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into consideration whether the film material is
treated realistically and yet with imagination,
whether it will make a favorable impact on audi-
ences to whom it will be shown.

I emphasize these points, well knovm as they
are to all of you, for several reasons. American
enterprise is increasingly directed to the overseas
market. We are in a period of adjustment and
great opportunity with respect to our trading
relations with Europe and the developing areas
of Asia. Africa, and Latin America. When we

' Remarks made before a film workshop for the Asso-
ciation of National Advertisers at New York, N.T., on
Jan. 17 (press release 35 dated Jan. 16) .

ask, "Do films expand our business?" we increas-
ingly think of their impact abroad. Is their mes-
sage always intelligible? Are we sufficiently
aware of the opportunities which visual presenta-
tion of our enterprise and the workings of our
society present ? I think not.

Whether we are or not, your films, individually
and in the aggregate, export an image of America.
The higher their quality, the better the job tliey
will do for you and for our country. Films pro-
duced by many such companies as Standard Oil,
International Harvester, E. E. Squibb, Sears
Eoebuck, Caterpillar Tractor, the Aluminum
Company of America, and many others have
played an excellent dual role — effective salesman-
ship of product and, not so incidentally, of

Films, whether for TV or movie theater, for
schools or civic organizations, whether news or
documentary, can make more vivid and under-
standable AID programs, developments in Laos,
Berlin, the Congo, and South Viet-Nam. They
can illustrate the work of the Peace Corps, Alli-
ance for Progress projects in Latin America, or
strides being made in Europe thanks in part to
the Common Market.

We must, if we can, establish the relevance to
others of our experiment in freedom. To much
of the world we appear too comfortable and con-
servative. Many erroneously think we are op-
posed to forces of change, though our society
thrives on change. This is clearly evident in many
of your films. But we need to do more not only
to show what we are doing but how others can
more rapidly develop their own farms, industries,
schools, and other institutions. By doing so, de-
veloping and uncommitted nations may prefer to
move forward in a free society, rather than in one
imposed by the coercion of the Communists. I
might say that the many pictures of the wall seal-
ing off the people of East Berlin have character-
ized for millions the harsh meaning of Communist

How the Film Industry Supports U.S. Objectives

"Wliile I suggest we can and should do more, rec-
ognition should of course be given to what is now
being done by the film industry in support, of our
broad American objectives.

For example, approximately 40 percent of the
films which stock the overseas libraries of USIS

February 5, J 962


[United States Information Service] are pro-
duced by U.S. companies. Your cooperation in
granting rights to translate the pictures into the
required languages and to narrate, reproduce, and
distribute them abroad has made it possible for
USIA to show many outstanding pictures around
the world. A few examples are "Books for All"
on U.S. libraries, "The Lady from Philadelphia"
on Marian Anderson's tour of the Near and Far
East, "Dark Interlude" on rehabilitation of the
blind, and "The Face of Lincoln."

One can appreciate the potential for expanding
this program when one considers the surge in dis-
tribution figures for business-sponsored films in
the ITnited States. For example, just one film
distribution network delivered 16 mm. prints for
its clients to over a million and a half group au-
diences last year. This means they reached nearly
68 million people as films. The same network re-
ports that television's growing interest in educa-
tional materials led to 45,000 showings of this type
film which, with an estimated audience of 40,000
viewers per showing, brings us to a total of 2 bil-
lion people for factual films.

When we consider the hunger for information
on science and technical subjects abroad, and the
many ways of distributing it — in USIA libraries,
homes, clubs, villages, and settlements, by mobile
trucks and river boats — we have some idea of the
opportunities at hand.

Figures from the Department of Commerce
support this trend, particularly with regard to the
export of 16 mm. films which has increased 100
percent in 10 years.

Aside from educational and informational films
we have learned from international medical film
exhibitions that there is much work yet to be done
by governments to simplify procedures by which
such films can be exchanged.

In the agricultural field I think American com-
panies are now more aware than ever of the value
of documentaries. One might cite as an example
of farsightedness the film entitled "Seeds of Prog-
ress" sponsored by the affiliated Ford Motor Com-
panies of Latin America. It is conceived as part
of a broad inter-American communication pro-
gram, with emphasis on the work of rural youth
clubs. It is a story with Spanish, Portuguese,
and English sound tracks which will reach mil-
lions of young people interested in exchanging
ideas and techniques on improved farming and
agricultural methods.


Of course, although we lay emphasis on motion
pictures as a medium for increased understanding,
other sorts of audiovisual materials are useful,
such as filmstrips, kinescopes, recordings, slides,
models, maps, and charts. One gets some idea of
what is available from the fact that the USIA
catalog on "U.S. Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Motion Pictures and Filmstrips Suitable
and Available for Use Abroad" has some 14,000

I think it helps us appreciate the dramatic possi-
bilities of films if we consider that each USIA
documentary, whether originally produced for a
U.S. firm or for the Government, after it has been
distributed in 40 languages and dialects has a
potential audience of 500 million people each year.
In this connection I would like to comment on the
very useful function which Business Screen maga-
zine performs in highlighting these programs and
establishing the relation which they have to the
basic aims of our foreign policy.

If we consider that in many parts of the devel-
oping world newspapers and radio are still limited,
we can appreciate the value of films and other
audiovisual materials in helping to provide basic
educational and technical skills. If we can reach
this audience with films of teclmical competence,
imagination, entertainment, and know-how, we
will be laying a base for expanding trade with
vast numbers of the world's people.

Export Expansion Program

In his state of the Union message last week
President Kennedy said, "Above all, if we are to
pay for our commitments abroad, we must expand
our exports. Our businessmen must be export-
conscious and export-competitive." ^ The Presi-
dent further stated that he will shortly send to
Congress a new 5-year trade expansion act to make
it possible for our major industries to compete with
their counterparts in Western Europe for access
to European consumers. "If we move decisively,"
he said, "our factories and farms can increase their
sales to their richest, fastest growing market."

I would urge everyone here to examine every
opportunity for extending the use of business and
industry motion pictures abroad. Certainly
among the 5,000 motion pictures annually pro-
duced by American business and industry there is

' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1062, p. 159.

Department of State Bulletin

a significant resource for assisting in carrying out
the proposed new instrument of trade policy.

I should mention that the Department of Com-
merce is already exploring with a number of in-
dustrial firms the possibility of their making
available for use by commercial attaches abroad
business and industry films describing competitive
products. They propo.se to do this through the
relatively inexpensive new medium of 8 mm. sound
films with magnetic stripping for foreign

International Film Festivals

Before going on to more general observations,
I would like to say that it is not often that the
competition between nations for the minds of men
can be measured. But very much as the Olympic
games provide a means of comparing the athletic
achievements of individuals in most of the coun-
tries of the world, so do tlie international film
competitions provide confrontation between na-
tions not only in artistic accomplishments in mo-
tion pictures but also a comparison of ideologies
and social concepts which relate to their produc-
tion. I want especially to commend the business
and industry community for their part in develop-
ing a method for selecting from their very impres-
sive productions outstanding films to represent the
United States in the international film competi-
tions in Berlin, Cannes, Venice, and Edinburgh,
and many other festivals around the world. I
understand that many of you in this audience have
contributed many hours to screening and selecting
the finest examples of motion picture products to
represent the United States in these international
events. Since the United States Government is
invited by foreign governments to participate offi-
cially in these events, this cooperation is very much
appreciated by the Department of State.

The initiative and imagination which go into
the production of these motion pictures brought
into being CINE, the Committee on International
Nontheatrical Events. And I understand that
both the present and the past chairman of this or-
ganization have come from this audience. In 4
short years this organization has effectively repre-
sented the United States in the major international
exhibitions and by its participation has increased
and augmented the prestige of the United States
in these events. Its regional screening committees
fimction very much like selection boards in the

Foreign Service. Wo want to be represented
abroad by only the best ambassadoi-s.

The programs I have summarized are among
the programs which America adapts to a chang-
ing world. We change as we grow.

Communication, essentially, is an agent which
facilitates change. It can channel it in the right
direction by throwing light on societies that grow
by choice, by observing those hobbled by coercion.

The historian Toynbee said : "Our age will be
remembered . . . because it is the first generation
since the dawn of history in which mankind dared
to believe it practical to make the benefits of civi-
lization available to the whole human race." If
this challenge can be met in practical terms and
if, in the process, communication can be extended
between men, we will find that the American ex-
periment has a mighty relevance for the world.

Our communication programs — whatever pi'od-
ucts, processes, or policies are involved — must help
inform our citizens and the world of the direction
in which our society is moving. We seek to in-
form, to have access to other peoples, to learn
from them, to help them. We would help them,
I believe, if there were no Sino-Soviet threat —
help them because by doing so we help ourselves.

Under Secretary Ball Visits Panama

The Department of State announced on Janu-
ary 18 (press release 40) that Under Secretary
Ball and a party of State Department officers
would leave on January 18 for a 2-day visit to the
Republic of Panama.

The Under Secretary's trip has a twofold pur-
pose. The first is to discuss with Panamanian and
U.S. officials the Alliance for Progress and other
matters of mutual interest. The second is to at-
tend the quarterly meeting of the Board of Direc-
tors of the Panama Canal Company at Balboa
Heights. The Under Secretary represents the
Department of State on that Board.

"I look forward," the Under Secretai-y said, "to
this visit and the opportunity it affords for frank
and friendly discussions with the Government of
Panama. Panama is an important country within
Latin America and one where the Alliance for
Progress is already well imder way. I hope that,
as a result of my visit, both the Panamanians and
I will have a better understanding of the mutual
problems that confront us."

February 5, 1962



United States Policy in the Congo

Statement by Secretary Rusk '

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to
appear with my colleagues before this subcom-
mittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee in order to discuss United States policy with
regard to the Congo and our support of United
Nations operations there.

United States policy with regard to the Congo
is consistent with our general foreign policy and
our attitude toward Africa as a whole. Briefly
stated, that attitude is (a) to help the African
peoples form societies and governments that will
be truly independent and consonant with their own
consciences and cultures ; (b) to maintain and pro-
mote the strong ties of culture, friendship, and
economic life that already exist between the new
nations of Africa and the nations of Europe and
America; and (c) to cooperate in every way ac-
ceptable to both the Afi'icans and ourselves as
these new countries strive to produce the political
stability, economic progress, and level of education
that are essential to a free society.

In pursuit of these broad objectives, the
United States has strongly supported efforts to
preserve the territorial integrity of the Congo.
Like almost every country in the world, the
United States has firmly opposed efforts by Kasai,
Katanga, Orientale, or any other province to
secede. This is our policy because there is no
legal, moral, or practical basis for the secession of
any of these provinces ; nor is there reasonable evi-
dence that secession is the will of the majority of
the population of any province involved.

Just how did the United Nations become in-
volved in the Congo? Memories tend to fade,
even after only 18 months.

You will recall that tribal fighting and mutiny

in the Congolese Army occurred in the first week
of July 1960, immediately after the Congo became
independent. During the night of July 8 many
Europeans fled from Leopoldville, and Belgium
annomiced the return of Belgian troops to protect
life and property.

The new Congolese Government reacted vio-
lently to the return of Belgian forces. On July
12 that Government requested urgent dispatch of
United Nations forces to the Congo to protect the
national territory of the comitry and avoid a
threat to international peace.^

On the same day on which the Congo Govern-
ment requested United Nations aid, it also re-
quested direct United States military aid. Three
days later the Congolese President [Joseph Kasa-
viibu] and Prime Minister [Patrice Lumumba]
cabled Chairman Khrushchev, "We have to ask
the Soviet Union's intervention, should the west-
ern camp not stop its aggression."

The urgent problem was to restore public order
and to permit the withdrawal of the Belgian
troops without leading to internal collapse in the

President Eisenhower rejected from the start
any direct intervention by the major powers. In
reply to the Congo Government's request for
United States forces, the United States stated
that any assistance to the Government of the
Congo should be through the United Nations and
not by any unilateral action by any one countrj',
the United States included.

Wliy was this decision taken ? The alternative
to United Nations intervention would have been
violence and chaos and a readymade opportimity
for Soviet exploitation, which the United States
would have been compelled to counter. There was
no alternative to limited intervention on the part
of the United Nations if a direct confrontation
of the great powers in the heart of Africa was to
bo avoided. Thus the United States strongly sup-

' Made before the Subcommittee on Africnn Affairs of
the Senate ForeiRu Relations Committee on Jan. IS. For
an article by Under Secretary Ball on "The Kloments in
Our Congo Policy," see BuLI,ETI^f of Jan. 8, 19C2, p. 43.

° For statements made by U.S. Representative Henry
Cabot Lodjre in the Security Council on July 13 and 20,
10(10, and texts of resolutions adoi>lcd by the Council, see
ihiiL, Aug. 1, 1900, p. 159, and Aug. 8, lOCO. p. 21':?.


Department of State Bulletin

ported United Nations action in the Congo. Look-
ing back, gentlemen, it seems obvious now that
this was the right choice.

Soviet Efforts To Gain Footliold

It seemed clear by August 1960 that, if the
Congo was to remain free and independent, United
States support of the United Nations would have
to be sufficient to permit United Nations opera-
tion in the face of a Soviet onslaught. Despite
United Nations resolutions to the contrary, the
Soviet Union was pouring personnel, materials,
and political agents into the Congo to establish
what the Communists hoped would be a foothold
in the heart of Africa. Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjold challenged the Russians because
of evidence which accumulated in August and
September that each Soviet Uyushin aircraft was
bringing in political agents. Wlien the Soviets
refused to halt these activities, the United Nations
Command closed major airfields in the Congo to
all but United Nations traffic. Shortly thereafter
President Kasavubu ordered the Soviet and
Czechoslovak Embassies to close, and several
hundred Russians and Czechoslovaks were forced
to leave the Congo.

It was this blocking by the United Nations of
the Soviet takeover scheme that provoked the So-
viet Union to declare political war on Secretary-
General Hammarskjold and to begin the campaign
for a troika directorate that would handcuff the
world organization. The Communist bloc has re-
fused to finance any part of the U.N.'s operations
to restore political stability and bring economic
progress to the Congo.

The United States supported the first govern-
ment of the Congo— a government that was a
compromise under which Joseph Kasavubu, a
moderate trained in a Catholic seminary, became
President and Patrice Lumumba became Premier.

Lumumba's ouster from office by President
Kasavubu in September 1960 was followed by a
period of political turmoil. Not xmtil July 1961
did the parliamentarians again meet to give ap-
proval to a government. Despite appeals by U.N.
officials and American and European diplomats,
Katangan Provincial President Moise Tshombe,
after hesitations, decided not to let his party's
parliamentarians participate in the formation of
a new government. Thus he chose to miss an
opportimity to play an important role on the na-

tional stage. Even without the hoped-for support
of Katanga, moderate forces prevailed in the new

Kasavubu, of course, remained Head of State
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
The new Prime Minister and Defense Minister
was Cyrille Adoula, an able and dynamic leader
of a trade union organization that is affiliated with
the free trade union movement, the ICFTU.
[Antoine] Gizenga was given the post of First
Vice Premier in the new government.

Most of the 42-man Cabinet were true Congolese
nationalists who were moderate in their views.
The United States view was that the Adoula gov-
erimient was not only the legal product of parlia-
mentary process but that it represented the only
hope of achieving a stable, secure Congo.

It was obvious, however, that there were two
main dangers to the Adoula government : the po-
litical insurrection of Gizenga, who in effect with-
drew from the government and attempted to
create a new redoubt in Stanleyville, and the con-
tinued armed secession of the Katanga. The first
was a political problem that had to be dealt with
by the Congolese themselves. This effort came to
fruition on January 1.5, when the Congolese Par-
liament voted overwhelmingly to censure Gizenga,
thus removing him from office. The U.N. re-
sponded rapidly and effectively to Prime Minister
Adoula's appeal for aid in restoring law and order
in Stanleyville in the face of armed insurrection.

Problems of Katanga Secession

The problem of the Katanga secession was more
difficult to deal with because it involved the active
participation of foreign mercenaries who had
taken up arms against both the U.N. and the
Congo Government. So strong were the senti-
ments of nationalism of the Congolese people re-
garding the secession of southern Katanga that
it became clear that no government would survive
in the Congo unless it demonstrated progress in
reintegrating the Katanga. It was obvious that
failure to bring the Katanga back into the Congo
would mean civil war and the ensuing chaos on
which the Communists have capitalized in other
parts of the world.

It was also clear that the moderate strength of
Mr. Tshombe and his party leaders and the
economic wealth of their area were needed in
the central government. U.N. officials and U.S.

February 5, 7962


and European diplomats therefore made repeated
efforts to achieve the reintegration of the Katanga
througli conciliation and peaceful means. One of
the difficulties was that foreign elements, not re-
sponsive to their own governments, sought to con-
vince Mr. Tshombe that through military force
he could maintain his secession.

The U.N. sought to remove the mercenaries, in
accordance with the Februai-y 21, 1961, resolution,''
so as to clear the air for a peaceful settlement.
The mercenaries refused to leave, cut off the
U.N.'s lines of communication, and resorted to
violence. The U.N. fought to protect itself and
to establish conditions under which it could pursue
its objectives with reasonable security.

Wliile it deplored the loss of life and the iso-
lated acts of barbarism that grew out of warfare,
the U.S. supported the U.N. in its limited military
action because the alternative was to acquiesce in
Katanga's secession and permit tlie civil strife that
inevitably would result in a big-power clash. ■*

Wlien Tshombe indicated a desire to negotiate,
President Kennedy set in motion efforts wliicli re-
sulted in Mr. Tshombe's meeting with Prime Min-
ister Adoula at Kitona.^ We are pleased by the
statesmanship shown by Prime Minister Adoula
and Mr. Tshombe in reaching an agreement at
this meeting. Mr. Tshombe has indicated that he
will abide by the agreement he signed at Kitona.
If so, the Congo's political crisis may be moving
toward an end and both the Congolese and the
U.N. can turn their attention from military effort
to the peaceful task of restoring the economy of
one of the wealthiest countries in Africa.

The U.N. role in militai-y matters can be brought
to an end with a political settlement on constitu-
tional and other questions among the Congolese
themselves and through U.N. assistance with the
training and organizing of the Congo's own se-
curity forces. Technical assistance in administra-
tive, economic, and social fields will undoubtedly
be required for a considerable time. It is simple
but correct to say that the U.N.'s purpose is to
help achieve as rapidly as possible the conditions

which will permit the U.N. to withdraw, leaving
full responsibility to the Congolese themselves.
We support them in that objective.

Department Reviews Negotiations
on Trade in Cotton Textiles

Statement hy Edio'm M . Martin

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs '

The Department of State was directed by Pres-
ident Kennedy in tlie sixth point of his seven-point
program of May 2, 1961,^ to call a conference of
the principal textile exporting and importing
countries. The purpose of the conference was to
"seek an international understanding wliich will
provide a basis for trade that will avoid undue
disruption of established industries."

Geneva Conference, July 1961

Pursuant to this directive, a conference was
held at Geneva from July 17-21, 1961, under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. The participants were representatives
from the governments of 16 major importing and
exporting countries, with several others present as
observers. The United States delegation was
chaired by Under Secretary of State George Ball.
Other members of the delegation included Under
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz and Assistant
Secretary of Commerce Hickman Price, Jr. The
conference resulted in agreement on a short-term
arrangement regarding international trade in cot-
ton textiles which became effective October 1, 1961,

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 45 of 101)