United States. Dept. of State. Office of Public Co.

Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) online

. (page 50 of 101)
Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 50 of 101)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook


the United Nations, I think the United Nations
would ahnost certainly say that the parties pri-



' Bulletin of May 8, 1961, p. 659.
242



• Ihid., Oct 30, 1961, p. 702.

Department of State Bulletin



marily involved in that situation should discuss
it among themselves further. That, in fact, is now
being done. It may well be that, if that problem
develops into more of a crisis, it will ui fact be
put before the United Nations. You will recall,
I think, yourself, that, when the first Berlin
blockage was imposed back in the late 1940's, the
United Nations played a very key role there and
it was within the framework of the United Nations
that discussions were undertaken which led to the
lifting of that blockage with the loss in prestige
only to those who had initiated the blockade.

Now there are many forums, many situations,
in which problems can be discussed before they get
to the general world forum of the United Nations.
In the case of Viet-Nam, for example, the situa-
tion there is not one which is likely to be deter-
mined in debate but is likely to be detennined
more by what happens on the ground. And we're
working with the Government of South Viet-Nam
to put them in a position to do an effective job on
the ground.

Again that may come to the United Nations at
a certain stage. But I want to emphasize, Mr.
Chancellor, that almost every aspect of American
foreign policy comes forth for debate in the course
of a General Assembly such as the one that we have
just had. But that does not mean that the United
Nations is in a position to take all of these matters
off of our own shoulders.

The United Nations is basically its members,
and it can only do what its members try to ac-
complish. In the case of the Congo it was pos-
sible for the United Nations to interpose an
administration and a force to prevent, on the one
side, either chaos or, on the other side, a direct
engagement of the great powers in a great
struggle for the heart of Africa. We are very
much encouraged to believe that this can be
worked out in peace and with the agreement of
the Congolese leaders and without the injection of
the Congo into these great, turbulent, worldwide
problems that we think of as the cold war.

Maintaining Western Rights in West Berlin

Q. Sir, with reference to Berlin, while we
understand the necessity of diplomatic discretion
in the talks between Ambassador [Llewellyn £".]
Thompson and Foreign Minister [Andrei A.]
Gromyko, can you give lis some view that you
might be able to express on those talks?



A. Well, these talks are exploratory, to ti-y to
find out whether these are a real basis for nego-
tiation. The Soviet demands with respect to
West Berlin, which were initiated back in 1958
and which have been repeated on more than one
occasion since, are basically imacceptable to the
West.

The vital interests of the West, namely, our
presence in West Berlm, the freedom of the West
Berliners to work out their own relations with
others, and access to West Berlin, seem to be
causing the Soviet some trouble. Now basically
these two positions at the present time are in
direct confrontation. The problem is to discover
by responsible contacts whether we are on a col-
lision course or whether there is a possibility of a
peaceful settlement.

On the one side the West is determined that these
vital interests will be protected by whatever
action is necessary. But on the other side, and
because of this determination, it is felt that we
must maintain responsible contact to see whether
this matter can be adjusted by peaceful means.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I tvould like you to expand
on that question, and just one facet of it, more
accurately, and that is, you said whether we are
on a collision course or whether it will be deter-
mined by peaceful means. Is it your feeling, as
you begin this second year of your term as Secre-
tary of State, that we will avoid the collision
course?

A. WeU, Mr. Agronsky, I would like to be able
to make a prediction on that point. But this is
something that cannot be determined in one
capital or in Western capitals alone. This will
require decisions in Moscow and other places as
well.

There is no question in my mind that the West
is determined to maintain its vital positions there.
I do not myself believe that rational men on the
other side will press in upon these vital positions
to the point of a catastrophe. But we can't take
these things for granted, and that is why we're
talking these things over with them.

Strengthening Processes of Peaceful Settlement

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have let it be known to
me that you were intrigusd and interested by the
columnist Walter Lippmann's observation that we
have not yet discovered an effective substitute for
war or the threat of war in the solution of inter-



February 12, 1962



243



national problems. Wlmt is your feeling about
that, sir?

A. Well, I think Mr. Lippmann in his columns
and also in that very profound speech he made the
other day hero in Washington has raised a very
far-reacliing question on this. It has been the
concern of Secretaries of State over many years,
and that is, how to accommodate the processes of
law which tend to formalize and freeze the exist-
ing situation with the necessities of peaceful
change over time.

I don't think that we can say that we have passed
the threshold of peaceful change, because differ-
ences arise which one party or the other seems —
would seem — to be prepared to press by force if
necessai-y. But I do think that the processes of
peaceful settlement are being steadily strength-
ened. They're not wholly effective yet. Certainly
the influence of the United States is being brought
to bear in a massive way to try to make it possible
for peaceful change to occur in tliis present world
situation.

We're in a rather unique position in the sense
that almost eveiy dispute in the world comes to
us in one way or another, because the parties to
the dispute seek the support of the United States
or our assistance in its settlement.

Therefore our agenda in foreign policy is filled
with what might be called other people's disputes.
We hope that our friends abroad will make as
much effort to settle their disputes with their
neighbors as they expect us to use in settling our
disputes in our particular problems.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thanh you so much for so in-
teresting, illuminating an insight into the problems
of the world crisis and our approach to them.

A. It's been a pleasure to be here.



Letters off Credence

Syrian Arab Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Syrian
Arab Republic, Omar Abou Riche, presented his
credentials to President Kennedy on Januai-y 25.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 53 dated January 25.



Kenya Expresses Gratitude
for U.S. Famine Relief

Following is an exchange of letters between
President Kennedy and Ronald G. Ngala, Leader
of the House, Nairobi, Kenya.

White House press release dated January 22

President Kennedy to Mr. Ngala

January 20, 1962

Dear Mr. Ngala: Thank you for your very
kind letter regarding American famine relief for
Kenya.

The American people were deeply moved by the
reports of the suffering caused by the prolonged
di'ought and the recent disasti'ous floods.

We are most happy to know that our food and
assistance were timely and did much to alleviate
the intense hardsliip caused by these disasters. I
very much appreciate your thoughtf ulness in writ-
ing to me on this matter.
Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy
The Honorable
Ronald Ngala,
Leader of the House,
Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. Ngala to President Kennedy

November 30, 1961
The President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.G.
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President : On behalf of the Govern-
ment of Kenya, I would like to offer our most
heartfelt thanks for all that your Government has
done to assist us in famine relief. The misei-y and
suffering that has been caused by this terrible dis-
aster has been greatly alleviated by the generosity
of the United States of America.

Three-hundred thousand bags of Maize which
we have received, together with proportionate
amoimts of Milk Powder and Edible Oil, to say
nothing of the free use of Hercules aircraft of the
United States Air Force, amounts to an incredibly
generous contribution.

I would like to convey our deepest gratitude.
You re sincerely,

R. G. Ngala



244



Department of Stale Bulletin



Military, Economic, and Political Necessities in the Cold-War World



hy U. Alexis Johnson

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs '



We have heard three thoughtful presentations
on the various facets of comnmnism and the threat
that it presents not only to us but to freedom
everywhere. These threats pose a challenge
wliich requires us to undertake many defensive
measures — militaiy, economic, and political — not
only liere in the United States but throughout the
world. However, I am sure that you will agree
that in our own society, as well as in our relations
with the rest of the world, we cannot confine our-
selves to simply the negative concept of countering
Communist threats, important though that is. To
do so would only court eventual disaster.

While there are some things that we must do
because of the threat, such as our military defense,
we need also to keep our eyes focused on the great
constructive tasks that face us within and with-
out this country. We need, for example, to con-
tuiue our eii'orts to secure equal rights and justice
for every American citizen, not because of com-
mmiism but because it is right and in accordance
with our own ideals to do so. Similarly, we sup-
port the liquidation of colonialism, not because it
is a good tactic against communism but rather be-
cause it is in accord with the oldest and deepest
of the impulses that foi-med this nation. Also
we are moved to ext«nd a helping hand to those
less fortmiate than ourselves, not just to fight
communism but because it lies deep within us as
individuals and as a nation that to do so is right.

There is, however, one field in which we are
forced to respond directly to the Communist chal-
lenge, and that is the field of defense. It is amply
clear to everyone that, unless we have sufficient
military power to deter and defend ourselves from



'Address made before an American Bar Association
seminar on communism at St. Louis, Mo., on Jan. 26
(press release 54 dated Jan. 25) .

februatY 12, 1962

626826—62 3



open militai-y attack, other aspects of our policy
would avail us little. The key question is, of
course, what is "adequate"' and what the balance
should be in the use of our finite resoui'ces. Since
World War II every administration in Washing-
ton has had to stniggle with this problem and to
make decisions that are truly "agonizing." In
one sense, in this age of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, within minutes able to deliver thermo-
nuclear warheads on any other part of the globe,
tliere can be no adequate defense. Yet in another
sense, it is entirely feasible and possible to have
such strength that the enemy knows, whatever
type of surprise attack he may laimch, we would
still be able to inflict devastating damage in re-
turn. This is the meaning of deterrence.

As you all know, the Soviet Union has made
progress in developing powerful intercontinental
missiles and high-yield warheads, progress which
has been overpublicized and overalarmist at times
but which nonetheless is real and significant. We
cannot wish away this development. At the same
time, we have never lost sight of the need to build
and perfect our own deterrent. As Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense [Eoswell L.] Gilpatric stated a
few months ago,

The de.structive power which the United States could
bring to bear, even after a Soviet surprise attack upon
our forces, would be as great as — perhaps greater than —
the total undamaged force which the enemy can threaten
to launch against the United States In a first strike. In
short, we have a second strike capability which is at
least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by
striking first. Therefore, we are confident that the
Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear conflict.

I know that this important statement was not
made lightly. You will note tliat it was reiterated
last week by Secretary [of Defense Robert S.]
McNamara.



245



Our manned bomber force is the largest and
most powerfnl in the workl. Our intercontinental
missile forces capable of striking the U.S.S.R.
are greater than are those of the Soviet Union
capable of striking the United States. And we
intend to preserve this favorable balance. The
total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles,
tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thou-
sands, and we have more than one warhead for
each vehicle. Present programs emphasize the
importance of less vulnerable, hardened, and
mobile imdersea missile systems.

I do not want to suggest that any nation could
gain from a general war or satisfy real political
objectives by resort to it. But we would never
choose this path while any honorable alternative
remained, and we must insure that the Soviets
would never do so. There is considerable evidence
that the Soviet leaders recognize full well that
general nuclear war would spell utter ruin for
themselves, even if it brought niin on others.

Power To Meet Limited Wars

Apart from the cai'dinal need to deter a direct
enemy attack on the United States or NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization], it has be-
come increasingly clear that we need military
power to deter and defend against limited wars.
The Soviets, and even the Chinese Communists,
have shown a healthy awareness of the dangers
of overt limited aggression. Korea involved costs
and frustrations for us, but it taught the Com-
munists an important lesson : that we would de-
fend an invaded part of the free world and use
the necessary force to prevent its being seized.
Incidentally, it also acted as the catalyst to mak-
ing NATO an effective militaiy organization
which, together with our rearmament, forever
destroyed any Soviet hopes for cheap and easy
overt conquests. Although they did not vent their
frustrations in public hearings, I am sure that
those in the Kremlin who conceived the Korean
operation never received any medals.

However, in order (o insure that the Commu-
nists do not estimate that we can be paralyzed
from taking action to meet local limited attacks be-
cause of our unwillingness to risk all-out nuclear
war, we and our allies must have visible military
power which can deter or defeat such efforts. As
the President declared in his state of the Union
address:



. . . our strength may be tested at many levels. We
intend to have at all times the capacity to resist non-
nuclear or limited attacks — as a complement to our nu-
clear capacity, not as a substitute. We have rejected any
all-or-nothing posture which would leave no choice but
inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation.

The third and in may ways the most difEcult
military necessity is to deter or defeat to the ex-
tent possible by military means revolutionary
guerrilla wars and subversion. In the Commtmist
lexicon these are called "wars of liberation." I
add the qualification of "to the extent possible"
not because we can be stinting in this regard but
because the kind of situation we face in the Re-
public of Viet-Nam today is not just a military
problem and it cannot be met by military comiter-
measures alone. However, similar aggressions
have in the past been defeated in Greece, Malaya,
and the Philippines, and there is no reason to be-
lieve it cannot and will not similarly be defeated
in South Viet-Nam.

^Aliile the Soviet Union has recently shown
some caution in situations of potential limited war
that could easily escalate to general nuclear war,
it has not been dissuaded from revolutionary and
subversive use of violence. The Chinese Com-
munists are pressing for more vigorous and overt
support to these so-called "national liberation
wars."

We are moving better to meet these military
needs. Our strategic nuclear offensive and de-
fensive forces deter general war and overt limited
wars. Our increased conventional military power
raises the level at which we might face the
choice of using nuclear retaliation or accepting a
local defeat. We now have 16 Army and 3 Ma-
rine combat-ready divisions. Our conventional
strength, including Naval and logistical support,
and our stepped-up Special Forces training in-
creases our ability to come to the aid of our friends
threatened by local external or internal Coninui-
nist violence. Military assistance programs play
a vital role in aiding our allies and other friends,
especially against these same dangers of local
Communist use of force.

Cooperation among free- world nations is an
important element in our strength. Tlio NATO
alliance, SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organ-
ization], CENTO [Central Treaty Organization],
tiie Eio Pact, and various bilateral alliances all
meet imix)rtant regional defense needs.
Success in the field of militaiy policy is decep-



246



Department of State Bulletin



lively inconspicuous. It is much easier to focus on
the ei-uption of violence in one place than on its
successful deterrence in ten others. We should
also be aware that military power has an im-
portant indirect effect on our whole political posi-
tion in the world and vis-a-vis the Communist
powers. If by our resolve and effort we have built
up military strength able to meet the many pos-
sible levels and forms of aggression, our resolve to
use it if necessary is also more surely imderstood
and thus the likelihood that we will need to use
it is reduced. "SVe must, of course, reckon with the
ever-present possibility that the other side will
miscalculate our reaction and set in motion a chain
of events beyond his intention. One of the most
important tasks of diplomacy is to prevent such
miscalculation. However, particularly in an open
society such as ours, it is difficult for our diplo-
macy to be effective in this regard unless clearly
backed by public opinion. In other words, it is
not just what our diplomats or the Voice of
America say that is important but rather what we
say and do as a people and nation that is even
more important.

Free Enterprise vs. Communist Economic System

Let us now turn from the defensive necessities
of our military requirements to the positive oppor-
tunities in the economic and political fields.

Our own economic vigor and growth is an ob-
vious objective which needs no justification on
grounds of any external threat. Similarly, the
value of vigorous successful economies throughout
the free world is readily apparent. We stand for
economic growth and economic justice, not as a
ploy to oppose communism but because it is right
in itself that we should do so. These are among
the purposes for which governments are instituted
among men. N"onetheless, we cannot dismiss the
economic aspect of our international posture in
the cold war with this simple restatement of its
importance.

The Commimist leaders, as Marxists, place great
stock in economic development. They are im-
pressed with economic power and growth, are em-
boldened by any signs of faltering in Western
economies, and are respectful of economic strength.
But, quite apart from the distorted Marxist-Len-
inist economic view of human society and the
question of the effect of our actions on the Com-
munist leaders, many others in the world look at



the respective economic and scientific-technical
achievements of the United States, on the one
hand, and the U.S.S.R., on the other, as indicators
of the superiority of the free-enterprise or Com-
munist economic and political systems. With
many new countries emerging into national mde-
pendence and groping for economic stability and
advancement, tliis question looms large. Moderni-
zation of former colonial societies and develoi:)ment
of underdeveloped economies are much more im-
portant to many in the world than ideological
appeals or traditional ties.

In dealing with these matters we must, on the
one hand, recognize the importance of semantics
in this field while at the same time not allowing
ourselves to be misled by semantics. In much of
the newly independent world the term "capital-
ism" is, in the popular mind, virtually synonymous
with "colonialism," from which they have just
freed themselves. Accordingly, "capitalism" tends
to be a "bad word." As opposed to "capitalism,"
"socialism" tends to be a "good word." Accord-
ingly, a politician seeking popular favor tends to
talk in terms of "socialism," even though his actual
approach to specific problems might be as prag-
matic as our own. For example, in India almost
any politician will speak approvingly of "social-
ism," while in actual fact the proportion of the
Indian economy that is in the public sector is con-
siderably less than here in the United States and
the private sector of the economy is growing faster
than the public sector. I mention this simply to
point out that we must use care and discrimination
in jumping to any conclusions that when the term
"socialism" is employed in other free countries it
is necessarily being used synonymously with IMarx-
ism or communism. Of course, additional confu-
sion is caused by the Communist use of the term
"socialism," although it has often been said, with
some justice, that as practiced in the Soviet Union
and its satellites the system is in fact neither
"socialism" nor "communism" but closer to what
might be called "monopolistic state capitalism,"
exercising a power to exploit far transcending the
worst period of the early industrial revolution.

The Communists attempt to advertise and ex-
aggerate their own economic progress and to cast
aspersions at real or apparent weaknesses in our
economic system. They have assiduously sought
to cultivate an image of economic growth and of
an economic system superior to any other to which



February 12, 7962



247



/^



the new countries could aspire. We can combat
tliis to some degree by better information, but we
can best dispel it by better example.

Free-World Economic Cooperation

To meet and blunt the Conmiunist economic
challenge, and still more to create a strong free
world which will blunt the Communist political
and subversive challenges, we, as the greatest free
economic power, must assist in building the eco-
nomic strength of our friends and allies. There
is little new in this. Our own early economic
development was heavily based on British and
European capital. We can assist in this process
of development in conjunction with, not at the
expense of, building our own economic future. I
am sure that with this audience I need not elab-
orate the fact that this is not a matter of charity
or unrequited sacrifice on our part but rather a
matter of our own hard self-interest in our own
economic prosperity. It is not with the poor and
underdeveloped countries of the world that we
have our largest and most beneficial trade but
with the most prosperous and the most developed
countries. Accordingly, the chief elements of this
program of free-world economic cooperation are
growth and stability among the advanced nations,
the movement of adequate amoimts of capital to
the less developed countries, and reduction of the
barriers to the free movement of goods.

In his state of the Union address, the President
noted that our actions in devising a new approach
to trade "could well affect the unity of the West,
the course of the cold war, and the economic
growth of our nation for a generation to come." -
This is not an overstatement but may even be an
understatement, for what we do in this field in
1962 may set the pattern for our entire fiiture as
a nation.

Our friends in Europe are taking fundamental
initiatives to capitalize still furtlier on the remark-
able progress in economic and political unity which
tliey have achieved over the past decade and a
half. The European Economic Conununity — the
Common Market^ — has just moved into an impor-
tant new stage, beyond the "point of no return."
Great Britain and several other countries have
now applied for membership in tlie Common Mar-
ket to join in a process wliich goes beyond economic
unity and which includes political iniity as well.



' BULLKTIN of .7.111. 2!t. l!Mi2, p. l.">9.

248



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 50 of 101)