appropriated revenues that
should have gone to the central government and
campaigned for secession. Supported by merce-
naries, they turned to violence against the United
Nations forces in Katanga, which symbolized the
goal of maintaining an integrated Congo.

United Nations troops had to meet force with
force. Their mission has never been to seek a
military decision — only a clear acknowledgment



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 31 of 101)